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Abstract
The principle theme of this study is an examination of the relationship between 
political and economic domination, and development and drought in the Dande area of 
the Zambesi Valley, Zimbabwe. To this end, two settlements, a centralised polity and an 
area of shallow and dispersed lineages, were researched and compared. While the 
populations of these areas comprised different clans and lineages, particular attention is 
paid to the Chikunda group whose dominant clan in Dande, the marunga rosario 
andrade, controlled a longstanding centralised chieftaincy.
Political process in Dande was until the 1990s viewed as the performance of two 
forms of chieftaincy, autochthonous and conquering. Autochthonous chiefs were 
believed to be supported by the people and to act in benevolent ways, while conquering 
chiefs were expected to act in the interests of their own clan and lineage. Particular 
attention is paid to the issue of chieftaincy through an examination of the formation of 
centralised Chikunda polities which derived from a Portuguese land tenure system. 
Accounts of marunga conquest of Dande and the Chapoto chieftaincy of the 1990s are 
examined with regard to domination. In comparison, the importance of land spirits in the 
discourse of chieftaincy is highlighted in terms of centralised and decentralised polities.
While the significance of chieftaincy as a political discourse in Dande was high, 
during the 1990s the introduction of state policies of structural adjustment and 
development altered political and economic practices. Serious drought in 1991-92 
exacerbated longstanding inter-generational conflict which led to a split of outlook on 
issues of kinship, political organisation, and livelihood practices.
The occurrence of serious drought and associated hunger and illness, coupled 
with social pressures brought by development, caused local populations to express the 
belief that the Zimbabwean state, which had been installed through the will of the 
people, was no longer for the people. The trajectory of the Zimbabwean state from its 
role as autochthonous ruler to that of conqueror in little over a decade after 
Independence is examined through discussion of land spirit ceremonies performed 
during and after drought.
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Introduction:
This study is about the issues of domination, development, and drought 
which characterised the period of intensive fieldwork I conducted in the Dande area 
of the Zambesi Valley in Zimbabwe in 1992 and 1993. During this time I witnessed 
how people wove a political discourse based on notions of conquest and resistance 
in order to grapple with the forces of development, central government, and 
drought. These issues will be addressed by recounting the case of Kanyemba and 
Chikafa, two settlements in Dande, which are populated by a number of clans, but 
ruled by conquering Chikunda lineages that arrived in the latter part of the 19th 
century. I will approach the theme of domination by juxtaposing the cultural logic 
of conquest in Dande with the arrival of development projects and the 
intensification of government interest in the area to examine local responses to 
change. In this way, domination is a primary issue, part and parcel of the way in 
which the Chikunda placed themselves in Dande society. Development is a recent 
feature, devised by a combination of international and state interests, which joined 
the political arena in the latel980s. Drought is a contingent and largely 
unpredictable circumstance which disrupts Zambesian society and periodically 
highlights inequalities in social organisation.
The Zambesi Valley, historically a marginal and neglected area, grew to 
prominence in the imagination of Zimbabweans during the War of Independence 
when local communities supported guerrilla soldiers. A decade later, during the 
drought of 1991-92 which affected Southern Africa, Zimbabweans refocused 
attention on the area when central government asked senior resident land spirits to 
perform ceremonies which would bring rain. However, these cases were 
exceptional. Although the actions of Zambesians were considered by many to be 
instrumental in the achievement of the Zimbabwean state, and the moral authority 
of its spirits to be supreme, the fact remained that since Independence the people of 
the Zambesi had gained little influence in Harare. Inhabitants of the two areas in 
Dande where I worked believed that they had little representation within the 
national government; a circumstance they thought was well demonstrated by the
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implementation of development projects without widespread local consultation. 
Many local people felt both angry and powerless at the thought that while the 
Zambesi played a pivotal role in the War of Independence, they did not receive the 
schools, clinics, roads, and livelihood opportunities which they believed the ruling 
party had promised. In wider Zimbabwean society, the Zambesi continued to be 
considered backward, dangerous, and an easy target for jokes and the occasional 
negative article in the national press.
Because they had been left alone for so long, the sudden appearance of 
development schemes as well as greater involvement on the part of the state in the 
late 1980s came as a surprise to many inhabitants. In the decade between 
Independence and the arrival of development projects, the Zambesi Valley had 
been mostly ignored by central government. While the area was incorporated into 
the ZANU-pf party organisation which extended from the role of President to the 
local Village Development Committee (VIDCO), much of people’s lives remained 
as before Independence. In both research areas, ZANU-pf representatives were 
members of established lineages whose position did not challenge the hierarchy of 
Chiefs, headmen, and land spirits. Instead they simply came to parallel the authority 
of lineage leaders, at times cooperating in crucial decisions. During this uneventful 
period the influence of land spirits, so important during the Independence war, also 
seemed to wane. Harvests had been good, the pattern of labour migration to the 
plateau continued, and ex-combatants were re-integrated into communities. 
Without the occurrence of dire problems, the role of land spirits receded to that of 
rain-making and adjudication of minor breaches of the moral order.
In light of their steady marginalisation, it was surprising for many 
inhabitants when two large-scale development projects were introduced into the 
Zambesi Valley during the late 1980s. The Mid Zambesi Valley Rural Resettlement 
Project (MZP) and the Communal Areas Management Project For Indigenous 
Resources (CAMPFIRE) in combination yielded radical changes to the physical 
landscape, re-settlement of people into new villages, the introduction of widespread 
cotton-cultivation, and the prohibition from hunting wild animals. Development 
planners began to hold meetings to recruit local representatives to organise the
30
implementation of these schemes and new migrants arrived from other parts of 
Zimbabwe. One interpretation of the sudden interest in the Zambesi Valley as the 
land of opportunity was the increasing shortage of farm land elsewhere in 
Zimbabwe. The ruling party, ZANU-pf, had received much popular support during 
the Independence War because of its political platform of returning land to Black 
Africans. Ten years after the end of the military struggle, and with a drastic increase 
in the population of Zimbabwe, the party felt compelled to deliver on this promise. 
At the same time foreign institutions, in this case the African Development Fund 
and the World Wide Fund for Nature, contributed money to transform the Zambesi 
into a place that, according to their perspectives, would be more inhabitable, more 
productive, and with a sustainable environment. For ZANU-pf, these foreign 
institutions provided a timely opportunity to reconsider the area as a safety valve 
for the unemployed and landless from other parts of the country.
Another government initiative implemented during this study sought to 
re-map the Zambesi Valley by changing place names from those associated with 
local lineages to labels holding no local meaning. For example, Chikafa was to 
become Ziwere (a swamp) and the MZP denoted new settlements with letters 
instead of place names. Some local people believed that the government wished to 
break their connection with their past, and their ties with their conquering lineage 
ancestors whose names demarcated the surroundings.
A serious drought struck the area during the 1991-92 growing season, 
shortly after the first effects of the MZP and CAMPFIRE began to be felt. At this 
time there was total dryland crop failure which meant that there would be no maize, 
millet, or sorghum to store for the following dry season. Vegetables and some 
maize grown in riverine gardens prevented famine, as did food aid, migration, the 
consumption of wild foods, and rationing within households.
The arguments within this study reflect a preoccupation with the central 
issues of domination, development, and drought in Dande during the 1990s. There 
is a long history of domination in the Zambesi by strong African polities such as the 
Munhumutapa State, Portuguese and British colonisation, the Rhodesian state, and 
in the 1990s, the Zimbabwean state in conjunction with foreign organisations. The
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issue of domination is central to the thesis, as a concept for discussing structured 
relationships, such as those between the Portuguese and Africans, the Chikunda 
and their subordinate clans, and the state and the inhabitants of Dande. It is essential 
background to understanding the impact of development policies in Dande, and to 
how the people of Dande reacted to a severe drought.
The thesis is organised into nine chapters which both reflect the 
pre-eminence of the issue of domination and how it relates to development and 
drought. Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical orientation through discussions of 
hierarchy, power, and change coupled with a debate on the nature of Chikunda 
group identity. Chapter 2 describes fieldwork methodology adopted in the context 
of disaster to illustrate how domination enhances the voices of some informants but 
diminishes that of others. Chapter 3 examines the motif of domination through a 
discussion of the history of Chikunda activity in the Zambesi, firstly within the 
Portuguese land-tenure system, then as conquerors of Dande, and finally as ruling 
lineages in Kanyemba and Chikafa. In Chapter 4 the theme of autochthony and 
conquest is adopted as a device to understand the differences in social organisation 
between the settlements of Kanyemba and Chikafa during the 1990s. Chapter 5 is 
an examination of the structure and role of the system of land spirits which 
underpins the power of chiefs and headmen. Chapter 6 interprets the involvement 
of Zambesians in the Independence War as a seminal act in which expectations of 
benevolence from the state were created to then be challenged by development and 
administrative practices during the 1990s. The last three chapters address the 
themes of development and drought by postulating that these constitute a form of 
social disruption providing both hardship and opportunity for locals depending on 
factors such as age, lineage affiliation, and gender. Chapter 7 argues that while 
development projects observed in the Zambesi Valley contained a discourse of 
individual and community empowerment, their application produced great social 
disruption through which people had to devise both their own opportunities and 
coping strategies. Chapter 8 discusses the serious drought of 1991-92 by examining 
responses to crop failure and ensuing illness, and describes locals’ interpretations 
of its causality. Chapter 9 is an examination of a witchcraft accusation which took
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place in the wake of the combined effects of development and drought. I argue that 
this particular case of witchcraft illustrates how the residents of Chikafa village 
understood the effects that political domination, in the form of development and 
central government administration, had on their individual lives and on their 
community.
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Chapter 1: Domination, Development, and Drought: Some Theories
i. Centralised and Acephalous Societies: The Meanings of Affiliation
African society is often depicted in anthropology as fluid, open-ended, and 
oscillating between strong polities which exist for a time, and sets of descent groups 
who share a social space while there is mutual interest. In this view, polities are 
temporary and contingent on political and economic circumstances. They are very 
heavily based on idioms of kinship, with particular attention drawn to fluctuations 
between a centralised Chieftaincy and a dispersed rule by lineage elders. Centralised 
societies are characterised by a unified history, a strong Chief, the presence of 
autochthons in counterpoint to conquerors, and a powerful rain-maker. Acephalous 
societies are denoted by the rule of headmen, shallow and dispersed genealogies, many 
histories, and fragmented allegiances. There are a number of implications in this 
approach. For one, this argument suggests that the shape of polities is dependent on 
whether a leader can maintain a following and exact tribute. Also, in this dichotomy 
social identities are dependent on relations of power. In a hierarchical organisation 
with a powerful leader at its summit, names denoting affiliation will be important. But, 
in a circumstance of dispersed power, social identifications become more flexible as 
people strive to keep networks open.
In his collection, The African Frontier, Kopytoff argued that African society 
has historically been fluid with constant movement of people between, what he refers 
to as, the metropole and the periphery. In his view, a society with an official history 
which appears unitary and has an account of its beginnings, “is belied by the individual 
histories of its separate kin groups that show their ancestors coming from different 
areas at different periods” (Kopytoff 1987:5). In his view, African society is flexible 
because people were compelled to move toward the margins. These migrations were 
characterised by people moving in kin groups and in leader-follower relationships. 
The new polities constructed in the peripheries of larger states had a number of 
attributes such as a dual model of the legitimate authority of first-comers coupled with 
political control by latecomers, ruler-subject interdependence evidenced in royal ritual, 
and a degree of incorporation into pre-existing societies (Kopytoff 1987:17).
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In a similar vein, Amselle in his book, Au coeur d e l ’ethnie: ethnies, tribalisme 
et etat en afrique, explained that the phenomenon of ethnic group was a creation of 
colonialism in order to “disarticulate”, in his words, the existing relations between 
local groups. He suggested that pre-colonial African society was made up of four types 
of social space, called, “chains of societies”, which delineated relationships between 
people. These were: fields of exchange; spaces demarcated by states, politics and 
warfare; linguistic spaces; and, cultural spaces (Amselle 1985:24). In his view, the 
periodic appearance of strong clans, such as those of the Chikunda, was related to a 
pervasive theme in African society: “that state and segmentary societies, far from 
corresponding to two types of societies, are nothing but the poles of an oscillating 
process” (Amselle 1993:25).
In his study of Tanzania, Feierman (1990) found a parallel between a strong 
state symbolized by the presence of a powerful rain-maker and political stability. But 
he also argued that homogeneity in African society was the result of the political and 
economic processes of colonialism which set out to achieve governable coherent 
groups. In effect, he argued that to grasp history, “the study of intellectuals, of their 
discourse and practice, leaves us with a strategy for dealing with the dissolution of a 
spatially coherent ethnographic object-the end of the ‘tribe’, the ‘ethnic group’, the 
‘ethno-linguistic community” (Feierman 1990:34). Accordingly, he argued that 
politics in Tanzania took the form of an oscillation between powerful states in which 
a king or Chief passed the office down to his children and a fragmented system of 
sub-chiefs and headmen who were half-brothers or father’s brothers whom he could 
not depose (Feierman 1990:92).
According to Lancaster (1974), centralised states in the Zambesi are 
characterised by the power of their rain-makers who have the moral authority of 
autochthons, unified histories, chieftaincy, a political hierarchy that extracts some 
form of tribute from the local populations, and strong group affiliations. Acephalous 
or decentralised societies have shallow genealogies, are ruled by a number of headmen, 
have competing histories, a profusion of healers who deal with local or domestic 
problems, and a diversified economy.
In my view, Zambesian society of the 1990s was the sum total of a number of
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influential forces. After a quiet decade between the Independence War and the late 
1980s, suddenly a great deal of foreign attention was paid to the area. The prevalent 
political style, characterised by an oscillation between centralisation and 
decentralisation, influenced how these populations confronted change. It was against 
this backdrop that residents of Chikafa and Kanyemba dealt with the arrival of 
development projects, the extension of the state, the influx of immigrants, and the 
distress and disruption of drought.
In the continuum between Zambesian centralised and decentralised social 
forms, Kanyemba fell closer to the former, while Chikafa was certainly nearer the 
latter. Characterised by both a strong longstanding Chieftaincy and a rigid social 
stratification divided into marunga and non-marunga clans, Kanyemba in the 1990s 
was the incarnation of a centralised polity. In contrast, the power-sharing arrangement 
between Chikunda and Korekore people in Chikafa meant that economic and political 
life was less controlled. These two forms of organisation, one characteristically 
dominant, the other fragmented, meant that each settlement managed development and 
drought differently. While CAMPFIRE consolidated marunga control of Kanyemba, 
the MZP further dispersed loci of power in Chikafa. As these two development 
projects took hold in the Zambesi, the drought brought with it new potential for social 
disruption or affirmation of existing structures. The encroachment of the Zimbabwean 
state into these two settlements was dealt with in Kanyemba by incorporation, and in 
Chikafa as conquest.
The trend toward centralisation in the Zambesi, with its monopolies and 
stratifications, created fertile ground for resistance. Forms of dissent depended on the 
degree of hierarchy and on mechanisms for social control. For instance, in Chikafa 
there was the opportunity for voicing opposition to the MZP and the state through the 
land spirit. But in Kanyemba, rather ineffective opposition to the marunga clan was 
voiced through localised lineage-based minor land spirits such as those representing 
the Korekore and the tembo mvura. It was also disclosed in confidential interviews to 
me. In centralised polities, the fragmentation of dissent is evidenced by the profusion 
of mediums and healers who deal with lineage-based or domestic problems.
The Zambesi of the 1990s was an exciting place in which to research and my
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focus on the Chikunda people was fortuitous. If I had conducted fieldwork only in 
Kanyemba as initially intended, I would have missed rich comparative material 
gathered in Chikafa. The differences in the way Chikunda people lived in each of 
these settlements, their sense of the past, and their relationships with members of other 
clans provided an introduction to social and political organisation in the Zambesi 
during the 1990s.
ii. Domination:
Domination of a territory is often equated with a strong centralised state where 
there is a discemable political hierarchy which controls the economy and generates a 
justificatory set of ideas about the legitimacy of its supremacy. In this view, the 
opposite of domination is decentralisation in which power is fragmented, clans and 
other interest groups compete for resources, and ritual specialists do not make rain but, 
instead, deal mostly with individual affliction rather than questions of morality.
The theoretical opposition of centralised and decentralised societies provides 
an umbrella under which to consider the pervasive oscillation between autochthony 
and conquest that characterised so much of political discourse in Dande in the 1990s. 
The view that the oscillation between domination and freedom from political 
constraint is a longstanding theme in Zambesian social life is echoed by a noted 
Portuguese historian who hypothesised that, “the binary opposition of 
occupation-resistance monopolises the historiography of the colonisation of the 
Zambesi Valley in the 19th century” (Capela 1988:7).
The seminal act in the construction of a polity in the Zambesi Valley is 
conquest. For conquest to be successful, the incoming conquerors must appropriate 
land, install themselves and their lieutenants, marry local women, exact some form of 
tribute, and appropriate the rain-making function. Ideally, domination must be 
territorial, political, of the kinship system, of ritual power, and involve 
marginalisation of autochthons. In their discourse, both Chief Chapoto and 
rain-making land spirits describe their lineage’s authority over their territories in terms 
of complete conquest. This issue is elaborated in Chapter 3 which is about the roots of 
Chikunda domination in Dande. However, conquest is an ideology of appropriation of
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land and people generated by ruling clans to ensure their continued dominion. In 
Dande, once I heard the multitude of voices of my informants, I soon realised that in 
strict terms, no area had been completely conquered. For example, while in Kanyemba 
the Chikunda clan of marunga rosario andrade controlled the political structure and 
the economy, their land spirits had no rain-making power whatsoever, instead 
deliberating on issues of succession and administration. Similarly, a number of 
individuals disagreed with Chief Chapoto’s ruling style and the position of the 
Chikunda ruling clan, but they had little opportunity to express their dissent.
In Chikafa, where the political structure was shared between Chikunda and 
Korekore and the economy more diversified, the land spirit was considered to be a 
powerful rain-maker. One interpretation of his power, and this is discussed in Chapter 
5, is that in an area of diversity, land spirits provide a rallying point for communities. 
This thought can certainly be supported by the fact that there was a peak of interest in 
land spirits during the liberation struggle (Lan 1985), a period of weaker involvement 
after Independence, and then a resurgence of interest with the arrival of the MZP and 
the drought.
Domination of a polity is also dependent on a strong and enduring ideology of 
ruling clan legitimacy. In Kanyemba, the marunga rosario andrade clan promote an 
account of the past which depicts complete control over the office of chief stemming 
from conquest, marunga oral histories depict three lines descending from each of 
three brothers who originally conquered Dande. The rule of succession requires that 
the Chieftaincy alternate between the lines of the three brothers’ descendants, but 
Chief Chapoto’s line monopolised the role for half a century. The strength of a system 
of clan ideology is that it maintains a rigid hierarchy over time by excluding all other 
groups from access to political process and the economy. The drawback is that the 
ruling line is under perpetual threat from classificatory father’s brothers. In Chikafa, 
a place of shallow genealogies, clan ideology was somewhat different and took two 
forms. First, the dominant Chikunda and Korekore groups enunciated stories of 
common arrival in the area coupled with economic alliance in the past. In some 
accounts the Korekore clan, the nzou samanyanga, is said to have accompanied the 
marunga rosario andrade to Dande, in others they were already there. Another notion
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of clan is one promoted by the land spirit as a device to unite all local inhabitants 
under his influence. In chapter 5 I will describe how the idea of the pangolin clan, to 
which all human beings belong, is used as a way to build a sense of community.
Political domination is accomplished by appropriating means of 
representation and decision-making. In Kanyemba, all but one of the political 
positions was controlled by the Chikunda. The Chieftaincy was held by one line of the 
marunga rosario andrade clan, while the Village Development Committee and the 
Wildlife Committee were held by another line of that same clan. The non-Chikunda 
representative was sabhuku Chiyambo, headman of the tembo mvura people who 
lived on the marginal western side of the settlement. Judging by the lack of land and 
extreme poverty of his constituents, Chiyambo had very little influence in political 
process in that region. The Chief held a court in which he ruled in conjunction with six 
male councillors, all marunga, but of two different lines. The oldest and most vocal 
of these councillors was from the line contesting the Chieftaincy. Thus, political 
process was controlled by the marunga clan who excluded members of other lineages. 
Disputes regarding rule were kept within the clan which meant that important issues 
such as land allocation and access to resources remained outside of the reach of 
subordinate clans.
In Chikafa, political process was shared between the Chikunda and Korekore 
groups. The Chikunda headman and the Korekore Village Chairman held meetings 
together and shared decision-making. Both supported the land spirit, and both disliked 
the MZP. Various village committees were stacked with men from these two groups. 
The land spirit, Nyamanindi, his medium, and assistants were also all Korekore.
Economic supremacy is another way in which to dominate an area. In 
Kanyemba, the marunga controlled most of the fertile land which was situated on the 
eastern side of the Mwadzamutanda River. They hired labour from the eastern side of 
the river, mostly the tembo mvura people, for very meagre payment in unground maize. 
Through their control of local structures linked to central government, such as the 
Wildlife Committee, they also managed to affect policies regarding access to 
resources. For example, at one meeting a marunga supported a proposal to erect a 
game fence which would further restrict the amount of land available to tembo mvura,
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in one stroke, affecting their access to food and making them increasingly dependent 
on the dominant clan for maize.
In Chikafa, most land was owned by the Chikunda and the Korekore and, 
unsurprisingly, they had the highest yields of maize and other grain. Also, they owned 
the most domestic animals, particularly goats. Brick houses, denoting financial 
success, tended to belong to members of these two groups. Because they were 
long-term dwellers of the Chikafa area, their residential patterns in clusters of kin 
attached to the homesteads of senior men enabled greater success in farming. Most 
trade between Mozambique and Chikafa was also carried out by these two groups. 
Thus, up until the first effects of the MZP, the economy had been firmly under the 
control of Chikunda and Korekore people.
In Chapter 6 I will explore the attempts at centralisation by the Zimbabwean 
state and hypothesise that these increased its domination in the Zambesi. I will discuss 
my view that the Zimbabwean state aspired to consolidate its power during the 1990s 
by creating oppositions between autochthons and newcomers, developing a unified 
history which obscured regional stories, destabilising local economies through the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Program, and redefining the relationship between 
people and the state along kinship lines. Chapter 7 will explore the issue of 
development as a further extension of the state into the Zambesi.
In sum, domination involves conquest, an ideology of ruling clan legitimacy, 
control over political process, and a firm grip on the economy. In Dande, to dominate, 
the marunga did not need to control ritual. Instead the character of ritual life, whether 
an area is graced by a powerful rain-maker or a proliferation of weaker spirits, is an 
indication of method of domination. In Kanyemba, where the marunga clan had a 
monopoly on political process and the economy and appropriated control of 
CAMPFIRE, dissent was articulated through weak land spirits. In Chikafa, despite the 
power-sharing arrangement of the Chikunda and Korekore, their authority had been 
continually under threat until it began to be destroyed by the MZP in 1991. There, the 
rain-maker became quite powerful in 1992 when possession ceremonies were used as 
a means by which locals articulated their sense of ownership of land and relationship 
with each other in opposition to foreigners. Strikingly, these rituals also started to
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express local disagreement with the MZP and national government.
These issues will be further developed in Chapter 3 with a review of the roots 
of Chikunda domination in Dande, Chapter 4 which presents an ethnographic account 
of the populations I encountered in Chikafa and Kanyemba, and Chapter 5 which 
discusses the cult of land spirits and the issue of rain-making.
iii. Rain-Making and Drought:
In the Zambesi, drought is a contingent aspect of the environment which 
occurs in cycles of 5 to 15 years. Serious drought producing famine, illness, and death 
occurred three times in the 20th century with the last episode having taken place during 
research for this study. In Zambesian cosmology, the occurrence of drought is 
construed as a symptom of disorder in the social world. If rain-making is related to 
power over territories and their inhabitants, then a drought can be interpreted as a 
weakening of the established order. Scholars have understood challenges to power in 
the Zambesi as “a dynamic tension between, on the one hand, the chthonic spirits and 
their mediums, and, on the other, the spirits of conquerors and their mediums; and this 
tension centres on who ultimately controls the fertility of the earth, the autochthons or 
the conquerors” (Garbett 1992:12). One explanation of the 1991-92 drought, which I 
explore in Chapter 8, is that it was the result of a breach of a moral contract which the 
people of Dande believed they had made with the guerrilla movement during the 
Independence War. In the possession ceremony discussed in that chapter, senior land 
spirits complained that after the war, President Mugabe had left the Zambesi full of 
“wandering spirits”, and added that he should make the rain himself. In Peasant 
Intellectuals, Feierman drew a similar conclusion regarding the issues of power and 
rain-making when he suggested that the cultural notion of “harming the land”, was 
associated with conflict between rain-makers rather than between peasants who had 
no power (1990; 80).
To inhabitants of the Zambesi, serious drought highlighted the ever-present 
oscillation between local and foreign sources of power, between autochthons and 
conquerors. The myriad responses of Zambesians to drought were interesting in that 
they addressed both the terrible immediacy of hunger as well as its cosmological
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implications. When crop failure became imminent inhabitants found alternate ways to 
procure food such as migration, trade, and intensification of work in riverine gardens. 
However, as the scale of the drought became evident, Zambesians were led to question 
the integrity of the state they had supported during the Independence War. They felt 
betrayed by development projects which both exacerbated the effects of the drought, 
and were implemented without consultation. In local discourse, the perceived neglect 
by the state coupled with development schemes, particularly the MZP, were both 
spoken about as a challenge to the established order.
Chapter 8, which describes the serious drought of 1991-1992 by examining 
local reactions to hunger, social disruption and illness, culminates in a rain-making 
ceremony where the accepted moral order is examined by local inhabitants.
In a number of studies, rain-making power is equated with a strong polity in 
which one ruling clan holds firm control over a given area (Feierman 1990; Lancaster 
1981; Garbett 1966). In contrast, in areas of weaker leadership, often exemplified by 
shallow genealogies, there will be a proliferation of lessor spirits who deal with 
individual illnesses and domestic matters but hold no greater ritual power. This 
dichotomy was reversed in Dande in the 1990s. In Chikafa, where political power was 
fragmented and people talked about ancestral home rather than lineage, the local 
rain-making land spirit could command huge audiences at possession ceremonies. On 
the other hand, in Kanyemba where the marunga clan had a firm grip on politics and 
economy, there was no strong rain-maker but instead a number of land spirits who 
catered mostly to their own clans. The answer resides, I think, with the different 
character of domination in each of these places, an issue I will explore in Chapter 4.
iv. Development:
During the 1970s, the Rhodesian government made failed attempts to cultivate 
cotton in the vicinity of Mushumbi Pools in Dande. According to informants this 
scheme was soon abandoned and had very little impact on the local population. It was 
not until the late 1980s that development projects, in the form of land resettlement and 
resource management, were again attempted by interests outside of the Zambesi 
Valley. In this study I will explore development as one way in which the state sought
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to extend itself into the Zambesi Valley. For instance, the design of the MZP involved 
a further social fragmentation of the Chikafa area through its method of land 
allocation. Similarly, the model for CAMPFIRE proposed a devolvement of control 
over the environment to local communities, but in Kanyemba it served to solidify the 
established hierarchy and further impoverish the population. Chapter 6 and 7 will 
provide an in-depth analysis into the growth of the Zimbabwean state and the meaning 
of development for the inhabitants of Dande.
The Chikafa area was the recipient of both the MZP and CAMPFIRE, while 
Kanyemba was host to the latter project. The MZP was a land resettlement and 
villagisation scheme which aimed to move local populations away from rivers to plots 
of arable land which also included a small residential stand. The overall objective of 
the MZP was to encourage cultivation of cotton for sale in Harare. But by doing so it 
would also transform the economy from its base in subsistence agriculture 
supplemented with trade and wage labour to cash-cropping of a very laborious crop 
(see Appendix I). Another feature of this scheme was that it dissolved a long-standing 
residence pattern of relatives clustering around the homestead of a senior male, 
thereby affecting the source of political influence of established lineages. Furthermore, 
the MZP designated sacred areas and shrines for cultivation thereby sidestepping the 
loci of power of land spirits.
While the methods and design of the MZP constituted a massive disruption to 
social life in Chikafa for everyone, people from subordinate lineages and new 
immigrants believed that it also brought a wealth of opportunity for them. A great deal 
of local objection to the MZP came from the established rulers, the land spirits and the 
headman and senior males from Chikunda and Korekore lines. They disputed the 
threat to their position as leaders and majority landowners (see Appendix II). The 
rain-making land spirit, with whom they ruled, articulated their concerns in 
cosmological terms which prescribe procedures for the proper incorporation of 
newcomers into their areas. According to these rules, immigrants to Dande could 
arrive through marriage which meant they would compensate the bride’s family either 
through brideservice or brideprice and thereby enter the established economy. If the 
settlers did not marry locally, they should enter into a sabwira relationship with a
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family of long-term residents. Neglecting to fulfil either of these two criteria for 
settlement and incorporation into local society would constitute a threat to the 
community. In the rain-making ceremony depicted in Chapter 8, the land spirits 
articulated how the established powers construed the MZP as a conqueror and usurper.
The CAMPFIRE program was a resource management scheme whose purpose 
was to turn wildlife into a profitable concern for neighbouring settlements. By 
relinquishing their rights to hunt and fish with nets, local communities were to receive 
a portion of profits from hunting camps established for wealthy clients. These 
payments were to be used to build schools, clinics, roads and other infrastructure in 
local villages. While CAMPFIRE had little impact in Chikafa as there were few wild 
animals, in Kanyemba the scheme had a huge impact on both the ruling marunga clan, 
and the subordinate clans who experienced its drawbacks more fully.
While the MZP provided opportunities for members of less important lineages 
to acquire wealth and influence, CAMPFIRE served to further solidify the 
pre-existing social hierarchy.
v. Who Are the Chikunda?
The Chikunda clan of marunga rosario andrade played an important role in 
the political and economic life of Dande. Their rule of Kanyemba area was 
characteristic of a centralised society in which they controlled both political process 
and the economy, and had an elaborate story of arrival along with a strong clan 
ideology. In Chikafa, the Chikunda shared power with the Korekore clan of nzou 
samayanga but their monopoly was continually under threat from outsiders. The fact 
that the Chikunda could maintain its identity in both centralised and decentralised 
polities is worthy of exploration.
Throughout the past five centuries there existed in the Zambesi Valley groups 
of people who have been referred to as vanyai, sipai, achicunda, Chikunda, and 
marunga. The people I encountered in the early 1990s were organised into patrilineal 
clans who ruled both Kanyemba, and to a lessor degree, Chikafa areas. Chief Chapoto 
called the Chikunda a ‘tribe’ and said that they were the most powerful group in Dande 
because they had arrived by conquest. His oral history accounts depicted a century of
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rule in Dande in which his particular clan, the marunga rosario andrade, took 
possession of Dande through force, subjugation of existing populations, control of the 
economy, alliance, and ritual. These issues will be discussed in depth in Chapters 3 
and 4.
Chief Chapoto was in his eighties when I met him and suffering from 
respiratory illnesses. His imminent death would precipitate a heated succession 
dispute already brewing at the time of this study. His main concern was that the story 
of his branch, the descendants of Chihumbe, be recorded as the factual history of the 
Chikunda in Dande area thereby consolidating his sons’ claim to the Chieftaincy. 
Understandably, Chief Chapoto wanted his life’s work of decades of successful rule to 
be acknowledged and continued. At a glance, it seems hard to dispute the Chiefs skill 
in governing the population through British, Rhodesian, and Zimbabwean rule, and in 
protecting villagers during the Independence War and their internment in the ‘keeps’ 
or concentration camps. However, a number of people in Kanyemba area disputed his 
version of accounts and the pre-eminence of his lineage. The descendants of two other 
branches of the marunga rosario andrade clan provided histories that agreed with the 
Chiefs version of conquest and marunga supremacy, but disputed his line’s claim to 
perpetual rule. Similarly, a number of descendants of subjugated clans who were 
long-term residents of Dande, while making no claim to the Chieftaincy, disagreed 
with Chapoto’s version of the past, and by association, with the social organisation of 
their own community.
Internal disputes regarding the constitution of communities and the affiliation 
of its residents indicate a fragmented past. This is a fact which I think has contributed 
to the different perspectives of historians and anthropologists regarding the nature of 
Chikunda identity. While the former describe a clear social hierarchy and historical 
trajectory for this group, the latter argue that identity is fluid in the Zambesi and that 
the label ‘Chikunda’ is situational.
vi. An Historian’s Perspective:
While this is not an historical study, I feel that it is important to review the 
work of historians as their insights inform my central arguments regarding the nature
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of political domination in Dande. Discussion of Chikunda history in the Zambesi, 
particularly with regard to the nature of the Chikunda political unit, can lend insight 
into the ways in which hierarchies are created, maintained, and deal with challenge to 
their power.
The prominent historian, Allen Isaacman, considered the Chikunda to be a 
discrete group who were socially and politically organised in a distinctive way. Much 
of his work over the past thirty years pieces together a 400 year version of Chikunda 
history through his reading of Portuguese colonial record and analysis of oral history 
interviews conducted with elder male Chikunda. Although he does not prescribe a 
label to the Chikunda, he argues for their social cohesion over time through a variety 
of transformations in their social organisation.
Isaacman’s thesis is based in the Portuguese land tenure system called prazos
tVida coroa, installed in the 17 century, which contained a rigid social hierarchy of 
leaders, labourers, and warriors often referred to as achicunda or sipais. With the
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organisation and livelihood strategy as warriors, mercenaries, and traders struck out on 
their own as separate groups under strong leaders. Isaacman argued that the Chikunda 
were uniquely characterised in the Zambesi by their origins within Portuguese 
colonialism coupled with their ties to the African populations with which they made 
alliances of marriage and trade.
Isaacman’s corpus of work suggests that a concept of Chikunda identity took 
shape during the long duration of the Portuguese prazo system. He believes that the 
social organisation within the prazos laid the foundation stone for a concept of 
Chikunda group identity. In a brief overview of Isaacman’s arguments in his book, The 
Africanisation o f  a European Institution (1972), he described a functional prazo to 
include a number of distinctive features. These were: A Portuguese or mixed race 
overlord holding privileges and prerogatives formerly held by an African chief in a 
given area; an African population living in a traditional manner on the land-holding; 
a slave population which owed its allegiance to the landholder; theoretically fixed 
frontiers based on the historic boundaries of the indigenous unit before the arrival of 
the land-holding system; and, the existence of a contractual relationship between the
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land-holder and the Portuguese Crown.
In this book the author suggested that, instead of remaining a new and alien 
form of social organisation in the Zambesi, the prazo system owed its longevity to its 
insertion into existing African polities. The author argued that prazeiros (landowners) 
behaved like African chiefs by organising labour, commanding armies of warriors, and 
marrying to form alliances. Several features, however, distinguished a prazo from a 
chiefs realm. First, the objective of the prazo system was to produce commodities for 
sale on the international market which required the availability of a productive labour 
force. Secondly, this population had to be organised and supervised to labour in fields 
or mines. Thirdly, the boundaries of the prazo had to be protected from the 
expansionist ambitions of neighbouring prazeiros. The prazo system was socially 
complex, but its most notable feature was it could not function without strata of 
warrior and policing slaves, initially referred to in colonial texts as achicunda, who 
protected the interests of their Portuguese masters. Slave armies in the prazos were 
organised into regiments (butaka), each led by a muzakambo. They were further 
subdivided into squads (nsaka) led by a tsachikunda who was appointed by the 
prazeiro (Isaacman 1972:54).
The crux of Isaacman’s argument for the consolidation of Chikunda corporate 
identity within the prazos rests with his contention that the social organisation of the 
regiment, where warrior slaves of various origins lived together, provided an 
opportunity to develop common interests. He suggests that factors such as fixed 
residence and isolation, mutual defence against the excesses of the prazeiro, struggle 
for collective rights and security, and day-to-day experience created a sense of 
common purpose amongst achicunda warriors.
thThe deterioration of the prazo system in the late 18 century provided an 
opportunity for organised Chikunda slaves to gain independence. The harsh climate, 
illness, inability to produce a surplus for export, endemic warfare, and a lack of
thadministrative support from Lisbon took their toll on landowners. By the early 19 
century prazos began to be transacted frequently either through the Crown or through 
straightforward military conquest. The notable feature of the early to middle period of 
the prazo system is that the efforts of prazeiros to maintain and consolidate their
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control over their land-holdings led to marriage alliances with the families of local 
chiefs. Also, as the prazo system declined, the economy of the Zambesi became 
increasingly dominated by trade in gold, ivory, and slaves. Those who participated in 
this violent economy were leaders who could command groups of warriors. Regiments 
of slaves were first and foremost loyal to their muzakambo (Isaacman 1972: 40-41). 
Thus, the prazeiros who had inter-married with local African women became warlords 
whose means of livelihood resided in the control of trade. During this time some 
Chikunda remained loyal to their mixed race overlords, but others chose to escape 
military existence into a more informal life.
tfiIsaacman (1972) suggested that from the mid to late 19 century Chikunda 
corporate identity was further consolidated when leaders and their warrior slave 
followers struck out on their own. Some groups of former slaves sought refuge with 
established indigenous chieftaincies such as the Manganja, Chewa, Tawara, and 
Nsenga, while in other instances “autonomous bands of 5-10 men, probably the 
remnants of Chikunda butaka, retained their corporate identity” (Isaacman and 
Rosenthal 1988:229). Other groups remained close to Portuguese towns, such as Tete, 
offering their services as tradesmen, and above all, as hunters and warriors to local 
merchants who wished to expand their trade networks (Isaacman and Rosenthal 
1988:230). It was with the growth of the ivory trade, however, that groups of Chikunda 
warriors developed a strong sense of group cohesion. Ivory “provided the economic 
basis of a unique but temporary autonomy in the history of Chikunda relations with the 
merchant and land-holding community of the interior. This window of freedom 
between the eras of slavery and state-sanctioned forced labour gave many Chikunda 
the opportunity to forge their own destiny” (Isaacman and Rosenthal 1988:230).
According to Isaacman’s analysis and my own oral historical data, these men 
are the ancestors of the ruling marunga clans I encountered during the early 1990s. 
The marunga rosario andrade are but one among a number of these clans. In Tete 
province I was told that a number of areas were ruled by clans such as the marunga 
disuza, marunga desfrip and others.
In sum, Isaacman’s arguments for a clear and defined Chikunda identity hinge 
on a notion of late 19 century clan structure dependent on success in trade, hunting,
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and the appropriation of land by leaders. He gathered oral histories from senior 
Chikunda males who, in the disruption of civil war in Mozambique during the 1960s 
and 1970s, may have found it opportune to emphasise the importance of their own 
affiliations.
While Isaacman’s erudite arguments for a clear and defined Chikunda identity 
certainly resonated well with Chief Chapoto’s accounts, and to a large degree 
complement my own ethnographic work, I also accept that these have been disputed 
by scholars of the Zambesi whose primary focus has been ethnographic. Chet 
Lancaster, for instance, has argued that identity in the Zambesi is fluid, and that ethnic 
labels are situational and often defined by the primary occupation of a given group. 
This interpretation of identity finds common ground with accounts I gathered from 
members of non-ruling lineages in Kanyemba and Chikafa. It seems peculiar that 
Africanist scholars should arrive at seemingly opposing conclusions which leads to me 
to suspect that they have examined different aspects of the same issue: the nature of 
group affiliation in the Zambesi Valley.
vii. An Anthropologist’s Perspective:
In his analysis of populations in the Gwembe area of the Zambesi Valley, 
Lancaster contended that “the changing ethnic labels they have applied to themselves 
and to others at varying times have been symbolic statements relating to empirically 
verifiable facts of history, habitat, social structure, and politics” (1974;709). He first 
conducted fieldwork in the 1960s in the wake of the enormous displacement caused by 
the building of Kariba dam. The population he encountered were of mixed origin, 
many were recent arrivals in the area, and others could only recount shallow 
genealogies. In his survey of 209 respondents regarding their ancestral home, 
Lancaster found that 80% were from the Zimbabwean highlands, and 20% from the 
eastern part of the Zambesi Valley and Mozambique (1981; 16).
From an ethnographic point of view, his field site very much resembled my 
own at Chikafa: subsistence agriculture with some trade, a ruling lineage whose 
legitimacy could be construed as tenuous, a population of diverse origin who tended to 
move around, and a matrifocal/brideservice ethos losing ground to brideprice and
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neolocality. In terms of political organisation, Lancaster’s comment that Zambesian 
settlements were composed of two realms, a chiefly realm and a number of subsidiary 
realms also made sense with regard to my own research. He observed that the chiefly 
realm contained the homestead of the chief and his councillors, and a ritual area with 
spirit huts and a sacred grove. The subsidiary realms he depicted as headed by 
sub-chiefs and composed of kinsmen, former slaves, and trade associates who had 
clustered together. These residential clusters also included land shrines which 
“provided a hierarchy of appeal through which the inhabitants of allied spirit realms 
could seek ritual protection” (Lancaster 1981:129). Thus, these land shrines provided 
a form of social and political organisation to what were really a disparate group of 
people sharing common residence.
With regard to Chikunda identity, Lancaster hypothesised that the label simply 
referred to Africans associated with the Portuguese. He said that, “the Chikunda were 
never a tribe in any strict sense” (Lancaster 1974:722), but instead people living in 
areas frequented by the Portuguese who became their followers and with whom they 
engaged in trade.
The disparity between Isaacman’s view of the Chikunda group and Lancaster’s 
cannot be explained away as differences in the orientations of their two disciplines, or 
even of their methodologies. I find it unsurprising that Isaacman would argue for a 400 
year old Chikunda ethnic identity since his work is primarily based in Portuguese 
colonial archives, which contain reports of life in the prazos, as well as first hand 
accounts of dealings with Chikunda warriors and traders1. Also, his interviews with 
Chikunda elders in Tete, Mozambique yielded genealogies ascending into the 19 
century. I also obtained similar data of established lineages who had maintained rule 
over specific areas. In contrast, Lancaster formulated his arguments based on 
ethnography conducted in an area of recent migration where no entrenched rulers
JThe published works of Father Dialer, Magalhaes e Solla and Carl Wiese provide 
depictions of Chikunda activity in the Zambesi.
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existed and no significant change had occurred to challenge or modify ongoing social 
organisation2.
The very different forms of social organisation in Kanyemba and Chikafa 
provided clues to the differences in Isaacman’s and Lancaster’s orientations. 
Kanyemba provided a case study of entrenched social hierarchy, discussed in depth in
fhChapter 3, where the conquering clan had ruled since the late 19 century. There I 
obtained both deep genealogies, as well as strong opposition to Chief Chapoto. In 
Chikafa area, although all the headmen were Chikunda, and Chikunda elders widely 
respected, there existed a diversity of clans and most people could only depict shallow 
genealogies. Perhaps these authors’ seeming opposition was based on two sets of 
observations of the same populations living in the same type of social system, but at 
different times.
It seems that each of these authors observed different poles of a local political 
system in the Zambesi which oscillates between a strong Chieftaincy, legitimated by 
an idiom of conquest which supports the ruling clan, and weak leadership in which 
group affiliations shift and appear undetermined. The former circumstance is 
characterised by long genealogies, definitive stories of conquest, claims of long-term 
residence, and ritual control. The latter instance includes shallow genealogies, 
undefined notions of ancestral home, weak claims to land, and disinterest in ritual. 
There are a number of reasons for this oscillation. One possible interpretation is the 
dichotomy Lancaster (1974) makes between centralised and non-centralised societies.
viii. Summary:
In this first chapter I have introduced domination, development, and drought as 
the three central issues of this study. Domination has been framed in terms of conquest, 
a strong ideology of clan, rain-making power, economic supremacy, and political 
control. The two development schemes, as experienced by residents of Dande, had a 
multi-faceted influence. For instance, in Chikafa these schemes challenged established 
hierarchies, particularly that of the land spirits and the headmen who serve them, and
2For example, new churches, development projects, or other foreign influences.
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thus provided opportunities for individuals and families who had been previously 
disenfranchised by that system. In Kanyemba, CAMPFIRE was administered by the 
dominant marunga clan who used it to further marginalise the tembo mvura clan and 
reinforce their entrenched dominance. With regard to the power of state government, 
in Chikafa where local leadership was weak, both development and new committee 
positions precipitated a further dilution of power. In Kanyemba, despite the succession 
dispute, the power of the marunga clan was such that they managed to both keep 
dissent within the clan as well as appropriate control of the development scheme and 
state-derived committee positions. In sum, development was disruptive in Chikafa, 
but reinforced the entrenched rule of the marunga clan in Kanyemba.
The availability of scholarly accounts of the Chikunda, both historical and 
anthropological, provides in itself a compelling reason to adopt this group as a case 
study of social life in the Zambesi. However, transformations of their social and 
political organisation over time also illustrate an oscillation between compliance with 
domination and resistance making this population especially useful in understanding 
life in the Zambesi Valley in the 1990s. In this chapter I have argued that the Chikunda 
provide a good case study of the three pervasive issues in contemporary Zambesian 
social life. Particularly useful is Lancaster’s (1974) thesis that acephalous societies 
tend to have fluid social structures in order to keep networks open, while centralised 
societies present with ethnic groups whose affiliations and loyalties are prescribed.
The following chapter is about methodology and will include discussion of 
fieldwork in the context of drought and social disruption. I thought it would inform 
this account to articulate some of the issues of fieldwork in an environmentally 
challenging setting at the periphery of the Zimbabwean state.
Chapter 3 reviews Chikunda domination in the Zambesi, describes the arrival 
of the marunga rosario andrade clan in Dande and its subsequent conquest of the area.
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Chapter 2: Methodology:
"He was always comfortable in someone else's landscape, enjoyed being 
taught the customs of a place."
Michael Ondaatje, In the Skin o f a Lion
i. Chikafa and Kanyemba: Fieldsites and First Encounters
The objective of this study is to convey an understanding of how processes of 
domination affected the life of inhabitants of the Zambesi Valley during the 1990s. To 
this end I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Chikafa and Kanyemba, two 
settlements of contrasting political and economic organisation. Chikafa was 
characterised by power-sharing between two dominant lineages, a varied economy, 
and a population of diverse origin. Kanyemba was the seat of a longstanding 
Chieftaincy which consolidated power within a dominant clan, had a subsistence 
economy, and a population organised into a rigid social hierarchy.
The principal challenge of working in the Zambesi during the 1990s resided 
with unpicking mechanisms of political and economic control while also listening to 
discourses of resistance and compliance. The application of development projects and 
the occurrence of drought intensified attempts at control and created new ways to 
resist the established order. People spoke and acted in many new and confusing ways 
during my time with them. For instance, it came as a surprise to me when a spirit 
possession ceremony ostensibly to make rain turned into a protest of the Mugabe 
presidency. For me, this was a time to be on high alert, both intellectually and 
physically.
The Zambesi is a harsh place at the best of times. The rainy season is muddy 
and miserable, and the dry season is desolate and suffocatingly hot, especially nearer 
the rains. The roads were terrible and the drive from the plateau into the escarpment 
nerve-wracking. It was a place with no phones or well-supplied clinics, no electricity, 
and not much personal security in the face of serious threat. During the drought, it 
became the home of hunger, hardship and distress for nearly everyone, particularly the 
marginalised.
But the Zambesi was also a place of great resilience and courage. People,
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whose everyday lives were challenging even in the best of years, mobilised to deal 
with changes brought by land resettlement and drought. And so, after the initial shock 
had worn off, I saw my role as an attempt to record aspects of continuity and change 
in that very interesting, very emotionally involving place.
I first visited the Zambesi Valley in March of 1992, but eventually moved to 
the area in June of that year. My first fieldsite was in Chikafa where I stayed between 
June 1992 and June 1993. At that time there was a serious drought and I did not find 
the social and physical environment I had come to expect from reading previous 
studies. Not only were people continuously hungry and anxious about the immediate 
future, the social activity of regular years was greatly disrupted. With no rainfall, there 
was little farming to do, and thus the flow of social life associated with the agricultural 
calendar did not take place. For example, the return of relatives to help with harvesting 
was delayed. Because the local Manyame River, a tributary of the Zambesi, was 
reduced to a few pools, there was little fishing that people could do. The absence of a 
dryland crop of maize meant no beer-making rituals to propitiate the ancestors. Thus, 
funeral and other ceremonies which involved the brewing of beer from locally-grown 
maize were delayed until the next harvest.
The drought was also a time of temporary emigration to the plateau where 
Zambesians looked for food and work. Several homesteads in the area lay empty while 
others were occupied by the very old. In some households people remained to wait for 
drought relief and hoped for remittances from departed family members.
In the midst of the drought I soon realised that the conditions depicted in David 
Lan’s book, Guns and Rain, my inspiration for the study, had changed substantially. 
While key concepts in his analysis, such as the myths of arrival, kinship relations, and 
the role of land spirits remained as he saw them, people’s relationship with the 
environment and the state had changed, precipitating a cascade of new ways and ideas.
In contrast, my second fieldsite, Kanyemba, at the confluence of the Zambesi 
and Mwadzamutanda Rivers, was almost exactly as I had come to expect from the 
literature. It was a heavily forested settlement of dispersed clusters o f households 
organised around the homesteads of male lineage elders. There was a Chief who 
owned brick houses and a granary full of maize. He was attended by councilors and 
held a Customary Law court. My first informants described deep genealogies, and
54
there seemed to be clear and longstanding group affiliations. Chief Chapoto was 
welcoming and accorded me a number of interviews. He recounted an elaborate story 
of his ancestors’ arrival in the area which he embellished as time went on. In contrast 
to Chikafa, Kanyemba appeared orderly and people’s lives reassuringly predictable. 
After the jumble of Chikafa, the appearance of a defined social organisation, though 
hierarchical, was soothing to me. I hoped this fieldsite would be easier to study.
Kanyemba turned out to be a challenge. The long distances between 
homesteads often meant hours of walking in the heat of day. Because the settlement 
lies between two national parks, the profusion of wild animals required knowledge of 
their habits and much vigilance. Also, the quite veneer of life-as-usual soon gave way 
to the conflicts of the succession dispute. Finally, the more people I met, the more I 
heard stories of dispossession and marginalisation.
Kanyemba and Chikafa were both complicated fieldsites, but in different ways. 
This ethnography of the Zambesi encompasses the contrast between these two places 
and thus presents a story of domination and resilience.
I take ethnography to be “a research process in which the anthropologist 
closely observes, records, and engages in the daily life of another culture-an 
experience labelled as fieldwork method-then writes accounts of this culture, 
emphasizing descriptive detail” (Marcus and Fischer 1986:18). Ethnography is, then, 
the written product of the relationship between the ethnographer and her informants. 
It is also a statement about the way in which the anthropologist has understood the 
political and economic context in which her informants live. Ethnography represents 
a moment in time, depicted in a text which situates research findings in historical and 
theoretical context.
ii. Methods:
Since I could speak neither Chikunda nor Korekore, my first task in the 
Zambesi was to find a field assistant. This proved to be a fraught process as the first 
person I hired did not have a good grasp of the Chikunda language and we eventually 
disagreed about the job at hand. My second assistant, however, was the making of this 
study. The friendship I made with him was the most important relationship I had in the 
field. September Shereni acted as translator, companion, teacher, and occasionally,
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nurse. He was instrumental in my acceptance by the local people. As well as 
interpreting the life ways of the locals to me, he also explained my peculiarities to 
them. September, was well-educated but unemployed, and struggled to reconcile the 
world of the village with the global world he had learned at school. He was educated 
by Catholic priests from Canada at one of Zimbabwe's best-known mission schools. 
When we first met I was surprised to find that I had travelled to Zimbabwe thinking I 
knew something of the Zambesi, only to find there someone who knew even more 
about where I came from
September and I did most of the research for this study together. In the 
mornings we conducted an interview, reviewed the previous day's notes, paid a visit, 
attended a meeting or walked to the fields and gardens. In Chikafa, he would go home 
to his mother for lunch or else cook ntsima (thick maize meal porridge) at my house. 
In the afternoon we repeated the pattern of the morning. If there was a spirit 
possession ceremony during the night, then September accompanied me. Through 
him I met many of the young people in the village, including his best friend who knew 
about medicinal plants, iron-work, hunting, fishing, and many other activities. It was 
through their concerted efforts that I finally managed to gain a working knowledge of 
the Chikunda language. I mastered greetings, learned to ask questions using the 
present tense, and acquired a sense of the accuracy of translations.
When we moved to Kanyemba, September’s workload increased. Our 
interview schedule was much the same as in Chikafa. We lived in tents, and so it 
became his job to do the household chores in the evening while I organised the day’s 
notes. Kanyemba settlement is 140km from September's home area. Although he 
belonged to the ruling Chikunda clan, he really did not know anyone very well and, 
for once, we were in the similar position of ‘outsider’1. In September I was fortunate 
to have found someone whom I could trust to be thorough and meticulous in our work, 
and who understood that the main job he would do for me was to interpret between 
my world and theirs.
1 September belonged to the marunga rosario andrade clan, his father was a Chikunda 
bom in Kanyemba, but who lived in Chikafa.
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I conducted household surveys of Chikafa in 1992 and 1993, which was before 
and after the drought. The first survey was very difficult as people were hungry and 
not particularly interested in discussing livelihoods or life-histories. It was also 
awkward attempting to draw people on strategies they used to cope with the drought. 
Survey I illustrated very much how locals experienced drought as a suspension of 
normal life. At that time one informant told me that people in Chikafa could not give 
the drought a name as they were still thinking about it. He said I should return later (at 
an unspecified time) to ask the same questions. Survey II was done a year later once 
it had rained and there had been a harvest. In this instance, people were happy to 
discuss the previous year. My surveys contained background information regarding 
household composition, clan and sub-clan affiliation, livelihood, and religion.
The interviews I conducted fell into three categories: oral histories; lineage 
and life-course interviews which included recording of genealogies; and, queries 
about a particular subject (for example, metal work, the spirit world, healing, and 
making canoes). These interviews were usually conducted at the informants ’ 
homestead and over a time of about two hours. I asked questions in English which 
were then translated by my assistant. Questionnaires were organised according to 
themes and consisted of open-ended questions. As I grew to understand more of the 
Chikunda language it became possible to discuss informants’ responses with my 
assistant according to, for example, their use of a particular key term, the tone with 
which they answered questions, or tactics to avoid discussing certain subjects.
Both villages researched were multi-lingual. In Chikafa predominant 
languages were Korekore which is a variant of Shona, and Chikunda. Locals also 
spoke English, chiZezuru, chiChewa, and chiNyanja. Villagers who lived in a nearby 
settlement in Mozambican territory also spoke Portuguese. In Kanyemba, the 
predominant language was Chikunda, but all of the above-mentioned languages were 
also understood. Initially I spoke English and Portuguese with informants, but 
eventually learned to speak rudimentary Chikunda which was enough to appear 
sociable and important to set a friendly tone for interviews. In addition to attempting 
spoken Chikunda, I recorded a lexicon in that language relating to the environment 
and social practice.
Initially I explained to Zambesians that my study was about the history of the
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area and about the Chikunda people in particular. Through observation of my daily 
pursuits locals started to form an idea about the work I was aiming to do and, slowly, 
the names of individuals who knew about the past or held particular specialised 
positions in the area began to be mentioned in conversations. It was then expected that 
I would visit these people for an interview. At the same time I also attended rain 
rituals, spirit possessions, drought relief distribution meetings, village meetings and 
other gatherings. With time, locals began to invite me to their homes to learn about 
such activities as beer-making, basketry, healing, iron-work, for meals, and for no 
reason other than to visit.
The serious drought of 1991-92 caused me to revise the aim of this study. 
From a primary focus on oral history, settlement patterns, kinship relations, and 
political structures, I shifted attention to circumstances precipitated by the drought. 
Because of the extent of the drought, it coloured almost every aspect of the lives of 
my informants and caused me to shift inquiry almost exclusively to their immediate 
preoccupations. For instance, instead of oral history, people discussed the relationship 
between the MZP and the lack of rain.
Although I was more than willing to interview any willing participant, prior 
research experience with Portuguese immigrants in Montreal led me to seek out 
individuals who would not readily come forward. While headmen, local politicians 
and senior women made themselves heard, the elderly poor, younger women, and men 
from subordinate lineages had to be sought and drawn out. The importance of their 
voices in a study about political and economic domination cannot be overstated.
Adopting a fieldwork method where the researcher gains knowledge by 
following the lead of local subjects is often referred to as participant-observation. The 
term ‘participant-observation’ is odd because it connotes a state of being close enough 
to the observation to understand it but far enough to be objective. In an interesting 
piece, Kleinman and Kleinman (1997) compared the work of anthropologists with 
that of psychiatrists by suggesting that each discipline had a propensity to translate 
human experience, for example suffering, into its own categories which, at the same 
time, reproduced the discipline and neglected the subject. These authors contended 
that a shortcoming of ethnography was that it participated “in this professional 
transformation of an experience-rich and -near human subject into a dehumanized
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object, a caricature of experience” (1997:170).
The Kleinmans were interested in the issue of individual suffering which they 
had encountered in their fieldwork in China. They argued that the inclination in 
anthropology to categorise suffering as role, strategy, or symbol belonged to the same 
moral dimension as the way in which psychiatrists produced “pathologizing 
reconstructions within biomedicine” (1997:170). In this way, both disciplines 
delegitimised the experience of the subject.
I liked the Kleinmans’ approach because it lent voice to the suffering I 
encountered in the Zambesi. This suffering shattered my preconceptions about the 
field and humbled me as a researcher, and in so doing taught me to follow informants 
and engage with them on their time and in their terms. To illustrate this approach, 
these authors suggested that, “experience may, on theoretical grounds, be thought of 
as the intersubjective medium of social transactions in local moral worlds. It is the 
outcome of cultural categories and social structures interacting with 
psychophysiological processes that a mediating world is constituted. Experience is the 
felt flow of that intersubjective medium” (1997:170-171). In this view, the knowledge 
that a researcher gains through experience in the field is, “both a cross-sectional slice 
through the complexity of ongoing priorities and a part of the temporal flow of 
changing structures of relevance” (1997:170). The result is that an ethnographer can 
only describe a local moral world, “for which the relative validity of observations 
must be regularly recalibrated” (1997:170).
In adopting subjective experience as the central concern of ethnography, 
Kleinman and Kleinman (1997) attempted to modify a number of orientations in 
anthropology. First, they argued that the basic question of research should be “what is 
at stake?”. Responses to this question would be experience-near (local categorisations) 
and much more relevant to ethnography than discipline-generated categories 
(1997:171). Second, they suggested that, “the ethnographer’s focus move back and 
forth” between the experience-near perspective and the historical and cross-cultural 
viewpoints which showed pattern (1997:172). This movement would mirror more 
closely, “the dialectical structure and contingent flow of lived experience than 
reductionist ways of knowing which by definition distort the existential conditions of 
life” (1997:172). Third, these authors submitted the “idea of experience as an
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interpersonal medium of mediation” (1997:190). By this notion these authors meant 
to shift notions of experience from the idea that it is something which an individual or 
a collective ‘has’ to the concept of “an interpersonal medium shared by, engaged in, 
and also mediating between persons in a local world” (1997:189). Thus, in my 
understanding of their argument, Kleinman and Kleinman indicated that experience 
occurs between subjects, and that it is experience which constructs further experience, 
like two mirrors each reflecting the other’s reflection endlessly.
In short, the thrust of the Kleinman and Kleinman (1997) position resided with 
two key ideas: first, that the researcher allow the informant to outline the parameters 
of his or her world (i.e. experience-near categorisation); and, second, that the 
ethnographer accept that data obtained is the result of a mediated interaction with 
informants hinging on the issue of what is at stake for each party.
It would have been possible in both fieldsites to conduct questionnaire-driven 
research, where the object of inquiry would be preset by the author. There was a good 
chance that politeness would ensure a response from informants. However, as an 
anthropologist I new that local knowledge was the point of the exercise. Besides, with 
development schemes, the influence of the state, and their own local hierarchies, the 
Zambesi in the 1990s was full of structures which told individuals who they were and 
what to do. My task, as I saw it, was not to reify those structures which were so visible 
that even a foreigner could see them, but instead to achieve an understanding of how 
people responded to them.
One particularly gratifying aspect of research was the interest that Chikunda 
informants took in my Portuguese background. Members of the marunga clan, who 
claimed descent from Portuguese colonisers, were especially welcoming as they 
explained that we shared a similar background. Chief Chapoto even went so far as to 
suggest that we were related because he and my father shared a given name. No 
member of the marunga clan refused to speak to me about history, genealogy, politics, 
or livelihood.
Chikunda individuals interpreted my Portuguese origins in a number of ways. 
First, it was a way to be white different from that of the British whose colonial 
presence was fresh in the minds of Africans. Also, in Chikunda cosmology, the 
Portuguese were ancestors who married Africans and inter-related with them in
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mundane ways, such as sharing food, and speaking a common language. 
Mozambicans I encountered spoke Portuguese as their own language, often as 
fluently as their African mother tongue. A phrase commonly repeated to denote the 
closeness between these two groups was that “the Chikunda walked with the 
Portuguese”.
In the context of the succession dispute in Kanyemba, members of the 
marunga clan were only too happy to instruct me in their version of history. Chief 
Chapoto saw me as a conduit for his accounts and, by association, his line’s continued 
claim to the Chieftaincy. In retrospect, the symmetry of a person of Portuguese 
background writing about a Chikunda Chief probably warmed his heart.
Ready acceptance by those in power certainly made research in Kanyemba 
easier; however it also sounded alarm bells with regard to those whose voices were 
silenced. While I interviewed many marunga clan members, I also sought out others 
who had different, often opposing, accounts of life in Kanyemba.
iii. Oral Histories:
Oral histories are a discourse-based exercise in which the informant recounts 
stories regarding his or her own life experiences and interprets the collective history 
of his or her social group. In a society in which knowledge is transmitted through 
conversation and oratory, there is large scope for gathering information through the 
analysis of narrative. Oral histories also tell a story of power in which dominant 
groups have a monopoly over the past, and the subordinate are silent. In Kanyemba, 
the Marunga clan shared an account of conquest, but the two lineages competing for 
the Chieftaincy each held their own versions of the order succession since that time.
There are a number of points which bear examination regarding oral history 
interviews I conducted. First, in their stories, many informants juxtaposed personal 
time with societal time. For example, one female informant related her age to me by 
stating that she had small breasts when the current Chief came to his position. 
Secondly, informants related cyclical with linear time. In one instance, an informant 
said that it had become increasingly difficult to grow maize on the riverbanks as the 
flooding level of the river had progressively dropped with each passing year. In a 
place where most of the older people held no identification papers and owned no
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calendars, the only way they could satisfy a western request for chronology was to 
establish relations between events in their own society.
In the Zambesi, members of important clans were concerned with unified 
accounts of the past in which the relative positions of all characters were clearly 
described. For example, the key theme of Chief Chapoto’s story of Chikunda conquest 
of Dande is the supremacy of the marunga clan, followed by the importance of his 
own lineage ancestor in the early days of settlement. Similarly, senior members of the 
marunga clan who claimed descent from the two other conquering brothers also had 
elaborate tales of the past which favoured their own claim or the Chieftaincy. 
Members of subordinate groups were not concerned with long genealogies or detailed 
accounts of the past, a fact which reflected their politically position in the settlement.
The historian, Trouillot, argued that people exist in three capacities with 
regard to history as a social process: “1) as agents, or occupants of structural positions; 
2) as actors in constant interface with a context; and, 3) as subjects, that is, as voices 
aware of their vocality” (1995:23). This analysis provided a helpful way to frame the 
types of oral histories I gathered. Furthermore, it also helped to avoid dichotomies 
such as those between old and young, powerful and weak, men and women, and other 
structural features which might make sense to the researcher but were not overly 
important within the social context of the research.
Another important attribute of oral history research is the relationship between 
authority and silence. An interesting idea is that the association between history and 
power is expressed in what is said and in what is silenced (Trouillot 1995: 23). 
Similarly, it is interesting to contemplate the idea that silence permeates a collective 
history by entering the process of historical production at four moments: at sources, 
when facts are created; in archives, when facts are assembled; in narratives, when 
facts are retrieved; and, in history which is retrospective significance (Trouillot 
1995:26). With regard to the issue of silence in Dande, the stories of the powerless 
lineages were virtually absent from these four features of historical production. For 
instance, the Dema people whose clan is the tembo mvura feature in the Marunga 
accounts of arrival in Dande, but their own version of their past does not feature in 
local collective history.
Researchers have perpetuated these pockets of silence in the history of Dande
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by neglecting to search out individuals who might generate accounts which are 
discordant with the versions of collective history espoused by the visible and 
confident members of dominant clans. To be fair, it is partly a matter of luck whether 
one is able to find a willing and vocal member of a subordinate lineage. Also, the 
history of influential clans and lineages may predominate because the subordinate do 
not care about the past as it is an instrument of their own subordination. In other words, 
“the value of the historical product cannot be debated without taking into account both 
the context of its production and the context of its consumption” (Trouillot 1995:146).
In Dande, for an historical account to predominate, it had to fulfil certain 
measures of credibility within a lineage, a clan, or a community. In Kanyemba, the 
marunga story of conquest was promoted as official history because it suited those in 
power. But in Chikafa, where two lineages shared tenuous power, it was the land 
spirits who held monopoly of the past. Following this logic, an attack on the discourse 
of the mpondoro, or simply neglecting to attend possession ceremonies to listen to 
him, would signify a challenge to his version of the past, and by association, a 
repudiation of the social and political order he represented.
For both the Chikunda and the Korekore, chieftaincy was usually 
accompanied by the support of mpondoro who declaimed an account of the past in 
which the chiefs lineage and the accomplishments of its real and mythical ancestors 
predominated. But even in the case of Chief Chapoto, who had lost the support of the 
local Chikunda mpondoro, the position of Chief held enough authority for his views 
of history to carry weight locally2. It is reasonable to raise the criticism that 
ethnography can rely too heavily on the voices of those in authority. At the same time, 
it is also a practicality of fieldwork that the researcher must, in a sense, work with the 
hierarchy and appear to pay lip service to it. For this reason, I conducted seven 
interviews with Chief Chapoto in Kanyemba. On the one hand, he was the Chief of the 
area and even his enemies agreed that it was right and proper to speak with him. On 
the other hand, by virtue of his age and position, he could recount a history of the area
2
Chapoto was a descendant of Chihumbe, while the mpondoro represented Kanyemba 
who has been Chihumbe’s brother in life. Chihumbe’s mpondoro had no medium in 
the 1990s. The dispute over who would succeed Chapoto hinged on a tussle between 
the descendants of Chihumbe and Kanyemba.
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which included the major events since the Second World War, even if his own 
position in these predominated. One methodological consideration I had to bear in 
mind was that, because Chiefs in Zimbabwe can enforce Customary Law, Chief 
Chapoto would have been in a position to implement his own views which would then 
be passed on as fact. Thus, in his recounting of past events, the debate which had led 
up to final judgments could be obscured from the final account.
It was because authority was blatantly confined within the three lineages of the 
dominant marunga rosario andrade clan, that I sought out informants of other clans 
and lineages in order to leam their views. In this case, the silence was deafening. 
While non-marunga had been politically and economically marginalised, their history 
had also been obscured. Interestingly, I also found that the way in which people from 
these subordinate clans staked their claims locally was not by creating a sense of then- 
own clan, lineage, or interest group identity, but rather by aligning themselves behind 
one of the marunga factions involved in the contention of the moment. Thus, during 
the succession dispute, no non -marunga made a claim for political power, rather 
many of these people supported Chief Chapoto’s opposition. Some did so by citing a 
version of local histoiy which argued that the Chiefs rule was illegitimate. I found the 
relationship between the ruling marunga rosario andrade clan and subordinate clans 
and lineages to be that of patron-client. This idea is supported by the fact that, to my 
knowledge, no interest groups had emerged outside of the political arena dominated 
by the three marunga rosario andrade lineages. Even in circumstances of great threat 
to livelihood, such as the persistent geographical and social marginalisation of the 
tembo mvura clan (the Dema people) by the Chikunda, there arose no organised 
opposition.
Silence stands in counterpoint to a discourse of oppression. A master narrative 
will cloak other narratives which, through their own invisibility both support the 
dominant view and negate themselves. For this reason, in obtaining Chief Chapoto's 
account of history in the context of an ongoing succession dispute, I also set the 
groundwork for searching out dissent. That Chapoto obscured the position of the 
follower lineages that live in Kanyemba indicated a tacit admission of their potential 
threat to his position.
In the Zambesi, the subordinate often used the opportunity presented by their
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social invisibility to participate in an alternate ritual life. Although, this may look like 
resistance, it was also a way of coping with a demoralising condition of social 
inferiority. An example of these alternate behaviours was the increasing participation 
in the newer churches appearing in the Zambesi Valley. Whilst the longer established 
Catholic and Anglican churches allowed for participation in the cult of land spirits, 
these newer churches did not. In other words, they presented alternate belief systems 
separate from those which existed previously and, thus, a chance at a different life.
In striving for alternatives to the established social order, the disempowered, 
in effect, attempted to re-organise their positions within it. Whilst chiefs, sabhuku, 
and mpondoro declaimed history from the standpoint of the established power 
structure to which they belonged, the participation by the weak in other orders was 
their attempt to be “linked to differing concepts of the person, of the cosmos, of 
morality” (Bloch 1996:220).
In such a society, the relationship between visibility and invisibility depended 
on much more than economic and political oppression. For a relationship of 
dominance and subordination to have existed for as long as it has done in Kanyemba 
area, there has had to be a degree of complicity between the Marunga and their 
subjects. Given the longevity of the social order in that area, it can be argued that 
“power does not enter the story once and for all, but at different times and from 
different angles. It precedes the narrative proper, contributes to its creation and to its 
interpretation” (Trouillot 1995:29-28).
By recording the thoughts of a variety of individuals regarding their 
circumstances and place in local collectivities, I hoped to build a window into their 
present. The past is not a monolith but rather the “variety of narrators is one of many 
indications that theories of history have a rather limited view of the field of historical 
production. They grossly underestimate the size, the relevance, and the complexity of 
the overlapping sites where history is produced, notably outside of academia” 
(Trouillot 1995:19).
iv. Field notes:
Although access to informants is of primary importance, it is from fieldnotes 
that ethnographies are written. After the immediacies of the field have receded and
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when there is nothing left of the experience but memory, the quality of fieldnotes 
becomes of primary importance.
The possession of fieldnotes is the proof of ‘having been there’ and the 
justification for positions taken in texts produced post-fieldwork. The idea of a 
fieldnote seems quite straightforward, yet as Lederman (1990) suggested, they are a 
‘bizarre genre’ part both of the doing o f fieldwork and the writing of the ethnography. 
She suggested that there existed no established models for fieldnotes (1990:72). Also, 
that fieldnotes were “not a fixed repository of data from the field but a reinterpretable 
and contradictory patchwork of perspectives” (1990:90). Thus, in thinking about the 
position of fieldnotes in the anthropology, it is helpful to keep in mind that these are 
very personal, not least because each researcher must often devise his or her own 
method of note-taking. Also, since fieldnotes record and represent a particular context, 
they cannot be read without invoking that circumstance. At the same time as 
fieldnotes are a source of authority, they are also like floodgates which once opened 
inundate the researcher with a combination of memory and recording characteristic of 
ethnography.
I organised my fieldnotes occurred in two steps. First, there were the notations 
made by hand in the field, recopied and revised in consultation with my assistant. 
These reflected the day's work. Once in London, I typed and organised these notes 
into neat folders. This post-field classification was the first step in acquiring a sense 
of the data outside of the field and an attempt to gain control over a body of very 
diverse data.
It can be argued that what one understands from fieldnotes changes over time. 
The original notes of interviews written on cheap yellowing paper encrusted with 
dead insects and smelling of a campfire certainly evoked different thoughts to those 
of the version typed on clean white paper. In my case, recopying of notes took place 
within a context of discussion with fellow students, and of further reading of 
anthropological texts. The more I learned of the world outside of the notes, the more 
meanings and possibilities I saw within them.
Other types of fieldnotes I took included a daily journal which reflects more 
obviously the pattern of my data collecting, a plant catalogue, lists of songs, recipes, 
language notes, maps, aerial photographs, and photographs of people and the physical
66
environment.
v. The Issue of Ethnographic Authority:
The issue of ethnographic authority has implications not only for the 
anthropologist who is concerned to translate her field experience, but also for 
informants who told their stories also in hopes of representation. Therefore, it is 
important transpose what happened in the field into an authoritative text to be read in 
the outside world.
Traditionally there have been two ways in which anthropologists assert their 
authorial control within the texts they write. The first is ‘having been there’, and the 
second is disappearing from the narrative (Moore 1994:112). To be credible an 
account must contain a metaphor of travel in which both the ethnographer and the 
reader can pass from their familiar home world, in which they are ignorant of the other, 
into a situation of foreignness (usually abroad) where knowledge would be acquired 
(1994:113). In order to fulfil these disciplinary requirements, the anthropologist had 
to create a stable self in order to depict stable others (1994:116-117).
Another way to assert one's authority is by depicting access to informants as 
successful and almost unproblematic. Although many ethnographies discuss the issue 
of access in broad terms, very seldom does one read about problems in making 
contacts, even when these problems are beyond the control of the researcher. It is 
unfair that methodological impediments can be transformed into intimations of 
personal incompetence. My reality in the field was that problems with making 
contacts, obtaining access to informants, coping with physical and emotional hardship, 
fending off danger, and ultimately making a few good friends engaged a sizable 
amount of my time and energy. In researching the Chikunda I encountered obstacles 
which were beyond my control. Initially I felt overwhelmed, confused, and frightened. 
Loss of control, often in the form of a sense of loss of self is intrinsic to fieldwork in 
harsh settings and is part of the process of gaining knowledge. I do not think that it 
detracted from my authority as an ethnographer, but rather informed it. For this reason 
I argue that, along with theory, survey methods, audio-visual skills, and other 
fieldwork methods, students should be prepared for the psychological realities of 
conducting fieldwork abroad. Post-colonial settings are full of natural disaster, war,
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hunger, disillusionment, and aggression. These are the hurdles the anthropologist has 
to overcome and the conditions which the discipline needs to acknowledge because 
hardship is the everyday reality of societies which young anthropologists are sent to 
study.
vi. Working in Disaster:
Many events take place during fieldwork which both deter from the goal and 
enrich the account. In the instance of this study, it was often difficult to separate one 
from the other. I think that few young anthropologists who have grown up in relative 
comfort in places safe from hunger or fear can be prepared to apprehend a field 
situation of disaster. In his book, L'Ecriture du Desastre, the writer Maurice Blanchot 
described the encounter with upheaval: "Le desappointement du desastre: ne 
repondant pas a l'attente, ne laissant pas faire le point, l'appoint, hors toute orientation, 
fut-se comme desorientation ou simple egarement" (1980:81).
As Blanchot described, confronting a situation of disaster is very disorienting 
for the observer. He or she may feel betrayed and alienated by it. My first contact with 
the drought in Chikafa village in 1992 left me bewildered and confused. And once I 
had a certain amount of time to apprehend the extent of the situation and the impact it 
was having on people, I felt profound shame. I thought that I had no place as a witness 
to the suffering of others and no business making a subject of upheaval of that 
magnitude.
Remaining in a fieldsite where there is disaster is not an obvious choice. 
During those first few months in the Zambesi, I created many reasons to leave. For 
example, one night I became convinced I had contracted malaria and promptly rushed 
to Harare for treatment only to have the symptoms disappear upon arrival in the city. 
My problem then was the belief that I could endure neither the dignified silence of 
people who were hungry, nor their hopelessness at having their livelihoods at the 
mercy of forces beyond their control.
Encountering a fieldsite where there is disaster is disorienting almost to the 
point where the reason one stays is because of ambivalence as to what to do. I cannot 
explain why I did not abandon fieldwork, except to say that once one comes to know 
people who share what little they have, then it is almost impossible to leave. Persisting
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in a circumstance of disaster takes place almost by default. During my first few weeks 
in Chikafa, each day that passed brought me further into their world and farther away 
from my own.
How can one justify anthropological research in the context of disaster? First,
I believe that interviews and conversations with informants provide a helpful 
opportunity for people to display their knowledge, and by extension, regain a sense of 
self. In the case of the older people whose traditional positions of influence and power 
were challenged by a younger generation, they welcomed the chance to have their say. 
Second, my own feelings of displacement heightened my empathy with informants 
and contributed to the creation of a comfortable space where they could make their 
disclosures.
By considering the drought to be more than the sum of economic policies, 
natural disaster, and inadequate relief distribution, and seeing it for the human tragedy 
that it was, I allowed myself to better understand how people coped and recovered. 
When the first rains fell the morning after an all-night rain ritual in November 1992 
and people rushed out of their houses with hoes and sticks to scratch at the earth, I 
could see that their actions meant more than a willingness to grow food. Rather, these 
were an affirmation and a hope that the world was back on course.
For me, the Zambesi was a setting of huge contrasts. While some days were 
spent in cracking boredom, others brought so much new information that I felt 
overwhelmed and fantasised about adopting simpler research questions, such as 
fishing methods or classification of types of maize. In a field situation of great sensoiy 
stimulation, especially hunger and distress, where one attempts to account for every 
new piece of information just because it might be important, the temptation to simplify 
in order to cope is a dragon that must be slain on a daily basis. Deference to the 
ethnographic context in the form of the courage to truly listen is, I think, perhaps the 
key to telling a more representative story in which the ethnographer avoids playing into 
the hands of dominant groups.
In “The Third Space”, an interview with Jonathan Rutherford, Homi Bhabha 
discussed the avoidance of hegemony by listening to the multiplicity of voices in an 
encounter with the ‘other’. He argued that encounters between people constitute an 
intersubjective reality in which:
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“The articulation of cultures is possible not because of the familiarity or 
similarity of contents, but because all cultures are symbol-forming and 
subject-constituting, interpellative practices”.
(Rutherford 1990:210).
He suggested that translation is “a motif or a trope...for the activity of 
displacement within a linguistic sign” (Rutherford 1990:210). In other words, 
languages are structurally disposed to convey shifts in meaning. For this reason he 
stated that cultures: “are only constituted in relation to that otherness internal to their 
own symbol-forming activity which makes them decentred structures” (Rutherford 
1990:210). Thus he made way for the possibility of the concept of Third Space, which 
he suggested: “displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of 
authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through 
received wisdom” (Rutherford 1990:211).
In Bhabha’s argument culture does not lend itself to categories. Instead, it is 
about constant change of ideas and practices through intersubjective acts of 
communication. For culture to exist thus requires “a non-sovereign notion of self’ 
(Rutherford 1990:212), an idea which is not dissimilar to the erosion and 
reconstruction of self anthropologists experience in the field
The idea of the ‘Third Space’ is attractive because it is not proposed as a 
psychological, social, or geographical space separated from the continuity of social 
life. Instead, it is a notion about the process of culture-making, about the normality of 
a contingent self, and about the abstraction of a mythical cultural destination 
ever-receding with each intersubjective encounter. The avoidance of a priori labelling 
is a humanist approach to the other because it allows for the possibility of renewing an 
understanding of things previously known. Kingsley Garbett, Chet Lancaster, and 
David Lan wrote inspiring accounts of the Zambesi which played a large part in my 
decision to work there. But in the 1990s, conditions were different, and I had to 
understand the place anew. I found the sort of approach which Bhabha espoused to be 
both natural and gratifying because it permitted me to know the Zambesi and my 
informants on our own mutual terms.
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Chapter 3: The Roots of Chikunda Domination: The Making of Kanyemba’s 
House in Dande
i. An Introduction to the Marunga Rosario Andrade Clan:
Conquest and domination are important issues in this study because they help 
to interpret the patterns of social life in the past that have shaped the way in which 
Zambesians understood and dealt with change in the 1990s. The Chikunda provide a 
good case study of domination in Dande area because of their long-term control of 
political process and economy. In this study, they stand in counterpoint to other clans 
and lineages that were less well-structured. The key to Chikunda supremacy was their 
social organisation. The Chikunda I lived with in Chikafa and Kanyemba were 
organised into two strata: the marunga rosario andrade clan composed of three 
lineages who ruled; and, a number of subordinate clans of shallow genealogy who 
claimed origins from a variety of ancestral areas.
Chikunda hierarchy enabled three crucial circumstances which consolidated 
the group’s power. First, the Marunga clan always ruled a centralised polity, a fact 
which allowed them to control trade and exact labour or tribute. During the 1990s, 
they used this hierarchical approach to monopolise political process and to control the 
local committees who administered the CAMPFIRE scheme in Kanyemba. Secondly, 
Chikunda hierarchy facilitated alliance with other powers. Those who the Chikunda 
could not subjugate they made their allies, especially the presence of the state in the 
Zambesi. For example, the marunga rosario andrade clan was well connected with 
the Portuguese during the late 19th century as was evidenced by the fact that its leader, 
Jose do Rosario Andrade held the capitania (Portuguese regional administration) of 
Zumbo, a town at the confluence of the Luangwa and Zambesi Rivers. When the 
Portuguese Crown and the British South Africa Company formed administrative 
boundaries during the 1890s, the clan split with Jose do Rosario Andrade (also known 
by his African name of Kanyemba) moving into Portuguese territory, and Chihumbe, 
the elder brother staying within designated British land. Chief Chapoto harnessed the 
potential of Chikunda social structure to maintain friendly relations with the 
successive regimes of the British Crown, the Rhodesian state, and the Zimbabwean 
state. For instance, he acted as administrator for the British and provided labour when
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it was demanded. He also worked with the Rhodesian District Commissioner during 
the Independence War to mediate the tenuous relationship between the population and 
the pressures exercised by both the guerrilla movements (ZANLA and ZIPRA) and the 
Rhodesian forces. In the 1990s he accepted the Zimbabwean state, adjudicated with 
the local police, and even compared President Mugabe with Kanyemba the conqueror. 
The third feature of Chikunda monopoly is the fact that their strong leadership could 
command a compliant following which enabled the acquisition of tribute, and the 
ability to provide labour for the state. The ability to command a population has been 
a feature of Chikunda leadership during the duration of marunga occupancy of Dande.
Together with their monopoly of resources, the Chikunda liked to accentuate 
their higher status as marunga through social markers. In the numerous stories I 
gathered for this study, the clan term ‘marunga’ was associated with legitimate 
conquest of the area, long-term residency, relative wealth and power. The language to 
indicate superior rank was articulated in local clan histories which alluded to alliances 
and experiences with colonial power, particularly that of the Portuguese.
In a general sense, marunga status was heightened by the assertion that 
exclusive membership was available only to clans associated with azungu ntsuwa 
ancestry (‘whites of the islands’). The story of ntsuwa identity sheds some light on the 
position of Chikunda clans in the Zambesi at the end of the 19th century. Before the 
construction of the Cabora Bassa dam east of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, 
there existed a number of islands on the Zambesi River populated by Chikunda clan 
chiefs. These were individuals of mixed Portuguese and African ancestry who acted as 
middlemen between Mozambican coastal exporters and local populations who 
produced trade goods. Of note was the marunga monopoly in trade of elephant tusks, 
particularly as it provided the context for the establishment of a relationship with the 
Korekore clans now known as the nzou samanyanga (elephant, keeper of tusks). This 
association was quite strong during the 1990s when the Chikunda headman in Chikafa 
shared rule of the area with the Korekore Village Chairman. Livingstone (1857) 
mentioned having stopped on these islands whilst crossing from the north to the south 
shores of the Zambesi River and acknowledged the control which island leaders 
exercised over traffic there.
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A number of marunga individuals liked to distinguish themselves from other 
clans by their Catholicism. In the 1990s, most members of this clan supported both the 
Catholic Church, as well as a land spirit. Unlike newer churches such as the Faith 
Apostolic Mission or Jehovah's Witnesses, the Catholic Church did not prohibit 
participation in local spirit-based forms of belief. This is an unsurprising fact as the 
Catholic Church first arrived in the Zambesi in the 1500s. Its survival is undoubtedly 
due to a co-existence with other forms of worship. For example, in Chikafa, the son of 
a Chikunda headman would occasionally preach at Sunday Mass. In Kanyemba, Chief 
Chapoto went to lengths to indicate his pious belief in the Catholic Church. On one 
particular occasion he crossed himself and bent his head theatrically in prayer before 
a meal. Also, past generations of Chikunda boys of the marunga clan traditionally 
attended the Catholic Miruru Mission in Mozambique.
Historically, the Chikunda have been associated with the Catholic Church 
through the Portuguese land-tenure system. The prazeiros of the past were Catholic 
and a number of prazos had been owned by Dominicans and Jesuits. In an article about 
the famous Chikunda diarist Jose Fernandes Jr., Leisegang (1991) described his 
baptism at the age of twelve as a type of initiation. He wrote that Chikunda boys could 
be called muzungu after their baptisms and that “baptism must have been considered 
as a form of initiation to the world of Europeans” (Leisegang 1991:5). But during the 
1990s, in the face of social change brought by immigration and development, it is 
possible that Catholicism became another aspect of local identity harnessed to denote 
long-term residence and, therefore, greater claim to land and resources.
Portions of the Chikunda lexicon, terms of address, customs, and even 
personal preferences associated with the Portuguese were considered indicators of 
high marunga status. A number of nouns in the Chikunda language derive from 
Portuguese, for example, the word for ‘sweet potato’ is mbatata (from the Portuguese 
word for ‘potato’) in contrast to the Korekore term bambaira. Chikunda greetings are 
also in Portuguese. For example, the Chikunda would instead say ‘Bom Dia’ (good 
morning) in the Portuguese way, whilst the Korekore morning greeting is ‘marara sei?’ 
(How have you slept?). Food preparation through extra refinement of flour, and longer 
cooking hours for fish was also depicted as of higher status. Finally, professed
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preferences for saluting (in the way of Chikunda soldiers) instead of African hand 
clapping, and for perceived Portuguese foods such as tea and biscuits, can be 
interpreted as an allusion to notions of a preferential relationship between colonial 
powers and marunga.
Lineages subordinate to the marunga clan in Kanyemba liked to recount stories 
of their ancestors' association, as soldiers and hunters, with a marunga leader. In 
doing so they reiterated their position as collaborators in the original act of conquest 
of Dande, rather than as conquered people. In effect, these people wanted to position 
themselves as allies of the Chikunda power rather than as either kaporo (slaves) or 
autochthons, both of whom are the classificatory conquered. The Chikunda name 
derives from the verb kukunda (to conquer) and thus conquest is important as a marker 
of group identity. For the non-marunga, the importance of historical identification as 
marunga followers resided with a greater claim to land, resources, and marriage 
partners during the 1990s. This approach to history was an attempt to limit 
marginalisation by the all-powerful marunga clan, and to participate, in perpetuity, in 
the spoils of conquest.
In order to better situate the Chapoto chieftaincy I encountered during 
fieldwork and to understand how the marunga clan came to conquer Kanyemba and 
rule Chikafa, it is useful to examine the tradition of Portuguese colonialism from 
which they emerged.
ii. Portuguese Colonisation of the Zambesi: The Prazo System and Slavery
In comparison to the extensive Portuguese domination of the Zambesi over the 
past five centuries, the Chapoto chieftaincy in Kanyemba area seems insignificant. 
However, Chief Chapoto’s style of rule, and his clan and lineage’s affinity with 
domination all had their roots in early Chikunda history. Important features of 
contemporary Chikunda social life such as their two-tier social hierarchy, their 
propensity to subjugate, and ability to collude with state-level power are entwined with 
oral histories depicting a privileged closeness with the Portuguese. A number of 
informants reiterated the saying, “the Chikunda walked with the Portuguese” to denote 
this special relationship. In this section, I will discuss the relevance of the prazo
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system, the issue of slavery, and early relations with African populations to provide a 
background for later discussion of the ethnographic data I gathered.
The Portuguese encountered the Munhumutapa State during their first 
incursions into the Zambesi and found that the Mutapa controlled a number of 
tributary chiefs and a state-level polity with a system of communication and an army. 
The key moment of early Portuguese colonisation of the Zambesi was the Barreto 
expedition of 1569-75 in which Muslim plantations and settlements were occupied 
and the Karanga Chief ceded tributary Tonga chieftaincies. By the early 17th century 
Jesuits and Dominicans were awarded lands. By 1629 the Munhumutapa ceded 
sovereignty to the Portuguese Crown. This concession of power by entrenched 
Zambesian authorities was good news for Portugal, except that it did not have the 
resources to rule these vast conquered areas. In order to maintain a degree of influence, 
the Portuguese Crown turned to established Afro-Portuguese families and their private 
chicunda armies. While hiring these armies seemed a useful way to sub-contract 
control, it turned out to be a double-edged sword for the Portuguese. At the same time 
as the prazeiros fulfilled their military contracts with the Portuguese Crown, they also 
reinforced their own strength by using their newfound legitimacy to extract tribute 
from local populations. The Portuguese tacitly authorised this system of land 
acquisition because the prazeiros paid their soldiers in women captives and trade 
goods. This pattern of effective conquest by the prazeiros took the form of forcibly 
invading a chieftaincy, gaining permission form the Munhumutapa to settle, then 
petitioning the Crown for title to the area. Because it served the Portuguese Crown’s 
interests, these titles were granted (Newitt 1995:218-221).
The Portuguese Crown applied three legal models in its attempts to stake out 
land in the Zambesi. In effect, these were attempts to attract Portuguese settlers to what 
was a very harsh climate for Europeans. The first model was that of the sesmaria, 
which consisted of rights to vacant lands granted under the principle of emphyteusis 
or inheritance through the female line for three generations. These grants were usually 
made to female relatives of Crown servants as a form of dowry in a system where the 
monarch performed a parental role. The objective of this system was to encourage 
Portuguese settlement by attracting couples to these land grants who would makes
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attempts at economic development.
The second type of grant was that of the capitania (captaincy) of an area. In this
case, grants were made to the head of a local Afro-Portuguese family who was given
the title of captain. In return he was required to raise taxes, administer justice, and
undertake defence. The benefits to the recipient were seigneurial rights over the land,
and the position to create trade monopolies. These grants were also hereditary. Jose do
Rosario Andrade, the conqueror of Kanyemba area who installed the marunga rosario
andrade clan there, was made capitao-mor of Zumbo in the late 19th century. The third
legal model of land concession was basically administrative in character. It applied to
land title in the form of grants of villages made to religious orders in order to support
a Crown office in their jurisdiction (Newitt 1995:223).
Although these legal models seemed to indicate that the Portuguese Crown had
a measure of control over areas claimed under its name, and could collect taxes, their
effect was the opposite:
“The huge extent of the prazos, the length of the leases, and the fact 
that they involved control over a subject peasantry all combined to 
frustrate these intentions and reinforce the feudal relationships of the 
Afro-Portuguese families with their clients and peasants on the one 
hand and with the Crown on the other”.
(Newitt 1995:225)
Considering that the prazo system lasted almost 400 years, from its formalisation in 
1646 when a letter from the King of Portugal to the Viceroy of Mozambique described
tlithe system of emphyteusis, to the early 20 century, there was plenty of time for 
prazeiros to develop a social organisation to maintain power over subject populations. 
To this end three overlapping systems of authority were devised for the prazos: in the 
first tier there would be the prazo dona (lady by title who held rights by emphyteusis) 
and her family who provided services to the Crown, kept chicunda soldiers, paid a 
quit-rent, developed land, received tribute and labour, and performed chiefly duties to 
the settled African population; in the second tier, there were the colonos or free 
population whose leaders were fumos (headmen) and paid mussoco (tribute) in grain, 
ivory, or gold dust; in the third tier, there existed the regiments of soldier slaves 
referred to as achicunda who supervised labour and defended the prazo against attack
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(Newitt 1995:232-234).
The consolidation of a Chikunda identity began on the prazos. Prazeiros 
acquired large amounts of slaves “through various clientship arrangements which 
might involve the exchange of labour service for the eventual acquisition of cattle or 
wives” and thus encompassed people in a relationship of “reciprocal obligation” 
(Newitt 1995:234). With the need both for protection and internal policing of the 
peasant population, prazeiros created the category of soldier slave. These slaves, or 
chicunda, were organised along military lines and lived in regiments in defined areas 
in the prazos. They had a chain of command at the pinnacle of which stood the 
prazeiro, followed by a mocazambo (captain), a sachikunda (deputy), and then the 
soldiers. Newitt argued that a strict hierarchy provided the opportunity for the 
chicunda to acquire a strong identity where, “they came to see themselves as attached 
to a particular prazo rather than a particular senhor, and as a result it was crucial that 
whoever was granted a prazo should be able to establish control over the chicunda” 
(Newitt 1995:235).
There were many factors which bound achicunda to particular prazos and 
patrons, including protection from further enslavement, the opportunity to acquire 
wives, a role in trade, and a position of relative power to other slaves and to the 
established peasant populations. At the same time, the fact of living in a defined form 
of social organisation over long periods of time also provided ample opportunity for 
the creation of group interests not always in agreement with those of their prazeiro 
patrons. As we saw in Chapter 1, there is debate regarding Chikunda group identity 
and cohesion, however it is undeniable that the importance of chicunda regiments 
within the prazos increased over time, not least because they were needed both by the 
prazeiros to protect their interests, and by the Portuguese to further theirs. The 
relevance of the prazo system to contemporary Chikunda people is that it contributed 
to the social organisation I encountered in which chiefly marunga clans controlled 
subordinate follower and conquered lineages.
After a history of warfare and economic failure, the prazo system saw its
if.
demise in the early 20 century. The final blow to the power of the Afro-Portuguese 
muzungu was dealt by legislation enacted in 1890 in Portugal, “embodying a
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comprehensive restructuring of the prazos and with them the whole colonial 
administration of central Mozambique” (Newitt 1995:365). By these laws prazos 
deemed to be pacified (in other words, where there was no political turmoil and no 
warfare) were to be leased for 25 years, a specified amount of land was to be cultivated, 
and half of the tax collected had to be in the form of labour obtained from the resident 
population. It was the intention of the Portuguese government that the colonial 
administration of Mozambique would become more systematised and that this would 
bring about economic development. Under this new legislation production within the 
prazos would pay for the new infrastructure of rule. The historian Malyn Newitt 
speculated that these laws aimed to encourage settlement, but instead most land 
concessions were granted to commercial companies. For example, “in the Tete district 
126 out of the 134 prazos were leased to the newly-formed Zambesia Company” 
(Newitt 1995:367). In effect, at the beginning and at the end of the prazo system the 
Portuguese government attempted legislation of the colonial policy without having the 
means to enforce it. At both times, Portugal needed to form local alliances, in order to 
attempt to government their dominions.
While the structure of the prazo system alludes to contemporary Chikunda 
hierarchies, an examination of the issue of African slavery goes to the heart of 
conquest and subjugation in the Zambesi. In a broad sense, the Chapoto Chieftaincy 
articulated both marunga historical ease with hierarchy, and its ideology of social 
control. It is these issues which I explore with regard to slavery.
As a theme, slavery is very broad, but in the Zambesi it is related to two 
overarching preoccupations of the incorporation of strangers and their exclusion. In 
the 1990s, informants defined akaporo (slaves) as people who had no one to bury them. 
In other words, without kin, akaporo stood alone in the world. Akaporo did not have 
blood or uterine relatives, and they did not have the sabwira relationship essential to 
a proper funeral and burial ceremony. Fundamentally, to my informants, the 
denomination of ‘slave’ was synonymous with classificatory outsider as it connoted a 
human being with no history and no residence, who was essentially situated outside of 
time and space. In their minds, kaporo (slave) was the opposite of muntu (person). 
Thus, the term ‘kaporo’ denoted relations of clientship, subjugation, and social
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exclusion practised within the Zambesi over the time of Portuguese colonialism, and 
certainly within the duration of marunga settlement in Dande.
During the 1990s, Zambesians were greatly preoccupied by issues of social 
incorporation and exclusion. Clan, lineage, and the locally-used term, ‘tribe’, 
functioned as labels to situate individuals in a community. The cult of land spirits also 
described many more mechanisms of incorporation than of exclusion. For example, 
newcomer families who were readily welcomed by their neighbours could perform the 
beer rituals that allowed them to build a homestead and acquire a sabwira. Men were 
accepted if  they paid the required brideprice in instalments, the preferred method in the 
areas where I worked as it entailed an ongoing relationship of obligation to the bride’s 
family. I also noted instances of temporary adoption of distant members of families in 
Chikafa during the drought of 1991-92. These arrangements often involved children 
who performed household services in exchange for food and shelter. There were also 
patron-client relationships of various types ranging from seniors mentoring and 
providing opportunities to the young, to families placing girls with a local shopkeeper 
as maids during the 1991-92 drought. That these young girls provided domestic and 
sexual services to the shopkeeper, in an arrangement similar to that of wives, resonates 
with the practice of wife capture practised in the Zambesi in the past. As I will discuss 
in Chapter 5, the ultimate form of inclusion in the Zambesi was when individuals, 
households, lineages or clans became members of the pangolin clan.
Witchcraft stood in counterpoint to the cult of land spirits because witches 
represented disorder and affliction. Witchcraft was the premier instrument of 
exclusion and, as a rule, always emanated from within the collectivity. Thus kin, 
neighbours, and newcomers could all be targets of witchcraft which mediated where 
a person stood on the continuum of kaporo and kin. Unsurprisingly, within the kin 
group, affines were potential sources of witchcraft. Affines were, by definition, 
perpetual newcomers, and considered to be dangerous. Members of clans and lineages 
who were ranked as latecomers to the area were also in danger of becoming targets of 
sorcery. Also, recent arrivals in Chikafa and Kanyemba ran the risk of witchcraft 
accusations in times of stress, especially if their clan names were foreign. In Chapter 
9 I will describe one such incident which played out the distress caused by the
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combination of the MZP the drought of 1991-92.
In their everyday discourse, Zambesians spoke of akaporo as the hopelessly 
excluded. However, these categorical statements must be tempered with the 
knowledge that I researched during a time of stress when social structures were under 
threat from immigration, political and economic changes, and drought. During the 
1990s, to label others as akaporo became a shorthand for social exclusion and 
legitimation of marginality. Its use was also a clue to me of the pressure which the 
succession dispute in Kanyemba, and drought and development in Chikafa had placed 
on inhabitants.
However Zambesians perceived the issue of akaporo, attention should be paid 
to the issue of African slavery because it provides insight into Chikunda clan identity. 
Miers and Kopytoff (1977) argued that the difference between slavery as a lineage 
affair and an inferior status determined social mobility. In their view, slaves absorbed 
into a lineage by a relationship akin to marriage, would experience greater affective 
closeness, kinship integration, and a possible privileged position. Also, these slaves 
could assume the demeanour of members of their new households such that outsiders 
would find them indistinguishable. In contrast, the slave acquired to fulfil a particular 
structural position within a society might develop common allegiances with other 
similarly placed people rather than with the household to which they were attached. 
Social mobility would be enacted differently in these two circumstances. In the first 
case, there was the possibility of freedom for slave children, whereas in the second 
case, a disturbance of social rules might have been necessary.
African systems of slavery are concerned with the issue of rights-in-persons. In 
slavery, “such phenomena as kinship, adoption, the acquisition of wives and children 
are all inextricably bound up with exchanges that involve precise equivalences in 
goods and money” (Miers and Kopytoff 1977:11). There were a variety of ways in 
which people became slaves. For example, there was the practice of voluntarily 
placing oneself under the patronage of a powerful person in times of strife such as war
tlior hunger. During the 19 century, individuals joined Chikunda warlords by enacting 
a ritual called mitete in which the candidate demonstrated his subjugation by breaking 
a worthless possession belonging to the patron and, thus symbolically placing himself
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in debt. Additionally, individuals were given in compensation, became kidnapping 
victims, and were captured in wars and raids. In places of social upheaval such as 
warfare and drought: “Political and social power rested with those who could 
command a large number of kinsmen and dependents, whether clients, followers, or 
‘slaves’” (Miers and Kopytoff 1977:14). The Afro-Portuguese prazeiros were well 
aware that the acquisition and maintenance of large numbers of slaves, primarily 
achicunda warriors, strengthened their economic and political power.
In African systems of slavery, the key issue in the resolution of individuals’ 
marginality was their incorporation into a society. The initial status of a newcomer 
would be dependent on how they arrived in the new society and on the position of their 
patron. Over time, marginality could be reduced in three dimensions. These were 
based on the newcomers’ formal status, informal affective relationship with masters, 
and worldly achievement and success (Miers and Kopytoff 1977:19). The amount of 
social mobility experienced by a slave could, thus, represent their degree of 
incorporation into the receiving society. If a person had been acquired by a lineage, 
then “their position in its hierarchy reflects a balance between their authority as 
members and their vulnerability as wealth” (Miers and Kopytoff 1977:24). In the case 
of women slaves, their value often resided with reproduction for their master’s lineage. 
If the new society was patrilineal, then the woman slave might be married or enter into 
a role of concubinage with the master or a male member of his lineage. Her role would 
be to have children for the master’s line, a situation in which no bridewealth would be 
transacted. In these cases her children would belong to the new lineage and might be 
accepted on par with children of free mothers. Where the master married off the 
female slave, he would receive the bridewealth paid for her. If the new society was 
matrilineal, the slave woman’s children also belonged to her master as she would have 
no kin to make claims on her progeny. In either case, a reduction of marginality could 
be achieved by female slaves becoming kin through their children (Miers and Kopytoff 
1977:29-32).
In essence, Miers and Kopytoff (1977) argued that slavery in Africa had its 
origin in kin-based societies where a primary objective of acquiring individuals was to 
broaden a lineage. This conclusion is the point of debate with Meillassoux (1986) who
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contended that exploitation of members of one’s own lineage (into which reproducing 
slaves enter) is incompatible with a functioning model of kinship. Whereas Miers and 
Kopytoff (1977) argued that slavery and kinship exist on a continuum, Meillassoux 
asserted that these were two separate realms which could not inter-relate in ways 
where one would cause the perpetuation of the other.
In the first chapter of his book, Anthropologie de lEsclavage (1986),
Meillassoux was at pains to demonstrate the difference between kin and slaves. He
believed that the impetus to slavery was not couched in the need to broaden a lineage
or support base of retainers, but instead in economic reasons which made renewal of
productive individuals more attractive by capture rather than through reproduction. He
distinguished between social and biological reproduction by comparing the role of the
male outsider in both patrilineal and matrilineal societies. In patrilineal societies the
social and biological roles of father coincided in that for a man to be a father, he only
needed to be the husband of the children’s mother (Meillassoux 1986:30). However, in
a matrilineal society, a man’s social role as a senior male hinged on his relationship
with his sister’s children. In this case:
“L’homme etranger ne peut remplir de fonction reproductrice que s’il est, 
lui aussi, apparente, accepte comme ‘pere sociale’, c’est-a-dire s’il recoit 
de ces hotes la capacite formelle de reproduire ou d’etendre les 
structures-plutot que les effectifs-de sa communaute d’accueil”.
(Meillassoux 1986:30)
In this case, a man in a matrilineal society may become a father only if  he is
incorporated through marriage. Simple biological reproduction is not enough in these
circumstances. In a way, I think that Miers and Kopytoff (1977) neglected to make two
essential distinctions: that between blood and uterine kin; and that between social and
biological reproduction. As a result, their thinking became focussed on manumission
through biological reproduction rather than through achievement of social position.
In a chapter on children of mixed slave and free person unions Meillassoux 
addressed a series of ideas relevant to the problematic of Chikunda clan identity. After 
deliberating on the various combinations of possible unions between slaves and 
receiving societies, he concluded that mixed marriages could result in the creation of 
independent lineages which would exist side-by-side with established lineages. He 
suggested that the liminal position of new slave-founded lineages enabled them to
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fulfil ritual and administrative functions within the larger society (Meillassoux 
1986:133). Additionally, the principle of “monolineal succession” permitted the 
constitution of a new social strata, neither slave nor free person, perfectly situated to 
carry out essential bureaucratic and ritual roles by virtue of a structural seniority with 
relation to other outsiders in that society (Meillassoux 1986:135-136).
The relationship between the rigid social structure promoted within 
Portuguese prazos and the African approach to slavery was crucial in the development 
of Chikunda clan identity in the Zambesi Valley. There is a strange symmetry between 
the position of powerful slaves on the prazos during the 17th and 18th centuries, and 
habits of conquest and subjugation during the 19 century. But rather than argue that 
the marunga clans who live in the Zambesi today have their origins in the prazo 
system, I will instead submit that the prazos simply provided the conditions for the 
creation of corporate identities based on power and mediation.
Specifically, if  the prazos provided the conditions for the creation of an 
achicunda (warrior-slaves) corporate identity, then African slavery practices, which 
the prazeiros put to use, contributed to its logic and meaning. For instance, the issue 
of incorporation and exclusion of foreigners to polities was a very important aspect of 
marunga clan identity in the 1990s where Chapoto embraced the Zimbabwean state 
but excluded the tembo mvura. Similarly, the concept of former slaves who create new 
independent lineages specialising in bureaucracy and ritual also resonated with the 
position of Chief Chapoto who displayed ambivalence between his alliance with the 
state from which he had traditionally derived his power, and the local population with 
whom he lived.
In sum, the marunga rosario andrade clan I encountered in the 1990s 
embodied a duality of influences through their clan ideology of exclusive corporate 
identity and experience of oscillation between subjugation and alliance with others. In 
a sense, their everyday life was a performance of their origins where, ‘Tesclavage, 
meme lointainement herite, meme tempere par le ‘sang’ des francs, nourrit une 
ideologic puissante de discrimination et d’arbitraire” (Meillassoux 1986:138).
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iii. Chikunda Migration to Dande: The Cultural Logic of Conquest
Historians place Jose do Rosario Andrade as capitao-mor (Portuguese
thadministrator) of Zumbo town during the late 19 century, and describe him as a 
warlord of note who controlled numerous prazos along the Zambesi River. However, 
he was also known by the African name, Kanyemba, and in Chikunda oral history, is 
considered to be one of three brothers belonging to the marunga rosario andrade clan 
who conquered the present-day areas of Chikafa and Kanyemba in Dande. The eldest 
of these brothers was Chihumbe, followed by Kanyemba, and then Nyanderu. Their 
parents were Chowufombo, an individual of mixed Portuguese-African parentage, and 
Maria.
According to Chief Chapoto, the first of the three brothers to arrive in 
Kanyemba area was Nyanderu. He traveled on a reconnaissance trip to gather 
information regarding the suitability of the area for settlement and the availability of 
elephant tusks for trade. Upon arrival he found the Sori people hunting elephant with 
madipa (spears), killing them, taking the meat but leaving the tusks. Nyanderu then 
sent word to his father, Chowufombo, who was in Nyungwe, to come to the area and 
bring beads, cloth, and hoes. When Chowufombo arrived he gave the people cloth. He 
asked who the owner of the area was and the people replied that it was Nyawanga. 
Chowufombo then took a peca (length of cloth), mbadzo (hoes), and usanga (beads) 
which he gave to Chief Nyawanga. Shortly thereafter Nyawanga was possessed by the 
land spirit Nyamaqwete. The spirit was given cloth, after which Nyawanga, acting as 
medium for Nyamaqwete, took a lump of soil and gave it to Chowufombo. He also 
planted a mutuwa tree. After these things were done the spirit told Chowufombo that 
the land was his.
The dramatic climax of this story, when Chowufombo is given a lump of soil, 
is a statement regarding conquest. More importantly, the planting of a sacred tree 
symbolises the legitimacy of this conquest as it alludes to the relinquishing, by the 
established authority, of ritual power. These two acts in legend were apt metaphors for 
Chapoto’s predicament during the 1990s. On the one hand, it was true that his clan 
controlled land use in the area and held a monopoly of the economy and political 
process. On the other hand, their ritual power was almost nonexistent as support for
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marunga land spirits had become fragmented along lineage lines due to the succession 
dispute. The result was that the mpondoro Kanyemba was supported by members of 
his lineage, while the mpondoro Chihumbe did not have a medium. The key tension I 
observed in Chapoto Chieftaincy existed between a strong marunga clan identity 
which enabled their power and the interests of descendants of Chihumbe and 
Kanyemba who competed for the chieftaincy. The Chiefs story of conquest should be 
seen in light of this circumstance.
Chapoto’s story depicts the three themes central to Zambesian cultural logic of 
conquest: the symbolism of cloth, hoes, and beads. In Chikunda lore, these items are 
important to marunga life in the Zambesi and symbolise civilisation. First, the gift of 
cloth to the Sori people and to their leader Chief Nyawanga was recounted as the 
proper way in which to approach a territory. Cloth was the prescribed gift for obtaining 
an audience with the land spirits. In the 1990s one gave black or blue cloth, 
symbolising their rain-making role, to the mediums of land spirits as payment for the 
performance of a ceremony. It was also an appropriate gift for the wives of sabhuku 
and chiefs because it showed deference to their social status and position of authority.
In Chief Chapoto’s account, cloth was also symbolic of new forms of exchange 
introduced into the area by the Chikunda. Oral histories described a time in the past 
when elephant tusks were traded for pieces of cloth of the same length. For the 
Chikunda, presentation of cloth to local authorities meant the expansion of their trade 
networks. Also, in Chikunda lore, if a local population exchanged their bodily 
coverings made of skins or pounded bark for clothing, this meant that they had 
accepted Chikunda authority. Importantly, that the Chikunda had offered cloth upon 
arrival was mean to convey that Chikunda conquerors acted appropriately, and so their 
rule was legitimate. Thus, cloth was highly symbolic of domination.
The story of the introduction of hoes to Kanyemba also supported marunga 
domination in the area. In the first place, hoes symbolised cultivation of food crops. 
The Chikunda opposed cultivation to the gathering of wild foods which they mocked 
as inefficient because people could not gather enough to store. Several senior 
Chikunda said that the absence of granaries in tembo mvura households was an 
example of their inferiority. The gift of hoes to local people and their acceptance of
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these could also refer to economic subjugation of the local population by the marunga 
clan
It is also important to note that hoes symbolised brideservice. In the 1990s, 
notions of the ideal Chikunda marriage involved the husband moving into the bride’s 
parent’s homestead to farm and build houses for two to three years (and/or until the 
wife became pregnant). After that time the man was expected to take his wife to his 
parent’s household where they would settle and build their own gwangwa (granary). 
For a couple to possess their own granary was symbolic of their ability to reproduce 
and rear children and thus ensure patrilineal continuity. In this way, a marriage 
conducted according to prescription would have a man performing brideservice to 
compensate his wife’s line for providing the means by which children, who will belong 
to his line, could come into the world. Once an independent granary was built 
patrilocally, the ability to rear the children was demonstrated and the couple would 
have entered fully into adulthood. Problems of inter-generational conflict had arisen in 
the 1990s when young Chikunda, as well as their Korekore counterparts, rejected the 
idea of brideservice by either marrying outside of the area, or making cash payments to 
their in-laws.
In Chikunda oral histories, the idea of newcomers presenting hoes to a 
conquered population alluded to an inversion of the proper relations between a 
bridegroom, who must pay compensation, and the bride’s family, who have the right to 
expect it. In conquest, the Chikunda arrived in an area as newcomers, appropriated 
women and subjugated men. In doing so they inverted the proper order of the marriage 
process because not only had they appeared as grooms to the wife-giving clans of the 
conquered locality, by subjugating the men, they also symbolically collected 
brideservice. In the proper process of marriage, a groom should compensate his wife’s 
clan for her loss, and thereby enter into an alliance of mutually beneficial exchange 
over time. In Chief Chapoto’s story of arrival in Dande, the Chikunda refused to enter 
into a set of obligations with the local wife-giving lineages, in addition to which they 
also refused to acknowledge the autochthons ritual superiority.
In contrast to Chief Chapoto’s Chikunda story, David Lan interpreted Korekore 
myths of arrival in Dande in the following way: “the Korekore transform themselves
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from fathers-in-law into sons-in-law, whereas the autochthons start off as sons-in-law
and are fathers-in-law by the end” (1985:84). In this way, the Korekore adopted local
marriage customs which implied a set of ongoing obligations to wife-giving lines, and
accepted the ritual importance of the autochthons that provided both women and water
and were therefore the source of fertility (Lan 1985:86). As this author explained:
“If one lineage supplies another with the fertility it needs to perpetuate 
itself, it will be partially reciprocated by a marriage payment or labour 
but the debt is so great that the wife-giving lineage remains in a position 
of superiority with a call on the services of the wife-takers when the 
initial exchange has been completed”.
(Lan 1985:86).
In some oral histories, marunga lineages intermarried exclusively when they 
first arrived in Dande, but later took brides from the local population. When I asked 
about marriage, all informants responded that the marunga preference was to “marry 
our neighbours”. I was told that marunga ignored the practice of brideservice and 
brideprice common in the Zambesi because they would not place themselves in 
situations of social inferiority. In the Zambesi, the marriage prescription was the 
following: newcomer=groom=brideservice. For marunga clans, the marriage rule 
inherent in conquest was: established population=grooms=brideservice.
There is a significant gender angle in the story of introduction of hoes to 
conquered populations. At the same time as hoes represented domination through the 
symbolic brideservice of subjugated people, they also made a statement regarding the 
type of economy that marunga rule entailed. In oral histories marunga men were 
hunters, traders, and warriors who circulated in the Zambesi looking for wealth. 
Women stayed in their home areas and farmed food crops, had children, and 
maintained the integrity of the household. In this way, marunga domination was 
characterised by the movement of men and the geographical fixity of women. That 
women stayed at home to provide for all necessities would make it seem that the 
forcefully patrilineal form of kinship the marunga installed had reverted back to 
matrilineality and matrifocality. This, in fact, was not the case, but rather a way to cope 
with the absence of men whilst maintaining families. In Magomero, Landeg White 
described a similar situation in which the thangata system of forced labour caused 
men to leave the area while women remained behind. The resulting social organisation,
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where women found other affiliations, resembled a return to a matrifocal society when, 
in fact, “custom became an alternative form of resistance, a doctrine thrust in the face 
of reality” (1987:167).
In effect, the apparent alternation between patrilineal and matrilineal systems 
of kinship was really a function of the economy in which women compensated for the 
prolonged absence of men. Chapoto recounted that his father had married a number of 
wives in order to have enough labour capacity in his household to maintain his status 
as Chief.
The fixity of women during early marunga settlement is inscribed in the local 
belief system with the phrase to explain the word for sunset, kudoka, “when the sun is 
going to its mother’s womb”. The vivid imagery of land as womb signified well 
women’s reproductive role as well their association with the earth. On one visit to a 
Chikunda household, being short of mat space, the senior woman offered me her place 
and sat on the ground. When I protested she grasped soil in her fist and stated that she 
liked the bare earth because it was the source of many good things including field 
mice.
An important division of labour in Dande occurred between activities which 
transform and organise. Women were primarily responsible for the gestation and 
supervision of children, a great amount of farming, cooking and beer-making. Men’s 
responsibilities included organising social events, political decision-making, 
discussion regarding settlement of disputed claims, and building the frames of houses. 
From males flowed not only an individual’s identity, but also group identity. As men 
organised collective action, women transformed raw materials into finished social 
products. One example of differences in gender roles was that most local committees 
(for example, the Village Development Committee, the Wildlife Committee, and the 
Borehole Committee) were comprised exclusively of males. With the demise of the 
male meeting house (dare), local meetings of these committees became the fora for the 
discussion of social organisation.
The division of male and female social spheres was highlighted by the 
behaviour of women who were past child-bearing, who made a point of subverting the 
proper gender division of activity. For example, older women engaged in male
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activities such as making rope. They attended as many ritual beer parties as possible, 
danced salaciously or in unprescribed ways, and drank beer until they were drunk. One 
interpretation is that this behaviour was the antithesis of the format of a mpondoro 
possession ritual in which male and female roles were arranged to represent the sexual 
division of activity, where males organised and women transformed. For one, land 
spirits were almost all male, as were the overwhelming majority of their mediums and 
assistants. Also, in possession rituals, women brewed beer from local maize, and it 
was a woman, perhaps the medium’s assistant’s wife, who prepared snuff consumed 
by the medium during trance. Women’s participation in the unfolding of the ceremony 
required that they dance in a prescribed pattern, sing established songs regarding the 
spirit, and ululate when the spirit arrived. Consultation with the mpondoro usually 
involved male members of a family. It could be argued that women were marginal to 
dealings with the mpondoro, whose role was to ensure the social and physical 
continuity of the area. In other words, males dealt with the source of fertility, women 
with providing its conduit. In contrast, by getting drunk on ritual beer, dancing and 
speaking outside of convention, smoking tobacco and taking snuff, older women 
rejected their subjugation as conduits for male design rather than participants in the 
ongoing dominant cultural discourse. The perceived audacity that accompanied these 
behaviours only served to illustrate the separation between the sexes, and women’s 
association with land as symbolic of their transformative powers, and their 
geographical fixity.
The rich meaning of hoes in Chapoto’s story of marunga arrival described a 
symbolic feminising of the subjugated population by their refusal to perform 
brideservice, while at the same time it entailed an economic division of activities 
which older females ritually subverted by their performance of oppositional acts in 
their old age.
The introduction of beads to Kanyemba area by the marunga provided another 
interesting story of domination. In Chief Chapoto’s story, Chowufombo gave beads to 
Chief Nyawanga. Complementary oral history accounts of other Chikunda informants 
supported the belief that their ancestors, the marunga conquerors, introduced the 
practice of marrying with a bead. One Chikunda male elder described the practice in
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the following way. In the past the patrilineal Chikunda married within their own clan 
in order to avoid the Tande and Korekore people who lived close by. At this time the 
ideal marriage for a female was to her father’s brother’s son. Prescriptively, all 
marriages were to take place between members of the ruling Chikunda lineages who 
all belonged to the marunga nkangaiwa (pigeon) clan. The result was that women and 
their children remained within the clan. The advantage also being that Chikunda of the 
marunga clan (the ruling clan) were neither bride-takers nor bride-givers, which meant 
that they did not enter into obligation-creating affinal relations with outsiders. Oral 
history accounts about Chikunda activity before the conquest of Kanyemba described 
Chikunda ancestors both serving and trading with the Portuguese in a mutually 
beneficial relationship. At the same time, they also depicted a relationship of economic 
inequality between Chikunda and local peoples. One prominent feature of tales of 
conquest was the subjugation of conquered peoples and their disappearance from the 
narrative.
Oral history accounts of Chikunda conquest were unmistakably about 
subjugation. In contrast, accounts of settlement in Dande shifted gears to allude to a 
measure of social interaction with non -marunga clans in the long-term. One example 
of this change was the shift in the marriage prescription from marrying within one’s 
clan to the preference for ego to father’s sister’s daughter. For the patrilineal Chikunda 
this formula meant marriage to a woman of another clan, and constituted an innovation 
in their approach to social relations. According to informants, at the time that the 
Chikunda adopted this practice they paid no brideprice and did no brideservice. 
Instead the criterion for marriageability was the possession of beads. To acquire these 
beads a man had to be a follower of a senior Chikunda male (which meant a warlord) 
such as Kanyemba, Nyanderu, or Chihumbe. These beads were then given to the 
bride’s parents as a form of brideprice. In other words, the groom would have had a 
role in the conquest of the area in order to be eligible to “marry with a bead”. Only men 
in these sub-leadership roles were able to choose from the local women.
In these stories, marriageable women were confined to those from prominent 
families (who were worth marrying for alliance purposes). The point of this argument 
is that, symbolically, male Chikunda wanting to marry non-Chikunda women did their
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brideservice to their leaders who then gave them a bead as a proof of status which was 
then given to the woman’s parents. It was a way in which the local population was 
symbolically constructed as brides to the Chikunda conquerors. In the logic of 
brideservice and brideprice, the lineage that acquired a woman’s labour and future 
children compensated her lineage for their loss. By doing so marriage became an 
alliance between equals. In Chikunda accounts of their arrival in Dande, conquest 
feminised local populations by inverting the practice of compensation to the 
appropriation of reproduction and labour.
Although not mentioned in Chief Chapoto’s story, guns constituted the fourth 
significant introduction that the Chikunda made to Dande. The association between 
Chikunda and guns was often mentioned by members of other clans. The Chikunda 
gun, guguda, was homemade and said to be used for hunting big game such as 
elephant. The gun placed the Chikunda in opposition to both the Korekore and the 
tembo mvura whose specialty was the manufacture of spears. There were two reasons 
why the gun was crucial to Chikunda power in the Zambesi. First, firepower made it 
easy for small groups of Chikunda men to force local populations to do their bidding. 
Second, and more importantly, the possession of guns permitted the Chikunda to 
control trade in elephant tusks in the area.
Trade in elephant tusks was one of the sources of livelihood for Chikunda 
warlords and their followers. In oral accounts it was also given as a reason for 
Chikunda territorial expansion. One story described early Chikunda trade in tusks in 
the following way: When the Chikunda first arrived in Dande they hunted and killed 
elephant. The Korekore were allowed to keep the meat in exchange for carrying the 
tusks to the town of Tete from where they would be shipped out of the valley. What is 
significant about this relationship is the division of labour. Some Chikunda today say 
that the Korekore acted as the slaves of their ancestors. While the Korekore 
totem/sub-totem (mutupu/chidau) is nzou samanyanga or ‘elephant, keeper of the 
tusk’, these people did not say that they were subjects of the Chikunda, but rather 
partners in the ivory trade. In Chief Chapoto’s view, when the Chikunda arrived in 
Dande, they gave the Korekore cloth in payment for carrying tusks. In other Chikunda 
accounts, the trade item was meat. In Korekore accounts, reference to a particular trade
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item was imprecise, probably because meat and cloth were not significant in the 
construction of Korekore worldview. But it is important to note that the difference 
between Korekore and Chikunda accounts of their mutual relationship in the past is 
that the former described partnership whereas the latter described subjugation.
These differences in Chikunda and Korekore versions of their past relationship 
represented a significantly different outlook on their relative positions within Dande 
during the 1990s.Whereas Chikunda adhered to their ideology of clan superiority, 
Korekore accounts were tempered by the knowledge that, at least in Chikafa, they 
shared power with a Chikunda clan.
In the early 1990s, the possession of guns symbolised not only power, but more 
significantly, danger. In Dande, guns were associated with the Chikunda who were 
considered to be specialists both in their production and use. Since possession of guns 
as well as hunting was prohibited in Dande, people were reluctant to discuss the use of 
guns within Zimbabwean territory. For this reason, I was told that the information 
people had about guns related to their use in nearby Mozambique. In the 1990s, some 
guns were made out of the steering shaft of old Landrover cars, while gunpowder was 
made from fertiliser. No one would readily admit to possession of a gun or appear in 
public with one.
In Chikafa and Kanyemba, guns were very much symbols of danger because of 
the two decades of civil war in neighbouring Mozambique, and the ways in which 
Mozambican government officials who legally possessed guns were said to abuse their 
power. For example, there were stories about Mozambican officials intercepting 
travelers at gunpoint along paths (nzira) in order to steal their possessions. One 
informant described a trip to Chinthopo, a town on the Mpanyame River in 
Mozambique, to obtain game meat. He said that on his way back to Chikafa he was 
stopped by a local Mozambican official who pointed a gun at him and forced him to 
give up the meat he was transporting. The sight of guns also reminded people of the 
Independence War, the violence of guerrilla warfare, and the trauma of their time in 
the concentration camps at Mushumbi Pools where they were patrolled by armed 
Rhodesian soldiers.
Chief Chapoto’s story of conquest emphasised marunga domination of
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Kanyemba area through subjugation of established populations and appropriation of 
the economy by the introduction of trade. He recounted his views of the past in a 
context of a succession dispute in which his lineage could lose control of the 
chieftaincy, and at a time of significant change in the Zambesi brought by 
development.
iv. Chikunda Migration to Dande: The View from Chapoto’s Opposition
While Chief Chapoto’s account of arrival told the story of marunga 
domination of Dande, his interpretations derived from his position as the leader of the 
Chihumbe lineage that controlled the disputed chieftaincy. His opponents emanated 
from the Kanyemba lineage also in contention for the Chieftaincy and their 
non-marunga supporters who disliked the Chief.
In contrast to Chapoto’s story, an elderly man of the Kanyemba lineage 
depicted Chikunda arrival in Dande in the following way. He said that in the past there 
existed no ‘tribe’ called the Chikunda. Instead the name applied to people who were 
soldiers of Kanyemba. They did not clap in greeting but rather saluted or shook hands. 
Chikunda “ancestors were coloured, were used to chirungu (European culture)”. In his 
view the Chikunda became black by marrying with the Chirenje who were the 
followers of the marunga clan. The Chikunda brought clothes to Dande. When the 
informant’s ancestors arrived in the area “the people living here were wearing animal 
hides”. He said that “Kanyemba came here looking for elephants”, and that the area 
was under the Portuguese. The Chikunda traded clothes for ivory. But they also hunted 
for elephant in order to obtain tusks which they traded to the Portuguese for cloth and 
missanga (beads).
In this individual’s view, the first member of the marunga rosario andrade 
clan to arrive in Dande was Nyanderu who stopped at Bawa (a settlement across the 
border from Kanyemba), obtained tusks and returned to Tete. Some time later he 
returned to Kanyemba area with his parents, Chowufombo and Maria, and his brother 
Chihumbe. At this time, Kanyemba was away at war and consequently arrived later 
with followers who consisted of his sub-commanders and their warriors. Among these 
groups were the Tanda whose commander was Chicoa, and Guvheya, an African who
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led his own soldiers. This informant added that Kanyemba also brought the Tenjera, 
Atipwe and Mwalongo clans from the area of Ruwenya River close to Tete1.
In this informant’s story, when the marunga rosario andrade clan arrived in 
Dande they found the VaSori, who’s chief was Mburuma, living close to the 
Mwadzamutanda River. They also found the tembo mvura clan whom he claimed had 
originated in the region of Songo Mountain, further east along the Zambesi River. The 
Korekore, whom the informant described as the original inhabitants of the area, were 
to be found at the nearby Angwa River. He added that Kanyemba fought with 
Mburuma but not with the Korekore because “they had no power to fight Kanyemba 
so they paid taxes instead”. He said that at one point Kanyemba helped the Shona to 
fight the Ndebele and so conquered territory all the way to Bulawayo, but that this area 
was lost when the British arrived.
While this informant commented upon the same themes of civilisation and the 
superiority of Chikunda power as had Chief Chapoto, he also discussed Chikunda 
identity in the Zambesi and emphasised the role of Kanyemba in the conquest of the 
Mwadzamutanda River area. His comment that the Chikunda were not a ‘tribe’, and 
that the term applied to soldiers who followed Kanyemba is a statement about social 
hierarchy. At the time of this study ‘Chikunda’ was a label denoting rank, invoked by 
residents of Dande, to describe the social hierarchy characteristic of areas where the 
marunga ruled. The informant who was elderly and quite senior in the Kanyemba 
lineage took pains to accentuate the superiority of the marunga. He said, for example, 
they did not clap hands in the African way, but instead saluted. Clapping hands was a 
custom used in greeting individuals who were socially superior such as elders, teachers, 
and other individuals who were respected. The Chikunda did not clap because they 
acknowledged no social superiors. The informant also mentioned that the Chikunda 
were acquainted with western ways or chirungu, a reference to the marunga past 
association with Portuguese influence. When he stated that the Chikunda had become 
black by marrying their subordinates, the Chirenje, he meant to say that not only was
11 did not find any informants of these clans (mutupu) during my research.
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the marunga clan superior, but that it had married into subordinate lineages. Another 
interesting aspect of his account was the description of the diversity of clans which the 
Chikunda subjugated or incorporated. In mentioning these people in his history he 
tacitly acknowledged their presence within the social milieu of Kanyemba area.
Not surprisingly for a descendant of Kanyemba, this informant made repeated 
mention of his ancestor. By placing Kanyemba at the centre of the act of conquest of 
the area, at the same time as obscuring the role of Chihumbe, he staked a claim for his 
line’s eligibility to the chieftaincy.
v. Marunga Settlement of Chikafa:
The story of the settlement of Chikafa was recounted by Chief Chapoto. At the 
time of this study, although the area was governed by an alliance between the 
Chikunda headman and the Korekore Village Chairman, it had long ceased to be under 
Chapoto’s jurisdiction and was currently under Chief Chitsungo, a Korekore. 
According to Chief Chapoto, in 1912, during the reign of his father, Chapoto (I), the 
boundaries of his chieftaincy extended south of Kanyemba area to the Manyimo River 
from Mpedzapasi, to Chikafa, and Gonono. At the time of conquest, he first of the 
marunga rosario andrade clan to arrive in Chikafa was Basiyao. He was one of 
Chihumbe’s soldiers. The second soldier to arrive was Guvheya, and the third was 
DiSuza. The fourth soldier to arrive there was Chikafa who was Ntsereru, but who had 
married one of Guvheya’s daughters. These four men founded the cluster of 
settlements that formed the greater Chikafa area. Between foundation and 1945 there 
were seven sabhuku ruling in the area. These were: Guvheya, Basiyao, Musuzandare, 
Chowufombo, and Zhuwao who were Chikunda, Chikafa who was Ntsereru, and 
DiSuza who was Chewa.
By 1945 there were six Chikunda sabhuku in Chikafa, Zhuwao having left to 
be Chief in Kanyemba for a short time after the death of Chapoto (I). In the early 1990s 
there were also six sabhuku in the area: Chikafa; Kamunga; Basiyao; DiSuza; 
Guvheya, and Chowufombo. Sabhuku Chikafa obtained his position because his 
mother was descended from Nyanderu. When asked what had happened to the Chikafa 
line, he replied that “the sons died”.
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According to oral history Chikafa area was clearly part of the original marunga 
rosario andrade migration into Dande. A number of lieutenants of the three 
conquering brothers were installed as headmen in conquered areas, and founded their 
own lineages. However, it also seems that with the distance from the seat of the 
Chieftaincy at Kanyemba, it became a difficult area to rule. In addition, Chikafa area 
had been subjected to different political, economic, and ecological circumstances 
which differentiated it from Kanyemba area. For example, it is closer to the plateau of 
Zimbabwe and had experienced more migration to and from commercial farms and 
towns. There was an Evangelical Mission there for many years, which closed during 
the War of Independence when the local population was sent to a concentration camp 
near Mushumbi Pools (a town within the middle Zambesi Valley). With increased 
population in the area, and development schemes, Chikafa experienced hunger in 
years of low rainfall prompting yet more migration. These and other factors made 
Chikafa an area of great social diversity as well as contributing to a more changeable 
political structure. As Chief Chapoto lamented “the people in Chikafa are now 
foreigners and no one knows the history properly...the big men all died and their 
children don’t know anything”. In other words, the allegiances of the people of Chikafa 
do not fall firmly within marunga clan monopoly of politics.
I could see that the issue of Chikafa posed a dilemma for Chief Chapoto during 
our discussions. On the one hand, he was at pains to emphasise marunga sovereignty 
over the area and described meticulously the various individuals who settled and 
governed it. On the other hand, it was quite clear that Chikafa had not been under 
marunga domination for some time and that this clan had no discemable superiority 
there. Political process was shared with the Korekore, whose land spirit, Nyamanindi, 
was supported by a number of disparate lineages. Also, the fact that the area was under 
the jurisdiction of Chief Chitsungo, who, although particularly uninvolved in the area, 
was considered to be the supreme authority. It was clear in our conversations that 
Chikafa represented the slow slippage of power which the Chapoto Chieftaincy had 
experienced over time and was a subject the Chief did not discuss at length. Rather, he 
liked to accentuate the nearly absolute power of the marunga in Kanyemba area and 
discuss the benefits of his line’s rule there.
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vi. Chihumbe, Kanyemba, and Nyanderu as Symbols o f Marunga Domination:
Stories of the military prowess of the three brothers who conquered Kanyemba 
functioned as a form of propaganda for the marunga political cause in Dande. 
Accounts of Kanyemba, vividly described him as a powerful and frightening warlord 
who did not hesitate to use violence against his enemies.
In one version of history, a male informant of Chihumbe’s line recounted the 
following story about how the three conquering brothers obtained their names. In his 
account, the brothers originally had Portuguese names but acquired their African 
names through qualities of violence which they possessed. One day, as the three 
brothers played ntsoro (a board game played with stones), they began to boast. 
Antonio said that he was like chihumbe, a violent attack of diarrhea, which kills the 
person once it seizes the body. Zuze said that he was like the poisonous bean 
kanyembanyemba which is known to kill unsuspecting goats. Manuel said that he was 
like a dzodzo, a poisonous beetle which is black with red stripes and eats the flowers 
of a shrub called nkungudzi. In this way, the three conquerors, Chihumbe, Kanyemba, 
and Nyanderu are said to have acquired their imposing warlord titles.
Although legend depicted the three brothers each as powerful and inspiring 
fear in other men, Kanyemba was by far known as the most violent and frightening of 
all. Chief Chapoto recounted that “Kanyemba used to order people killed by cutting 
the head and having it brought to him”, and “when Kanyemba saw a clever person he 
would have him castrated”. In addition, the Chief also mentioned that Kanyemba “was 
interested in killing people and the Portuguese used to tell him to kill people....even the 
Portuguese were afraid o f him”.
An elderly descendant of Nyanderu also related stories of Kanyemba’s 
superhuman qualities. He said, “Kanyemba was a great warrior, when someone threw 
a spear on him, it would break...if you shot him, the bullet wouldn’t go in”. He also 
described how Kanyemba had special medicine which both protected and made him 
powerful. At the same time, he added that Kanyemba had banished n ’anga (healers) 
from his territories saying that he “didn’t want to live with n’anga who could reveal his 
secrets”.
In a similar vein, an elderly man (in his 80s) from Chitete settlement, close to
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the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border, described Kanyemba as a dangerous man. He said 
that the warlord killed the husbands of desirable women, and maintained his power by 
eliminating adversaries. In the informant’s words, Kanyemba’s “wives put together 
would be bigger than the village of Chitete”.
Individuals from a diversity of positions all agreed on the basic features of the 
warrior Kanyemba. In a way, his legend presented an archetype of the marunga 
warlord because of the attributes of power and invincibility. At the same time, the 
qualities ascribed to Kanyemba were also occasionally mentioned in conjunction with 
soldiers who become famous in newer conflicts such as the civil wars in Angola and 
Mozambique. One informant observed that FRELIMO soldiers were sometimes 
referred to as Chikunda.
Important themes within the stories of the three brothers fall into line with key 
features of marunga mythology. For instance, the story that the brothers devised their 
own noms de guerre alludes to the marunga notion that the clan is self-contained and 
needs no outside influence to govern. The mention of Kanyemba’s persecution of 
traditional healers also implies an attempt to silence all potential opposition to 
non-marunga rule, especially from those wit ritual or autochthonous power. That 
Kanyemba was impenetrable to bullets also connotes the infallibility of the marunga 
clan.
Stories of Kanyemba’s power supported the marunga conviction of historical 
social superiority. By suggesting that Kanyemba was invincible, had huge territories, 
many wives, controlled local economies, and was not only friendly but also related by 
descent to the Portuguese, the marunga clan made an unequivocal statement regarding 
domination of Kanyemba area.
vii. The ‘Giving of Boundaries’ in Dande:
The setting of boundaries in Dande proved to be a crucial act in shaping the 
nature of the marunga chieftaincy in Kanyemba because it set the tone for potential 
points of conflict, at each succession, between Chihumbe’s and Kanyemba’s line.
During the second half of the 19th century competition between European 
nations for territories in Africa intensified. Whilst alliances were forming and
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disintegrating locally in the Zambesi, treaties between European nations were also 
being made and broken. The bounty of dominion over African territories was to be 
natural resources and agricultural products to service and feed industrialising 
European cities. On the global scale, during this time Britain and Portugal were in 
competition for opportunities to control areas which would generate wealth, but 
locally in the Zambesi the European scramble for Africa threatened to bring a radical 
change to political and economic life. Both Portugal and Britain proposed to introduce 
greater administrative control of the Zambesi as well as modem forms of production. 
To this end the Companhia de Mocambique set up by the Portuguese entrepreneurs de 
Sousa and de Andrada, and Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company entered into 
competition. The Portuguese Crown based its claims to territories in Africa on the 
longevity of their presence there, whilst Britain argued that effective occupation 
should be the deciding factor in international recognition of a country’s ownership of 
a colony (Newitt 1995:341). At the Berlin Congress of 1884-85 Portugal proposed a 
‘Rose-Coloured Map' in which it staked claim to a wide band of territory extending 
from the Atlantic to the Pacific and including all of the Zambesi Valley. Significantly, 
it also included a large part of present-day Zimbabwe, covering all of the eastern part 
of the country as far south as the Limpopo River. The Portuguese government 
managed to have the map appended to the Berlin Act by 1887, but it was never 
recognised by Britain which continued to support Cecil Rhodes’ endeavours in 
southern Africa (Newitt 1995: 343). With the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891, 
Portuguese territory on the south bank of the Zambesi River was reduced to a narrow 
strip at the point where present-day Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique meet.
The ambitions of European governments and their entrepreneurial nationals 
posed a serious threat to the Zambesian way of life. Both Portugal and Britain began to 
devise plans to administer the Zambesi more effectively. For one, the feudal system of 
land tenure where prazeiros held absolute control over their territories was to be 
usurped by the instalment of large concession companies. Similarly, the existing 
decentralised system of rule was to end with the holding of censuses as a prelude to the 
introduction of taxation (Newitt 1995:337). For the Afro-Portuguese warlords, the 
advent of greater colonial control through concession companies would deal a death
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blow to their power and their livelihood based on trade and raiding.
Whilst European nations argued over territories at the Berlin Congress, the
Afro-Portuguese warlords were involved in finding a place within the larger dispute
between Portuguese and British interests. Portugal’s territorial claims as outlined in
the ‘Rose-Coloured Map’ were based on the number of informal treaties which a
number of powerful individuals, under nominal Portuguese influence, made with
Shona chiefs. In a review of the personal correspondence of de Andrada, a Portuguese
adventurer and entrepreneur, the historian David Beach described the circumstance of
Portugal in the late 1800s:
“The creation of a network of treaties with Shona rulers across the central 
and northern Zimbabwean plateau in 1889 that, had they been properly 
exploited, would have given Portugal a reasonable claim-by the 
standards of the Scramble for Africa-to a western frontier to their 
Mocambican province running from the modem Kariba Dam area to the 
east and south-east of modem Zimbabwe, up to 350 kilometres beyond 
the modem frontier
(Beach 1992:3).
Beach further asserted that the area between Zumbo (in present-day Zambia) 
and Tete town (in Mozambique) was effectively controlled by four Afro-Portuguese 
warlords, “notably Kanyemba Jose do Rosario Andrade, Matekenya Jose do Araujo 
Lobo, Mutopa Gudo Firmino Luis Germano and Chimbangu Vicente Jose Ribeiro da 
Fonseca” (Beach 1992:8). Oral accounts gathered for this study claimed that Jose do 
Rosario Andrade, the founder of the marunga rosario andrade clan which I 
encountered in the 1990s, had at one point laid claim to territory as far south as the 
River. He had also been capitao-mor (captain-major) of Zumbo, a Portuguese 
administrative position. In effect, his sympathies lay with Portuguese interests. It can 
thus be argued that he would have been among a number of powerful individuals who 
were allied to Portuguese interests and served their territorial claims vis a vis British 
claims. Below I will discuss oral history accounts regarding Kanyemba and the 
Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891.
There are a number of oral accounts of Kanyemba’s activities at the time of the 
Anglo-Portuguese Treaty (1891) when the boundaries between Portuguese and British 
territory were set. Versions of Kanyemba’s movements at the time were invoked in the 
1990s in order to support or dispute claims to the chieftaincy of Kanyemba area. These
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stories fell into two broad categories: that Kanyemba was an inveterate Portuguese 
supporter and fled to Portuguese East Africa when “the muzungu gave boundaries”; 
and, that he decided to stay in present-day Kanyemba area (which became British 
territory) and eventually died there.
One widely respected elderly man, whose family had provided mediums for 
the mpondoro of Kanyemba area for at least two generations, recounted a version of 
Kanyemba’s activities which alluded to the political issues created by 
boundary-making. He stated that when Chihumbe and Nyanderu died, Kanyemba 
became owner of all the conquered territory which extended into present-day 
Mozambique. When boundaries were set, Kanyemba traveled across the border to live, 
but said that Chihumbe’s son should remain to be Chief in British territory. Kanyemba 
became Chief in Mozambique, died there, and was succeeded by his son Antonio 
Muondoka. This informant said that parallel Chikunda chieftaincies were created in 
the original conquered area because of the boundary. In Mozambique the succession 
passed from Kanyemba to his son, Antonio Muondoka who was in turn succeeded by 
his son Manwere Kanyemba. In British territory Chihumbe’s son Chapoto became 
chief, was briefly succeeded by his brother Basiyao, and then by Manwere Chapoto 
whom I encountered in the early 1990s. With this story, the informant related two 
ideas. First, that in the general area of Kanyemba, all the leadership belonged to the 
same clan, the conquering marunga rosario andrade, and that, therefore, power in the 
form of claims to the chieftaincy should be confined to its members. Secondly, he 
qualified this assertion with the declaration that “Kanyemba made Chief Chapoto”. 
Not surprisingly, he also supported the current medium of the mpondoro Kanyemba 
claiming that she was authentic.
Whilst this informant appeared to be a supporter of the Kanyemba line’s claim 
to the chieftaincy, his account also illustrated the basic ongoing tension of leadership 
of Kanyemba area. At the same time as he recounted that Kanyemba left the area in the 
hands of Chihumbe’s son, he also suggested that the Chikunda of the general area 
(including those in Mozambique) all belonged to one initial conquest. Thus, the 
leadership belonged to one clan. But, he added that the proper order of succession was 
that the ruling chiefs sons should inherit the position, after which it should pass back
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to the original chiefs sons (the rule is that inheritance should occur horizontally, then 
vertically). In effect, the chieftaincy should alternate between the three lineages 
founded by the three original marunga rosario andrade conquering brothers. In this 
case, the lineage comprised of the descendants of Nyanderu would be overdue for the 
chieftaincy as no member had ever been chief. The acknowledgment of a third group 
of contenders would complicate the succession dispute as the debate was mostly 
centered on very keen candidates from the Kanyemba and Chihumbe lineages.
Another informant, a member of a subordinate clan whose ancestors originated 
in Malawi, claimed that Chapoto (II) did not rule legitimately as the first Chief 
Chapoto had tricked Kanyemba into returning to Mozambique when the Europeans 
drew up the boundaries. In his words, Chapoto (I) “said the (British) azungu coming 
here were not good so they should go back to Mozambique”. He also claimed that at 
this time Chapoto (I) prepared to depart to Mozambique but instead chose to remain in 
British territory, while Kanyemba completed the journey across the border. According 
to his story, when Europeans arrived in the area, there were four sabhuku there by the 
names of Kabareti, Pondo, Marama, and Zhuwao. The Europeans asked Pondo about 
Kanyemba, but when they were told that he was in Portuguese territory, they enquired 
after other relatives. It was then that Chapoto made himself known and became Chief. 
What was interesting about this account is the appearance of the subordinate Chikunda 
lineages in past events. Pondo, I was told, was Kanyemba’s second-in-command, and 
was left behind by him. The third-in-command was Chikohwa, and the 
fourth-in-command was Murizafesa. Both Pondo and Chikohwa were of the Chirenje 
clan, and came to the area as Kanyemba’s warriors. This informant believed that “the 
Chikunda named Chirenje liked war too much, their Chief was Chikohwa”. He also 
said that the “Chirenje clap to marunga because long ago they worked for marunga 
and clapped to thank for payment”. This informant supported the Kanyemba lineage’s 
claim to the chieftaincy probably because, as he believed, his grandfather had come 
from Malawi to fight under Kanyemba. In this case, the informant’s position as a 
member of the Chikunda dominated community would have been tied to his ancestor’s 
original role as a warrior attached to Kanyemba.
The way in which this eloquent individual expressed his structural position in
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this account of legitimacy to the chieftaincy elucidates the important issue of 
subordinate identities within the Chikunda group. His account also illustrated how the 
succession dispute was about so much more than contention between the candidates 
of three dominant lineages, in that it also involved the fate of classificatory followers. 
Additionally, it suggested that the alignments between individuals at the time of 
conquest became reflected in the relative positions of lineages in Kanyemba and 
Chikafa areas in the 1990s.
viii. The Chapoto Chieftaincy:
There was one Chikunda Chieftaincy in Dande in the 1990s, and it was held by 
Chief Chapoto (13) (see Figure 8). He was elderly at the time and has since died. During 
my fieldwork period, when the Chief was infirm but still active, a succession dispute 
was underway between three eligible lineages. It was a fact that most of the oral history 
I gathered for this study contained the predominant theme of marunga supremacy and 
political legitimacy due to this clan’s conquest of the area in the late 1800s. But the 
issue the eventual demise of Chief Chapoto would elicit was the way that rule was to 
be allocated. Of three suitable lineages, Kanyemba, Chihumbe, and Nyanderu, only 
the first two presented viable candidates for the Chieftaincy. Claims to the position of 
Chief were made through the device of oral history. Earlier I discussed the importance 
of the theme of boundary-making in local Chikunda history. I demonstrated how, in 
the 1990s, ideas of where important marunga settled at the time of the creation of the 
boundary between Portuguese and British territory affected the legitimacy of their 
current position within the Kanyemba polity.
Other themes permeated the succession dispute. For example, the role of the 
District Commissioner in past selection of candidates was mentioned. But competition 
for the Chieftaincy really existed between two camps aligned behind candidates from 
Chihumbe’s and Kanyemba’s lines.
Chief Chapoto was adamant that one of his sons should succeed him to the 
Chieftaincy. In his genealogy, he described himself as the grandson of Chihumbe, the 
eldest of the three conquering brothers. According to the rule of succession, the 
Chieftaincy should alternate between the three lines descending from the three
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brothers. The dispute centered on whether the rule of inheritance should be observed 
and the Chieftaincy passed to one of Kanyemba’s descendants or whether one of 
Chapoto’s sons, who was familiar with the role of Chief and had represented his father 
in Harare, should inherit.
In terms of strict social prescription, Chapoto did not have a valid argument as 
the Chieftaincy had been held by descendants of Chihumbe since boundaries were set. 
There had been a brief interlude after the death of Chapoto (I) during which Zhuwao 
of the Kanyemba lineage was Chief. But it was generally agreed at the time that he was 
unsuitable, possibly due to mental illness, and so Chapoto (II) was installed in the 
position.
The other factor against the Chiefs claim was that the mpondoro Kanyemba 
was in favour of someone from his own lineage taking the Chieftaincy. At a possession 
ceremony, when the mpondoro was questioned about the succession, he stated the 
following: “Chihumbe is my brother from the same mother and father. There is no 
difference in giving Chapoto or my child but Chapoto is the eldest of them all. This is 
why I gave him the post. But when their turn is over I will turn to my children”. 
Chapoto countered with the view that the medium was a prostitute and a fake. In 
addition to which he also suggested that Kanyemba was said to have so many wives 
that he could not have had children with them all, thus calling some of his opponents 
illegitimate. But the fact is that, theoretically, the greatest supernatural support the 
Chief would obtain would be from the mpondoro Chihumbe who at the time had no 
medium. The reason for this may have been that local support for the Chihumbe line 
was waning. I also noted that members of subordinate Chikunda lineages did not 
support the Chief, probably due to a history of exploitation under his long rule.
In Chapoto’s favour was the fact that his lineage had ruled the area for over 100 
years and so had weathered many changes. His life-history paralleled important 
regional and international events which affected the area. For example, he was himself 
a migrant worker on the plateau before he was called to be Chief, an experience he 
shared with many Zambesians. He engaged in regional travel, having brought banana 
trees from Malawi in the 1940s. He witnessed the guerrilla war and worked in 
conjunction with the District Commissioner in attempts to thwart its effects locally. In
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addition to his length of experience in events of the area, there is also the fact that he 
lived through the transition to Independence and the installation of Chiefs as 
dispensers of Customary Law entrenched in the Zimbabwean constitution. Finally, he 
had groomed one of his sons for the chieftaincy.
In my estimation, the Kanyemba camp had the greater number of supporters. 
Not only were there a number of venerable elders who could be put forward as 
candidates for the chieftaincy, there were also a number of active young members who 
were involved in several committees. For example, a senior member of this lineage 
was one of the Chiefs councilors who advised him at the Customary Law court, while 
a young member was the Ward Councilor. In this way, members of the Kanyemba 
lineage had a greater hold on both the longstanding and newer forms of political life in 
the area.
According to the rule of inheritance, this lineage was also in line for the next 
position of chief. The traditionalists amongst the local population supported upholding 
the social prescription. A number of members of subordinate lineages described 
Chapoto’s rule as unsanctioned, stating as proof versions of the past in which 
Chapoto’s father had tricked a number of opponents into fleeing the area.
As I explained above, the mpondoro Kanyemba had a medium, in itself a sign 
of local support, who was vocal in supporting the claims to the Chieftaincy of the 
Kanyemba lineage. Judging by the attendance at ceremonies, a large number of people 
supported this spirit. Interestingly, the tembo mvura and Korekore groups supported 
neighbouring Korekore land spirits. For subjugated and conquered clans, the only 
means to participate in political life was to align themselves behind a marunga rosario 
Andrade clan member. Otherwise, there was the option of dropping out of political life 
altogether, a practice evidenced by attendance at the shrine of a neighbouring 
mpondoro2.
2Locals attended ceremonies at the shrine of a Korekore mpondoro in the neighbouring 
Angwa River area.
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In this chapter I have reviewed three features of Marunga domination in Dande: 
centralised political organisation; a propensity to seek alliance with the powerful; and, 
the ability to recruit a following in light of their conquest of Dande and the subsequent 
installation of a chieftaincy. To this end, I introduced the marunga rosario andrade 
clan who ruled Kanyemba area and then discussed the Portuguese prazo system which 
provided the conditions for the formation of Chikunda corporate identity. Next, 
versions of Marunga arrival in Dande were recounted from the points of view of 
Chapoto and opponents, and the mythology surrounding the three conquering brothers 
was also briefly mentioned. Finally, the process of boundary-making in the 1890s 
between the British and the Portuguese was discussed along with its implications for 
the Chapoto Chieftaincy which was disputed during the 1990s.
The following chapter plunges into the ethnography of Chikafa and Kanyemba 
with a discussion of social relations within these settlements.
106
Chapter 4: Autochthony and Conquest: The Ethnographic Present of the 
1990s
i. The Multiple Meanings of Dande:
The opposition between autochthony and conquest is a central
preoccupation in Zambesian cosmology which underpins the social and political 
organisation of settlements. This dichotomy is dependent on an idiom of kinship 
which structures social relations through incorporation or subjugation. In order to 
properly address the central issue of domination, it is important to review 
ethnographic data gathered during the 1990s. In this study, I compare Chikafa, 
characterised by shallow and dispersed lineages where political control is shared 
between Chikunda and Korekore groups, with Kanyemba, which is governed by the 
dominant marunga rosario andrade clan.
In Chapter 3 I introduced the cultural logic of conquest in Dande through a 
description of conflicting local accounts of Marunga settlement there. Also, the 
problematic of African slavery was discussed with a view to providing a first 
glimpse of the issue of incorporation. In this chapter, I begin by introducing a social 
map of Dande, proceed to discuss kinship, and then describe the populations of 
both settlements researched for this study. Because kinship is so important to social 
organization in the Zambesi Valley, it will be the primary focus of this chapter. 
Discussions of political structure and economy will be better placed in Chapters 6 
and 7 to provide a background for the impact of development and drought.
During the 1990s four conceptual maps existed of the area of the Zambesi 
where my two fieldsites were located. First, according to the logic of autochthony 
and conquest, the area was characterised by a number of spirit territories 
established in the mythological past. In this instance, the area was called Dande, a 
reference to the autochthonous Tande who held ritual power. Secondly, there were 
Chieftaincies also installed through the logic of autochthony and conquest, but a 
number of which had been reinforced by the colonial and subsequently, the 
Zimbabwean states. Thirdly, post-independence, the Zimbabwean state mapped the 
area into VIDCOs (Village Development Committees), Wards, and Districts in a
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chain of responsibility linked to the President’s Office. Fourth, the African 
Development Fund, which financed the MZP, proclaimed the area ‘the 
Mid-Zambesi Valley’. Each label represented a particular philosophy regarding 
social organization and power structures.
Dande includes all the land delineated by the Mavuradhona mountains to 
the south, the Zambesi River to the north, Chewore Safari area to the west, and the 
Musengezi River to the east. Dande was situated within the Zambesi Valley which 
is the lowland area adjacent to the Zambesi River. The two fieldwork sites 
discussed in this study, Chikafa and Kanyemba, are situated within Dande. 
Typically, to Zimbabweans, the Zambesi Valley was a mystical and marginal place 
whose inhabitants they thought backward and uncivilised. To support these ideas, 
the tembo mvura people (also known as the Dema) were often mentioned in 
conversation and in the national press because some members had a genetic 
disorder which caused a bifurcated two-toed condition. In some pejorative accounts 
of Dande, inhabitants were thought to be terrible farmers. Other stories depicted the 
area as dangerous because of its wild animals, witches, incompetent people, 
unbearable heat, tsetse fly which prevented the keeping of cattle, and dense bush.
In addition, Zimbabweans believed that Dande did not have decent roads, 
marketplaces, churches, shops, or male meeting sites1. For them, the area was a 
hinterland relevant as a source of labour, a place for wild animals, and powerful 
rain-makers. In short, in the popular imagination, the Dande area, and the Zambesi 
Valley, stood in counterpoint to the civilized plateau. For the most part, during the 
colonial and post-independence periods the area was left alone. However, during 
the early 1990s, because of the introduction of development schemes, Dande and 
the Zambesi became a site for economic opportunity and extension of state-level 
political influence.
1
In the past these male meetings places consisted of dare, special huts where men 
met to discuss local issues. At present, the main meeting place for Zimbabwean 
men is the beerhall which does not exist in the Zambesi Valley.
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The cultural logic of this change in attitude toward the Zambesi can be 
understood as a transformation of the area from the place of autochthons who gave 
legitimacy to the new Zimbabwean state, to a conquerable area vulnerable to the 
incursion of new forms of dominance. Thus, in Zambesian cultural logic, during the 
1990s the Zimbabwean state transformed itself from autochthonous, reflecting the 
will of the people, to that of conqueror which, by definition, is a foreign form of 
dominance. I adopt the term ‘cultural logic’ from Garbett (1992) who took it to 
mean the relations between cultural categories and between sets of cultural 
categories.
Social change is not a new feature for the Zambesi Valley. Its history of 
migration is a testament to the constant influx of new people, ideas, and practices. 
Historical studies have discussed the effect of migration in the area by describing 
the introduction of new lineages, clans, and large polities into the area (Beach 1980, 
1986, 1992; Bourdillon 1978, 1987; Mudenge 1988).These migrations have 
occurred over the centuries because of war, colonial demand for labour in mines 
and commercial farms, pressure on land and resources, the need for cash to pay 
taxes and purchase consumer goods, and to escape droughts which strain food 
resources from time to time. For example, during the drought of 1991-92, I 
observed a marked emigration out of Dande which reversed with the arrival of rains. 
In Chikafa village, Survey I conducted in 1992, during the drought, counted 306 
individuals living in 60 households with an average of 5.1 people per household. In 
1993, after the rains, and well into the growing season, Survey II counted 353 
individuals in 76 households at an average of 4.64 people per household. The 
population difference is accounted for by emigration of adults for work and 
children sent to live with relatives. The difference in household size is attributed to 
relatives grouping together to share scarce food.
However, migrations which do not greatly disrupt social life are easy to deal 
with through the mechanism of incorporation discussed in the previous chapter. As 
I outlined earlier in this study, conquest is a good thing only for the conquerors. 
Autochthonous people and long-term residents who are subjugated tell stories of
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social marginalization with terrible implications for the quality of their lives.
In sum, by bringing development into Dande, the Zimbabwean state 
divested itself of the legitimacy it derived from popular support during the 
Independence War and became a conqueror. This perceived act of conquest was 
dealt with differently in Kanyemba and Chikafa because of the contrasting forms of 
social organization in these two settlements, and also the nature of each 
development scheme. In Kanyemba, the centuiy-long entrenched rule by the 
marunga clan betrayed a history of alliance with the state. There, rulers 
incorporated CAMPFIRE into their political structure by appropriating its 
decision-making process, thereby further consolidating both their power and the 
marginalization of the tembo mvura clan. In contrast, Chikafa, with its tenuous 
power-sharing political structure, experienced the MZP as great disruption which 
prompted renewed interest in mpondoro as loci of resistance. This chapter 
discusses the kinship system and relations between groups in both settlements 
which underpin these greatly contrasting approaches to social change to be 
discussed later in Chapter 7 about development.
ii. Kinship in Dande: The Importance of Clans and Lineages:
Until the new migrants who came with the MZP arrived in Dande during the
early 1990s, kinship was the primary way in which people were related to each 
other. Immigrants who had no family members in Dande, and who did not acquire 
kin once settled, brought new forms of identification, such as church membership 
and citizenship of Zimbabwe. These types of affiliations became important as land 
resettlement took hold, and I will discuss these in Chapter 6 which focuses on the 
state. Kinship relations in Dande stem from a system of clans and lineages which is 
organized according to two principles -  patrilineal descent, and the principal of first 
arrival. Thus clans could be autochthonous holding the power to make rain, 
conquerors in control of governance, and latecomers who were either incorporated 
or posed a threat to this hierarchy. Lineages were technically sub-divisions within 
clans where different lines each claimed to be descended from a particular ancestor, 
such as in the case of the marunga rosario andrade.
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During the 1990s, all clans I encountered were patrilineal bride-givers with 
an ideal of virilocality which, in practice, meant neolocality. Each clan was founded 
by a mythological male ancestor who traveled to Dande from elsewhere. In practice, 
distinctions between clan and lineage were made for political reasons. A simple 
rule of thumb I used to distinguish clans from lineages was the notion of a common 
ancestral home, and a shared food prohibition. For example, all members of the 
marunga clan were marunga nkangaiwa referring to the baby pigeon, which was 
their food prohibition, and all claimed to have come from Nyungwe (Tete). Thus 
marunga rosario andrade and marunga robo were of the same clan, the pigeon, but 
descended from different male ancestors and were, therefore, of different lineages. 
David Lan described clans in Dande in the following way: as exogamous,
patrilineally inherited, named after an animal or after an object which constituted 
the food prohibition, associated with geographical areas, and, “dispersed with no 
corporate or ritual functions” (1985:23). In effect, in this definition, clan was 
equated with lineage because the primary criterion for membership was a 
patrilineal link. As Lan argued, “clan members are said to experience a sense of 
relatedness to each other in more or less the same way as members of the same 
lineage” (1985:23). Although he did not deny the importance of descent in 
reckoning patrilineal kin, he believed that members of the same clan were defined 
by their common food prohibition. In this way, clan membership was demarcated 
by “common substance with other members” of one’s clan (1985: 23). Thus, for the 
Korekore, the belief that eating one’s totem could make one ill related to the notion 
that what was being ingested was of the same substance, effectively oneself.
The case of the marunga clan contrasted with Lan’s findings regarding the 
Korekore. Although, principles of common substance did apply to marunga 
notions of clan membership, these were not the most important means of inclusion. 
Among the marunga rosario andrade clan I encountered, and according to oral 
histories regarding other Marunga clans in Tete, the most important factors in clan 
membership were the notion of common ancestral home and association with 
Portuguese azungu in the past. It is true that, like the Korekore, the marunga of 
Kanyemba mentioned an original ancestor who founded their clan. However,
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unlike the Korekore, they had no elaborate stories about him. Also in contrast to the 
Korekore, a concept of common substance was mentioned but not emphasized.
The reasons for these differences were couched in marunga mythology of 
conquest and in their practice of domination. The marunga concept of clan was 
very different to that of the Korekore in one crucial point: in their concept of 
common substance. While Lan’s observations of the Korekore were of a number of 
dispersed lineages organized into territorial allegiances by powerful land spirits, my 
focus on the marunga yielded a powerful and entrenched clan in Kanyemba area. 
While I did not have the opportunity to interview members of other marunga clans 
in Mozambique, it did seem to me that clan members in Kanyemba held a very 
powerful notion of clan identity which superceded all other forms of affiliation. It 
seemed to me that marunga conceived of a supra-clan affiliation organized through 
a concept of common substance couched in the term nyamatanga (white flesh), 
related to the social category of the Afro-Portuguese Zambesian land-holders with 
whom they all claimed affiliation. Additionally, marunga ascription to the term, 
ntsuwa, meaning “whites from the islands” was a consolidation of the exclusivity 
of clan membership. Thus, the various marunga clans, such as marunga dabreu, 
marunga desfrip, and the marunga rosario andrade each claimed a male ancestor 
of mixed Portuguese and African parentage.
For marunga, individual clan identities were a statement on territoriality, 
supra-clan identity was an expression of an ideology of unmitigated supremacy 
through a story of association with Portuguese colonial power. Lineage identities, 
as I observed in Kanyemba, related to mundane issues of governance. In sum, the 
supra-clan concept, marunga, provided the ideology of conquest and inherent 
superiority, particular marunga clans articulated a concept of conquest of a territory 
such as Dande, and patrilineal lineage referred to the business of governing 
appropriated land. Because of this logic, while this group might pay lip service to 
autochthons, they really had no need for their rain-making power in order to govern. 
In Kanyemba, even during a period of drought, I never heard mention of a 
rain-maker.
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The clan and lineage structure I describe above comprised an ideal concept 
of group organization. In reality, while the ideology of clan power justified rule, 
members of the marunga clan shared social spaces with other groups, participated 
in their everyday practices and shared many kinship concepts to be discussed 
below.
It is useful at this point to mention ethnic group terms used by both 
Zambesians and scholars of the area. As I mentioned previously the English word, 
tribe, is employed by Shona speakers in Dande People conceptualised tribe or 
ethnic group as an umbrella term which covered a cluster of clans and lineages with 
similar attributes For example, individuals I interviewed belonging to the marunga 
rosario andrade clan, said that they were of the upper strata of the Chikunda tribe. 
In the early 1990s there were 13 ethnic groups living in the two settlements in 
Dande where I researched. Chikafa was by far the most ethnically diverse with 12 
ethnic groups recorded in the second of two surveys conducted (see Appendix 2). In 
Kanyemba there were three major ethnic groups: the Chikunda, the Korekore, and 
the Dema. All groups listed reckoned descent patrilineally, except for the Ntsenga, 
who claimed to hold a matrilineal ideal.
In Chikafa, at times, the term tribe was used interchangeably with clan 
(imutupu) and lineage (chidau). At other times, it was loosely applied to new groups 
in the area such as the Shona. In truth, in Chikafa there was no standard way of 
referencing groups of people. Sometimes groups were referred to by their mutupu, 
at other times tribe, occasionally by occupation (such as sabhuku, nurse, Ward 
Councilor), and even by father’s name (as the son of x).
The Chikunda denomination encompassed two strata. First, there was the 
marunga clan divided into lineages each claiming descent from a male ancestor of 
mixed Portuguese nyamatanga and African parentage. Marunga clan members 
shared the food prohibition of baby pigeon (marunga nkangaiwa), descent from 
Portuguese males, and ancestors who lived on islands in the Zambesi River
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(ntsuwa)2. In other words, the group’s defining features were based on a relatively 
weak idea of common substance, patrilineal descent, and a sharing of a type of 
geographical and social space (the prazo, the conquered territory) which over time 
became encoded with notions of prestige. The second strata of Chikunda did not 
possess the common defining features of clan or lineage membership. Instead their 
claims to being Chikunda were self-ascription and a history of association with 
marunga lineages. These people were not marunga, had food prohibitions other 
than pigeon, and were of lineages associated exclusively with African parentage. 
Additionally, they also made no claim to having ancestors associated with islands 
in the Zambesi. Often they said that their ancestors came from Malawi area. 
Members of the dominant marunga clan often reiterated their true Chikundaness, 
and their legitimacy as conquerors of Kanyemba.
Among the Chikunda I studied, marriage was primarily patrilocal, or in 
some instances, neolocal. Brideprice (mari akuroora) was paid to the bride’s 
parents in installments. If the bride’s parents died before all payments were made, 
the groom and his kin transferred these payments to the bride’s father’s next oldest 
brother. As recently as the preceding generation, marriage involved a system of 
brideprice paid in installments as well as a period of uxorilocality and brideservice. 
Some people lamented that the introduction of large amounts of cash into local 
economies had adversely affected this practice. Brideprice, in the 1990s included 
combinations of cash payment, goats, clothes, and household items. Although there 
existed prescriptions, the amount and length of payments were negotiated in each 
particular case. The preferred marriage was ego to father’s sister’s daughter so as to 
marry outside of one’s lineage. Accordingly, in both cases, mari akuroora or lobola 
(brideprice) was paid in installments to the bride’s parents, and later to her father’s 
brother should the former die before all payments had been transacted. Brideprice 
included money, clothes, household goods, and goats. Additionally, there was a 
pattern of virilocality in all groups and, with changing land tenure practices in
2 A number of powerful 19th century warlords used islands in the Zambesi River, later submerged 
by the Cahora Bassa and Kariba Dams., to control the flow of trade. Thus, for a lineage to be 
associated with these islands alluded to power and prestige.
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Chikafa, of neolocality. Older people disliked the fact that brideprice had become 
more popular than brideservice. One older man lamented that “any man can now 
come and take my daughter”, and had likened girls to prostitutes because they could 
be exchanged for payments in cash. There are various ways to interpret this opinion. 
For one, brideprice shifted the balance of power and wealth away from the bride’s 
family. At the same time, the combination of brideprice and neolocality also shifted 
power and social control away from older people and into the hands of the young. 
Furthermore, it deprived affines of male and female labour which would contribute 
to the maintenance of their homestead and ensure steady cultivation of their fields. 
In the early 1990s it was not uncommon to see older people living in dilapidated 
homesteads, a symbol of their declining power.
Although clan was the dominant idiom of relatedness in the Zambesi Valley, 
analytically there were five different types of kinship relations. Each individual 
existed in a web of kinship the importance of which depended on moralized role 
expectations, rights, and duties, he possibilities produced by circumstance, and 
personal and group aspiration. Similar to other sources of identity, the five types of 
kinship relations I will describe below provided both ways for an individual to 
become situated in the social world, and sets of possibilities for their future.
First, there was patrilineal kin, known as wagazi ibodzi (of the same blood). 
Second, there was uterine kin, called wamimba ibodzi. Third, there were varoora, 
or relatives by marriage. Fourth, was the sabwira relationship, a type of ‘fictive 
kinship’. Fifth, there were ancestors, also known as midzimu. The first two types 
were locally acknowledged to be of a biological nature, to have to do with 
substances within individual bodies which originated in other bodies and thus 
created the relationship. The second two types were constituted primarily of social 
relations creating alliances between different lines of kin. And the last form of 
kinship related to living members of lineages acting in ways beneficial to its 
integrity.
Clans were constituted by patrilineal kin where an individual shared blood 
with his father, his father’s father, his father’s father’s father and so on, and also
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with any brothers of each male ancestor. Additionally, an individual was 
constituted by mbeuyamamuna (seed of a man), the source of life, derived entirely 
from a biological father or genitor. Blood shared by patrilineal kin constituted the 
strongest social bond of all. Obligations to patrilineal kin took precedence over all 
others. Brothers had a moral obligation to look after each other’s widows and 
children. Lineage names (chidau) were equivalent to patrilineages who shared the 
same blood. The Chikunda believed that it was preferable to marry outside of one’s 
chidau, while the Korekore did not seem to care. For example, inter-marriage 
frequently occurred within the Korekore totem, nzou samanyanga. But amongst the 
marunga Chikunda, although the preferred marriage was within the clan, there was 
little marriage between people of the same lineage. Thus, while marunga preferred 
to marry other marunga, there was subtle preference for marriage between different 
lineages. For example, marunga rosario andrade intermarried infrequently, 
preferring to marry marunga from other clans and lineages lineages.
Chikunda and Korekore conceptualised patrilineal kin differently. The 
Korekore described early arrival in Dande through an elaborate genealogy 
culminating in a pivotal mythical ancestor. The Chikunda, on the other hand, 
believed that conquest was the means to landownership, and that lineages became 
important in that way. Because they arrived in Dande after the Korekore, Chikunda 
royal genealogies were much shallower. There exists colonial record, both British 
and Portuguese, of the 19 century activities of ancestors of the Chikunda I 
encountered. In contrast, Korekore ancestors were so remote as to be mythological. 
The further the ancestor from his descendants, the less important the concept of 
blood as a means of inclusion and exclusion into a given group. For the Korekore 
who displayed shallow genealogies, the concept of the pangolin clan, as articulated 
by mpondoro was important. This idea will be reviewed later.
The other substance received from the genitor, the seed, was different in 
nature to blood. The idea of one seed for one child spoke to individuality. Thus, in 
a chain of blood relatives, each ready to fulfill prescribed obligations, the concept 
of seed stood as a way to create individuals. People were united by food prohibition
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(clan) and by blood (lineage), but differentiated by seed. In a milieu where most 
kinship relations spoke to the constitution and fortification of group affiliation, the 
concept of seed symbolised individuality. Although individualistic acts were 
discouraged, the concept of the seed as a separate substance could indicate that the 
idea of the individual was inherent in local cosmology and not strictly an import 
from the outside . The articulation of the individual voice in local debate, 
particularly with the advent of development, posed a serious threat to established 
hierarchies in Chikafa.
Uterine kin were individuals from the same womb, wamimba ibodzi. They 
were also referred to as mwana wakumai (children of the same mother). It was more 
important to be made of seed from the same origin than to be of the same womb. 
The womb provided the shelter for seed to grow, in the same way that a woman in 
a polygynous household possessed her own cooking fire. By acting as a shelter for 
seed to grow into infants, the role of women was to provide a circumstance for the 
transformation of substance. In other words, women provided vessels for seed from 
men to become children who shared their father’s blood. Women were also the 
processors of food which allowed children to grow. A woman’s womb and her fire 
enabled the transformation of the raw materials of male semen and maize meal into 
the finished social products of children and ntsima, porridge. Where men were the 
source of life, women were its “transformers". Female roles carrying high status 
were all transformative roles. For instance, once a woman gave birth to a child, she 
was no longer addressed by the term sisi (young girl, Miss) but instead as amai 
(mother). To this title was added the eldest male child’s name. So if the first child’s 
name was William, the woman would be known as “amai William”. Once a
3
In times of strife, problems were framed locally as a tension between individual 
interests emanating from foreign areas and those of the community. Thus, a 
common theme in witchcraft accusations was that of individual interests in 
competition with the good of the community. In this way, when individual 
initiatives conflicted with the power of Chiefs, represented by the local land spirit, 
these were framed as negative foreign influences rather than as legitimate 
components of local debate.
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woman’s children had children of their own she became ambuya (in Korekore) or 
ayavhu (in Chikunda), a term of address generally used for senior post-menopausal 
women. The transformative role of mother had been the principal way in which a 
woman could gain status until the MZP brought female land ownership in its design 
and a number of business opportunities for women.
Another high profile female role in Dande was that of nchembere, a ritual 
specialist responsible for the organisation of menarche and marriage ceremonies, as 
well as a marriage broker. Post-menopausal women usually filled this position. One 
former responsibility of the nchembere had been to conduct virginity tests of 
prospective brides. Also, she organized the menarche ceremony which involved a 
girl spending time in a hut at her parents’ homestead for the duration of her first 
menstruation. During this time the nchembere taught the girl skills regarding the 
absorption of menstrual blood with cloths (which in the past had a ritual 
significance), and about sexual relations with her future husband. In the past, this 
instruction was couched in a beer-ritual which involved sexually suggestive 
dancing on the part of the nchembere and much drinking of beer, both activities 
considered unacceptable for women of child-bearing age. I did not attend a 
menarche ritual as these were rare in the 1990s, although specialists were available 
if requested.
Perhaps a significant point to emphasize is that the nchembere's role as 
organizer of female rituals could be filled by a senior uterine relative (usually 
mother’s elder sister). It is also important to note that in some newer Christian 
churches, the role of the nchembere in preparing girls for marriage was fulfilled by 
pastors’ wives, often women of child-bearing age. Interestingly, pastors’ wives 
derived their status from their husbands’ position, not through age or apprenticeship 
with a female relative. One interpretation of this change could be that a locus of 
female power, maintained through a ritual role, had been appropriated by newer 
male-dominated belief systems.
If we accept the social role of females as primarily transformative, 
brideservice and brideprice can be considered as compensation paid to a girl’s
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family for the loss of her labour. Girls performed many household tasks, such as 
cooking and gardening, which enabled the continuity of members. When a woman 
left her parents’ homestead, there was no loss of substance (blood or semen) but 
instead a loss of labour. Her new role in her husband’s family became a conduit for 
the perpetuation of his line, through nurturing of his seed, and cooking for his 
relatives. Thus nkuni, the marriage payment compensating a woman’s family for 
wood cut to keep her warm in childhood, symbolized the groom’s willingness to 
pay for his bride’s transformation into adulthood, and alluded to her future role as 
a conduit for the continuation of his lineage.
Marriage relatives were called varoora.. At first glance marriages seemed to 
be economic and political alliances to perpetuate a man’s line. However, within 
these parameters existed many partnerships constructed by social convention but 
cemented by love, affection, and shared experience. Statements such as, “Felipa is 
old now, but when she was young she was beautifur depicted the admiration which 
created bonds enabling couples to endure the droughts, deaths of children, and 
migrations which made life in the Zambesi Valley difficult. Marriage practices 
changed over time with influences brought by trade, migration, and other 
circumstances related to livelihood. They have also varied according to shifting 
moral conventions. Generally, interest in custom was greater in lineages of higher 
rank. For example, in Kanyemba area, a non-Marunga woman told me that her 
“husband” had not made payments to her family, and that she had simply started to 
live with him. She also emphasised that “marriage is for rich people”. Thus, if  no 
status and no property were at stake, then there existed little interest in marriage 
prescriptions. Although ideal rules of marriage and locality were articulated by 
informants, it is important to keep in mind that affect and rank greatly affected 
whether these were put into practice.
Sabwira relations, a form of fictive kinship, are established between 
members of different lineages. Sabwira are inherited, but a measure of acceptance 
of newcomers is that an established family agrees to enter into that relationship 
with newcomers. A close examination of sabwira relations can show patterns of
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settlement in areas, as well as degrees of acceptance of newcomers. The function of 
this type of relationship is to situate individuals in space and time, ie. make them 
kin. I was told that, without a sabwira, a person is like a slave. Ideally, the sabwira 
relationship was one of mutual burial responsibility. It was also described as a 
mutual aid agreement but, I was told it was rarely put into practice as people turned 
first to their patrilineal kin in times of need. During the drought, when I asked 
people if  they had approached their sabwira for help, invariably the reply was that 
the sabwira was also in need and could not respond. In these terms this was a 
relationship based on equity of position and circumstance. It was also a relationship 
crucial to the local construction of personhood. Sabwira played a pivotal role in 
funeral procedures which ensured that the spirit of the deceased made the 
appropriate journey into the realm of the ancestors. Thus, to have no sabwira meant 
that a proper life-course stage could not be accomplished, and that the person had 
no social support. Some informants in Chikafa mentioned that, with changes in 
settlement patterns brought about by the MZP, people in other areas were beginning 
to strike up sabwira relations as a substitute for blood or uterine kin.
The fifth type of kinship relation is couched in an idiom of clan and 
concerns the relationship between local people and their mpondoro (land spirit). In 
this instance, the focus is not on relationships between members of clans or 
lineages, but rather on a connection made between a land spirit and the people who 
live within his territory. The relationship between the living and spirits is 
articulated through the idiom of clanship where the spirit is ‘father’ or primary male 
ancestor and the locals are his children. This important relationship can, 
nevertheless, become tenuous depending on current circumstance. Athough the 
Zambesi Valley was mapped according to spirit territories, these spirits only existed 
through the auspices of locals. If at a given time local people supported mpondoro 
and his medium, then the connection with the pivotal ancestor would become 
relevant. But if  the shrine was not supported then mpondoro would be dormant 
until there was renewed support. Generally, in difficult circumstances when people 
felt some anxiety, there would be support for all ancestral spirits, including 
mpondoro. In the Zambesi, ancestors became important during both the
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Independence War and the drought of 1992.
iii. The People of Kanyemba:
Cutshall(1990) conducted a survey of Kanyemba area in which he noted the
existence of three main ethnic groups: Dema; Korekore; and Chikunda. The 
Chikunda were the largest group and dominated political and economic life. Their 
group consisted of the ruling marunga rosario andrade clan which was subdivided 
into three lineages which should have ideally alternated control of the Chieftaincy. 
Chief Chapoto, the head of the Chihumbe lineage had, in fact, ruled Kanyemba area 
since the 1940s.
Kanyemba was the seat of the only Chikunda chieftaincy in Zimbabwe, a 
circumstance which resulted from the creation of a boundary between Portuguese 
and British territories during the late 1800s. Chief Chapoto, who is now deceased, 
ruled from 1945 until 1997(see Illustration 1). Marunga owned most of the arable 
land on which they grew mainly maize, as well as some vegetables (see Figure 2). 
They also owned the greatest number of goats. Most headmen in Kanyemba were 
Chikunda (either descendants of marunga conquerors or descendants of their 
lieutenants). In fact, members of this group held most of the influential positions 
available which included both the longer established roles of Chief and headman, 
and the new administrative jobs of Ward Councilor4, VIDCO chairmen, and game 
warden. Chief Chapoto ruled through Customary Law, which is entrenched in the 
Zimbabwean constitution, and his networks of supporters. During fieldwork there 
was a dispute regarding succession to the chieftaincy. At first glance the argument 
seemed to rest on differing interpretations of the rules of inheritance, which stated 
that the chieftaincy should alternate between descendants of the three sons of 
Chowufombo, the founding marunga ancestor. But, in truth, the descendants of 
Kanyemba had consolidated quite a base of influence through their appropriation 
of almost all committee positions in the area.
4
Between 1980 and 1993 there were five Ward Councillors, four of which were 
Chikunda from the marunga rosario andrade (chiefly) line.
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Chief Chapoto’s ancestor, Chihumbe, was the elder brother of the warlord, 
Kanyemba, who was known to have brought the Chikunda people from Tete 
province to Dande. Specifically, Kanyemba, brought with him various lieutenants 
who were described as Chikunda but who bore non -marunga clan names. These 
were the people who settled the area along the Mwadzamutanda River and who 
later became sabukhu. In 1945, at the beginning of his reign, Chief Chapoto had 17 
sabukhu under his rule in Kanyemba, 1 in the adjacent Angwa area, and 6 in 
Chikafa area. In the 1990s Chapoto’s rule was limited to the Kanyemba area where 
there were 13 sabhuku (headmen). The Chief listed the ‘tribes’ of 10 of these 
sabuku: 3 Tande; 1 Chewa; 2 Shangwe (from Karoi); 2 Chikunda of the marunga 
rosario andrade clan; 1 Tavara (from Mozambique); and 1 Dema (itembo mvura). 
All of these headmen, with the exception of the Dema individual, could also be 
locally classified under the rubric “Chikunda” because all came into the area at the 
time of conquest.
It is useful to remember that the name ‘Chikunda’ derives from the verb 
‘kukunda’, meaning ‘to conquer’. Because there was some local debate as to 
whether the Dema preceded or arrived in Dande with the Chikunda, this group was 
not classified under that umbrella. That male individuals from such disparate 
‘tribes’ could fall under the same category of Chikunda illustrated the nature of the 
group’s social organisation: that the marunga rosario andrade people were the 
militaiy leaders and decision-makers and that the other groups consisted of their 
followers. According to marunga lore, these followers were acquired as Chikunda 
warlords moved through the Zambesi Valley conquering territories. Thus the 
present-day Chikunda label refers to a group of people organised into a two-tier 
social system of rulers and followers, whose relative positions and relationship 
during the 1990s were set at the time of conquest. As a result of this longstanding 
hierarchy, most sabukhu were descendants of either the conquerors or of their 
lieutenants.
In Kanyemba, decision-making with regard to land use and dispute 
settlement was overwhelmingly in the hands of the marunga rosario andrade clan.
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The Korekore did not figure in these older forms of authority simply because they 
had no role in the initial conquest. Although there was one Dema {tembo mvura 
clan), the sabukhu had very little influence in the area. For one, there was the fact 
that the people he represented cultivated the poorest land in the settlement and 
existed in an economic relationship to Chikunda which was disadvantageous. At 
the same time, their marginalisation continued post-Independence as they held no 
positions within the newer administrative structures. For instance, it would have 
been crucial to the interests of the Dema to be represented on the Wildlife 
Committee because of its influence over the CAMPFIRE scheme which greatly 
affected their livelihood. Little account was taken of the effects of this scheme on 
the lives of the tembo mvura. During one meeting of the Wildlife Committee at 
which the Chairman, the Ward Councillor, and a Senior Ecologist from the Parks 
Department were present, relocation of tembo mvura households to build a 
campsite for tourists was discussed without any representation from their group.
In Kanyemba, as stated earlier, marunga controlled both the Chieftaincy 
and post-Independence administrative positions. For example, between 1980 and 
1993 there were 4 individuals who filled the position of Ward Councillor, 3 were 
marunga rosario andrade. The exception to this monopoly was the membership of 
a Korekore man of the nzou samanyanga clan, whose position was due his group’s 
classification of long-term residence. Also, this individual was a local shopkeeper 
and in a position to be well-informed, as well as quite popular.
The Korekore, also agriculturalists, constituted the second largest group in 
Kanyemba. In local stories, their presence pre-dated the arrival of Chikunda 
conquerors. Chief Chapoto said that long ago the Korekore had worked as 
agricultural labourers for the Chikunda. But this was probably his way of saying 
that the Korekore were of lower status. By other accounts, the Korekore acted as 
intermediaries between the Chikunda and traders from the east coast of 
Mozambique in the lucrative ivory trade during the 19th century. A few informants 
stated that the Korekore, along with the Sori people were in Kanyemba area before 
the arrival of the Chikunda. They named the Sori Chief as Mburuma, who fought
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against Kanyemba and lost. There was at least one Sori lineage left in the area, as 
my neighbour was a member. The Korekore of Kanyemba supported a Korekore 
mpondoro in the Angwa region to the southeast.
The smallest of the three major groups, the tembo mvura had been hunters, 
fishers and gatherers in the past. Because they had been forcibly settled during the 
Independence War, and because the CAMPFIRE program forbade hunting, many 
tembo mvura had little choice but to work for the Chikunda as field labourers. The 
only tembo mvura headman in the settlement lived in Chansato VTDCO, on the 
western side of the Mwadzamatanda River, along with his followers.
By some oral accounts, the tembo mvura pre-dated the Chikunda in 
Kanyemba. However, other stories depicted various patterns of migration and 
settlement into the Kanyemba area, and into the social space that was shared with 
the dominant Chikunda. Prominent Chikunda described the Dema as originating in 
Tete and having arrived in Kanyemba with the Chikunda leaders who were their 
masters. For example, Chief Chapoto said that Chowufombo, the founding ancestor 
of his lineage, took the tembo mvura from their original place on Songo Mountain 
in Mozambique. But that it was Chowufombo’s son, Chihumbe (one of three 
brothers who conquered Kanyemba area), who brought the Dema with him as 
porters when he came into Kanyemba from Nyungwe (Tete). Other informants, 
particularly of the tembo mvura group, recounted that the people followed their 
own leaders (mostly lineage elders) to the area either from Tete or unspecified 
places. The current tembo mvura sabhuku told me that his father was the first to 
hold the position, and that he had brought the tembo mvura people to the Kanyemba 
area
What seems certain is that the fortunes of the tembo mvura people have 
fluctuated over the past century. What I can glean from oral histories is the 
following. The first generation of tembo mvura existed in a better relationship with 
other inhabitants of Kanyemba than they did in the 1990s. They also lived then on 
the western shores of the Mwadzamutanda River and into the mountains. One 
account stated that the tembo mvura “have one father” called Nyamupango, who
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used to be their leader but died and became mpondoro of Chewore area. But since 
Nyamupango’s death was said to have occurred after Kanyemba’s, the latter became 
the senior mpondoro. Thus, Nyamupango’s spirit territory resided within 
Kanyemba’s. The junior relationship of one mpondoro to another was indicative of 
the relative status of their followers: that the Chikunda were superior to the tembo 
mvura irrespective of how the groups had come into contact. In another account, a 
Chikunda sabhuku said that the tembo mvura used to clap to (ie. support) mpondoro 
in Angwa area who called Chinyenzva. The informant did not specify if  this spirit 
was related genealogically to the tembo mvura people or whether he was Korekore. 
But since the death of this mpondoro's medium, no new candidate had emerged and 
so the tembo mvura began to clap to Chikwamba who was also a Korekore 
mpondoro. It seems that the tembo mvura do not want to be under Chikunda 
domination, look for alternate means of representation, but remain crucially tied to 
them for their livelihood.
At the time of this study the allegiances of the tembo mvura seemed to be 
divided between the Korekore who were generally considered to have preceded 
both the Chikunda and the tembo mvura, and to whose land spirit they clapped, and 
the Chikunda Chief who held the power to allocate land, and through whom they 
were ruled by the state, directly through Customary Law, and indirectly through the 
huge effect that CAMPFIRE had on their lives. In this way, they lived socially, 
economically, and politically marginalised lives, within the jurisdictions of others, 
but outside of their families. In other words, they had avoided incorporation into 
ruling lineages in opposition to other Zambesians, ie. alliances of marriage, warfare, 
trade, or friendship. This position had led them to be constructed as ‘other’, existing 
in the balance between identification with the Korekore who did not accept them, 
and the Chikunda who considered them to be inferior.
Tembo mvura informants seemed to give contradictory accounts with 
regard to their recent past. On the one hand, I was told that the current generation 
of elderly tembo mvura man in Kanyemba had possessed cultivatable land in the 
past from which, in conjunction with the procurement of wild foods, they had made
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a living. Other accounts stated that in the previous generation tembo mvura had 
lived in the mountains to the west of the Mwadzamutanda River. In these stories 
people pointed to their birthplaces situated at a number of streams in this mountain 
range. During the Independence War, tembo mvura people were forced to settle in 
Kanyemba area as part of the Rhodesian government’s policy of concentrating 
African populations in definable areas. In the early 1990s these people lived in the 
most marginal parts of Kanyemba area. The two different versions of the tembo 
mvura past point, I think, to a pattern of livelihood which incorporated hunting and 
fishing in what became the Chewore safari area, mixed with enough farming to 
provide a basic supply of cereal. As hunter-gatherers the tembo mvura would have 
moved within whatever was their ranging area at the time of the year which would 
account for the birth of some members in the mountains. Thus, I believe that the 
tembo mvura had in the past a more varied livelihood due to better access to local 
resources, but were gradually deprived of mobility and agricultural land so that in 
the 1990s they found themselves at the mercy of the Chikunda rulers in Kanyemba.
It is difficult to discern when the gaping opposition between Chikunda and 
tembo mvura, and ‘civilised’ and ‘wild’, became important in Kanyemba. The 
denomination, Dema (a pejorative term applied to the tembo mvura), appeared in 
Portuguese colonial records, and was applied to individuals in Dande who preferred 
to be known as Chikunda, Korekore, Ntsenga or as members of other groups5. 
These people were in a difficult position because they were classified by others 
with a label that they themselves rejected because of its undesirability. Yet this 
particular group exhibited characteristics which differentiated them from the 
Korekore. Although their principal language was chiKorekore, which some people 
thought they spoke with a distinctive accent, they used Chikunda for work and local
5
In his memoir, “Divagacoes Historicas Sobre o Distrito de Tete” (Historical 
Wanderings in Tete District), 1944, the Portuguese adventurer, Jose Fernandes 
Jr., wrote that the Dema people lived near Cabora Bassa in the Nhanterezi 
mountains. He wrote that in the past, “it was said that they were a peaceful people 
who would pay tribute to aggressors without offering resistance” (1944:19, my 
translation).
126
meetings. Perhaps most significantly, the clan name of this group was not shared by 
either Korekore or Chikunda. The stated food prohibitions associated with this 
label were related to big game. For example, the tembo mvura sabhuku said that he 
once ate elephant and broke out in spots, a condition which had also affected his 
parents. Similarly, he did not eat hippopotamus. On the other hand, his father’s 
father who originated in Tete area could eat elephant without experiencing dire 
consequences. It would seem, then, that the food prohibition attached to the identity 
of tembo mvura developed with the process of settlement into Kanyemba area and 
the social, economic, and political hierarchies that this process entailed. The 
versions of oral history presented by the dominant Chikunda clearly stated that big 
game hunting was the preserve of their ancestors who brought guns into the area. 
These Chikunda stories underlined the notion that other peoples used spears to hunt 
smaller animals and were therefore inferior. It is unclear from oral histories why the 
tembo mvura settled in Kanyemba in earlier times, when the present-day social 
composition of the area was beginning to take shape. However, it was clear from 
their position in the 1990s that they were socially, economically, and politically 
disadvantaged.
The genealogy of the tembo mvura sabhuku was three generations deep 
whereas those of the various Chikunda sabhuku spanned five or six generations. 
Many tembo mvura were not interested in discussing genealogy. In fact, it was very 
difficult to obtain interviews with members of this group as they believed that 
outsiders wanted information which would compound their image as socially 
inferior, and serve to exploit them further. Their concern with public image was not 
related to social prestige, but rather to the anxiety that the more known about them, 
the more they could be constructed as peculiar and not deserving of a fair share of 
resources. As a result, the contact I had with these people was mostly in the guise 
of informal visits to homesteads, of men dropping by my camp, at local meetings 
such as for food aid distribution, and in the vicinity of the clinic. Whereas members 
of the Chikunda group, and particularly of the ruling marunga rosario andrade clan, 
were very interested in imparting their views to me, the tembo mvura searched for 
invisibility.
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Tembo mvura informants claimed that their parents and grandparents 
hunted kasenye and pembwe (antelope), but that they did not hunt elephant because 
this was not possible with spears, their principal hunting weapon. Their ancestors 
did not make guns, they said, a feature which distinguished them from the 
Chikunda who claimed that they brought gun-making technology, acquired from 
the Portuguese, into Kanyemba area. According to both tembo mvura and Chikunda 
accounts, these people used to eat wild plants and honey in the bush. In the 1990s, 
a tembo mvura person would not volunteer any knowledge about wild foods in the 
belief that this could contribute to their image as uncivilised. They also worried 
that exposing knowledge of the bush might infer that they had been in the bush 
poaching. However on visits to tembo mvura homesteads I saw foodstuffs, such as 
wild okra and ntsapani (the leaves of a shrub). Although illegal and despite the 
danger of imprisonment, some hunting was conducted with spears and by setting 
traps. The tembo mvura cultivated small parcels of land (half an acre or less) on 
which they grew maize and vegetables such as rape, pumpkin, and sweet potato. 
There was some fishing with poles, the use of nets also being illegal. Fishing with 
nets was the cultural preserve of the Chikunda who described particular methods of 
cooking fish as markers of group identity6. The CAMPFIRE program prohibited 
residents of Dande from fishing with nets.
In the 1990s, the tembo mvura lived in homes of meager construction, on 
small parcels of land. Along with the economic activities described above, they also 
laboured in fields owned by Chikunda for payment in money, maize, or goods. A 
few men acted as trackers at the safari hunting camp, and there was occasional 
pot-making for sale to foreigners. The tembo mvura were the poorest of the 
inhabitants of Kanyemba. They inhabited and cultivated the most marginal land in 
the area. According to their sabhuku, Chief Chapoto’s control over land allocation 
had been disadvantageous to his constituents. Their access to wild food was
6
Chikunda say that fish must be cooked with water in a clay pot between sunrise 
and midday until the bones become soft enough to eat.
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impeded by the CAMPFIRE program. They held no influential political positions, 
although they were represented by a headman. They earned very little maize by 
working for Chikunda farmers, about one small vegetable basket of dried maize 
kernels per day. They were contracted mostly for weeding and paid either by the 
day or by the line of maize plants they finished per day. The pay was usually in the 
form of maize, an item of clothing, or rarely money.
It was difficult to know what tembo mvura informants thought of other 
groups. In contrast, the Chikunda held quite emphatic and highly vocalised views 
regarding the tembo mvura. In general, these opinions related to the tembo mvura 
unsuitability as partners in social, political, and economic relationships. But, as 
strong as the impulse to marginalise the tembo mvura was, there were exceptions to 
their exclusion in the form of occasional marriages, and sabwira7 relations. 
Because of their infrequency, these relations might appear to be token gestures, but 
they were important because they were proof, despite the rhetoric, of the ongoing 
relationship between Chikunda and their long-term neighbours. One of Chief 
Chapoto’s “policemen” (men who acted as informants, guards, and enforcers of his 
rules) was from that subjugated clan. I learned that he did not advise the Chief but 
rather kept him informed with regard to Chansato VIDCO, the tembo mvura area.
In constructing the tembo mvura as inferior, the Chikunda found an 
opportunity to create a group opposition which better served their aims as rulers. 
Although the Chikunda thought they were socially superior in Dande, their 
construction of the tembo mvura as “wild” facilitated their own self-image as 
civilised. At various times I was told that before the arrival of the Chikunda, local 
people had no notion of cultivation because they spent their time poking at their 
fields with digging sticks whilst wearing skins and bark. When their ancestors 
arrived, Chikunda informants related, they brought metal implements for more
7
This is a relationship which is created by a beer ritual. It involves lineages in 
mutual burial responsibilities. It is also a mutual assistance agreement and a 
joking relationship. Essentially, it is a way to incorporate suitable outsiders into 
the local community.
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effective cultivation, cloth so that people could be properly clothed, guns that 
would facilitate hunting, and beads for the purposes of marriage. In their accounts 
of the past, the Chikunda stressed the opposition between civilisation and wildness.
In order to illustrate the perceived inferiority of the tembo mvura, one 
Chikunda informant began a story with the assertion, “their gwanga (granary) is the 
hoe and the axe”. He then explained that in the morning the man took his axe, the 
woman picked up her hoe and that they then walked in different directions. In other 
words, the implication was that the tembo mvura lacked both the technology and 
the social organisation to farm effectively. This informant also described the 
practice of women gathering wild plants and men hunting animals and looking for 
honey as unproductive. The Chikunda perceived the tembo mvura as unable to 
produce stores of grain and ridiculed them for this, thus articulating the notion that 
this clan did not deserve good land and that it was not unfair to exclude them from 
its distribution. In addition, this particular Chikunda informant regarded the fact 
that tembo mvura women had started to make pots for sale as an improvement in 
their lifestyle and attributed this change to the beneficial influence of his own 
group.
In a discussion about marriage, another Chikunda informant was very clear 
in distinguishing between the suitability of Korekore and tembo mvura wives. He 
said that the Chikunda preferred to marry Korekore women because the tembo 
mvura were considered dirty. He also stated that most Korekore looked to marry 
other members of their group and that they would travel to the neighbouring Angwa 
area to do so. With this statement he articulated the notion that, regardless of tembo 
mvura aspirations to be considered Korekore, the fact remained that this group did 
not consider them to be suitable marriage partners. In other words, although people 
of the tembo mvura clan might claim to be of the Korekore group, actual Korekore 
(ie. Nzou samanyanga) regarded them as outsiders.
Social hierarchy in Kanyemba was easily identified. Two tiers of the 
Chikunda group, the marunga and their historical followers, occupied the top strata 
while the Korekore occupied the middle level, and the tembo mvura resided at the
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bottom.
iv. The People of Chikafa:
Chikafa is a village situated on the shores of the Mpanyame River close to
the Mozambican border. It was part of a Village Development committee 
comprised of six villages (VIDCO). It was administrated by a Chikunda headman 
and a Korekore Village Chairman. Technically, Chitsungo was Chief of the area but, 
because he resided elsewhere, had no influence locally. The hereditary headman 
and the Village Chairman enjoyed a friendly relationship and worked well together. 
They made major decisions, particularly regarding land distribution, in conjunction 
with local mpondoro.
Physically, Chikafa area is relatively flat. To the east lies a forested area, to 
the west the Mpanyame River, to the south a cluster of villages, and to the north 
Mozambique and Chikafa’s sister village of Chitete. Cross-border relations were 
frequent during my stay. In the early 1990s Chikafa had a primary school, a clinic, 
several boreholes, a soccer field, and a main dirt road leading into Mozambique. 
The American Evangelical Mission built the school and clinic, but departed in 
aboutl970 as the Independence War reached Chikafa. Services in Chikafa were 
used by Mozambicans on a regular basis. Nurses’ aides at the clinic said that they 
often treated people who did not possess Zimbabwean identity papers. Similarly, 
during the drought of 1991-92 some Mozambican families received maize from 
Zimbabwean drought relief programs.
I conducted two surveys of Chikafa village, during the drought in 1992 and 
afterward in 1993. Although Survey II includes more information and is better 
elaborated, comparison of the results of these two surveys illustrates demographic 
and livelihood changes which occurred as a result of drought8.
Survey I counted 60 households, 28 of which were Chikunda and 20 of 
which were Korekore.. The remaining 12 households were of at least 4 other ethnic
8 Data from surveys I and II are available in Appendices 1 and 2.
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groups, taking into account that 6 households did not respond. Of the Chikunda 
households, 16 were of the marunga (pigeon) clan, 3 of the nzou (elephant) clan 
also associated with the Korekore ethnic group. A further 3 clan names were 
ascribed to groups from northeastern parts of the Zambesi Valley. Of the Korekore 
households, 7 were of the elephant clan, the largest within that group, 6 of the 
monkey clan, 2 of the zebra clan, and 2 of the eland clan. The last three clans were 
minorities within the Korekore ethnic group and represented people who migrated 
to the area from the northeast of the Zambesi Valley. In 1992 the most popular 
religion was the cult of the mpondoro Negomo. 27 of 60 households surveyed 
included members who attended possession ceremonies. Roman Catholicism, the 
second most popular religion, allowed members to support the mpondoro.
Survey II counted 76 households, 42 Chikunda and 28 Korekore. The 
remaining households were of 6 different ethnic groups. Of the clans listed, 25 were 
marunga, 17 nzou samanyanga, and 10 tembo mazvimbakupa. Of the religions 
practiced in 1993, 18 households supported a combination of the Catholic Church 
and the mpondoro, 13 attended mpondoro ceremonies, 6 were Evangelical and 
mpondoro, and 1 was Jehovah’s Witness and mpondoro. Hence, 38 households 
supported Nyamanindi. The greatest number of households which did not support 
the land spirit belonged to the new Johan Masowe Church.
Both during and after the drought about half of Chikafa households 
supported Nyamanindi, the local mpondoro, an unsurprising fact as his primary 
function was rain-making. Another reason for Nyamanindi’s popularity was that the 
mpondoro*s cult became the focal point for political process at a time of both great 
social change as well as little opportunity to challenge the government.
During the drought many residents left Chikafa in search of work and 
trading opportunities, thus the ratio of Chikunda to Korekore was closer in 1992 
than in 1993. Drought ended when rain fell in November of 1992, followed by a 
harvest in 1993. By the time I embarked on Survey II many residents, including 
departed Chikunda, had returned to their homes and fields.
Chikafa was an interesting study in social organisation and political life.
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Although ruled by a Korekore land spirit, an elected Korekore Village Chairman, 
and falling into the area of a Korekore Chief, the majority of residents were 
Chikunda, as was the sabhuku. Political process was shared between the Chikunda 
sabhuku and the Korekore headman. A variety of committees held proportionate 
numbers of Chikunda and Korekore. While the Chikunda headman had the support 
of the majority of the population since these were Chikunda, the Village Chairman 
had been elected and also enjoyed significant support. However, the fact that the 
majority of the population believed that ultimate power resided with the mpondoro 
represented a common interest shared by the Korekore and the Chikunda. When 
foreign development schemes arrived in Chikafa in the early 1990s, collective 
support of Nyamanindi and Negomo, a neighbouring senior mpondoro, provided 
the basis for the identity of ‘long-term’ resident which developed in relation to the 
arrival of new migrants.
Landownership was perhaps the greatest indication of the shared interests 
of Chikunda and Korekore in Chikafa in the early 1990s. Of a total o f323.25 acres, 
the Chikunda owned 166 acres and the Korekore 133 acres. These patterns of 
landownership had been set during the early 20th century as the result of conquest, 
subordination and migration, and were felt to be greatly threatened by development. 
Whereas in Kanyemba, primary identities resided with clan and lineage, in Chikafa 
the overarching opposition was between long-term resident and newcomer. So 
powerful was the shared identity of long-term resident that the historical 
differences between these two groups became obscured. Korekore individuals, with 
their shallow genealogies of three generations, had in the past rallied around 
Negomo, and that spirit’s declamations of a glorious mythological past, to be 
situated within broader Korekore society in the Zambesi. They had also adopted 
newer positions provided by the ZANU government. In contrast, elder Chikunda 
recounted family genealogies five generations deep and past allegiance to a 
Chikunda conqueror in support of their rights to land and power. But, in light of the 
perceived threat posed by development and new immigrants, these two 
longstanding groups had put their differences aside to present a united front to 
foreigners. In Chapter 9 1 will discuss a witchcraft accusation which illustrated the
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overwhelming preoccupation with foreigners in Chikafa and the unity between 
lineage elders of the Korekore and Chikunda groups.
The pattern of settlement of Chikafa was similar to that of Kanyemba. In 
oral history accounts, at the time of the Chikunda conquest of Dande, 7 lieutenants 
of the warlord Kanyemba traveled south to conquer the Chikafa area. Of these 7 
men, 5 were marunga rosario andrade, 1 was Ntsereru and 1 was Chewa. The 
Chikafa area fell under the jurisdiction of Chief Chapoto until the 1970s when 
locals voted to be governed by Chief Chitsungo who was Korekore. In the 1990s 
the local headmen were Chikunda, and the practice of rule established at the time 
of conquest remained. It is important to note that Chikunda rule was never as firmly 
entrenched in Chikafa as it was in Kanyemba area because their conquest there was 
incomplete. According to oral accounts, Chikunda shared power with the Korekore 
since their arrival. That both groups support the mpondoro who acts as an 
organizing principle in Chikafa society is indicative of the relatively equal balance 
of powers between these two groups.
Since the establishment of the post-colonial state and the creation of 
positions falling under its governing structure, the influence of members of the 
Chikunda group had become further diluted. For example, the Ward Councilor, the 
Village Development Committee chairman, and the Village Chairman were all 
Korekore. These were the influential decision-making bodies in Chikafa as they 
deliberated on land use, placement of mills and boreholes, food aid, clinic business, 
and, very importantly in light of the land resettlement scheme, the terms of 
eligibility for residence. In Chikafa village, although the authority of the Chikunda 
sabhuku was both moral and practical, because of power-sharing with the Village 
Chairman, the moral dimension tended to carry the heavier emphasis. He consulted 
with the mpondoro regarding rain-making, disputes between people, and land 
allocation. However, decisions were made after lengthy discussion with the Village 
Chairman. The relationship between sabhuku and Village Chairman was amicable 
because these two men had compatible personalities, had lived in the same area for 
a long time, and, as long-term residents had interests in common.
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The Chikunda ruled differently in Chikafa and Kanyemba. By not having 
appropriated the shrine of the land spirit in Chikafa as they had in Kanyemba, the 
nature of their conquest there was forever incomplete with the consequence that a 
certain measure of power-sharing with the Korekore had become necessary. 
Marriage patterns were one indication of a longstanding alliance between Chikunda 
and Korekore in this area. The easy relationship between the sabhuku and the 
Village Chairman was also an example of this association. In Chikafa, the 
organisation of identities into constellations of fluid relationships between 
long-established lineages differed significantly from the patterns of power in 
Kanyemba. While clan, lineage, and tribe were of some relevance in Chikafa in the 
1990s, identity began to be couched in the oppositions between local and foreign 
interests, inter-generational conflict, and changing gender relations. These new 
identities were underpinned by innovative and ideas regarding land and ecology, 
political process, and livelihood
v. Summary:
I began this chapter by suggesting that to best understand the different ways 
in which inhabitants of Kanyemba and Chikafa dealt with innovations brought by 
development, it was important to grasp the cultural logic of autochthony and 
conquest pervasive within the Zambesi. I suggested that the trajectory of Dande 
area from marginal and magical to inhabitable was mirrored in the Zimbabwean 
state’s journey from autochthon to conqueror in the minds of Zambesians. In order 
to apprehend the full meaning of this change it was important to understand the 
system of kinship in Dande and the nature of the populations in both fieldsites.
Chapter 5 expands on issues of domination and representation by 
examining the cult of mpondoro in Chikafa and Kanyemba. While these land spirits 
represented moral order, particularly in their rain-making capacity, they also 
contributed to the nature of political organisation in each of the settlements 
researched.
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Chapter 5: Spirits and Chiefs: The Cult of the Mpondoro
i. Mpondoro: An Introduction
Chapter 4 discussed issues of autochthony and conquest through an 
examination of how kinship relations affected social and political organization in 
Chikafa and Kanyemba. In it I argued that it was important to address variants of 
kinship because these articulated the principles of incorporation and subjugation 
through which local societies dealt with change brought by foreign influence. It was 
also suggested that the basis of Zambesian disenchantment with the Mugabe regime 
during the 1990s resided with the perception that their support of guerillas during the 
Independence War had been betrayed by the state through its promotion of 
development schemes. In this way, the ZANU regime which was constructed as 
autochthonous at Independence became represented as conquerors a decade later.
During the 1990s, the system of mpondoro or land spirits expressed 
preoccupations with autochthony and conquest, in this way playing a crucial role in 
political process. In this chapter, I argue that while mpondoro represented moral order, 
the system was predominantly a philosophy of governance through Chieftaincy. 
Through the structure of each shrine, land spirits gave voice to a localised discourse of 
Chieftaincy. In Chikafa, Chiefs and mpondoro represented a moral order to which all 
Zambesians belonged. In Kanyemba, the only active land spirit represented one faction 
within a succession dispute. During the 1980s David Lan found that this system 
expressed an opposition between African and European, while in the 1990s I observed 
that it gave voice to the conflict between local and foreign interests in Chikafa, but 
served as an instrument of domination in Kanyemba.
All mpondoro belonged to one system in the Zambesi (see Illustration 2); 
however, they existed in a hierarchy related to functions of rain-making, territoriality, 
and bureaucracy. Because research for this study extended to two settlements, I had the 
opportunity to encounter mpondoro who performed each of these important functions. 
In Chikafa, Negomo had rain-making power while Nyamanindi represented a 
principle of territorial integrity. In Kanyemba area, the land spirit Kanyemba
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personified lineage interests with regard to the marunga rosario andrade monopoly 
(see Maps 3 and 4).
Because this study is about domination, I will examine two ways in which land 
spirits supported Chieftaincy. In Chikafa, mpondoro supported a political process 
characterised by a power sharing arrangement between a Chikunda headman and a 
Korekore Village Chairman who ruled in place of the absentee Chief Chitsungo. With 
the arrival of development, and then drought, this alliance was severely tested. There 
the resurgence of interest in spirits during the 1990s served as focal point for a 
discourse of regional identity in opposition to foreign influences. In Kanyemba, rule 
by the marunga rosario andrade clan was reinforced by the mpondoro, who at the 
same time promoted his own lineage for control of the Chieftaincy. In this instance, the 
spirit deliberated exclusively on localised lineage and clan matters. Whereas in 
Chikafa, mpondoro articulated a discourse of Chieftaincy by alliance, in Kanyemba 
the active land spirit espoused Chieftaincy as legitimate domination through conquest.
In addition to its political dimension, the system of mpondoro also functioned 
both as a source of advice about morality as well as the business of everyday life. For 
instance, it was not unusual to hear Negomo declaim a set of rules regarding proper 
social conduct and then give instructions that trees should not be cleared from a certain 
area. Of course, moral authority was directly related to a spirit’s rain-making power, 
which gave Kanyemba no footing to deliberate on those matters.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the knowledge of mpondoro, 
particularly as it related to issues of cosmology and bureaucracy. Then there will be an 
examination of their interactions with Chiefs and function as producers of discourses 
of Chieftaincy. Shrines could not function without the work of mediums and assistants, 
both roles to be examined. Finally, I will examine the structure of possession 
ceremonies in order to demonstrate how the integrated system of spirits, mediums, 
assistants, and constituents functions to produce the discourse which supports the 
specialised function of each land shrine, whether rain-making, territorial or 
bureaucratic.
The whole of the Zambesi Valley is mapped into “spirit provinces” (Garbett
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1969) (see maps 1, 2, 3 and 4). Within these provinces, which were demarcated by 
physical boundaries such as rivers and mountains, resided a mpondoro believed to be 
the spirit of the dead Chief who was said to have conquered the area. Sacred places 
within these territories such as pools, groves, burial grounds, and the medium’s 
homestead were a testament to the conquering Chiefs stewardship of the 
environment and its inhabitants.(see map 1).
One elderly informant described the land spirits as “people who lived and died 
and came back to life (kuramuka)...in the place where they lived”. Throughout the 
Zambesi Valley the cult of mpondoro was uniform in terms of the structure of the 
shrines, the procedure for possession ceremonies, the participation of ritual specialists, 
and the necessity for supporters. However, because there were three categories of 
mpondoro, ranked in importance according to the principles of autochthony and 
conquest, there were also differences in the roles they fulfilled within communities.
Within the Zambesi Valley the hierarchy of spirits was based on Korekore 
myths of arrival, but also included the more recent Chikunda conquerors (see 
Genealogy 3). In this schema the senior rain-making figure was the Korekore Mutota, 
however ultimate rain-making power resided with the autochthonous Musuma. Lan 
collected five Korekore myths of arrival in the Zambesi Valley which described how 
the Korekore encountered the autochthons (1985: 75-83). In his analysis, Lan noted 
that in all of these myths the conquering Korekore deferred to autochthons’ superior 
rain-making powers. The Korekore also took wives from autochthons thereby 
transforming them into bride-givers, and themselves into sons-in-law. The logic of 
this practice was well-illustrated by Lan:
“If one lineage supplies another with the fertility it needs to perpetuate 
itself, it will be partially reciprocated by a marriage payment or labour but 
the debt is so great that the wife-giving lineage remains in a position of 
superiority with a call on services of the wife-takers when the initial 
exchange has been completed”
(1985:86).
In these stories, autochthons became a source of ongoing fertility to the conquerors 
which formed the basis of their rain-making power.
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In his pioneering work in the Zambesi, Garbett described land spirits as 
existing in cognatic and affinal relations within a hierarchy (1969:113). 
Autochthonous mpondoro were positioned in the spirit realm as classificatory sister’s 
sons (vazukuru) (1969:107). This relationship was mirrored in the marunga marriage 
prescription where the preferred bride was ego to father’s sister’s daughter. In other 
words, the marriage principle of the settled conqueror was one of male exogamy and 
relegation to the position of affines, thus placing them in perpetual obligation.
An important reason why autochthons held superior ritual power in the 
Zambesi Valley was their role as classificatory sabwira to the conquerors. As 
discussed earlier, sabwira. were “Active” kin whose primary function was to perform 
funerary rites. The fear of witchcraft which could accompany the death of a relative is 
one explanation for this role. Lan depicted witches as either members of one’s own 
clan or close affines. He also described the pervasive fear that “witchcraft will strike 
from within” (1985:36-37). Sabwira existed between lineages, were inherited 
patrilineally, and were interacted with on an everyday basis within joking relationships. 
Often sabwira formed agreements of mutual aid.
During the serious drought of 1991-92, informants said that the mutual aid 
which characterised the sabwira relationship had broken down because of widespread 
suffering. Thus, the sabwira relationship alluded to a common predicament and a 
common destiny, translated by mpondoro in the 1990s into a sense of local identity. 
Additionally, sabwira provided a ritual and moral link for new immigrants to a 
community. In Chikafa, vazukuru and sabwira were considered autochthonous, a 
classification based on a principle of first arrival. This was an important mechanism 
of inclusion because of the history of immigration within that area, a feature 
accelerated in the 1990s by the MZP. Headmen and mpondoro were particularly keen 
to support this system as it helped to consolidate political process under their tutelage.
In Kanyemba, sabwira relations between lineages were of longstanding 
duration and spoke less to a sense of local community, than to patron-client relations 
characteristic of political domination. For example, a number of marunga were 
sabwira to tembo mvura, however, in contrast to Chikafa, these were not relations of
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equality or shared predicament. Rather, this association seemed important mostly with 
regard to funerary rites, where the marginal tembo mvura were elevated from 
classificatory slaves (<akaporo), linked to their historical subordination, to that of 
legitimate social participants. Several marunga informants were emphatic in the 
opinion that to have no sabwira was to be like a slave, an unacceptable condition 
where a lineage existed in a community unanchored by kinship. They all believed that 
it was proper to have sabwira who performed the appropriate funerary rites.
There existed a division of labour amongst mpondoro dependent on their 
seniority in the Zambesian pantheon. Senior rain spirits were the autochthonous 
Dzivaguru, Karuva (Bourdillon: 1978), Musuma (Lan: 1985) and Madzomba. The 
senior rain-making Korekore spirits were Mutota and Chimombe. The Chikunda spirit 
I dealt with, Kanyemba and the others I was told about, Chihumbe, Muondoka, and 
Nyanderu represented later arrival and so dealt with localised issues of a political 
nature. Autochthonous, Korekore, and Chikunda mpondoro could be classified by 
their respective roles of rain-making, territoriality, and bureaucracy.
Because this study is about domination, I am concerned to examine the role of 
the cult of mpondoro in political process, especially with regard to the opposition 
between autochthony and conquest intrinsic to that system. Concepts of autochthony 
can serve to incorporate foreigners into a locality thereby consolidating a sense of 
common purpose. At the same time, classification as conquerors places newcomers in 
tenuous hierarchies entailing mechanisms of superiority and subjugation. In one study, 
Bourdillon suggested that spirits served to unite people against a common enemy, for 
example, Nehanda and Kaguvi mobilised Africans against Europeans in both wars of 
liberation 1978:239) (see Illustration 2 and Map 2). Similarly, Garbett argued that the 
linkage of separate spirit realms through the kin relations of mpondoro provided a way 
for the whole system to mobilise in times of external threat, such as during the 
rebellion against the British in 1896 (1966:143). I believe that this is the case for 
rain-makers and territorial land spirits whose incorporation into areas as well as 
longevity allowed them the power of autochthons. However, Chikunda land spirits 
were not well ensconced within the kinship system of mpondoro, and their rigid social
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organisation precluded incorporation. Thus, while they controlled areas they were not, 
as Garbett described the Korekore, varidzi vepasi (owners of the earth) (1966:141). 
Chikunda mpondoro were relegated to the position of conquerors in perpetuity, 
exercising control over areas and their inhabitants, but neither ‘ownership’ in the 
Zambesian sense of the concept which entailed responsibility for social continuity, nor 
representation outside their clan and lineage.
One important feature of political process in the Zambesi is that the support 
land spirits receive from constituents waxes and wanes with circumstance. For 
example, I was told that after the Independence War and throughout most of the 1980s, 
people in Chikafa lost interest in mpondoro, but that their support renewed with the 
arrival of development and drought in the early 1990s. Similarly, in Kanyemba, in the 
build-up to the succession dispute, Chief Chapoto’s ancestral spirit, Chihumbe 
remained without a medium, while his rival lineage was represented by the vocal 
mpondoro Kanyemba. Since the 1890s, people in the Zambesi have encountered 
several foreign states, namely the British, Rhodesians, and the Zimbabwean of the 
1990s, which they could not incorporate into their political systems. In these cases, 
mpondoro, even if their powers of representation were limited, provided a form of 
representation.
ii. The Knowledge of Mpondoro:
In his Ph.D. thesis, Making History, David Lan argued that:
“By the nature of their profession, spirit mediums can never be controlled 
or contained by any one set of political institutions. The mhondoro live 
forever outside and far above the transitory world of human ambition and 
desire. The only demand they make of their earthly substitutes is that they 
take care of their descendants and protect the land. Should they fail, they 
will be abandoned and some other group or class will find itself charged 
with the care of the community”.
(1983:309-310)
Among Korekore rain-makers there is a strong discourse of impartiality with 
regard to the world of humans. Mpondoro, such as Negomo, espoused the view that 
they were keepers of definitive cosmological knowledge regarding the history of the
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Zambesi Valley and appropriate moral behaviour which ensured social continuity. In 
addition, Korekore mediums were construed as bodies to be possessed by their land 
spirit, but who did not hold any opinion or indeed memory of his actions once out of 
trance.
Lan’s research took place shortly after the Independence War when the cult of 
mpondoro had found strong purpose as a focus of opposition to the Rhodesian army. 
This was a time of outstanding support from local populations who invested great 
expectations for political and economic empowerment in this system of belief. 
Because of their renewed power, the sacredness of mpondoro, in the form of stronger 
social prescriptions and a greater distance from the world of humans, was increased. In 
light of my own research, I believe that Lan’s conclusions regarding the sacredness of 
these spirits were greatly heightened by the dire predicament of their host populations 
during the guerilla war. The Independence War encompassed all of the Zambesi 
Valley, and presented therefore a situation, not seen since the coming of Europeans in 
the 1890s, in which the whole of the hierarchy of mpondoro could be mobilised. With 
the involvement of rain-makers, territorial spirits, and bureaucrats the system was in 
a position to produce an integrated discourse. It was this account of the spiritual 
mobilisation of the whole Zambesi Valley which Lan depicted so eloquently.
My time in the field was characterised by very different circumstances. For one, 
although the MZP encompassed a large part of the Zambesi Valley, its influence did 
not extend as far as that of the War. Since Independence, political process had 
diversified with the introduction of new structures tied to the state (to be reviewed in 
Chapter 6). Immigration to the area had produced localities which were socially 
fragmented, despite local mechanisms of incorporation such as the sabwira relation. 
Development schemes introduced contained intrinsic philosophies of decentralization 
(ideas to be developed in Chapter 7). Also, the nature of the terrain of dense bush, 
grasslands, and bad roads also lent itself to pockets of remoteness. The Zambesi 
Valley I encountered consisted of dispersed loci of power where the discourse of 
Chieftaincy was still relevant, but quite in tune to local issues. In Chikafa, I witnessed 
renewed interest in mpondoro in the wake of the MZP, which increased dramatically
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as the serious drought took hold. The territorial spirit possessed a medium whose 
shrine grew in stature with the support of Negomo, a rain-maker, and the campaigning 
of two vocal assistants. A number of ceremonies took place which gained the support 
of locals. Slowly, I understood that a discourse of local identity was being constructed 
which affirmed the power-sharing arrangement of Chikunda and Korekore in 
existence since Independence.
The case of Kanyemba was different in that the area had been less affected by 
change. However, Chieftaincy remained in the form of domination by one clan which 
had ruled for at least a century. In tandem with this situation, the mpondoro of that area 
was concerned with the maintenance of clan rule. Thus, in both fieldsites, the cult of 
land spirits addressed local concerns, some sacred and some mundane, but never the 
all-encompassing issues generated by the War. In Chikafa, Negomo and Nyamanindi 
deliberated on rain-making and territoriality, and in Kanyemba area, Kanyemba 
addressed clan and lineage interests.
Regardless of the way in which the cult of mpondoro is manifested at a 
particular time, it is an elaborate belief system which contains a number of defining 
features. First and foremost it has a political function in that it articulates a discourse 
of Chieftaincy. In the absence of Chiefs, it is believed that rival powers will take over, 
a concern raised by Negomo with regard to the MZP. Chieftaincy existed differently in 
the two areas studied and will be discussed below. Mpondoro also gave voice to the 
cultural logic of autochthony and conquest so important to social organisation in the 
Zambesi. But mostly, the knowledge of land spirits is related to the primary function 
of each.
Cosmology was the preserve of rain-makers such as Negomo who recounted 
local histories and spoke about moral issues. However, because he was not a senior 
rain-maker in the order of the autochthonous spirits such as Musuma, his deliberations 
of sacred knowledge sounded like localised cosmologies. I noted an interesting 
juxtaposition between cosmological and mundane knowledge in Negomo’s speeches. 
For example, at a rain-making ceremony in Kanongo, Chikafa area, November 1992, 
Negomo began by reciting the names of past conflicts within Dande, scolded people
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with regard to the importance of sacred areas, then dealt with local problems related to 
cutting trees and a case of incest.
The relationship between cosmological and mundane knowledge is important 
to examine in the context of 1990s Zambesi where the sacred role of mpondoro 
seemed somewhat diminished to me. Cosmology, as defined by The Oxford 
Dictionary o f  Current English, is “the science or theory of the universe” (Allen: 1990). 
In his book, Knowledge and Practice in Mayotte, Lambek discussed the relationship 
between practice and cosmology by demonstrating how religious and healing practices 
on the island of Mayotte formed a local theory of knowledge. In his argument, he 
juxtaposed the objectified knowledge of Islamic text (sacred knowledge), to which a 
limited number of specialists had access, with the embodied knowledge performed in 
spirit possession accessible to non-specialists (which he called cosmology or worldly 
knowledge). In his view these two types of knowledge served as a critique of each 
other. Thus, a specialist of Islamic texts who spent most of his time on the written 
word might be a respected specialist but not wise-in-the-world. In this study, Lambek 
made no assumptions about either form of knowledge, other than to submit that, 
“knowledge has an indexical, personal function; what one knows is not fully 
distinguishable from what one does or who one is” (1993:6). In this way, cosmologies 
were for all, not just the preserve of specialists.
In the Zambesi, there was no sacred text associated with mpondoro, and no 
specialists who might control its interpretation as, for example, in the tradition of the 
West African griot (Stoller 1989; 1995). Instead, the shrines of land spirits 
encompassed current affairs and generated an account of these for their constituents to 
which they tendered or withdrew their support. Unlike Lambek’s specialists of Islamic 
text whose sacred knowledge did not need direct rapport with lay people, the 
importance that mpondoro accorded to sacredness (of historical events, areas, or ritual 
materials) depended very much on the political and economic circumstances of their 
supporters. The Independence War gave Musuma as well as lesser rain-makers great 
powers of representation during the 1970s associated with the complex cosmologies 
Lan recorded. During the 1990s, political fragmentation gave way to a dispersal of the
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system and a localised approach to representation.
The production of sacred knowledge was the preserve of rain-making and 
territorial mpondoro who gauged their constituents’ degree of acceptance. Generally, 
land spirits were in tune with the wishes and requirements of local inhabitants through 
mechanisms such as the relative sacredness of specialist knowledge, and the 
incorporation of newcomers and new concepts. However, occasionally knowledge 
arrived which could not be framed within the local shrine. The greatest example of an 
innovation incongruent with local knowledge was the arrival of the MZP in Chikafa. 
The implications of new concepts are, “that the knowledge of any given system (or 
person) cannot be fully linked within a single system-that incommensurability is a 
critical feature of most forms of knowledge” (Lambek 1993:8). Unlike post-colonial 
state structures introduced into the Zambesi in the 1980s, the incongruence of new 
knowledge brought by the MZP with the capacity of mpondoro to integrate it posed a 
problem for that system. However, for a number of residents in Chikafa, new concepts 
couched in the language of development were dealt with at the various meetings which 
took place there in parallel with activities of the shrines. These events posed a threat to 
mpondoro who scolded the audiences at ceremonies for their divided loyalties.
One way that mpondoro remained relevant was through their commentary on 
mundane matters of land allocation, cutting down of trees, domestic disputes, 
boundary problems, and various forms of inappropriate social behaviour. With the 
political fragmentation characteristic of the Zambesi in the 1990s, which resulted in a 
localisation of issues, it made sense that specialist knowledge also narrow in focus. As 
Lambek suggested, “systematizing has been our concern, grounded in our 
epistemology and social order...their models were tacit or unconscious; they knew 
what they were doing and, when asked, could readily explain themselves, but they 
rarely stopped to consider how all their actions fit together” (1993:27). Thus, the 
search for coherence in other systems of knowledge does not necessarily lead to a 
fruitful interpretation. During the 1990s, the cult of land spirits was fragmented, a 
reflection of the decentralization of political process and the lack of local consultation 
characteristic of development schemes.
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The primary function of the cult of mpondoro was governance through a 
discourse of Chieftaincy. In Kanyemba, the connection between land spirits and 
Chiefly rule was clear and devoid of confounding cosmological concepts. There two 
bureaucratic mpondoro, the dormant Chihumbe and the active Kanyemba, affirmed 
Marunga clan rule and represented their own lineages. In Chikafa, the form of Chiefly 
rule was more complicated for a variety of reasons including the diverse nature of 
clans and lineages, political fragmentation, and the sudden implementation of the 
MZP. There, a discourse of Chieftaincy rallied around a number of features of the land 
spirit cult including cosmology, territoriality, and constitution of the shrine of 
Nyamanindi. These issues will be discussed in the following section.
iii. The Structure of the Chief-Mpondoro Relationship:
The ideal relationship between mpondoro and Chiefs is an alliance of 
benevolent rule where the interplay of cosmology and bureaucracy exists in balance. 
Within a given territory mpondoro, the Chief, and the population are linked by the 
principle of descent. The land spirit is the classificatory ancestor of the area whether 
his genealogy links him explicitly or mythologically to the actual human Chief. 
Populations within a territory are linked to the land spirit by an idiom of clan put into 
practice either genealogically or through the device of the pangolin. Lan described the 
Chief-mpondoro relationship in the following way:
“In life a chief should look after all his followers. He should provide them 
with grain from a common store in times of drought and maintain the peace 
by enforcing law through his court. When a chief dies he is transformed 
into a mhondoro and becomes the source of fertility of the land itself. He 
provides rain for the fields and protects the crops as they grow. Rain will 
only be withheld if the mhondoro’s laws are disobeyed. If incest, murder or 
witchcraft takes place drought follows and the crops will fail. But if the 
descendants of the mhondoro obey his laws and perform his ceremonies in 
due time, they will live in peace and plenty”.
(1985:32)
While Lan’s interpretation of the relationship between Chiefs and mpondoro relied 
heavily on cosmology, where notions of the order of the social and natural worlds 
predominated, I encountered Chieftaincy in tenuous circumstances in both fieldsites.
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In Chikafa, a reinvigorated shrine for Nyamanindi, supported by the rain-maker 
Negomo, worked in alliance with the power-sharing arrangement of Korekore and 
Chikunda lineages. Because of the absence and disinterest of the actual Chief of the 
area, a discourse of Chieftaincy was articulated by Nyamanindi with the approval of 
the headman and the Village Chairman. In Kanyemba, while the office of Chief was 
itself not under threat, competition between two lineages of the ruling clan caused a 
fraught atmosphere of name-calling, rumour, and alignments by the resident 
population.
In Chikafa, the 1990s was a time of rapid social change and of great threat to 
established Chiefly rule. The area was home to a population of diverse origins for 
whom the principle of descent meant not a long genealogy, but instead a vague notion 
of ancestral origins. Chikunda and Korekore clans had ruled in alliance since the area 
was conquered in the late 19th century, and these two groups formed the majority of the 
population. Chief Chapoto had ruled until the 1970s when the area was transferred to 
the control of Chief Chitsungo, a Korekore who took no part in local political process. 
Until the early 1990s, support for mpondoro had waned, however, the territorial spirit 
Nyamanindi possessed a new medium, and his shrine was re-invigorated by two 
ambitious assistants. The arrival of the MZP caused great upheaval to the established 
order because it offered new forms of social organisation which bypassed Chiefs and 
mpondoro. Also, importantly, the project brought immigrants who had no local 
allegiance and who proved unwilling to be incorporated under the umbrella of the 
ruling alliance.
Because of its scale, established rulers considered the MZP to be a conqueror 
which meant that it could not be incorporated into the established structure. Negomo 
lamented at a rain-making ceremony in 1992 that people had cleared sacred areas, 
delineated these for cultivation, and had begun to work the lands. He also asked why 
villagers from Chikafa and surrounding areas had neglected the spirits and if they were 
being told to stay away. In light of such change, the established political structure 
endeavoured to remain relevant by re-incamating itself as a locus of opposition to the 
MZP. A number of features of the cult of mpondoro were rallied to gain larger support,
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reiterate a discourse of Chieftaincy, and express opposition to change.
First, the shrine of the territorial spirit, Nyamanindi, was re-established in 
Chikafa with a new young medium. A new homestead was built for the medium 
containing the requisite ceremonial huts; he was given land, and married a local girl. 
Both the hereditary medium’s assistant and an appointed assistant worked to build and 
then promote this new shrine. Prescriptions for proper behaviour at ceremonies were 
reiterated and the behaviour of participants monitored. A neighbouring rain-maker, 
Negomo, participated in ceremonies with Nyamanindi in which he displayed the 
control and benevolence which are characteristic of senior spirits. During ceremonies, 
Negomo deliberated on history and social rules while Nyamanindi mostly agreed with 
him, thereby enacting a division of labour between cosmology and territoriality. This 
renewed presence caused one informant to comment that there were a lot of spirits in 
Chikafa, a statement which I took to mean that there was competition for political 
control.
One way in which spirits constructed local identity was through the pangolin 
clan, considered to be sacred knowledge, which demonstrated principles of 
incorporation and common identity. Pangolin were thought to be elusive animals that, 
if caught, should be brought to the local mpondoro. Lan (1983; 1985) argued that the 
prescription for bringing a pangolin to a mpondoro alluded to the way a new wife 
should be introduced into an area. According to the cult of mpondoro, hunters who 
catch a pangolin must offer it silently to the land spirit, much in the way that a new 
wife should perform menial tasks silently before she is acknowledged. The 
comparison between pangolin and new wife hinted at the expected submission of 
foreigners to local ways, before they should be granted acceptance. Pangolin also 
represented the universal food prohibition uniting disparate populations living 
together in a spirit territory into one lineage. Pangolin were only be eaten by chiefs or 
mediums because these individuals carried ritual authority. As Lan suggested, “while 
the pangolin found within a particular spirit province is being eaten, it is as if all those 
who live within that province become members of the pangolin clan” (1985:117). He 
added that, “the ‘pangolin clan’ combined the principle of common substance with the
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principle o f territoriality to overcome the divisiveness inherent in the principle of 
descent” (1985:117). In this way, in an area of multiple affiliations, the pangolin 
provided a common unifying element. In Chikafa, at a rain-making ceremony, 
Negomo asked why the state had taken all the pangolin as these animals could only be 
eaten by mpondoro. In doing so, this spirit articulated local concern regarding who, in 
light of the restructuring precipitated by the MZP, was in charge of looking after the 
population.
In contrast, Kanyemba was ruled by an established Chieftaincy monopolised 
by one clan since its foundation. A rigid social hierarchy dividing Marunga clan 
members from non-Marunga kept political process contained within that clan. For the 
most part, foreign influence had been incorporated into the status quo. This had been 
the case both with committees installed by the post-colonial state in the 1980s, and the 
newer CAMPFIRE scheme. In Kanyemba, Chieftaincy was a focus of local 
domination of politics and the economy. For this reason, the Chikunda mpondoro was 
predominantly preoccupied with bureaucratic issues pertaining to the administration 
of the area. Kanyemba held a ritually inferior position to neighbouring mpondoro such 
as Chikwamba, commanded no sacred knowledge and had no power over fertility. The 
activities of the Chikunda mpondoro, Kanyemba and the dormant Chihumbe were 
confined within their own territories (see map 4).
The following excerpts from audiences with Kanyemba and Negomo illustrate 
the different functions of their shrines.
From an audience with the mpondoro Kanyemba:
It seems as i f  Chapoto's son will be the next Chief What is your observation?
Kanyemba: I f  we talk about that whilst Chapoto is still alive he will know what to do 
but let us wait until he dies. I f  he says his son will be the Chief I  don t  agree with him 
because I  am the one who appoints the next Chief
What criteria do you use to appoint the new Chief?
Kanyemba: That is only known by me, no one else. What will happen i f  Chapoto’s son 
takes over? That will not happen but i f  he comes and tells me his plans maybe I  will 
hear him, but i f  he doesn *t, la m  the one who is going to appoint the next Chief1
11 am indebted to Lazarus Zhuwao who conducted this interview and provided me
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And with the mpondoro Negomo: (an excerpt from a longer statement)
Negomo: I f  people are properly settled after the war there will be no more wandering 
spirits, once there is a black government and the colonial system is removed. 
Wandering spirits are o f people who died during the war...Negomo is a true 
spirit... When Negomo wants to arrange things he calls the villagers and listens to 
suggestions, but Mugabe does things without consulting us. Why does he consult us for  
rain then? For the war we did things together...If people listened to spirits now the 
way they did during the war there would be no problem with rain...I don't want 
witchcraft in my territory...I don't want incest in my territory...If anyone practices 
witchcraft they will be killed.
These two brief excerpts from longer audiences with Kanyemba and Negomo 
suggest the different approaches to Chieftaincy in the two fieldsites. On the one hand, 
Kanyemba discussed the succession to the chieftaincy, his wish to control the selection 
process, and his reluctance to unveil his strategy for doing so. He was authoritarian and 
mystified the process of succession indicating that it was an issue to be obfuscated 
from the community. Kanyemba offered a representation of Chieftaincy as domination 
whereby rulers controlled a political process closed to outsiders.
In contrast, Negomo’s utterances suggested a vision of Chieftaincy based on 
moral authority and paternalism. His comments with regard to witchcraft and incest 
were related to ideas of moral order in which fulfilling social prescription was tied to 
rain-making. The idea of consultative political process was juxtaposed, somewhat 
ironically, with mention of President Mugabe. Also, “wandering spirits”, interpreted 
as competitors for political influence, were compared to Negomo who affirmed that he 
was a true spirit. In all, Negomo’s speech represented a view of benevolent 
Chieftaincy delivered through an alliance of mpondoro, headman, and Village 
Chairman. The contrast between Negomo as Chief and the state indicated an 
opposition between locality and foreign influence, or autochthons and conquerors.
A feature particular to Chikunda mpondoro is that stories about their lives as
with a transcript.
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Chiefs are couched in terms of social memory rather than events of the mythological 
past. Informants could provide personal details of Kanyemba as Chief which they said 
had been passed on from grandparents and great-grandparents. Stories of Kanyemba’s 
life contained elements associated with conquest rather than incorporation. For 
instance, many informants mentioned his interest in herbal medicines (mankwara), the 
consumption of which was a prerequisite for chiefly resurrection (kuramuka) as a land 
spirit. Kanyemba’s interest in herbs had additional significance in that he was said to 
have consulted n ’anga (African healers) in order to be impervious to bullets. Perhaps 
the most significant detail of these stories is that Kanyemba killed healers once he had 
obtained their knowledge. One informant named a number of soldiers retained by 
Kanyemba solely to kill discarded healers. One interpretation of Kanyemba’s 
legendary murders of healers is that, as a conqueror, he was preoccupied with 
controlling knowledge of the moral order, the source of power of autochthons. 
However, in the 1990s, Kanyemba area was dependent on neighbouring Korekore and 
autochthons mpondoro for rain-making. While the Marunga promoted their strong 
clan ideology characterised by stories of supremacy, the fact remained that their 
mpondoro had no rain-making power meaning that their conquest remained 
incomplete.
Precisely because Kanyemba had not acquired the moral authority of 
autochthons in the way of Korekore Chiefs, the Chieftaincy he founded was forever 
open to question. This was a paradox because, in reality, the Marunga-ruled 
Chieftaincy in Kanyemba was much stronger and more stable than that of Chikafa 
where the land spirit was respected. Members of subordinate lineages challenged the 
legitimacy of the Marunga clan while remaining powerless to usurp it. The Chieftaincy 
was also plagued by internal tension. Generally, Chapoto challenged the opinions of 
the mpondoro Kanyemba by disrespecting the memory of the dead Chief. For instance, 
Chapoto pointed out several times that the human Kanyemba was well known for his 
promiscuity, implying that with such a large number of liaisons it would be hard to 
know who were his legitimate children. In this way, Chief Chapoto challenged the 
legitimacy of his opponents by implying that they fell outside of the parameters of 
kinship (patrilineal descent). In addition, Chapoto’s mention of the human
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Kanyemba’s sexual activities hinted at his lack of personal morality. While he spoke 
o f Kanyemba as promiscuous and immoral, he emphasised his own Catholicism by 
crossing himself before meals and describing his sons’ education at a Catholic mission 
school. Given Chapoto’s attempts to discredit Kanyemba, it became evident that this 
mpondoro held tenuous moral authority. The Chief challenged the importance of the 
spirit’s pronouncements, the moral character of his personage, and the personal 
integrity and ritual legitimacy of his medium.
Because the preoccupations of the mpondoro Kanyemba were lineage-based, 
in times of political crisis, his constituency narrowed down to his descendants. I was 
told that before the succession dispute came about, the mpondoro had been a better 
representative of the interests of the Marunga clan. While staying firmly in the realm 
of local politics, Kanyemba’s oscillation between lineage and clan interests could 
weaken his position if the mood of the population was not well gauged. It was 
probably safe to promote the interests of the Marunga clan as non-Marunga had no 
political or economic power. However, to explicitly advance the claims of one 
Marunga lineage over another could result in a great deal of social disruption. Chapoto 
understood this danger and sought to exploit it by discounting the human Kanyemba, 
and the shrine of his mpondoro, as immoral. At the same time, Chapoto advanced 
notions of his own Marunga stature by invoking a Portuguese identity by means of 
pious Catholicism. In sum, Chapoto played with various notions of Chikunda identity, 
including links to Portuguese ancestry, morality, legitimate descent, and experience of 
rule to argue that his children were best fit to succeed him.
It can be argued, then, that amongst the Chikunda mpondoro their moral 
authority was significantly less established than that of their Korekore counterparts. 
Not only were the mpondoro less well-established in the pantheon of Zambesian land 
spirits, they also had very little rain-making power. If their pronouncements were not 
well-received then they could be open to criticism aimed at their character as spirits, 
and because oral histories of their time as humans existed, their activities then could 
also be open to re-interpretation. Additionally, when there was disagreement with the 
spirits’ stated opinions, the person of the medium could be attacked both
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professionally and personally. All this spoke to a closeness to the world of the living. 
In contrast, the mediums of Korekore land spirits were conceptually separate from the 
spirits they embodied and, thus, beyond reproach because of their high moral authority. 
If people disagreed with the spirits’ pronouncements, lack of authenticity of the 
medium could be blamed. There were no grounds on which to discredit the mpondoro, 
the land of the living being conceptually distant from that of the spirits.
Until the 1990s, Chieftaincy had been the primary vehicle for political rule in 
the Zambesi Valley. Forms of Chieftaincy depended on whether a society was 
centralised such as in Kanyemba, or dispersed as was the case of Chikafa. In both areas, 
relationships with mpondoro affected the character of the working chiefly political 
structure. In Kanyemba area, a mpondoro of low moral authority both affirmed clan 
domination o f the Chieftaincy, and challenged the lineage (of three possibilities) who 
ruled. However, a relationship between land spirit and Chief was not necessary to 
maintain rule as a rigid social hierarchy ensured political stability. In light of his 
standing outside of the realm of cosmology, the mpondoro Kanyemba functioned as a 
bureaucrat whose preoccupation lay with mundane administrative affairs.
In Chikafa, the established alliance between two longstanding Chikunda and 
Korekore lineages was thrown into question with the arrival of development schemes 
whose effects were compounded by serious drought. In response, there was renewed 
interest in the role of mpondoro as classificatory Chiefs of the area, with the result that 
the shrine of the territorial spirit, Nyamanindi, was revived. The strengthening of the 
relationship between land spirits and earthly rulers provided long-term residents in 
Chikafa with a substantial local political apparatus which could better focus and 
promote their regional interests.
iv. Mediums:
The roles of medium and the medium’s assistant formed the cornerstone of 
political process in chieftaincies. A medium’s job was to enter into trance and act as a 
vessel for the land spirit he or she embodied. The medium and the mpondoro were 
considered to be two separate social beings never existing concurrently. It was
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believed that, in possession, a medium loaned his or her body to the spirit and was, 
therefore, absent from possession ceremonies. This division of roles was well 
evidenced by the practice of greeting the medium once he or she emerged from trance. 
With regard to events having taken place during possession ceremonies, mediums 
always referred inquiries to their assistants, saying that they had no memory of the time 
they were in trance.
To the observer, the medium possessed by the spirit and the medium out of 
trance appeared as two distinct personalities. The speech and manner of mediums 
resembled that of any other person living in the Zambesi and their behaviour was 
usually age and gender appropriate and, as such, indistinguishable from that of other 
locals. But when possessed, mediums adopted characteristics attributed to the spirit 
they embodied. Because mpondoro were older male chiefs, the manner of possessed 
mediums was gruff, authoritarian, superior, and bearing eccentricities associated with 
the elderly. In effect, two social beings inhabited the same body of the medium. These 
characteristics applied both to Chikunda and Korekore mpondoro.
Mediums were, by definition, individuals from outside of the spirit’s territory. 
It was only when an individual realised that he or she was possessed by a mpondoro 
and the possession accepted as authentic, that the journey was made to the spirit’s 
territory. Becoming a medium followed a prescribed process technically out of the 
individual’s control. The following is a story, related to me by Tafire, o f how he 
became Nyamanindi’s medium:
In 1986, when he was a schoolboy, Tafire became physically ill and mad.
He stopped eating and drank only water. His relatives became worried, 
which prompted them to consult a spirit medium regarding his illness. 
When he went to see this medium he had a vision of a spirit of an ancestor 
approaching him. The experienced medium then gave Tafire snuff and 
showed him how to clap to appease the ancestors. He also explained that 
his condition would improve. Afterward, beer was brewed and his 
condition was explained to people.
Nyamnindi’s medium told me that when he first fell ill he felt upset and 
unhappy because he was still at school and thought the illness would badly affect his 
life. But once the illness was diagnosed, he said, he felt relief and was, “happy because
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I know when the spirit will come, before it was only when I was sleeping on a mat. 
Now I can make a living being a medium”. In other terms, he described the transition 
from the uncertainties of mentally illness to acceptance as ritual specialist who 
exercised his profession according to a prescription (i.e. he knew when the spirit 
would appear), and could support himself by doing so. Tafire expressed satisfaction at 
having gained an acceptable social role.
As this brief account illustrated, the process of becoming a medium began with 
repeated episodes of physical and mental illness which interfered with everyday life. 
Once the illness became a problem, the person’s family consulted specialist healers for 
an explanation. The afflicted described the early stages of illness as a time of great 
anxiety because of the inability to live normally and an unknown future. Once a 
diagnosis of possession by a land spirit was made, the affected individual took steps to 
gain acceptance within that spirit’s territory, first by the local kambande/mutapi 
(medium’s assistant), then by the local ruling hierarchy.
Candidates for the position of medium were tested locally through a prescribed 
procedure. Crucially, they had to gain support from the hereditary medium’s assistant 
in order to be considered as serious candidates. Once this happened the medium was 
tested by a neighbouring mpondoro who judged the authenticity of the candidate’s 
trance. If it was accepted, the candidate would be asked by the examining mpondoro to 
recite both the spirit’s genealogy and life-history. Finally, if  the medium could identify 
the spirit’s paraphernalia and if the local population were in general agreement, the 
medium would be invited to settle locally.
In theory mediums were apolitical because they had no knowledge of the spirit 
and could not, therefore, accept responsibility for events which occurred during trance. 
Also, as foreigners mediums were supposed to have no political interests in the new 
locality. These characteristics placed the medium at the crossroads of political process 
in the Zambesi. Lan summed up this ritual role when he stated that “the authenticity 
of the mediums is constantly reaffirmed by the authority of their vatapi which derives 
from the chiefs whose own legitimacy was established by one of the mhondoro who 
possess the medium” (1985:63). It was precisely because of their position in the
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structure of governance that the medium’s role could be tenuous. It was a 
contradictory role because while mediums were supposed to be impartial, their 
involvement in the territory of the land spirit, the need to gauge local expectations for 
behaviour, of acquiring local support, and performing an acceptable incarnation of the 
mpondoro meant that it was impossible to sidestep politics. Thus, through the 
medium’s body and structural position flowed political discourse and performance. In 
Chikafa, Nyamanindi’s medium had found local acceptance, I believe, because 
equilibrium had been struck between the shrine of the land spirit (administered by the 
medium’s assistant) and the local political leadership consisting of the sabhuku and the 
Village Chairman.
In Kanyemba area, the low moral authority of the land shrine meant that the 
position of its medium was uncertain. The presence of the mpondoro Kanyemba and 
the absence of Chief Chapoto’s ancestor, the mpondoro Chihumbe reflected popular 
opinion of the succession dispute. Chief Chapoto was upset by this lack of support 
from the population and so, in a shrewd maneuver, had made an attempt to influence 
the shrine of Kanyemba by supporting a female candidate from Mozambique for the 
position of medium. The Chief helped the woman to obtain Zimbabwean residency, 
but soon turned against her when, while possessed, she claimed that the descendants 
of Kanyemba should succeed to the Chieftaincy. Angered, Chapoto insisted that the 
medium was a fake and a prostitute, in one statement disputing her ability to mediate 
for the mpondoro by implying that her services were for sale.
In contrast, amongst mediums of Korekore mpondoro, the person of the 
medium and his individual behaviour when not possessed did not affect the respect 
that people had for the spirit. One time in Chikafa I witnessed a medium stumbling out 
of the clinic building so drunk he could barely stand. When I expressed surprise at the 
spectacle, my assistant told me that the medium and the spirit were two different 
beings and that, consequently, the medium’s behaviour was his own.
In David Lan’s writings (1983; 1985), he depicted an opposition between black 
Africans and Europeans (muntu asvipo and muntu murungu) by adopting the 
Zambesian concepts of autochthony and conquest. In this dichotomy, the physical
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appearance of Korekore mediums embodied notions of African chiefs by the fact that 
they wore cloth skirts or tunics of black and blue which symbolised the chiefly role and 
rain-making ability of mpondoro. Mediums also shaved their heads or, more 
commonly, wore their hair in dreadlocks. They wore sandals made locally of old tires, 
instead of commercially produced footwear. Around their necks were strung beads 
indicating possession by spirits . Sometimes they carried a walking stick in the 
tradition of old men. These mediums would not wear watches or any other adornment 
connected to the world of Europeans. They avoided traveling by car or bus (although 
strict adherence was difficult), and expressed a preference for locally brewed maize 
beer over the bottled variety from the plateau. They spoke chiKorekore and avoided 
English. In short, Korekore mediums represented a notion of chieftaincy which was 
exclusively African and devoid of foreign influence. This was not a historical 
representation, as the Portuguese made contact with the Munhumutapa State in the 
1500s, and other Europeans traveled and traded in the area for centuries. Instead, 
Korekore mediums depicted local Zambesian identity, constructed during the 
Independence War as particularly African in counterpoint to the European colonizer 
whom they fought for freedom.
During the 1990s, the conceptual opposition between autochthony and 
conquest in the Zambesi was no longer represented by the African/European 
dichotomy. While local identity remained conceptually fixed on essentialist notions of 
African identity, conquerors were no longer framed as European. Instead, the 
Zimbabwean state took on the role of conqueror, an argument I will develop in the 
following chapter. As an example of the changed role of Europeans in Dande, two 
Korekore mpondoro I consulted welcomed me by stating that, in life, they had been 
accustomed to seeing white people in the Zambesi. One of the land spirits actually 
congratulated me for consulting him as he said that it was proper for newcomers to 
make themselves known to mpondoro. Thus, during the 1990s, my white European 
appearance did not carry the political implications it might have done during the 
1970s.
2 Wearing beads indicated that a person was possessed by mashave (animal spirits).
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In contrast to Korekore depictions of mythological chieftaincy, the Chikunda 
medium I met represented a different set of distinctions. As conquerors, Chikunda 
mpondoro had weak moral authority and did not embody local identity, instead 
representing clan and lineage interests. The Korekore opposition between African and 
European was illogical amongst the Chikunda as their own ancestors were said to be 
of mixed African and Portuguese parentage. In appearance the Chikunda medium 
swayed between displays of African and European influence. At the time, she wore a 
dress of black which was representative of the autochthonous principle of rain-making. 
I could not find a reason for this attire as Chikunda mpondoro cannot make rain. On 
other occasions, the medium wore white cotton which the Chikunda associated with 
Portuguese ethnic identity. Although Kanyemba’s medium was Korekore, she called 
herself Mozambican and said she could speak Portuguese. In trance, however, her 
grasp of the language seemed tenuous. As a representative of Kanyemba, she did not 
regard an association with Europeans, or European things, as a breach of conduct. 
Rather, her association with local notions of Portuguese ethnic markers was a 
prerequisite for her position.
It was difficult to believe that Kanyemba’s medium was impartial with regard 
to the succession dispute. While in theory the mediums of Chikunda mpondoro should 
follow the same rules as those of the Korekore, Kanyemba’s medium took sides. In 
trance, it was not surprising that her utterances should uphold the claims made by 
Kanyemba’s lineage as she embodied their ancestor. However, while out of trance she 
associated mostly with members of that group. Although there was local expectation 
that Kanyemba’s medium support the claims of his line, it was considered unseemly 
for her to align herself overtly with these people when not in trance.
While the primary role of mediums was to bring the mpondoro, the 
classificatory “father” of the locality, to the local people, the medium’s assistant held 
the influential role of interpreting his utterances during possession ceremonies.
v. Assistants:
Although the cults of Korekore and Chikunda mpondoro performed the
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different functions of territoriality and bureaucracy, the role of the assistants who 
maintained their shrines was remarkably similar. Chikunda assistants were referred to 
as kambande, while those of the Korekore were called vatapi (pi) or mutapi (s).
In Guns and Rain, Lan suggested that “the medium is by convention entirely 
passive, so the mutapi is his active counterpart” (1985:60). I was also told that this was 
the ideal behaviour for a medium. Assistants performed a number of important 
functions for the land shrine. They were responsible for welcoming new mediums and 
for their continued care, especially during possessions ceremonies which were 
physically very demanding. Assistants received constituents at the medium’s 
homestead who sought consultations with the mpondoro. They organised possession 
ceremonies both at locals’ request and during the prescribed times for rain-making. 
Most significantly, mediums’ assistants interpreted the often incomprehensible 
utterances of the mpondoro during ceremonies. Nyamanindi’s shrine had two active 
assistants, one who had inherited the position and another who was appointed by 
Negomo. The criteria for appointment of an individual involved support by the 
community and knowledge of system of land spirits, particularly the local shrine.
Mediums and assistants complemented each other as one embodied the spirit 
while the other interpreted for him. By convention, mediums were outsiders while 
assistants came from amongst the local population. Principal assistants were of an 
established line which had long service to the ruling clan.
The assistant mediated between the mpondoro and his followers in three 
important ways. First, he interpreted the spirit’s utterances and reformulated these into 
intelligible language. This was an important task because often the mpondoro made 
pronouncements incomprehensible to his general audience. It was sometimes said that 
spirits spoke in their own language, but in my observation, assistants never failed to 
understand their utterances. The role of the assistant was not really one of translation 
because there seemed to be no consistency to the way mpondoro garbled their speech. 
Rather, the assistant interpreted what he believed to be the appropriate sense of the 
mpondoro1 s statements. The assistant’s position was crucial because he gauged local 
opinion, and then ensured that the land spirit’s pronouncements were not irretrievably
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discordant with these popular views. In this way, the assistant maintained equilibrium 
between the prevalent opinions of local people and political climate, thus ensuring the 
integrity and continuity of the shrine.
Secondly, assistants mediated between the medium and the spirit, who 
although they shared one body, were actually two separate social beings. In effect, the 
local image of the spirit was formed by the relationship between the style of the 
medium’s embodiment of the spirit, and the assistant’s verbal interpretation of what 
the spirit said. Thus, by negotiating an acceptable version of the spirit, the medium and 
the assistant kept the shrine alive and relevant. Earlier I argued that, for Korekore 
spirits, the behaviour of the medium had no impact on how people regarded the spirit 
because they were considered to be separate. In contrast, the person of the assistant 
was associated with the entity of the land spirit. For one, the assistant cared for the 
medium and promoted the land spirit. He also acted as a liaison between the chief and 
headmen and the spirit. If the advice that the spirit offered was not considered to be 
pertinent by either the rulers or the people, then the spirit might be ignored. It was, 
therefore, in the interest of the hereditary assistant’s line for the ongoing symbiotic 
relationship between assistant and land spirit to be cultivated in relevant ways.
In the third place, assistants had an important role as public relations officials 
for their shrines. Assistants helped mediums to settle in the new area and organised the 
building of the medium’s homestead which included ceremonial huts used in 
possession rituals. They also promoted the medium to locals and found suitable 
marriage partners, as was the case with Nyamanindi’s medium. Importantly, assistants 
also aided the medium in procuring a livelihood by arranging, for example, the 
cultivation of his fields.
In Chikafa there were two assistants to Nyamanindi, one appointed and the 
other hereditary. The hereditary assistant was Korekore. The division of labour 
between the assistants was not always clearly demarcated, but it seemed that the 
hereditary mutapi was responsible for activities to do with social continuity and 
cosmology, whereas the appointed mutapi was active in politics and interpretation. 
The hereditary mutapi was less knowledgeable about the hierarchy of spirits in Dande
160
than his appointed colleague. Consequently, he spent most of his efforts on ritual 
activities such as carrying fire to symbolically eradicate the illness that was thought to 
have caused a cholera outbreak. He also knew of ritual drumming and instructed junior 
drummers at ceremonies. His sister provided services to the shrine such as grinding 
snuff for the mpondoro as well as reciting Christian prayers before village meetings. 
The hereditary mutapi was possessed by mashave (animal spirits), in his case a baboon, 
but said that this was not a prerequisite for his role. As part of his ritual function, 
before rain-making ceremonies, he was responsible for providing an old woman with 
millet to make porridge for the medium. The consumption of this special porridge took 
place under a sacred mutowe tree after the medium had clapped to the mpondoro in a 
gesture of submission. This ritual was performed before the first rains as a gesture of 
appeasement to the land spirit. It was interesting to note that millet was considered to 
be an indigenous food, pre-dating maize. In the past it used to be a key ingredient in 
food prepared for ritual consumption such as the above-mentioned porridge and beer. 
Although of higher ritual value, in the 1990s, millet was often substituted with maize 
products in Chikafa.
Another function of the hereditary mutapi was the organisation of audiences 
with the land spirit at the request of paying constituents. The hereditary mutapi in 
Chikafa was considerably older than the medium and, as a result, dealt with him in a 
fatherly way. He moved his own homestead so as to be closer to the medium, helped 
him to establish fields and a garden, and tended carefully to the medium’s homestead 
which contained the ceremonial huts used for possession ceremonies. While it was 
obvious that medium and mutapi got on well, the reconstitution of Nyamanindi’s 
shrine could also be interpreted as a way to enhance local politics.
The appointed mutapi in Chikafa claimed his role to be the same as that of his 
colleague. His comment that they shared responsibility for arranging mats for the land 
spirit before a ceremony, and for keeping the medium supplied with snuff during 
possession, indicated that he believed his role was also of ritual significance. However, 
he claimed, that he understood the spirit’s speech, a role of political importance. In 
public, the appointed mutapi stated that he regarded his position as secondary to that
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of the hereditary mutapi and deferred to the latter’s status. This was a worthwhile 
interpretation as the hereditary mutapi represented a principle of autochthony through 
the longevity of his lineage’s association with the line of the mpondoro. In a way, the 
good working relations between hereditary and appointed vatapi reflected the alliance 
between the headman, who represented long-term residence, and the Village 
Chairman whose position was gained by virtue of the state.
The Chikunda mpondoro, was also served by two assistants (kambande), 
however they were both appointed. One kambande interviewed said he was of the 
tembo mbizi (zebra) line. He could not describe ancestral home as his father had been 
bom in Kanyemba and he did not know his genealogy any further. It was interesting to 
note that because he was not Marunga, his family would not have been directly 
involved in the succession dispute. This informant had been kambande for six rainy 
seasons when I spoke with him. He said that mpondoro had two assistants for practical 
reasons, for example, if  one fell ill, the other would be available to work. His job 
entailed the preparation of materials used during possession ceremonies such as laying 
out reed mats and the white bed and pillow on which Chikunda mpondoro reclined. 
Additionally, he stated that it was important to prepare a white cloth so that the 
mpondoro could wipe his face of snuff during the ceremony as, unlike other land 
spirits, Kanyemba did not like his face to appear smeared.
The second kambande, also appointed, was Changara and had previously 
assisted the mpondoro Chihumbe before his medium died. One interpretation of the 
ability of a professional kambande to shift support between rival lines was that the 
allegiance of classificatory subordinates in Kanyemba was primarily to the Marunga 
clan. Because Marunga rule was always based on lineage interests, it followed that a 
kambande should be flexible so as to serve whichever mpondoro currently possessed 
a medium.
The kambande of Chikunda mpondoro were appointed because their shrines 
functioned primarily as political vehicles devoid of any moral or ecological role. The 
role of kambande, like any other relationship the Marunga had with subordinates, was 
based on a patron-client arrangement whose basic principle was the enhancement of
162
the position of the superior clan. Hereditary vatapi of Korekore spirits represented a 
principle of autochthony which would not make sense in the shrine of a Chikunda 
spirit. Rather the appointment of assistants followed the logic of settlement of the 
Chikunda: that the marunga negotiated and maintained their achieved positions 
through alliances with subordinate followers (as the Tembo mbizi no doubt were) from 
whom they acquired wives, labour, and military or political support. The Chikunda 
leadership maintained its superiority by cultivating relationships of dominance and 
subordination with members of weaker groups.
Regardless of the land spirit assistants served, their roles in maintaining 
shrines and acting as spokespeople for their mpondoro played a significant role in the 
acquisition of local support.
vi. Possession Ceremonies:
In a book chapter entitled “Past Imperfect: Remembering as Moral Practice”, 
Lambek suggested that possession: “refers to the relations that particular disembodied 
creatures (“spirits”) engage with particular human hosts, such that the host is 
periodically “absent” from her own body, replaced by the voice and persona of the 
spirit” (1996: 236).
There existed two broad categories of possession ceremony in Dande. The first 
type followed established patterns of the agricultural calendar and of funeral 
obligations, and was associated with rain-making and fertility. The second type of 
possession consisted of ceremonies conducted for a specific purpose, such as the 
resolution of a witchcraft accusation, and related to social order.
The Zambesian cult of land spirits was performed through a particular form of 
possession ceremony. These events were usually held at mediums’ homesteads in two 
specially designed ceremonial huts. The first hut, imbayesvikiro (chiKorekore) or 
nyumbayamvura (Chikunda) sheltered the medium whilst he or she became possessed, 
an activity which took several hours. The second hut, dendemaro, usually an open 
structure consisting of poles topped by a thatched roof, was used by possessed 
mediums for addressing their audiences.
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The organisation of ceremonies was the responsibility of medium’s assistants. 
This involved setting a time and place, and gathering various items belonging to the 
mpondoro, including an elephant hair hat, ceremonial axes and spears, articles of 
clothing, and baskets. Also, it was important to prepare a ceremonial calabash with 
snuff made from locally grow rabu tobacco which the spirits snorted throughout a 
ceremony. Additionally, the medium’s assistants also ensured that the ceremonial 
drums were in good working order and that expert drummers were available. If the 
spirit was Korekore, the wife of the hereditary assistant organised the brewing of beer.
Possession ceremonies were laden with rules and prescriptions, which in my 
reading of Garbett, Bourdillon, and Lan, seem to not have changed in the past forty 
years. Ceremonies began at sunset when locals gathered at the medium’s homestead as 
specialist drummers started tuning four ceremonial drums by tightening the skins with 
burning grass. These four drums, jenje, mupanje, nyaruwo, and usindo were made of 
hollowed out trunks over which the skins of wild animals had been stretched. These 
drums were beaten with wooden sticks or, preferably, antlers. As the rhythm of the 
music intensified, the medium entered the first ceremonial hut 
(imbayesvikiro/nyumbayamvura) where he became possessed. Meanwhile women 
started dancing and singing songs which called to the mpondoro. Occasionally the 
music would be interrupted so that the drums could be tightened. Some people took 
naps at this time (see Figure 4).
Possession ceremonies entailed a sexual division of labour where the men 
stood near the drums to drink beer, whilst women and children sang and danced. 
During these ceremonies three spheres of inter-related activity could be observed: the 
singing and dancing women which constituted the focus of attention; separate groups 
of male and female drinkers who chatted softly; and, people who rested or slept on 
reed mats at the periphery of the main activity. Generally, individuals moved between 
these three arenas until the possessed medium sprang from the hut and jumped into the 
circles of dancing women. As the medium appeared, a swell of ululation emanated 
from the assembled women in a gesture of welcome to the mpondoro.
Possession ceremonies were very sensual events. The rhythmic sound of the
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drums playing various songs, combined with the rough singing voice of the mpondoro, 
set in relief a background of soft female voices. The mpondoro sounded hoarse, 
throaty, and plaintive whilst the women responded in soft tones interspersed with 
high-pitched vocal moments as they reassured the spirit of their support. The spectacle 
of women’s bodies moving in semi-circular formations to established choreography, 
and raising clouds of red dust as they stamped the earth hard with their bare feet, 
depicted a practiced synchronicity. The spirit danced amongst these women, twirling 
and flaring his skirt and weaving in and out of the lines of moving bodies. There was 
also a medley of smells: the sweetness of burning mopane wood, the sourness of 
homebrew maize-meal beer, and the pungency of women’s smoke-saturated perspiring 
bodies. Finally, as people became thirsty with the activity of dancing, there was the 
taste of warm beer and the sweet borehole water shimmering with minuscule clay 
particles. These sensual experiences, combined with increasing fatigue as the night 
progressed, contributed to the heightened emotional state in which participants 
addressed the mpondoro at sunrise.
Once dawn broke, and the eastern horizon glowed orange and pink, the 
dancing and singing subsided. The spirit took his place on a reed mat laid out in the 
second ceremonial hut, the dendemaro, and the crowd sat around him in a semi-circle. 
With his ceremonial articles displayed throughout this open hut, the medium reclined 
on his side and rested his arms on wide flat baskets. The Chikunda medium also 
reclined on a mat, but hers was covered with a white cloth and had a white pillow. 
Assistants placed ntekwe (calabash) full of snuff tobacco from which Korekore spirits 
grasped handfuls to snort and spread across their faces. In contrast, although the 
Chikunda mpondoro also took snuff, any excess was wiped off the medium’s face by 
the kambande who used a white cotton cloth. The Chikunda mpondoro did not possess 
calabashes, but was instead surrounded by porcelain items. In either case, if two or 
more spirits were present at the same ceremony there would be a seating arrangement 
based on seniority and kinship. Spirits of the same hierarchical position shared mats, 
inferiors each had their own mat.
Assistants sat close to the medium in trance in order to attend to his needs and
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interpret his speech. Constituents spoke to the spirit directly or else addressed the 
assistant who mediated for them. Spirits might respond to questions in clear language, 
but often assistants were required to interpret their utterances. As spirits addressed 
their audiences, the tone of their voice changed from the plaintive sounds of the night’s 
singing to paternal and admonishing tones. Occasionally Korekore mpondoro roared 
like lion, an act symbolic of ancient chieftaincy. I never witnessed the mpondoro 
Kanyemba roar, nor make references to lion. At all possession ceremonies the spirits 
made introductory speeches summarising histories and broaching current issues. 
Korekore land spirits reminded audiences of their genealogies and illustrious past. 
Then they affirmed social rules and reminded the audience of proper moral behaviour 
required within their territories, including admonishments against witchcraft, 
desecration of sacred areas, incest and violence.
The Chikunda mpondoro also gave an introductory speech extolling his past 
accomplishments and affirming his ownership and control of sacred areas. There was, 
however, almost no deliberation regarding cosmology. After these short utterances, 
the Chikunda mpondoro entertained questions regarding local matters. During this 
part of the possession ceremony, the crowd was divided into men and women who sat 
in a semi-circular pattern around the dendemaro. Individuals who wished to discuss 
private matters sat close to the hut.
Possession ceremonies ended at the mpondoro's cue, usually two hours after 
sunrise. To be released from trance, mediums re-entered the first ceremonial hut, after 
a while emerging sleepy and extremely tired. Upon seeing the medium, people greeted 
him or her with the words “marara sei?” (“How did you sleep?” in Korekore) or “bom 
dia!” (“good morning” in Portuguese for the Chikunda spirit). In offering this greeting, 
locals acknowledged the transition from the social being of spirit to that of medium. 
At this time, the crowd began to disperse along various pathways (nzira) leading to 
home villages. Assistants then tended to the body of the medium who would be thirsty, 
hungry, tired and occasionally sick after the night’s activities.
Customarily, mediums had no intellectual recollection of trance, but the 
sensations experienced by their bodies left resonances of the night’s activities. Thus,
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the conceptual difference between the beings of medium and mpondoro was a social 
feature for the community, but an act of embodiment for the medium. Conceptually 
and cognitively separate, medium and mpondoro functioned through one body. For 
example, although very different in demeanor and language use, the medium and the 
Korekore mpondoro affected the same style of dress and deportment. Furthermore, 
there existed prescriptions of conduct for mediums, out of trance, which related to 
their sacred roles. These included avoidance of the colour red, because of its 
association with fertility, and things European such as buses. Additionally, the 
medium’s attire and general appearance represented contemporary ideas about how 
ancient Chiefs looked.
For Chikunda mpondoro, the same social and cognitive distinction existed 
between the person of the medium and that of the mpondoro. Similarly, there was 
continuity in the appearance of the spirit and the human because both represented the 
same cult. However, as discussed earlier, the medium of a Chikunda spirit was 
vulnerable to attack because of the lesser moral authority that the shrine of the 
Chikunda land spirit carried.
Possession ceremonies played an integrative role in communities because they 
provided a platform for the expression of collective sentiment. For example, 
mpondoro expressed the opinion that the serious drought was the result of social 
breaches perpetrated by development. In the Zambesi, land spirits represented 
identities related to locality, ethnic group, clan, and lineage. The spirit world contained 
ancestors, witches, and animals which were believed to occasionally possess human 
hosts, however, mpondoro were the only spirits who spoke for communities.
vii. Summary:
In this chapter I reviewed the Zambesian cult of mpondoro through an 
examination of the three primary functions of rain-making, territoriality, and 
bureaucracy which I encountered among these spirits during fieldwork in 1992-93. 
The overarching theme on which this system of belief hinged is the conceptual 
opposition between autochthony and conquest through which most of social life in that
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area is understood. Through work in two fieldsites, I was able to compare the place of 
land spirits in a decentralized society characterised by a fragmented social 
organisation with a centralized Chieftaincy in which one clan dominated a rigid social 
hierarchy. The predominant model of governance in the Zambesi was Chieftaincy, a 
feature which I found required the support of mpondoro in both settlements studied.
Chikafa area, an acephalous society defined by a power-sharing alliance 
between Chikunda and Korekore elders, faced a grave challenge from development 
schemes in the early 1990s. There mpondoro produced a discourse of Chieftaincy 
based on notions of autochthony to mobilise local populations against social, political, 
and economic change. In Kanyemba area, tight control of rule maintained by the 
dominant Marunga Rosario Andrade clan relegated political process entirely within 
three lineages. There a discourse of Chieftaincy supported a hierarchy in existence
tVisince conquest of the area at the end of the 19 century, and was based on a language 
of domination.
In the following chapter I would like to extend the Zambesian conceptual 
opposition of autochthony and conquest to an analysis of the post-colonial state in 
Zimbabwe. During research for this study, mpondoro became a focal point for 
opposition to the state in Chikafa area where development had brought great change. 
In Chapter 6 I will examine how over the course of a decade the Zimbabwean state 
made the transition from autochthon (put in place by the will of the people) to 
conqueror.
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Chapter 6: The State in Zimbabwe during the 1990s: Some Influences on Dande
i. The Autochthonous State Becomes Conqueror: An Introduction
The preoccupation with domination and development in this study has two 
inter-related strands. In preceding chapters I have argued that domination in the 
Zambesi Valley is conceived of and experienced through an opposition between 
autochthony and conquest. A comparison of two settlements suggested that this 
dichotomy is, in fact, manifested through a discourse of Chieftaincy where a 
centralised society is more apt to dominate, and an acephalous society is more prone to 
be dominated. It was through this local lens that Zambesians viewed the arrival of 
development projects in the late 1980s. Their gaze intensified with the occurrence of 
serious drought in 1991-92 when the combination of changed social organisation and 
environment was associated with acute distress and precipitated a re-evaluation of 
local beliefs about the state. While the Dande area of the Zambesi Valley is 
particularly remote and had mostly been left alone since Independence, the installation 
of development projects extended the influence of the state into that area.
In this chapter, I propose to examine the reasons why Zambesians stopped 
believing in the state as autochthon and Mugabe as Chief, and began, instead, to see it 
as conqueror. How did the Zimbabwean state, which started out as “the victory of the 
autochthons” (Lan:1985), become “the betrayal by the conquerors”? To address this 
crucial issue I will examine how people were governed in the Zambesi during the 
1990s. Political process has changed over time and it is important to describe the 
cumulative effects of the British, Rhodesian, and Zimbabwean states on the area. 
Similarly, although local economy was based mostly on subsistence agriculture, 
post-colonial changes in the national economy, particularly the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Program, had an important impact on the Zambesi.
It is my intention that this chapter should serve as a pivotal point between the 
two strands of this thesis: the first five chapters which disclose the cultural logic of 
social organisation in the Zambesi through a comparison of a two settlements in which 
the Chikunda stood in counterpoint to other groups; and, the last three chapters, 
respectively, about development, drought, and witchcraft which depict how the impact
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of the state in this comer of Zimbabwe, was interpreted in Chikafa as great social 
dismption and betrayal, and in Kanyemba as an influence to be incorporated. Chapter 
7 will examine the insertion of development into the Zambesi, the changes these 
precipitated, and the different sense of upheaval and opportunity these brought to 
individuals and families. Chapter 8 will focus on the impact of serious drought in 
1991-92, on coping strategies, and ways in which this disaster was interpreted locally. 
Chapter 9 discusses a witchcraft accusation as a local response to new forms of 
impoverishment and accumulation which Zambesians observed in the wake of 
development and drought. In all these chapters, Chikafa and Kanyemba settlements 
will provide comparative material.
As with most things, Zambesians viewed the state in their own way. The 
concept of nyika, translated as “territory”, referred to the land area dominated by a 
leader, usually a Chief who lived there or, a land spirit representing a real (Chikunda) 
or a mythological (Korekore) conqueror. Governance for Zambesians involved a 
discourse of Chieftaincy based on the principles of autochthony and conquest, in 
which a Chief was related to his constituents through principles of descent (real or 
mythological) or through the inclusive device of the pangolin clan. In Kanyemba, a 
discourse of Chieftaincy was generated by an ideology of marunga clan supremacy, 
and put into practice by two lineages which had held the office of Chief since conquest 
in the late 19th century. In Chikafa, Chieftaincy was enacted by the mpondoro 
Nyamanindi, the designated owner of that territory, whose advice was enacted by a 
Chikunda headman in collaboration with a Korekore Village Chairman.
After Independence, in the Zambesi, the concept of nyika was extended to 
include all of Zimbabwe, while President Mugabe was thought of as mambo, or Chief. 
As such, Zambesians believed that since he had ascended to his position through the 
support of their land spirits, and the sacrifice of families, he would enact a role of 
Chief whereby their welfare would be under his care. In the early provision of a small 
amount of infrastructure such as schools, clinics, and roads, work opportunities on the 
plateau, food in times of drought, and post-war peace, Mugabe did enact a role which 
resembled that of legitimate Chief, or autochthon. Chief Chapoto stated, in an 
interview conducted in August of 1993, that President Mugabe was mambo of all
170
Zimbabwe, in the same way that Kanyemba had been mambo of all of Dande.
A number of issues contributed to the long process of disenchantment with the 
Zimbabwean state experienced by people in the Zambesi Valley. In an immediate 
sense, demobilised guerrillas were sent home and left to the care of their families and 
communities. Their reintegration took place at the local level through time-honoured 
mechanisms of incorporation such as Chiefs or headmen’s gifts of land, and also 
through marriage. Some guerrillas became members of newly formed village 
committees, where they introduced the voice of a younger generation into political 
process heretofore dominated by the elderly. Sub-Chief Neshangwe, who represented 
Chief Chitsungo in Chikafa area, was an ex-combatant. After the war, these former 
soldiers expected economic aid to the Zambesi in the form of schools, clinics, and 
roads, but very few of these expectations materialised.
The irony of these individuals’ sacrifice to the common project of building the 
Zimbabwean nation coupled with their lack of inclusion in the spoils of victory was 
not lost on Zambesians. In a similar vein, in a discussion of memorialism and the 
postcolony, Richard Werbner suggested that the monument and cemetery in Harare, 
Heroes’ Acre, created a selective view of the value of individuals’ contribution to the 
construction of the Zimbabwean nation, particularly since inclusion was within the gift 
of the Politburo of ZANU, a highly centralised and mystified way of delivering 
favours. As Werbner suggested: “Such memorialism puts the stamp of state hierarchy 
negatively.. .at the bottom of the hierarchy, the povo or masses are expected to bury 
their own dead. The regime’s lesson for them is that they need to look after themselves 
or, in the current development-speak, it is a matter of self-help” (Werbner 1998:78). In 
other words, the state would not enter into a role of mutual aid and obligation, the role 
of sabwira, with ex-guerrillas and their communities which was the proper way for 
newcomers to forge social connection. And, in contrast to the way of sabwira, the state 
also did not bury all war dead, instead selecting for a heroic few. In the Zambesi, the 
ranking of heroism, the lack of continuity between local and national level 
commemoration of the war effort, and the absence of tangible improvement in their 
everyday lives over the long-term, caused Zambesians to lose faith in the state.
Werbner’s (1998) argument that the post-colonial state constructed a hierarchy
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of important contribution to the Independence effort which promoted a differentiation 
between elites and the povo, and the state and kin, holds well for the Zambesi. The 
refusal of the state to be sabwira to communities that had suffered much disruption as 
a result of their support for guerrillas, and their disenfranchisement from opportunities 
for advancement led to a simmering sense of betrayal. In the 1990s I noted a degree of 
resignation, amongst informants, with the post-colonial neglect of their communities. 
People made derogatory jokes about government officials, calling them “fat cats”, and 
referred to ministers and other government officials as “chefs”, a reference to the new 
elite. In a way, because the Zambesi, particularly Dande, had always been so remote, 
expectations of improvement in quality of life probably dissipated more quickly than 
elsewhere. Life in both Chikafa and Kanyemba was mostly uneventful during the 
1980s. There was no serious drought to disrupt the subsistence base of their livelihood, 
the insertion of party structures did not upset the balance of power in either settlement, 
and there were no schemes or policies to change social life. The fact of weak support 
for mpondoro could, in of itself, indicate low stress.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the MZP in Chikafa and CAMPFIRE in 
Kanyemba brought changes to political process and access to resources in the 
environment. These innovations created anxiety and a degree of hardship for members 
of both communities. However, it was the arrival of serious drought in 1991-92 which 
precipitated mass discontent in the Zambesi. While post-colonial structural changes to 
local political process were, for the most part, incorporated and life went on as usual, 
it was the assault on their subsistence livelihood by development and drought which 
really brought Zambesians to reconfigure the state as conqueror.
A strong contributing factor to the high levels of anxiety which people 
experienced during the 1990s was the ambiguous language of centralisation and 
decentralisation which the state used. These were not new ideas for Zambesians as 
they understood well processes of domination within their own local systems of 
Chieftaincy. The strongly centralising style of the Chapoto Chieftaincy was generally 
accepted, even if  subordinates were not happy. The fragmented type of leadership in 
Chikafa was also dealt with through the centralising ideology of the cult of mpondoro. 
In both villages, inhabitants understood power as a discourse of Chieftaincy. However,
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the oscillation o f the state between intimations that it was a Chieftaincy without 
actually acting as one and the discourse of self-empowerment and local responsibility 
proved to be confusing.
The ZANU-pf government came to power through a centralising idea of 
Chieftaincy which had support from the population. But, while the government 
continued to capitalise on popular support, it did not take long to implement 
decentralising policies. In 1984, in the prime minister’s policy statement on Provincial 
Governorship and Decentralisation (which became the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act) the orientation of government shifted toward decentralisation and 
self-help:
“The aim o f the strategy was to forge hegemonic links between 
development, accountability, and state authority in rural development. The 
objectives o f the decentralisation policy, cast in terms of technical 
rationalisation and efficiency, were to strengthen the link between 
development planning and implementation, and to broaden the base of 
accountability by bringing local authorities and communities into policy 
planning and implementation processed under the aegis of the national 
state”.
(Munro 1998:243-44)
It was within this policy that Ward Development Committees, Village Development
Committees, Provincial Councils, and District Councils had their beginnings in 1985.
People in Dande participated in these new structures, for example, they turned up to
vote and individuals campaigned as candidates. Members of subordinate lineages, the
young, and women saw new opportunities to bypass the power of Chiefs and headmen,
and to have attention focussed on issues which affected their lives. However, the
language o f self-empowerment and local community responsibility seemed
contradictory to the other major idea espoused by the government, a discourse of
Chieftaincy. This was not the intention o f the government as it sought “to make
VIDCOs and WADCOs the moral, political, and institutional core of community life”
(Munro 1998:246-47). The greatest flaw o f this policy with regard to the Zambesi
Valley, was that while its intention was to give voice to localities in a “bottom-up”
approach, the achievement of this goal was clouded by the fact the policy did not
account for pre-existing social hierarchies. In Kanyemba, post-colonial political
structures were appropriated by the dominant clan and were used in the inter-lineage
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conflict of the succession dispute. In Chikafa village, which emerged from the war 
socially and politically fragmented, there was more scope for traditionally weak groups 
to become involved in politics. But even there, it took the arrival of development 
schemes in the late 1980s for representation to extend to previously disenfranchised 
groups.
During the 1990s, after waiting a decade for the benefits of liberation to reach 
Dande, mostly people there became resigned to the fact that their lives would not be 
improved through the actions of the state. Not only this, it seemed that development 
schemes threatened their relationship with the environment, which formed the basis of 
their subsistence livelihood. This change caused some tension locally, but people 
made attempts to work through problems via the various committees, headmen, and 
Village Chairmen. A true sense of betrayal by the state took place with the hunger and 
despair which accompanied the drought of 1991 -92 when, not only did crops not grow, 
but access to the bush was also impeded. At that time, any notions of benevolent 
Chieftaincy that Zambesians may have held with regard to the state were utterly 
shattered. It was then that they began to visualise the state as conqueror. But, due to 
different political structures, the sense o f betrayal by the state was experienced 
differently in Chikafa and Kanyemba.
The contradiction between the discourse of centralisation of the state and the 
decentralising language of development proved confusing for Zambesians such that 
they lost faith in the state. These inconsistencies played havoc with expectations and 
livelihoods to the extent that dissent was manifested in Chikafa through a witchcraft 
accusation mediated by a mpondoro ceremony to be discussed in chapter 9. In order to 
understand the level of disruption associated with the confluence of development and 
drought during the early 1990s, it is important to have a background view of political 
process in the two settlements researched and state economic policy which affected 
livelihoods there.
ii. Political Process in Dande: Local Structures During the 1990s
During the 1960s Garbett observed that:
“The Valley Korekore have a complex political system on to which a 
modem administrative superstructure has been imposed. The imposition
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has modified the traditional political system, and has added a new 
dimension to it. Alongside the modem administrative system large parts of 
the traditional political system continue to function intact.”
(Garbett 1966:140)
During the 1990s, the political system in the Zambesi Valley continued to be 
characterised by a combination of structures which had been installed at various 
junctures in history. But, while Garbett would have observed a relationship between 
colonial administration and a system of Chiefs and land spirits, governance during the 
1990s had become more complex. The system of Chiefs and land spirits continued to 
be crucial because it provided the dichotomy of autochthony and conquest through 
which most political process was understood. A network of representation linked to the 
party structure of ZANU was installed on to this system which was itself partially a 
product of colonialism. This dual system functioned harmoniously in Chikafa until the 
early 1990s when it was threatened by land re-distribution and resettlement. In 
Kanyemba, post-Independence, new party structures were appropriated by members of 
the marunga clan, and thereby inserted into the existing hierarchy. The common thread 
in both Chikafa and Kanyemba was that new political structures of the 1980s were 
easily inserted into already existing hierarchies, and did not threaten to upset 
established order.
In Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla Warfare, Ranger noted that:
“At the same time that the committees established peasant power at village 
level as it had never been exercised before, they also represented a return to 
a pre-war situation. Those elected to the village committees were the 
resident junior elders, the sort of men and women who had been dominant 
in peasant nationalism before the war but whose influence had had to take 
second place to that of the guerrillas and their adolescent helpers during the 
war itself’.
(Ranger 1985:292)
The difference in political representation between colonial times in which Garbett 
researched, and the post-Independence era, was that, as Ranger suggested, after the war 
positions within the existing structures were made available to younger members of the 
elite. In both Chikafa and Kanyemba, almost all of committee work was in the hands 
of young lineage members of the conquering Chikunda and their traditional allies with 
whom relationships originated with conquest.
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During the early 1990s, rule in Dande was characterised by three conceptually 
distinct spheres of influence. First, there was the Chief who ruled either directly or 
through a system of sabhuku. Secondly, there were ZANU-pf party structures in the 
form of Village organisations represented by a Village Chairperson, and youth and 
women’s representatives. In the third sphere, there were the new state-level structures 
which were ultimately responsible to Cabinet such as District Council and Ward and 
Village Development committees (see Illustration 4).
In the following sections I will discuss the origins and function of each of these 
important spheres of rule in the Zambesi Valley to show how, together, they 
contributed to the very different forms of rule encountered in Chikafa and Kanyemba 
which determined how populations dealt with the extension of the Zimbabwean state 
through development projects.
iii. Chiefs and Headmen:
The most important function of chieftaincy in the Zambesi Valley was that it 
provided an idiom of governance couched in terms of an opposition between 
autochthony and conquest. This local view of chieftaincy was articulated through the 
cult of mpondoro where a benevolent Chief ensured fertility of the land and social 
continuity through just rule of his followers. Ideal chieftaincy was related to 
rain-making and the ritual power of autochthons. Chieftaincy based on social hierarchy, 
where community members were marginalised and exploited was believed to be 
governance by conquest. It was in the oscillation between these two poles that social 
innovations in the Zambesi were understood.
In Zimbabwe, chieftaincy has been an important form of rule since the 
beginning of European colonisation because its centralised format contributed to better 
control over disparate populations. The prime objective of early British rule was to 
ensure a supply of indigenous labour to work in farms acquired by white settlers. The 
policy of ‘Indirect Rule’ which consolidated the position of male lineage elders by 
providing these with state-sanctioned judicial powers, proved to be successful in 
achieving this end. Chiefs whose rule was consolidated by alliance with the state were 
believed to be conquerors, with little or no rain-making ability, because their primary
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interests did not lie with the welfare of the population but, instead, with external needs.
The opposition between autochthony and conquest has been the primary theme 
in Zambesian political process since the 1890s, when the British first installed their 
rule. For instance, a notion of benevolent rain-making chieftaincy was invoked through 
the cult of mpondoro, both in the 1890s and 1970s to resist British colonisation and, 
later, the Rhodesian government. At the same time, chieftaincies, such as that of 
Chapoto, which worked with the state to the detriment of certain groups in the 
population, were considered to be bureaucratic and of no rain-making power.
The two settlements researched exemplified the oscillation between notions of 
autochthony and conquest. First, in Kanyemba area, the Chapoto Chieftaincy had a 
long history of alliance with the state. It was supported by the British and Rhodesian 
governments, but had its roots in Portuguese colonialism. In Chapter 3 I reviewed the 
history of Chikunda group identity and local stories regarding the origins of the 
Chapoto Chieftaincy. While Korekore Chiefs derived their position from the state 
while espousing an ideology of autochthony, Chikunda Chieftaincy had always 
expressed conquest. The term “achikunda” refers to “people who conquer”. Research 
for this study involved contact with two very different versions of Zambesian 
Chieftaincy. In Kanyemba, Chief Chapoto ruled a centralised polity dominated by one 
clan since conquest in the late 19th century, where political process was relegated 
exclusively to three lineages.
In contrast, in Chikafa area, political process involved a power-sharing 
arrangement between the old and young generations of long-term residents where a 
Chikunda headman and a Korekore Village Chairman represented the elderly, and a 
number of junior members of these groups did most committee work associated with 
the post-colonial state. While the titular head of the area, Chief Chitsungo lived 
elsewhere, a principle of benevolent Chieftaincy was created during the drought by 
renewed interest in the shrine of Nyamanindi, the local mpondoro, who was ritual 
owner of the area. Chieftaincy, as represented by Nyamanindi during possession 
ceremonies, was benevolent rule where the interests of constituents, mostly land in this 
case, were of primary concern.
While benevolent chieftaincy was associated with rain-making, the
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exploitative chieftaincy related to bureaucratic mpondoro originated in alliances with 
the state. For scholars of southern African, the notion of chieftaincy is connected to the 
British colonial policy of ‘Indirect Rule’, a measure which came about to support 
capitalisation of the economy of Southern Rhodesia, a territory administered by the 
British South Africa Company between 1890 and 1923. This policy extended directly 
into localised lineage politics by formalising the position of senior male members who 
were given powers under a number of legislative acts. For example, Native 
Regulations of 1989-1910, and the African Affairs Act of 1927 turned African 
methods of conflict resolution into “courts of record” which enhanced the position of 
designated leaders (May 1987:45-46). The judicial power of Chiefs was integrated into 
the national system with the African Law and Tribal Courts Act of 1969 which allowed 
for unresolved issues of customary law to be brought to the Appellate Division of the 
High Court of Rhodesia. In post-colonial times, the Zimbabwean state maintained the 
continuity between local adjudication and state law with the Customary Law and 
Primary Courts Act of 1981 which placed village courts and Community courts, 
presided over by elected officials from Ministry-approved lists, as the primary form of 
local dispute resolution. These courts were answerable to the District Magistrate’s 
court and then to the Supreme Court. The objective of this legislation was to transfer 
the power of chiefs into the hands of ex-combatants, but instead positions were taken 
up by the same people who had presided at headmen’s courts (May 1987:47-48), thus 
keeping power concentrated amongst prominent lineages. In 1988 the state returned 
some judicial power back to chiefs, although not to headmen. This policy was later 
formalised by the Customary Law and Local Courts Act of 1990. Chief Chapoto 
certainly enforced his powers under national law, holding his Chiefs Court with some 
regularity and allowing his senior counsellors to formulate rulings and dictate 
sanctions.
Policies of ‘indirect rule’ served a number of purposes. First, the primary 
objective of early British colonialism in southern Africa was to create an export 
economy for which African labour was required. The consolidation of compliant 
chieftaincies in which senior males recruited labour and collected taxes was one way to 
accomplish this end. Central to ‘indirect rule’ was the marginalisation of male juniors
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who would provide export labour and women who maintained rural agricultural
production and produced children. The cycles of migratory labour which developed
within the British colonial project had important consequences for local communities:
“State officials discouraged African women from settling in the towns and 
on the mines. On principle, they opposed the growth of a permanent, 
potentially explosive, African population in urban areas. Moreover, 
European industrialists paid men barely enough to support themselves, let 
alone a family. They counted on women and children to subsidize male 
wages through agricultural production at the rural homesteads.. .European 
capital and the colonial state expected rural-based women to bear the 
social costs of production, caring for the sick, disabled, and retired workers 
and raising the next generation of labor”.
(Schmidt 1992:54).
The social costs of Chieftaincy were borne by women who ensured the continuity 
of the African family on which the colonial economy was based, and the labour of male 
juniors who returned home with few savings.
Secondly, Leroy Vail argued that the simultaneous emergence of ‘indirect rule’
and tribal identities in newly conquered British territories served to quell any
large-scale opposition from African populations. He said that:
“Administrators assumed that Africans were naturally ‘tribal’ people. If 
the natural ethnic units could be strengthened, it would help ensure their 
continuation as discrete ‘tribal’ groups and prevent the emergence of 
‘detribalized’ Africans of whom whites were deeply suspicious. This, in 
turn, would slow the emergence of any potentially dangerous 
territory-wide political consciousness that might develop”.
(Vail 1989:13)
This type of political mobilisation was preciously what David Lan (1983; 1985) 
depicted with regard to the way in which the cult of land spirits was used to create a 
large-scale opposition to Rhodesian armed forces in the Zambesi Valley. During the 
1990s, a notion of Zambesian local identity in opposition to the foreign MZP project 
was also created through the cult of Nyamanindi. However, in Kanyemba, Chief 
Chapoto presided over a centralised polity where Chikunda local identity was strong, 
leaving very few means by which to express dissent toward either rulers or 
CAMPFIRE, a development scheme disadvantageous to subordinate lineages.
Post-Independence structures were easily absorbed into local communities 
during the 1980s and caused very little disruption to established social hierarchies.
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However, further extension of the state through development schemes in the 1990s 
renewed the importance of Chieftaincy as a response to these innovations. Headmen, 
the traditional lieutenants of Chiefs, also saw their power increase as they were called 
to perform a greater number of services toward the consolidation of the Chiefs power.
The population of Chikafa, of myriad origins and depicting shallow lineages, 
rallied around the idea of chieftaincy though the local mpondoro in response to the 
social disruption brought by the combination of development and drought. This area 
had been ruled by a succession of headmen dating to Chikunda conquest. When it was 
under Chief Chapoto between 1945 and the early 1970s, he lived elsewhere. Once 
Chief Chitsungo was installed in the 1970s, his residence elsewhere also meant that he 
ruled through sub-Chief Neshangwe and headmen.
Although tension existed within the long-term alliance between Chikunda and 
Korekore in this area, these two groups shared political power. The headmanship was 
held by an elder male Chikunda who derived his position from his mother’s line. The 
Village Chairman was an elder male Korekore. These men worked well together, 
engaging in a number of informal encounters before meetings, as well as generally 
arriving at agreement regarding the business of the day.
The Chikunda headmanship was installed at the time of conquest during the
tVilate 19 century, as depicted in Chapter 5. Chikafa had been made headman in the 
earlyl970s before Chief Chapoto lost the area to Chief Chitsungo. When I asked 
Headman Chikafa what had precipitated this change, he replied that, “long ago we 
were under Chapoto, when war came, Chapoto invited the people of this area to go to 
Kanyemba. The people refused, then the people decided to have Chitsungo as Chief’. 
His appointment came about, he said, because he was the only available descendant of 
Guvheya, one of Kanyemba’s lieutenants who had settled in the area a century 
previously. The sabhuku’s interpretation of the change of Chief referred to a dispute 
regarding political power in Chikafa area which took place during the war.
While I gathered no oral history depicting discontent with Chief Chapoto’s rule of 
Chikafa during the thirty years that he controlled the area, it seemed likely that local 
Korekore used the experience of life in the ‘keeps’ (concentration/internment camps), 
in which a number of villages from Dande were enclosed together, to further
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consolidate their Korekore identity. Chikunda influence over Chikafa had slowly 
decreased during Chapoto’s reign, a fact evidenced by the diminished economic 
circumstances of a number of prominent families. For example, one family who had 
owned cattle in the 1950s and several brick structures, were in the 1990s reduced to a 
small homestead comprised of thatched huts.
The headman’s responsibilities included allocation of land to villagers, dealing 
with boundary and domestic disputes, resolving rape charges, settling situations in 
which a man refused to marry a woman he had impregnated, and making 
representations to the mpondoro. Sabhuku Chikafa lamented that he had lost power 
since Independence, and that the Village Chairman took precedence over him, 
although I witnessed their collaboration many times. He also said that his most 
important function was a ritual one, whereby he maintained the relationship of the 
population with the mpondoro. During the 1990s, he was instrumental in reviving the 
cult of Nyamanindi as a local representation of autochthonous chieftaincy in response 
to the threat posed by development to the long-standing alliance between the Chikunda 
and Korekore groups. Sabhuku Chikafa’s comment that, “beer is my church”, 
illustrated his allegiance to the rituals of mpondoro, and his rejection of newer 
philosophies which had marginalised his role.
In Kanyemba, each incursion by the state resulted in further strengthening of 
marunga rosario andrade clan rule. There, the longevity of a strong centralising polity 
ensured that change was absorbed into existing structures. Chapter 3 discussed the role 
and history of the Chapoto Chieftaincy, so I will here focus on Chapoto’s relationship 
with headmen. One of the means through which Chapoto dominated was by 
maintaining strong links with a number of lineage elders he designated as headmen. 
He claimed to have sixteen headmen under his rule in the Kanyemba and neighbouring 
Angwa areas, while only about eight usually attended village meetings. In his view, the 
primary role of headmen was to keep him informed about current issues and to refer 
most matters to him. His authoritarian approach to headmen caused discontent 
amongst lineage elders who were not included in political process. For example, in an 
interview in August of 1993 a headman, who represented a subordinate lineage, 
complained that Chapoto had always chosen his headmen from among men who had
181
large families so that they could provide more taxes. It seems that in this area there 
were a number of long established lineages whose elders were potential headmen, but 
that the actual designation was in the gift of the Chief. The apparent fluidity of 
headmanship contributed to consolidation of marunga clan supremacy because it 
allowed the Chief to determine who would be included in political process. The tembo 
mvura headman held a different view as he reiterated that his position was inherited 
from his father and legitimated from Guruve “after the Chimurenga War” (i.e. by the 
post-colonial government). It was understandable for this individual to cling to his 
headmanship as his lineage had no other means of representation in Kanyemba area, 
and suffered terrible economic oppression by the Chikunda. Their poverty stemmed 
from the fact that, as forcibly settled former hunter-gatherers, alienation from the bush 
had resulted in a dependence on the Chikunda for land. But no tembo mvura household 
seemed to have more than half an acre of cultivated land which meant that they needed 
to work for the major landowners, the Chikunda, in order to have enough food to eat.
If the Zimbabwean state, through the person of the President was ever 
considered to be part of the system of chieftaincy in the Zambesi, it lost its position 
during the 1990s. Renewed interest in local chiefs meant that the population was 
interested, once again, in local identities. The irony was that, through its explicit 
policies of decentralisation, the state also diluted its own influence in the area. These 
ideas will be discussed below.
For the most part, neither war nor the introduction of party structures greatly 
affected chieftaincy in Chikafa and Kanyemba. One reason was that chiefs and 
mpondoro supported guerrillas and so these positions were incorporated into ruling 
lineages. Another is that these changes did not affect the distribution of land in the 
Zambesi, the source of power of chiefs and headmen.
iv. The Independence War and Changing Allegiances:
The Independence War changed allegiances within the Zambesi Valley, not 
least because it had huge impact on the lives of its residents. For one, the population 
supported both ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas through the provision of food and 
shelter, and the participation of their youth as soldiers and mujiba (children who acted
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as messengers). Importantly, villagers also participated in the overall aim of the war, to 
liberate the country of white minority government by supporting a constellation of 
mpondoro whose shrines gave both guidance and ritual approval to the actions of 
guerrillas. It is not surprising, then, to find that the war created a sense of allegiance 
and belongingness to the newly conquered nyika that became Zimbabwe.
If the impact of the war was such that it could create local allegiance to a new 
state, then it would surely reconfigure affiliations at the local level. Re-alignment of 
interests did take place, but the degree of change within communities depended very 
much on the strength or fragility of pre-existing structures, the degree of hardship 
experienced during the war, and the nature of local leaders. Notably, time spent in the 
‘keeps’ fractured old relationships based on residence and social position in home 
villages and created new ones.
While residents of Kanyemba suffered terribly during the war, Chikafa was 
more affected socially and economically. For one, Chikunda lost the economic power 
which they had managed to maintain for over a century. During the 1940s and 1950s 
Chikunda had owned shops, grinding mills and cars, but no businesses were owned by 
this group in the 1990s. In Chikafa, post-Independence the economic power of the 
Chikunda group decreased at the same time as political alliance with the Korekore 
increased, particularly with their traditional allies, the nzou samanyanga lineage. In 
oral histories regarding conquest, these two groups were depicted as trading partners 
by the Korekore, and as subordinate hunters hired to procure tusks by the Chikunda. 
Before the war, Chikafa was governed through a partially fragmented political system 
because it was ruled by a string of Chikunda headmen whose leader, Chief Chapoto, 
lived more than 100km away. They maintained power through the fact that Chikunda 
headmen controlled the distribution of land. The fact that the population elected to 
replace Chief Chapoto with the Korekore Chief Chitsungo was a reflection of changing 
allegiances. Chikunda lost exclusive control over Chikafa due to a fragile system of 
governance through headmen, and the community’s experience of the ‘keeps’.
In Kanyemba, Chikunda power remained unchanged probably due to Chief 
Chapoto’s strong leadership throughout the war, certainly because of the rigid 
hierarchy which gave no opportunity to subordinate lineages, and also because
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Kanyemba village was placed into one ‘keep* where their contact with people from 
other settlements was limited to the few hours when they were allowed out to tend their 
gardens.
In the 1970s, both settlements were placed into concentration camps called 
‘keeps’ in a town called Mushumbi Pools which is situated near the escarpment 
leading to the plateau. There were three camps designated according to Chieftaincies: 
Chapoto; Chitsungo, and Matsiwu. While whole populations were placed in detention, 
their Chiefs did not join them, instead spending time under the protection of the 
Rhodesian regime.
In 1975, Chikafa village was relocated to Mushumbi Pools, in order to distance 
the population from guerrilla activities. At that time, the American Evangelical 
Mission, which had operated since 1947, was closed and the missionaries left the 
Zambesi Valley. Between 1975 and 1978 displaced villagers attempted to make a 
living in Mushumbi Pools through cultivation, particularly of vegetable gardens, and 
occasional work picking cotton at a nearby commercial farm. In 1978 the population 
of Chikafa was forced into a ‘keep’. An informant related how families were woken 
early one morning, told to gather belongings and congregate at the local primary school. 
Their huts were burnt that day along with the possessions they had not managed to 
carry. They stayed behind barbed wire for a year surviving on the gardens they were 
allowed to tend and wild foods gathered between sunrise and midday. Conditions were 
crowded and sanitation poor with, “people dying of diarrhoea, no medical care, but 
there was traditional medicine and the security forces knew first aid”. In this account, 
internees were questioned by the Rhodesian forces with some regularity, while 
beatings were frequent. Guerrillas who approached villagers through the wire to be fed 
were shot. This informant’s family left the camp in 1979 after intervention from the 
Red Cross and spent some time on the plateau where he completed his education at a 
mission school.
While the stories of the ‘keeps’ I gathered were recounted by Chikunda 
informants from Chikafa, it is clear that all inmates from diverse clans and lineages 
shared an experience of physical and emotional hardship which further diluted already 
tenuous allegiance to Chikunda rule of Chikafa area. The combination of common
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internment in the ‘keeps’ along with the pre-dominance of the Korekore in the guerrilla 
movement, conspired to break Chikunda hold over the Chikafa area. When people 
were finally resettled in Chikafa at the end of the war, although they went back to their 
pre-war settlement patterns of clustering around patrilineal elders, the Korekore 
brought with them new claims for a larger part of political process. Particularly with 
the installation of government and ZANU party structures, the Korekore saw a chance 
at better representation.
Residents of Kanyemba also had a fraught experience of the Independence War 
which affected the area from 1966 until they went into the ‘keeps’. By 1967 both 
ZANLA and ZIPRA were recruiting adolescents there which they then took to 
Mozambique and Zambia. According to informants life was very difficult at the time 
because the population was interrogated by both guerrilla movements and the 
Rhodesian army, a situation which placed individuals in constant danger of being 
beaten or shot. One informant depicted circumstances in the following way: 
“Rhodesian forces would track ZANLA and ZIPRA. If these people came to your 
house you had to report to the authorities. But if  you reported to the Rhodesian forces, 
then the rebels would kill you”. By 1970 people were so frightened of being in their 
houses at night that they slept in their fields. In 1976 the Rhodesian government 
required the population to move into the camps at Mushumbi Pools where they stayed 
for three years. Their routine in the camps was the same as that of inmates from 
Chikafa. They were let out early in the morning to cultivate gardens and then had to 
return. Chief Chapoto was taken to Sipolilo (Guruve) by airplane, for his own 
protection, he said, because the Rhodesian government thought that he might be killed 
as a collaborator. People returned to Kanyemba in 1980 to find that wild animals had 
overrun houses, fields and gardens. They cleared land and re-established themselves 
with the help of food aid which they continued to receive into the 1990s.
While the war experience served to divide the population of Chikafa along 
lineage lines, common residence in the ‘keeps* and the survival of the Chapoto 
Chieftaincy meant that residents of Kanyemba strengthened their common clan bond 
at that time. Once new government and party structures arrived in the area, these were 
also subsumed under marunga rosario andrade control. Chikafa experienced further
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political, social and economic fragmentation in the post-war period, but eventually 
alliance between Chikunda and Korekore based on common economic interest created 
stability which endured until the advent of development.
v. District, Ward and Village Councils:
The real source of power during the 1990s resided with new councils due to 
their administrative functions, but also because of their membership. The ZANU 
Congress of 1984 re-organised and expanded party structures to extend representation 
within Zimbabwe through a set of parallel structures. The party organisation was 
positioned separately from local government structures and made accountable to 
Politburo. Local government structures were placed under the wing of the Ministry of 
Local Government which was answerable to Cabinet and included District Councils, 
Ward Development Committees (WADCOs), and Village Development Committees 
(VIDCOs) (see Illustration 4) (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989:76-83).
Once again, the impact of these new structures on the populations of Kanyemba 
and Chikafa was very different. While their implementation produced a shift of power 
toward the younger generation of established lineages and their traditional allies who 
filled new positions, subordinate groups remained disenfranchised. In Chikafa, power 
was further eroded from the conquering Chikunda group, a fact which placed them in 
a relationship of equality with the Korekore. State-level political structures 
consolidated marunga clan supremacy in Kanyemba, while opening the door for 
participation from lineage juniors. In fact, committee work permitted the Kanyemba 
line of the dominant clan to launch a two-prong offensive on the office of Chief 
because it gave power to junior members whose political activities enhanced those of 
lineage elders who were campaigning for the position.
In Chikafa, the Village Chairman was an elderly Korekore whose family had 
been in the area for generations. Interestingly, he was not of the dominant nzou 
samanyanga lineage, but instead tembo mazvimbakupa. He was elected to his position 
by the population, and, in 1992, had been in office for five years. That a Korekore 
individual of a less important lineage should accede to office in Chikafa meant that the 
loss of Chikunda control which had accelerated during the war, continued into the
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1980s and 1990s. However, it was not usual for subordinate lineages to hold these 
important positions. The Village Chairman described his role as the same as that of 
sabhuku because “they talked to each other”. Dispute settlement and decisions were 
agreed upon between these two parties in conjunction with the Village Committee.
People in Chikafa area were well aware of the structures under which they were 
governed. While they knew the name of the Governor of Mashonaland Central 
Province, and of the Provincial Administrator, most attention was focussed on 
structures from District Council level and below. Decisions to do with implementation 
of development schemes were made from District Council and so this structure was of 
interest. At the local level, Chikafa belonged to Zvaitika Village Development 
Committee (VIDCO) comprised of six villages, each with its own sabhuku and Village 
Chairman. The Zvaitika VIDCO Chairman was a young Korekore who, once elected, 
vowed that he “would also listen to the advice of elders”. Of the six VIDCO chairmen 
elected between 1985 and 1993, four had been Korekore and two Chikunda. At the 
next level, Neshangwe Ward was lead by a Korekore Ward Councillor and 
encompassed a number of VIDCOs. Local level structures took on great importance 
from the early 1990s because it was through these that issues to do with drought and 
development projects were discussed.
The VIDCO Chairman was elected by the people of the six villages he 
represented. In ordinary years he would be responsible for overseeing the good order 
of roads, primary school, clinic, grinding mill, borehole, and also government 
employees such as schoolteachers and the nurse’s aides who worked in the clinic. His 
role involved consultation with the various government entities who contributed to 
infrastructure of the six villages under his supervision. With the arrival of the MZP, 
VIDCO Chairmen had had to mediate between disgruntled villagers who objected to 
relocation, and attempt to intervene, often unsuccessfully, with officers of the project. 
Once the drought became serious, they were also responsible for overseeing drought 
relief distribution when it arrived. It was their responsibility to take local matters which 
they or the sabhuku and Village Chairmen could not solve, to the Ward Councillor. In 
the instance of crime, the police were called to take statements, and the matter was 
referred to the Magistrate’s Court in Guruve.
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One especially noteworthy aspect of representation in Chikafa area during the 
1990s was that, while headmanship and ZANU representation was in the hands of 
elders of long established lineages, administrative government structures were 
controlled by junior members of these same lineages. In most cases, there was a 
respectful relationship between young and old, especially as the economic interests of 
long-standing Chikunda and Korekore lineages were similar. They owned the greatest 
amount of land, the better houses, and the most goats. This political arrangement was 
reminiscent of brideservice, where junior men, here conceptualised as grooms, 
performed labour for elders, while these controlled important decision-making.
Beside these formal administrative structures, there were also a number of 
committees which maintained the local infrastructure. For example, in Chikafa area 
there were committees responsible for the primary school, the clinic (although this was 
dissolved in 1992 after a dispute with a newly appointed nurse), boreholes, and the 
market. Committee membership consisted mostly of Korekore and Chikunda lineages, 
but there were young and old and a number of women.
In Chikafa area, old and new structures of rule worked well together mostly 
because these were dominated by two Korekore and Chikunda lineages of long 
established residence. Elders agreed on issues of land distribution and adjudication, 
while younger members administered the day-to-day maintenance of infrastructure. 
This arrangement was put to the test with the arrival of development in the form of 
resource management and land resettlement. While the resource management scheme, 
CAMPFIRE, did not have much impact on livelihood in Chikafa as there were few 
wild animals there, it did, however, change the notion of social ecology. Within the 
cult of land spirits, proper stewardship of land and animals was linked to social 
behaviour which strengthened community. CAMPFIRE stipulated that wild animals 
were off limits. Under CAMPFIRE, the value of animals was reconfigured as a cash 
value. Similarly, the MZP took control of land out of the hands of the ruling alliances 
within Chikafa and changed the balance of power with the introduction of new 
migrants. These issues will be developed in the next chapter.
At the same time as it appeared that development precipitated an opposition 
between long-term residents and new migrants, the fact was that social organisation
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became fragmented along a number of lines. I have emphasised throughout this study 
that Chikafa is characteristic of an acephalous society where, despite a ruling alliance 
between Chikunda and Korekore, control of political process was tenuous. 
Development demonstrated the fragility of this arrangement by splitting the interests 
of junior and senior members of these elite lineages. This was accomplished by 
removing control of land out of the hands of lineage elders and into the power of the 
state. But in this process, juniors who controlled local government structures mobilised 
their positions to maximise their share of allocated land. They saw the MZP as an 
opportunity to obtain land outside of the control of elders. By 1993 a number of young 
leaders had been allocated desirable plots of land by the MZP causing widespread 
unease.
In Kanyemba, while political process also included long established chieftancy 
and headmanship, post-Independence party structures, and newer committee work, it 
functioned somewhat differently from that of Chikafa. For one, chieftaincy was very 
strongly entrenched and mechanisms for dissent almost non-existent. Power was 
concentrated within two of three lineages of the marunga rosario andrade clan. Chief 
Chapoto, a descendant of Chihumbe, controlled the office of Chief during the 1990s, 
and had done so since 1945. The Ward Council and its head Councillor belonged to the 
Kanyemba line of the ruling clan. Politics in this area was distinguished by the 
domination of the marunga rosario andrade clan.
Post-colonial government structures were also dominated by the marunga clan 
through its junior members and the junior members of traditionally subordinate 
lineages which dated back to conquest. The most prominent of these new structures 
were the Ward Council and the Wildlife Committee. The Ward Council was composed 
of four members, all Chikunda, who oversaw a number of committees responsible for 
the school, grinding mill, wildlife, development, and liaised with District Council. The 
Wildlife Committee, composed of seven members, oversaw the functioning of 
CAMPFIRE, a position which had become very important as the project had a huge 
effect on the livelihood of the population at the same time as it brought in money to be 
used by the community. According to the Ward Councillor the project had increased its 
takings from clients ten-fold between 1991 and 1993. Interestingly, the head of the
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Wildlife Committee was a male Korekore of the tembo mbizi clan, a fact which 
indicated a small amount of power-sharing amongst the younger generation.
Ward Council meetings were well-attended affairs where a number of local 
committees reported on their activities. The Chief did not attend these but senior 
members of Kanyemba lineage did so in an advisory capacity as they held no formal 
role. As the Ward Councillor once said, “we should choose old and young for the 
committees, the young can read and write, the old give advice”. One interpretation of 
this attitude is that incorporating young and old into committee work would bring 
together two bases of power of the Kanyemba lineage: domination of post-colonial 
political structures and the Chieftaincy which they hoped to soon control. One elderly 
man who attended many meetings was from Kanyemba’s line and held a position as 
counsellor at Chapoto’s Court. Of six Ward Councillors since 1980, five had been 
marunga. At most meetings there were very few complaints about political process, 
rather statements such as, “the committees are working well for the people” were 
common. If problems arose, such as misdistribution of meat obtained from animals 
killed by clients of the safari camp, individuals were blamed, but no serious sanctions 
were applied. At a meeting in 1993 one contender for the Chieftaincy stated that: 
“leaders should call other leaders and share ideas”. In other words, decision-making 
should remain within the circle of established representatives. Those excluded from 
Ward level political process were the tembo mvura (Dema), and most Korekore except 
for the tembo mbizi clan. All committee work was dominated by the marunga clan, but 
there appeared to be a further consolidation of power amongst descendants of 
Kanyemba in preparation for a strong claim to the Chieftaincy.
The Wildlife Committee was another powerful instrument of marunga 
domination in Kanyemba area. Although its Chairman was not marunga, he was young, 
educated, versed in the technical language of development, and involved in the Faith 
Apostolic Mission for which he collaborated on a translation of the Book of Mark into 
Chikunda. He belonged to a lineage associated with the original marunga conquest of 
Dande, and had become a senior member of the Faith Apostolic Mission where his 
wife had taken over the role of initiating young girls in menarche ceremonies. Both his 
background and position within a growing church made him a good ally for the
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marunga cause.
The Wildlife Committee was probably the most powerful political instrument 
in Kanyemba area during research for this study because it oversaw functioning of the 
CAMPFIRE project. This committee controlled local distribution of funds obtained 
from Zambezi Hunters, the hunting concession owners who serviced the project. It also 
made important decisions regarding designated hunting territories, employment of 
locals in the safari business, and the distribution of game meat.
The financial clout of this committee was hard to underestimate. In August of 
1993, the Ward Councillor told me that the safari operator had contributed Z$1.2 
million to District Council in 1992, Z$91 000 of which was given to Chapoto Ward. 
Part of that money was divided up amongst households, so that each received Z$192. 
At a Ward Council meeting in August of 1993, a sum of Z$11000 of total monies was 
said to have been given for improvements to the primary school. In truth I could not 
track distribution of money within Kanyemba area, and it was hard to know how much 
of the money was reinvested by the committee in local infrastructure and services
Another source of power for the Wildlife Committee was that it had 
decision-making power with regard to the designation of land to be used for safari 
hunting. At a meeting held in August 1993 with an ecologist from the Parks 
department, discussion centred on whether the community should build a campsite to 
attrict tourists to the area. In order to build this attraction, land would have to be 
claimed on the eastern side of the Mwadzamutanda River and a game fence erected to 
protect people from the herds of wild animals which descended on the river at night 
time. The area under question was populated by tembo mvura people, 108 families to 
be exact, who would need to be relocated elsewhere. The ecologist suggested that these 
people could be employed as anti-poachers. At this meeting both the Ward Councillor 
and the government official did not give any thought to the difficulties that moving 
their homesteads would pose for these families, nor to their sudden loss of livelihood 
ones they became separated from the forest which supplied them with wild plants and 
aninals. Because this scheme would remove their means of livelihood, the tembo 
mvtra would have no choice but to become even more dependent on Chikunda 
landowners for work in order to obtain food. The CAMPFIRE project, which I will
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discuss in detail in the following chapter, had begun a process of removing members 
of this lineage from their forest environment so that, in 1993, they were greatly 
dependent on the Chikunda. Any extension of hunting or tourism in the area would 
further encroach on their territory and way of life.
Through the Wildlife Committee, the marunga clan managed to control a 
development project which seriously affected not only the livelihood of the tembo 
mvura, but also of other subordinates, such as fishers, who made their living through 
the natural environment. Their involvement in the finances of the project also allowed 
them decision-making power over which infrastructural issues to privilege. In short, of 
the post-colonial political structures implemented in Kanyemba area, the marunga had 
managed to appropriate those which provided the opportunity to consolidate their 
power by further marginalising historically subordinate clans.
In Kanyemba, processes of domination originating with the state were not 
perceived as threatening because marunga already presided over a centralised polity 
which was able to incorporate and use to its advantage any new initiatives. They did 
not conceive of the Zimbabwean state as a traitor, rather they had always understood 
the issue of conquest and never conceptualised the state as autochthonous in the way 
of the Korekore. For the Chikunda, whose very name speaks of conquest, the state was 
never anything but a conqueror.
In the 1990s, the impact of the state on political process in Chikafa and 
Kanyemba was very different. Chikafa, a settlement distinguished by a tenuous 
power-sharing arrangement between Chikunda and Korekore lineages, experienced 
further fragmentation. In this area, the conquering Chikunda had ruled through 
headmen for most of the 20th century, but lost a great deal of influence during and after 
the guerrilla war. For one, guerrilla war in Dande was based on the support of a 
pantheon of autochthonous and rain-making land spirits in which Chikunda mpondoro 
featured as outsiders. Also, the experience of villagers in the ‘keep’ at Mushumbi 
Pools served to consolidate Korekore identity in opposition to their white jailers. The 
slippage of power from Chikunda hands was further evidenced during the 1980s when 
Korekore took up ZANU representative positions. During the early 1990s both groups 
owned most of the land in Chikafa, and so shared an interest in maintaining political
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control of representative structures. However, once land resettlement took hold, new 
opportunities arose for junior elders and new migrants to the area. Whilst capable, 
these people did not manage to bring local opinion to development managers. When 
the drought occurred in 1991-92, the combination of a highly decentralised political 
arrangement, fragile environment, and the threat of imminent resettlement resulted in 
a sense of deep betrayal by the state. Thus, while the Zimbabwean state had been 
construed as legitimate during the 1980s because it had been built by popular support, 
it was viewed as traitorous during the 1990s when villagers found themselves with 
political structures which did not represent their opinions, development schemes 
which threatened their livelihood, and a drought which brought anxiety and hunger.
The impact of the state was very different in Kanyemba. This settlement had
tlibeen ruled by the same clan since the 19 century, and the same Chief, a member of 
one of three ruling lineages, since 1945. Because of a rigid social hierarchy, 
subordinate lineages did not have opportunities to participate in politics, except in 
alliance with marunga. All other clans and lineages were impeded representation, and 
there existed no channels for dissent except support of a neighbouring Korekore 
mpondoro, which proved ineffectual. The effect of post-colonial state structures was to 
consolidate marunga control over the population. The Ward Council, VIDCOs, and 
the Wildlife Committee were monopolised by this clan. A secondary effect of state 
intervention in this area was that, through their participation in new political structures, 
junior members of the Kanyemba lineage strengthened their power base against their 
rival for the Chieftaincy, the Chihumbe lineage. In sum, the Zimbabwean state 
consolidated marunga rule in Kanyemba area because, as a centralised polity for over 
a century, rulers there knew that political innovations were best incorporated under 
their wing.
vi. Structural Adjustment: Some Effects on Dande
Post-colonial political structures in Dande resulted in further dispersal of 
power in Chikafa, while in Kanyemba, these reinforced a pre-existing hierarchy. 
Kanyemba was similarly less affected by structural adjustment, but this may have been 
due to its distance from the plateau, the smaller amount of labour migration there, and
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certainly the fact that it was not subject to the MZP which encouraged cash-cropping 
of cotton. It was a different story in Chikafa where structural adjustment, combined 
with land resettlement and drought, contributed to loss of livelihood and anxiety 
amongst residents. There were a number of reasons for this including its relative 
proximity to the plateau, the longstanding pattern of labour migration, increasing 
monetarisation of local economy through cotton farming, the introduction of the MZP, 
and crop failure due to serious drought.
As with most foreign innovations, structural adjustment was interpreted, by 
locals, in terms of the Zambesian discourse of Chieftaincy which understood political 
and economic behaviours through the dichotomy of autochthony and conquest. In this 
section, I will argue that the structural adjustment policies of the 1990s affected the 
Zambesi Valley in two important ways: First, structural adjustment changed 
longstanding labour migration practices through reduction of job opportunities on the 
plateau. Labour migration had long served as a safety valve in the event of crop failure 
and was a source of cash to purchase seed, chemical, and other items used in 
cultivation. Cash earned also paid for school fees, household needs, building materials, 
transportation, medicines, and other goods and services. Secondly, changes in the 
state-organised marketing system made difficult both production and sale of surplus 
maize and cotton cash crops. While the remoteness of Dande usually meant that the 
effects of government policies were not immediately felt in the area, unlike the 
political structures introduced during the 1980s, structural adjustment had strong and 
almost immediate repercussions because it affected livelihood. The impact of the 
drought was exacerbated by structural adjustment because usual coping mechanisms 
became unavailable.
Until the 1990s, Zambesians did not engage in significant cash-cropping. Their 
livelihood was confined to subsistence cultivation of approximately two acre plots and 
kitchen gardens, and the tending of small numbers of goats and chickens. Household 
incomes were supplemented with seasonal or life-course labour migration, trade in 
fish or game meat, and products and services associated with special skills such as 
healing or building. It is difficult to gauge the impact that Zambesians had on the 
Zimbabwean national economy through their work on the plateau. However, the state
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has had long impact on the Zambesi through its wars and labour requirements. 
Dramatically, during the 1990s, state-sanctioned development projects were 
introduced which changed land use and the relationship with the environment at the 
same time as structural adjustment was applied. Local economy in Chikafa and 
Kanyemba will be discussed in Chapter 7 where it provides background material to the 
impact of development projects. In this section I will summarise the structural 
adjustment program and then discuss its effect on livelihoods in Dande.
The impetus toward structural adjustment was provided by the World Bank 
during the mid to late 1980s when it found fault with the practice that Zimbabwe had 
“pursued policies favouring stabilisation rather than growth” (Gibbon 1996:349). 
While, overall, policies of economic growth seemed to make sense for a country which 
appeared to be politically stable, and had strong industrial and farming sectors, the fact 
remained that post-independence infrastructure had been built on borrowing, that job 
creation was low, and there were also low levels of private investment (Gibbon 
1996:349). Despite these caveats, a structural adjustment program based on trade 
liberalization was introduced in 1990-91 which targeted price controls, wage 
regulation (except for farm and domestic workers), government employment, and 
import controls. These changes were all based on the notion that the market is 
self-regulating and that growth would be, therefore, inevitable. In the same way that 
development schemes were unilaterally accepted by the Zimbabwean government, 
structural adjustment was adopted without consultation amongst affected parties. 
Trade unions, farmers, and others concerned were not involved in the decision-making 
process. Protests from trade unions, churches, and students were quashed through 
imprisonment of leaders and banning of demonstrations. Locally, the acronym for the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Program, ESAP, became known somewhat bitterly 
as “Europeans Suffer, Africans Perish”, or simply as “Hapana sadza” (no porridge). 
There were very important reasons for these interpretations as ESAP was associated 
with widespread hunger and despair during the 1990s.
While changes to funding of infrastructure may have had an important impact 
on the plateau, people in the Zambesi were used to lack of roads, schools, clinics and 
other facilities. For them, ESAP disrupted their lives because its agricultural and
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industrial policies affected their livelihood. The agricultural policies of ESAP
unraveled a number of positive steps for African farmers taken by the ZANU-pf
government during the 1980s. Most significantly, there were benefits from the
incorporation of African farmers into “the state-marketing system.. .through marketing
depots, crop collection points and extension services in the communal area and making
modem crop development packages available through Agritex” (Gibbon 1996:365).
Because of the collection and distribution facilities provided by the Grain Marketing
Board and the support received through AGRITEX, in the late 1980s African farmers
produced approximately half of Zimbabwe’s export maize, and a large portion of
cotton. However, by 1991 the World Bank made two crucial objections to the GMB. In
the first place, it argued “that GMB services to farmers in communal areas, and the
control associated with them, were uneconomic and counter-productive” (Gibbon
1996:365). Secondly, it also believed that there were:
“Large diseconomies involved in maintaining the strategic grain reserve 
and disposing of excess stocks in boom years and in maintaining the 
centralized system for shipping maize from the remoter depots to a small 
number of urban-based mills, before shipping it back to these same remote 
areas in the form of meal”.
(Gibbonl996:365)
As a result of these complaints, the GMB was made to reduce the number of grain 
collection points around the country to almost none by 1992, to cut staff costs, and to 
reduce its maize stocks. In effect, “because of crop failure during the 1991-92 crop 
season it obliged the GMB to undertake massive imports in the 1992-93 marketing 
season” (Gibbon 1996:367). In addition to modifications of the GMB, the World Bank 
also asked for market deregulation including partially decontrolling trade in the staple 
white maize (to enhance the position of independent traders), and “to eliminate all 
controls and restrictions in the trade in beef, dairy products, cotton, oil seeds and 
yellow maize” (Gibbon 1996:368).
There were widespread repercussions of these measures for the whole farming 
sector in Zimbabwe. Commercial farmers found it more profitable to switch from 
maize crops to tobacco (from 31% cultivating tobacco to 79%), as well as engaging in 
horticulture to produce vegetables and flowers for export. This sector employed 300 
000 workers and so any changes which affected employment would have important
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repercussions for communal areas, whose residents engaged in labour migration. In 
one instance, a young white farmer who managed a tobacco farm some 50 km outside 
of Harare expressed regret at the farm owner’s choice of crops, saying that he would 
prefer to grow “food” (meaning maize).
Communal areas, already suffering from the effects of serious drought, also 
lost their grain collection points. This caused many problems for producers, “as 
marketing through the GMB became more physically difficult for them more and more 
turned as anticipated to small-scale private traders” (Gibbons 1996:369). This 
situation made small farmers, without their own means of transport and in the absence 
of local cooperatives, quite vulnerable to the exploitation of traders.
ESAP also affected the Cotton Marketing Board, and in the years from 1989 to 
1992 cotton prices fell. For one, the post-drought cotton input package offered to 
farmers carried a 31% interest rate out of reach of most people. Also, with a new 
market-driven approach, the CMB found it more profitable to sell cotton lint overseas 
rather than to supply local spinners in Harare, thereby putting the spinning sector in 
financial difficulties and risking job cuts. Political intervention avoided this 
circumstance, but this case also illustrated the drawbacks of a purely market-driven 
approach (Gibbon 1996:371).
ESAP rejected the protectionist approach which the industrial sector had 
inherited from the Rhodesian regime because of structural problems which it said 
prevented growth. Pre-Independence and well into the 1980s, the industrial sector had 
had access to local capital and benefited from foreign exchange controls. In response, 
the program prescribed a rejection of protectionist foreign exchange policies and 
encouraged liberalisation of foreign investment, restraint within budgets, and 
investment in re-equipment. In other words, ESAP suggested a restructuring of 
production which would include reduction of employees and, in all probability, 
computerisation. These changes entailed social consequences as employment in 
industry fell by 25 000 jobs between 1991 and 1993. These figures represent full-time 
employees and not the scores of people on short-term contracts (Gibbon 1996:374).
It is hard to understand why the Zimbabwean government adopted a structural 
adjustment program of which repercussions would be felt so immediately and so
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deeply at the social and economic levels. It is possible that the political implications 
of loss of popular support were also not taken into consideration. In the Zambesi 
Valley, ESAP compounded existing hardship caused by land resettlement and serious 
drought by affecting available jobs on the plateau, the traditional safety valve in times 
of strife. Furthermore, modifications to GMB and CMB policies also resulted in 
difficulties with the production and marketing of maize and cotton, the latter forming 
the backbone of the MZP. But, perhaps the most profound impact of structural 
adjustment was that it shattered people’s hopes for a better standard of living for their 
families.
For the better part of the 20th century labour migration was a common practice 
amongst residents of the Zambesi Valley. There were two patterns of migration: a 
seasonal movement to the plateau with a return at harvest time; and, a migration of 
several years duration during which workers attempted to save money to build brick 
houses. In addition, migration was an option in times of stress such as food shortages, 
family troubles, or in cases where life at home became untenable. Both men and 
women participated in these cycles in the settlements studied. During the drought of 
1991-92, migration accelerated as evidenced by the presence in Chikafa of 60 
households in 1992 and 76 in 1993.
One elderly informant in Chikafa described how he worked on the plateau, 
mostly at commercial farms for nearly thirty years, returning for one month each year 
to help his wife’s father with the harvest. His wife stayed with her family during that 
time. He said that for the most part, he enjoyed working away from Chikafa, 
particularly during the first ten years which he said he spent “ndakuya pleasure” 
(eating pleasure). From the appearance of his homestead and the size of his fields, it 
was clear that he had accrued no savings from his time away and made no investments 
in business, land, or buildings. It is possible that he made small contributions to his 
wife’s parents household over those years and so was unable to amass savings. He paid 
a long period of brideprice and also engaged in brideservice at harvest time. In contrast, 
a younger informant said that he used the opportunity to work on a commercial farm to 
escape a call-up to join the Rhodesian army.
In 1991 and 1992 a number of people in Chikafa went to the plateau in search
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of work. Most went to commercial farms where they seemed to have done odd jobs, 
including weeding and other low status activities characteristic of short-term 
employment. Most came back with no savings saying that pay was very low and that 
they had just managed to survive. The only work one informant could manage to find 
was picking peas on a commercial farm for 25 cents/kg at 20 to 30 kg each day. He 
could not send money to his wife who had remained behind and survived the drought 
by eating bush foods and relief maize. Migrants, who returned toward the end of 1992 
in time to prepare fields for planting, were rewarded with a harvest in April of 1993. 
Others who stayed longer and did not plant crops relied on relatives for food. No 
informants found work in an urban area, due to a lack of jobs I was told, but probably 
also because they lacked skills. Although at least sixteen families from Chikafa, but 
probably more, tried migration as a response to drought, shortage of jobs and poor 
remuneration led many to return before the drought ended, and most with no money at 
all.
Crop failure during the 1991-92 drought coupled with the inability to find 
employment left many households with few resources to grow cotton. People in 
Chikafa thought it peculiar that after so much encouragement to grow cotton, 
particularly from agencies such as AGRITEX, the price of agricultural inputs should 
rise at the same time as it became more difficult to sell the bales they produced. While 
the cash earned from cotton cultivation was attractive, it strained the resources of 
people in Chikafa who found it to be expensive and labour-intensive. However, most 
cotton growers were starry-eyed with regard to the promise of a cash income, and soon 
found themselves in a cycle of demand for labour and expense which they had not 
anticipated. Because energy had been diverted away from food cultivation, the income 
from cotton was needed to supplement local food sources. Also, with near-total crop 
failure in 1992, any income from the subsequent 1993 harvest was welcomed.
Cotton cultivation in the Zambesi Valley had historically been a doomed 
prospect. In the 1970s, commercial cotton cultivation was attempted in Mushumbi 
Pools town, the site of the ‘keeps’, but failed for a number of reasons, including poor 
soils, large amounts of water required and small yields. In Chikafa, people started 
growing cotton during the 1980s. In 1992, the CMB provided 100% credit on cotton
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seed in the Zambesi, an offer accepted by a number of growers in Chikafa.
The economics of cotton cultivation made people’s tenacity to grow it hard to 
understand. In the early 1990s it was an expensive crop to grow, paid few returns and 
took scarce labour away from food crops. In 1993 there were 93.5 acres under cotton 
cultivation as compared to 152.5 acres of maize. 40 households grew cotton which 
meant that the average size of plots was 2.3 acres. The price of cotton seed increased 
from Z$12.50/25kg in 1991 to Z$57/25kg in 1993. About 20kg of seed was required 
for each acre. In addition, AGRITEX recommended the use of fertilizer which cost 
about Z$76/acre, and pesticide which varied in price between Z$27/acre to Z$80/acre. 
Cotton was complicated to sow, having to be done in two stages. Also, this crop 
required constant weeding between December and mid-March which led a few 
growers to hire workers to whom was paid 50 cents per line of cotton plants (most 
people averaged 15-16 lines of weeding per workday). Households yielded between 
one and three bales of cotton which was taken to a collection point in Mahuwe, a 
settlement situated at the bottom of the escarpment on the main road leading to the 
plateau. From there bales were to be taken to Bindura town where a contract had been 
struck with a local ginnery to buy the cotton at Z$ 150/bale. In 1993, part of the cotton 
crop was destroyed by pests, so yields were lower than anticipated.
O f great concern to producers in Zvaitika VIDCO was their distance from the 
collection point at Mahuwe village which was situated on the main road out of the 
Valley. In 1993 they campaigned to move it to Mushumbi Pools from where they 
could also collect seeds and empty bale packets. Without control of distribution of 
their cotton bales, growers in Chikafa were at the mercy of intermediaries who struck 
deals with spinners on their own terms and for their own interests. If the return on 
cotton was not good, then there would be no money to buy seed, fertilizer, and 
pesticides for the following year. A number of farmers had sold goats to finance cotton 
growing. Cotton cultivation continued in Chikafa in 1993 because of financial aid 
from AGRITEX, and because of people’s hopes that it would eventually be grown 
successfully and provide cash. In truth, only households which could pool their land 
and labour resources managed to grow cotton effectively. In 1993, my last 
observations of cotton cultivation in Chikafa indicated a potential for new social
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stratification based on relative success in growing the crop.
In sum, the effects of ESAP in Chikafa were two-fold. The shortage of jobs on 
the plateau due to shifts in commercially farmed crops, and cut-backs in industry made 
labour migration ineffectual. Zambesians needed other ways of supplementing their 
subsistence livelihood, which they attempted to do through the cultivation of cotton. 
This proved to be an expensive and labour-intensive endeavour which was difficult to 
market and yielded little return during the early 1990s. In a way, for many farmers in 
Chikafa, cotton symbolised freedom from the cycle of labour-migration in which they 
had seen their parents and grandparents caught. It also offered the promise of cash to 
buy desirable consumer goods which people interpreted as a release from the 
tenuousness of subsistence farming. But not everyone believed cotton to be a viable 
livelihood alternative. In the midst of AGRITEX meetings at which the wonders of 
cotton cultivation were espoused, and the pressures from the MZP to grow the cash 
crop, many people started to wonder about the consequences of recent social and 
economic changes in Chikafa. These uncertainties were articulated through a 
witchcraft accusation which was resolved through intervention from local mpondoro 
depicted in Chapter 9.
vii. The Zimbabwean State and Domination in Dande:
It did not take long after Independence for international organisations to offer 
opinions on the state of Zimbabwe’s economy and way in which it was governed. The 
World Bank and later the International Monetary Fund objected to a longstanding 
approach to economy which privileged stabilisation over growth, and suggested that 
an overall change to economic policy based on growth and foreign investment was 
preferable. On the other hand, it was not difficult to understand why the post-colonial 
state introduced new governing structures throughout Zimbabwe. A network of 
representatives elected by local people but answerable to central government (and to 
the Politburo) corresponded well with the socialist ideology of ZANU. It would also 
mirror images of Chieftaincy, familiar to most Zimbabweans, in which a Chief or King 
governed through tributary polities. After Independence, many parallels were drawn 
between the Munhumutapa state and the new Zimbabwean state. Books by Mudenge
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(1988) and Randles (1979) on this subject became available in Zimbabwe, an 
unsurprising fact as these depicted a view of the past in accordance with the image of 
Zimbabwe constructed by ZANU.
The idea that Zimbabwe had been re-conquered from white colonisers by 
Zimbabweans and, therefore, belonged to all was shattered by the introduction of the 
philosophy of decentralisation. This was done on political initiatives while structural 
adjustment was the result of pressure from international financial institutions which 
promoted the renewed dominance of market principles.
The confusing language of centralisation, embedded in ZANU party structures, 
and decentralisation promoted in development schemes has its origins in ambiguities 
inherent in the Zimbabwean state. Munro (1998) argued that this imprecise language 
of governance is common to post-colonial African states which have a historical 
tradition of nationalism based on political inclusion coupled with romantic notions 
appealing to the cultural integrity found in tradition. For Zambesians it proved to be 
a confusing combination of messages. A history of political domination in the 
Zambesi by centralised chieftaincies would have helped people to understand a state 
which behaved like a conqueror. But a government of mixed messages which 
emphasised an ideology of participation through new elected representative structures 
at the same time as it supported a language of self-help and individual empowerment, 
proved to be untenable. During the 1990s, the lives of residents of Dande changed 
dramatically with the conjunction of development, drought, and ESAP. Unfortunately 
these features compounded each other’s effects to produce a circumstance of acute 
hardship beyond the control of most individuals and families.
In response, Zambesians began to view the state as conqueror after a decade in 
which it dismantled any grounds it had possessed to being an autochthonous 
chieftaincy. The government took a number of steps which, interpreted through the 
cultural logic of a Zambesian discourse of chieftaincy, were construed as conquest. 
During the war, the support of mpondoro for guerrillas and the sacrifices made by 
families involved the population in the construction of a new state grounded in 
legitimacy. By the mid 1980s, the Zimbabwean state promoted a hierarchy of heroism 
in which some guerrillas became more deserving of commemoration. The symbolism
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of Heroes’ acre broke the ties of kinship invested in the sabwira mutual aid and burial 
relationship. This was crucial in the minds of Zambesians as any relationship between 
locals and newcomers unmediated by sabwira ties was believed to lead to 
discontinuity between ancestors and their living descendants. That the hierarchical 
Chikunda maintained sabwira relations with the tembo mvura people, whom they 
oppressed so consistently, spoke volumes about the importance of this relationship. By 
designating ranks of heroism, and in the Zambesi, the label “ex-combatant” to denote 
a hierarchy of important contribution to Liberation, the state signaled its refusal to be 
sabwira. The sense of betrayal felt in Chikafa was articulated at a mpondoro ceremony 
in mid-1993 when a land spirit lamented that the valley had become full of wandering 
spirits (of the improperly buried).
The dismantling of the Grain Marketing Board and the dissipation of grain 
stocks, as recommended under structural adjustment, was also interpreted as another 
refusal by President Mugabe to play an appropriate Chiefly role. A proper Chief, even 
an oppressive one like Chapoto, maintained a granary with surplus maize for those 
inevitable times of strife. That the state failed to do so was another indication of 
betrayal. In the Zambesi, during the drought, I heard people say that even the muzungu 
(Rhodesians) gave food aid. Well into the drought, when food aid did arrive in Chikafa, 
a number of people told me that it was “Mugabe’s food”, regardless of provenance. I 
interpreted this view to mean that, in local terms, donated food, even if it was 
inadequate and late coming, must be from the Chief.
In Chikafa, the belief that the state had lost its claims to autochthony finally 
gelled with the implementation of the MZP. During the 1980s, when the alliance 
between Korekore and Chikunda had been strong, land distribution was controlled by 
the sabhuku and the Village Chairman. By taking land out of local control, the MZP 
disrupted a number of important social relations. For one, marriage payments were 
shortened and brideservice rendered irrelevant since obligation to affines became no 
longer a prerequisite to land ownership. An elderly informant lamented to me that girls 
had become like prostitutes because they could be taken with one payment and no 
ongoing obligation on the part of the groom. Also, patrilineal ties were tested as 
patrilocal residence was rendered difficult by the scheme. New couples would live
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neolocally, a feature which made obligations to blood kin less obvious. On the small 
scale, sabwira relations, which incorporated newcomers into established settlements, 
were also diluted by the MZP which acknowledged no ritual authority in Dande.
In sum, post-colonial structures introduced into the Zambesi Valley by the 
Zimbabwean state and international organisations caused a great deal of disruption in 
Chikafa and threatened the very basis of chieftaincy there. Both the Independence War 
and ZANU government structures introduced during the 1980s weakened Chikunda 
economic power which led to a power-sharing arrangement with the Korekore group. 
During the 1990s, ESAP was associated with weakening of the labour migration cycle 
and difficulties with cotton cultivation. Development, to be examined in the following 
chapter, changed land use patterns and undermined the Chikunda/Korekore ruling 
alliance formed during the 1980s. Serious drought in 1991-92 highlighted the fragility 
of the changing economy through the occurrence of widespread hunger, distress, and 
illness. Perceived failure on the part of the Mugabe government to behave like a 
chieftaincy led residents of Chikafa to feel betrayed and to view the state as conqueror. 
In response to this dire circumstance, there was a revival of the shrine of the local 
mpondoro, Nyamanindi, in an attempt to recreate a notion of appropriate governance. 
Through renewed support of land spirits, people in Chikafa recreated a notion of 
locality and long-term residence which they deployed to oppose both the MZP and 
new migrants. By mid 1993, when a post-drought cholera epidemic claimed well over 
thirty lives, a witchcraft accusation took place, of which resolution through spirit 
possession ceremonies articulated the high level of stress which a decade of economic 
and political changes had brought to Chikafa.
In contrast, the longstanding rigid social, political, and economic hierarchy of 
Kanyemba settlement enabled absorption of post-colonial innovations which averted 
disruption. Residents of that area had had long experience of domination through the 
highly centralised Chapoto Chieftaincy which had been installed in 1945. To most 
residents of Kanyemba, from the Chief to the most subordinated clans, the 
post-colonial state had always been a conqueror. Never had they imagined that the 
state was their sabwira, or ritually installed and legitimate. For them, Mugabe was a 
conqueror in the same mould as their great ancestor, Kanyemba.
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Chapter 7 will continue to examine the central issue of domination in the 
Zambesi Valley of the 1990s by examining local response to the implementation of 
resource management and land resettlement schemes.
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Chapter 7: Development Schemes in the Zambesi Valley during the 1990s: 
Empowerment and Control
“They should come and kill us; we don’t want to go”.
Sabhuku Chikafa speaking about his village’s planned relocation under the Mid 
Zambezi Valley Rural Resettlement Project
“There was more relish before the war, people could hunt and fish with nets. It is 
impossible to get fat now”.
Resident of Kanyemba discussing access to food sources
i. Critique of Development:
In the west, the notion of development alludes to the progress and betterment 
of the predicament in which disadvantaged peoples are found. For the Zambesi Valley 
of the early 1990s, development became a term of widespread use which resulted in it 
acquiring a set of local meanings not necessarily in line with the aims of providers. In 
this chapter I will describe the different meanings of development in the west and in 
the Zambesi Valley by juxtaposing the ideology of development with the 
circumstances of its application. I will argue that the benevolent language in which 
development is couched masks a profoundly western-based paradigm which becomes 
problematic when faced with local worldviews. In the Zambesi, I became aware of 
development ideologies, local acceptance and resistance to their realisation, and the 
power relations which ensued between local individuals and groups.
In Chapter 6 I outlined political institutions in Dande to demonstrate how in a 
centralised polity, like Kanyemba, existing rulers used their position to appropriate 
new structures to their advantage. At the same time, in a fragmented settlement such 
as Chikafa, new political structures eroded the position of the most powerful, and 
provided opportunities for formerly disenfranchised groups. The introduction of 
development schemes in the Zambesi Valley in the late 1980s, whilst impoverishing 
most people, aided domination by the Chikunda of Kanyemba settlement, and state
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domination of politically weak Chikafa area. In doing so, the state lost the popular 
support it had gained during the Independence War, locally framed as autochthonous 
and legitimate power, to become considered a conqueror whose interests did not 
coincide with those of local people.
In this chapter I will analyse the role that development projects played in the 
lives and livelihoods of residents of Chikafa and Kanyemba, the ways in which these 
came to inhabit their imagination, and the ways in which these were encountered 
locally. The CAMPFIRE resource management scheme was applied to both Chikafa 
and Kanyemba areas, but had most impact on the latter. The notable impact of 
CAMPFIRE in Chikafa was that it had helped to create a significant problem with 
regard to the destruction of fields by elephant which could not be culled by locals 
under the project’s regulations. The MZP scheme was introduced to Chikafa area in 
the late 1980s where it planned to re-organise the distribution of land and local 
economy. The common thread between these two different projects was that both 
proposed to re-organise people’s relationship with their environment through both 
changed cultivation activities and relationship with bush resources. In order to 
interpret my observations of the impact of development in Dande area, I will invoke 
the work of Arturo Escobar who examined power relations and development, and 
James Ferguson who argued that development is characterised by its unintended 
results. To describe the effect of drastic modification of land use practices in a 
subsistence economy, I will invoke Tim Ingold’s notions of skills, dwelling, and 
livelihood which argued that the type of relationship which people have with 
environments depends on interactions at any particular moment. In this view, if a 
relationship changes or ceases to take place, then skills and knowledge will also 
change. These issues are important to consider in the context of development schemes 
which worked to transform subsistence cultivators into cotton cash-croppers (MZP), 
and former hunter-gatherers into subsistence farmers (CAMPFIRE).
It is important to review the language of development in order to understand 
how the Zambesi was brought into global processes which resulted in inequality. 
Arturo Escobar is amongst the most vociferous critics of the development paradigm.
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His book, Encountering Development (1995), began with an examination of how the 
post-World War II dream of development turned into a nightmare in which “the 
discourse and strategy of development produced its opposite: massive
underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression” (Escobar 
1995:4).
Escobar described the notion of development as having come about in the 
period after World War n, at the same time as the Marshall Plan. He related both of 
these schemes to an American foreign policy initiative rooted in the Truman Doctrine 
of 1949. In Escobar’s words the doctrine’s manifesto was:
“to bring about the conditions necessary to replicating the world over the 
features that characterized the ‘advanced’ societies of the time-high levels 
of industrialization and urbanization, technicalization of agriculture, rapid 
growth of material production and living standards, and the widespread 
adoption of modem education and cultural values”.
(Escobar 1995:3-4)
He suggested that the good intentions of Truman’s ideas resulted in an 
‘enframing’ of the world by “a regime of objectivism in which Europeans were 
subjected to a double demand: to be detached and objective, and yet immerse 
themselves in local life” (Escobar 1995:7). He further stated that “this regime of order 
and truth is a quintessential aspect of modernity and has been deepened by economics 
and development” (Escobar 1995:8). This author held the strong view that the west 
created a set of foreign policy ideas, couched in the language of benevolence, which 
greatly disadvantaged the countries to which they were applied. More specifically, in 
his critique he argued that the development paradigm contained three key axes: forms 
of knowledge; systems of power; and, forms of subjectivity (Escobar 1995:10).
With regard to forms of knowledge, Escobar contended that the development 
paradigm required a vocabulary of concepts which created client categories as 
recipients of aid. For example, he believed that the classification ‘poverty’ with its 
attached ideas of mobility, vagrancy, promiscuity, frugality and ignorance laid the 
groundwork for the objective of managing the poor through education, healthcare, 
hygiene, morality, employment and child rearing (Escobar 1995:23). The trope of
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‘village’ was also a similar label masking notions of control. The label ‘peasantry’ was 
another category with which this author took issue. He believed that the persistence of 
the idea of peasant and its associated concepts ‘small farmer’ and ‘landless labourer’ 
was associated with “a broad range of economic, political and cultural, and discursive 
processes” (Escobar 1995: 106). Furthermore, he argued that the relationship which 
takes place between clients and aid providers “is structured by bureaucratic and textual 
mechanisms that are anterior to the interaction” and is emblematic of the power 
relations within development (Escobar 1995:127). The author called this last point 
“documentary practices” and believed it a way to manufacture knowledge about 
intended recipients in order to meet the needs of the providing organisation.
During the colonial period, both British and Rhodesian states devised new 
categories with which to refer to African populations. I discussed earlier in this study 
that categories such as ‘tribe’ were created to encompass networks of extended kin in 
a given geographical area, the position of Chief was created from the more flexible 
role of lineage elders for the purposes of colonial administration of rural areas, and that 
in chieftaincies, sons-in-law (i.e. junior males) were transformed into labourers as 
required by the state. During the 1990s, development brought into the Zambesi its own 
defining vocabulary which was a reflection of a new capitalist worldview. The term 
‘development’ began to be used within the local Chikunda and Korekore languages as 
an allusion to bettering one’s economic circumstance through adoption of foreign 
innovations. This re-orientation of personal and household objectives was one of the 
aims of CAMPFIRE and MZP. Increased use of the term ‘village’ to denote settlement 
signalled distancing from the primary binding feature of home: the fact of clusters of 
households situated around the homestead of a patrilineal elder. Also, the 
transformation of fields, gardens, and homesteads in Chikafa into ‘arable plots’ and 
‘residential plots’ indicated a new organisation of livelihood centred on cash-cropping 
instead of the complex agricultural practices of keeping a number of fields, crop 
rotation, and intercropping which ensured subsistence in marginal land.
While there was much to criticise with regard to the new vocabulary of 
development, some formerly disenfranchised people were happy to adopt new terms
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and worldviews if these promised improvements for them. For example, junior men 
and immigrants to Chikafa were quick to adopt the new technocratic language of the 
MZP because it was associated with land ownership free of the constraints of ongoing 
affinal obligations and the power of headmen. Similarly, women who were not 
represented by men, such as widows, divorcees, single mothers, or the childless, could 
own land and make a living outside of social constraints. I observed these women to 
have a particularly hard time making a living in Chikafa as acts of economic 
emancipation, such as success in selling vegetables, were greeted with accusations of 
prostitution.
Escobar’s second axis of development was power achieved through the 
workings of western economics. He argued that development aimed to re-organise 
local economies by changing production so that it was oriented to the market, by a 
commodification of land, labour, and money, and by the “invention of the economy as 
an autonomous domain” (Escobar 1995:60). In short, in his own words, this author 
argued that:
“Economic men and women are positioned in civil societies in ways that 
are inevitably mediated, at the symbolic level, by the constructs of markets, 
production, and commodities. People and nature are separated into parts 
(individuals and resources), to be recombined into market commodities 
and objects of exchange and knowledge”.
(Escobar 1995:61)
He also argued that, because it was in the nature of post-Fordism to selectively 
connect to and disconnect places from the world economy to which they were linked, 
this “disconnection not infrequently presents attractive opportunities from poor 
people’s perspectives” (Escobar 1995: 217).
Both development schemes in the Zambesi were premised on a re-organisation 
of local economies. The MZP was explicit in its goals of achieving a cash-cropping 
economy in places which had subsistence economies. CAMPFIRE, although less 
explicit in its economic goals, also sought to transform forested areas into sources of 
cash for adjacent communities. I will describe below how development disrupted 
livelihoods by contrasting the skills and knowledge required to survive in Chikafa and
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Kanyemba with the changes brought by new schemes.
While development has become inevitable in many places, Escobar believed 
that hybridisation occurred in people’s everyday adaptation to a market-driven 
economy and in the livelihood strategies they adopted when the market did not deliver 
the intended result. In his view:
“Paradoxically...the groups with a higher degree of economic autonomy 
and ‘insertion* into the market have at times a better chance of successfully 
affirming their ways of life than those clinging to signs of identity the 
social force of which has been greatly diminished by adverse economic 
conditions”.
(Escobar 1995:219)
The idea o f ‘hybridisation’ is useful in cases, such as that of Dande, where the
Chikunda were able to manage CAMPFIRE to their advantage, while other groups 
suffered economic and political loss. In Chapter 3 I described the relationship between 
Chikunda clans and the Portuguese and the survival of the Chapoto Chieftaincy during 
British and Rhodesian rule. The Chikunda had a long association with the state and so 
their identity, which was in turns, military, commercial, and administrative, resulted 
from experience of engagement with a state and a global economy. Whilst their 
neighbours the Korekore and the tembo mvura suffered more from development 
schemes, the Chikunda fared better. The reason for this situation was that over time 
this group had turned their original, to use Escobar’s term, subjectification by the 
Portuguese as slaves, into an identity centred on domination.
Escobar’s third axis of the development paradigm he called forms of 
subjectivity. He wrote that the Third World was the recipient of forms of 
representation including colonial, European modernity, and, post-colonial and 
post-Independence national projects which included regimes of violence. He argued 
that these encounters had suppressed, for example, local cultures, women, local 
identities, and local histories (Escobar 1995:214). In a way, this third dimension of the 
development paradigm incorporated other aspects discussed earlier. By changing how 
people and their surroundings were categorised and reifying those labels through the 
production of documents, and in altering how people made their living, a process of 
subject-making favourable to development took place.
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The idea that strong polities, economic organisations, militarised groups, or 
religious institutions create subjects is not new. But Escobar offered an interesting 
viewpoint regarding subjectification of the weak by the powerful by saying that new 
terms, while often readily adopted, carried hidden significance with regard to local 
worldviews. For example, in Kanyemba, a male member of the tembo mvura clan was 
identified by his social group primarily as a hunter. This was an important label as it 
was related to the ability to survive in that environment. Restrictions imposed by 
CAMPFIRE turned men of that clan into poachers if  they attempted to apply their 
skills, or highly unsuccessful farmers as they possessed little land and did not have the 
social supports required to farm well. Similarly, while young men in Chikafa readily 
adopted the role of cotton farmer because it included a land grant, the season of cotton 
farming which I observed demonstrated the high level of cash investment and labour 
required to make a return. In both cases, whether roles were forced upon people or 
readily adopted, new labels incurred a change in social relationships and, in the case 
of people engaged in subsistence livelihoods, of new links with the natural 
environment.
In sum, Escobar suggested that although development had produced 
underdevelopment, the reason it persisted as a discourse and practice was that it had 
constructed “hegemonic forms of representation: the construction of the poor and 
underdeveloped as universal, pre-constituted subjects...and the colonization and 
domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World” 
(Escobar 1995:53). This was certainly the case for Dande, where certain groups 
viewed development as domination, while others used it to dominate.
The three main ideas espoused by Escobar, forms of knowledge, 
re-organisation of local economies, and subjectification of recipients of development, 
are useful tools with which to explore the impact of the MZP and CAMPFIRE 
schemes in Dande. Although project outlines may appear coherent, implementation of 
these projects depends on a number of often unpredictable variables.
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ii. Development and Intentions:
While Escobar delivered a strong critique of the failure of the development 
paradigm suggesting that hope lay with cultures which had had experience of foreign 
incursion, James Ferguson offered a different, but complementary view. In his book, 
The Anti-Politics Machine (1994), Ferguson proposed that rather than analysing 
development by comparing stated objectives with intended outcomes, the researcher 
instead consider each case on its own merits by examining its historical particularities, 
circumstances, and contingencies. He began his book by dismissing what he 
considered to be the two dominant approaches in development. The first approach is 
the task to reform “an institution whose fundamental beneficence they take as given” 
(Ferguson 1994:13). The second approach is the neo-Marxist which argues that 
development is basically about the establishment of centre-periphery relations. Instead, 
he believed that it is better to take the view that “a structure always reproduces itself 
through a process, and through a sense of struggle” (Ferguson 1994:13). He argued 
that, for example, a concept such as ‘rural development* could be analysed “not in 
terms of its own proclamations, but as a social institution in its own right, supported 
and maintained not by ‘capitalism’ in the abstract, but by historically specific political 
and economic interests in each case” (Ferguson 1994:14).
In his work on Lesotho, Ferguson argued that development discourse about 
that country was full of false constructs which would never stand up to academic 
scrutiny. He went on to suggest that the information written into development reports 
is relevant to the development structure, and that if  its standards diverge from those of 
the academy the reason is that there exist “two different sets of rules of formation for 
discourse...two different problematics” (Ferguson 1994:28). He further argued that it 
is more useful to examine what theoretical functions particular types of discourse fulfil, 
and why these maintain their qualities.
Ferguson also observed that, in Lesotho, development did not bring about a 
reduction of poverty or new relations of production and that, instead of simply 
concluding that the paradigm did not work, it would be better to examine why it 
persisted and what unintended effects it may have had. In order to achieve these ends,
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Ferguson submitted a number of interesting points of view. For instance, he argued 
that instead of getting bogged down in the language of development, it was better to 
focus instead on the apparatus doing the developing in a particular setting. He also 
suggested we consider that structures do not represent but are “multi-layered, 
polyvalent, and often contradictory, and that economic functions and ‘objective 
interests’ are always located within other, encompassing structures that may be 
invisible even to those who inhabit them” (Ferguson 1994:17). In addition, he thought 
it would be useful to shift analysis toward a decentred conception of power where “the 
outcomes of planned social interventions can end up coming together into powerful 
constellations of control that were never intended and in some cases never even 
recognized, but are all the more powerful for being ‘subjectless’” (Ferguson 1994:19). 
Finally, he contended that outcomes of development projects can be manifest:
“As unintended yet instrumental elements in a resultant constellation that 
has the effect of expanding the exercise of a particular sort of state power 
while simultaneously exerting a powerful de-politicizing effect”. It is this 
last point which alludes to the theme of the book, the “anti-politics 
machine”.
(Ferguson 1994:21)
In effect, Ferguson’s approach is one which divested development of any moral 
quality, coherent structure or intentionality. Instead it was to be viewed as an apparatus 
with many parts, encompassing many different people, and applied to places with their 
own inner workings which affected the outcome of schemes. In his view, development 
was not a monolith but instead a fragmented body of ideas in which separate parts may 
not be recognisable as belonging to the whole.
Ferguson highlighted a number of important points to consider when analysing 
the impact of development schemes. His idea that development could yield unintended 
results is interesting in light of the fact that the project outlines for both the MZP and 
CAMPFIRE neglected to consider important features about the sites of their 
application. For instance, the project outline for the MZP omitted many crucial, and 
well-documented, attributes of the Zambesi Valley. There was no mention of patterns 
of labour migration, of social organisation, political structure, or livelihood practices 
which could be found in a number of ethnographies and histories of the area. Also, no
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consideration was paid to soil quality or sources of water when planning areas 
designated for resettlement. Similarly, the glaring omission in the CAMPFIRE scheme 
was neglecting to account for the social and political organisation of recipient 
communities, including the presence of social hierarchies. For example, the emphasis 
on the issue of consensus with regard to a community’s ability to manage the project 
locally obscured the ways in which it could be used as an instrument of domination.
Ferguson’s suggestion that the outcomes of development schemes were often 
the result o f contingencies and unintentional occurrences explains the disruption 
which the drought of 1991-92 caused to the implementation of the MZP. For one, the 
drought highlighted increased fragility of the relationship between people and 
environments which then prompted opposition to the project. These issues will be 
discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. But also, it demonstrated the shortcomings of a land 
resettlement project which did not account for sources of water and quality of 
designated land, thus creating great vulnerability to climactic change, particularly the 
pattern of cyclical drought which occurs in the Zambesi Valley.
In sum, Escobar and Ferguson both accentuated a number of important features 
regarding hegemonic attributes of development as well as contingencies involved in 
implementation of schemes. Importantly, they illustrated the discrepancy between 
project outlines and their application. These ideas resonated with my observations of 
how CAMPFIRE was appropriated as an instrument of domination by the Chikunda in 
Kanyemba area, while the MZP could not be implemented as the unintended effects of 
the drought unfolded.
iii. Developing the Zambesi:
In the Zambesi Valley of the early 1990s development was a contentious 
subject which greatly affected people’s lives. It was an innovation which caused 
anxiety in both Chikafa and Kanyemba not least because of its scale and the fact that 
schemes had been implemented without significant local consultation. Development 
also involved confusing messages with regard to issues of local empowerment, 
because while people were told that they had a voice through committees, the truth
215
was that decisions with regard to the application of MZP and CAMPFIRE were taken 
regardless of local opinion. Part of the problem of representation was that committees 
did not necessarily express local views. Stress caused by development was based on a 
perceived contradiction. On the one hand, development promised a better standard of 
living, while on the other hand, people felt apprehensive about life-altering changes 
which had been devised without taking into account how they made a living, related to 
one another, and to their surroundings.
In this section I will review how the Zambesi Valley was viewed by the British 
and the Zimbabwean states and suggest reasons why two large-scale development 
schemes were adopted in the late 1980s. I will propose that processes of domination 
were inherent in the implementation of CAMPFIRE and the MZP, both within 
recipient communities and in the relationship between the Zimbabwean state and 
localities. Development became a question of inequalities of power as a result of 
discrepancies between project design and the circumstances of recipient communities. 
To address this problem I suggest that Tim Ingold’s approach to the relationship 
between people and environment provides a useful alternative view to that of 
development.
During the late 1980s the Zambesi Valley became a focal point for 
development in Zimbabwe. Although over time there had been attempts by British and 
Rhodesian administrations to introduce schemes for the betterment of people in the 
area, the projects conceived during the 1980s had no historical precedent in scale, 
financing, and technical design. The Mid Zambezi Valley Rural Resettlement Project 
(MZP) and Communal Areas Management Project for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE) were quite different in scope and objective. The MZP aimed to resettle 
subsistence farmers in order to encourage cotton cultivation, while CAMPFIRE 
focussed on resource management with the objective of conserving wildlife by 
transforming it into a capital asset for local people. Both of these projects entailed a 
drastic re-organisation of local economies with the unintended result of internal 
disruption to communities.
In his book, Missionary Travels (1857), Livingstone described aspects of local
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life in the Zambesi Valley with the sort of detail, interest, and empathy that would fuel 
the imagination of Europeans for decades. The dangers of elephant hunting were 
written about in the same manner as a friendly encounter with inhabitants who offered 
food and shelter. Politics, trade, war, tsetse fly, transport, hunting, and the 
environment were all related to the reader in a manner that could only be described as 
compelling. As the first British person to record his experience in the Zambesi Valley, 
Livingstone started a tradition of writing also encompassed by Richard Thornton 
(1858-63) who accompanied him as a geologist, and Frederik Selous. From these 
authors emerged, amongst the readership, an imaginary view of the Zambesi Valley 
which persists to this day. From these first key writings the idea was bom of the 
Zambesi as ecological fantasy and potential playground for Europeans. In this place 
lived large and dangerous wild animals to be hunted only at great peril, undisturbed 
bush, sparkling rivers, and strange but compliant inhabitants. In short, in the British 
colonial project for south-central Africa, the Zambesi Valley would come to stand in 
counterpoint to the civilising and commercialising efforts applied to the less harsh and 
mystified surroundings of the plateau.
In Southern Rhodesia, policies of land use and social delineation introduced on 
the plateau had little or no impact in the Valley mostly because they were not aimed at 
the area. Instead the whole of the Zambesi Valley was considered to be a bounded 
African area following the same conceptual rule as that for Tribal Tmst Land or 
African suburbs situated in the hinterlands of urban areas. During the early colonial 
period an opposition in spatial definition was created between African and European 
areas. The Pass Laws demonstrated the boundary between these. The Zambesi Valley 
was considered to be an African area, but because it also contained National Parks 
(Chewore and Mana Pools), it became a tourist destination. In a way, for Europeans to 
make an annual trip to one of the National Parks, became a pilgrimage in which the 
boundaries between identities were confirmed. Travelling from their 
racially-exclusive areas to the perceived exoticism and danger of the Zambesi served 
to confirm the spatial and social order of the Southern Rhodesian colony and later of 
the Rhodesian state.
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Until the 1980s the Zambesi was considered to be marginal and not fit for 
development. Sporadic colonial era projects such as an attempt at cotton cultivation in 
Mushumbi Pools during the 1970s had not been successful. Besides its position as an 
African area, there were other reasons why the Zambesi was left alone. First, there was 
the presence of tsetse fly which made keeping of cattle impossible. Oral history 
suggested that tsetse fly arrived in the Zambesi during the 1920s. The very old told me 
that cattle and goats were kept by their parents when they were young and that it was 
elephant which brought the pests from elsewhere. Another reason for not developing 
the Zambesi was lack of infrastructure. Transport was a major problem. Until the early 
1990s roads consisted of dirt tracks, often corrugated from overuse, the viability of 
which depended on season and on the condition of the road. In 1993 a paved road 
running down the escarpment at Mahuwe was under construction. In the early 1990s 
there were no telephones and no electricity. Except for the Zambesi, rivers flowed 
seasonally and were only navigable by small boats such as the locally-made mwadia 
(dug out canoe).
In the early 1990s schools, clinics, and shops were few and for the most part 
badly outfitted. The clinic in Chikafa, for example, was staffed by nurse’s aides who 
treated a myriad of conditions despite the persistent shortage of medicines. One time 
I gave my supply of emergency malaria medication to treat an afflicted child as the 
clinic had run out of its own supply. A mission doctor made infrequent visits to the 
area because he was the only doctor working in the whole of the middle Zambesi 
Valley and simply could not leave his mission station. The environment was another 
reason the Zambesi was left alone. The combination of poor soils, extreme heat, 
malaria-carrying mosquitos, and profusion of wild animals made conceiving of dense 
human habitation difficult.
Given these inhospitable conditions, it is interesting to review reasons why in 
the late 1980s the Zambesi Valley was suddenly considered to be inhabitable. The 
most obvious reason was population pressure on the plateau. Many Communal Areas 
had become deforested and with poor soils and inadequate water. Also, with a young 
population and insufficient employment, there was a need to find places for people. In
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light of the perceived crowdedness of the plateau, the Zambesi looked empty. In 
addition, the ZANU government had achieved power by fighting a guerrilla war based 
on the issue of control over land. During the Independence War the liberation forces 
had received crucial support from the countryside based on the very idea of equitable 
land distribution. The fact that the African Development Fund financed a land 
resettlement program a decade after Independence, dovetailed nicely with the 
government’s own political agenda of distributing land. But this meeting of objectives 
was only the beginning of the development story in the Zambesi Valley.
As I have outlined above, there existed a variety of ways in which to approach 
development. In the western economic approach, the idea behind development was to 
liberalise an economy so that it became mediated by the market. For proponents of 
sustainable development, the idea was to enable local people to support themselves 
whilst maintaining the integrity of their environment. These two understandings of 
development both shared the same flaw: they were based in foreign philosophies and 
practice. It follows that in order for a foreign entity, such as a state or an international 
funding organisation, to apply projects beneficial to recipients it would need to include 
local perspectives in their design.
Local perspective was not a consideration in the design of either CAMPFIRE 
or the MZP, as I will illustrate below. Instead, the implementation of both schemes, 
whether intentional or not, appeared to be about hegemony of the state over the 
Zambesi Valley and of domination of strong over weak groups within localities. The 
opposite of domination would be consideration for local requirements in project 
design, including knowledge of local economic practices, social organisation, political 
process, and worldview.
In a book entitled The Perception o f the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, 
Dwelling and Skill (2000), Tim Ingold proposed a model to explain relationships 
between people and surroundings. He introduced his theory by reviewing his own 
earlier contention that humans were both organisms existing in environments, and 
persons within systems of social relations. He then dismissed this argument as 
unsatisfactory in view of that fact that it did not take into account cognitive aspects
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which he believed mediated the movements of human beings within a given setting. 
He believed that human beings and environments moved and changed in mutual 
relationship, and that there was not a distinction between people, land and social 
relations. In short, in this book he argued that ‘the person is the organism’. To support 
this view he defined the concept of human being to be:
“Not as a composite entity made up of separable but complementary parts, 
such as body, mind and culture, but rather as a singular locus of creative 
growth within a continually unfolding field of relationship”
(Ingold 2000:3-4).
In this way, Ingold’s approach suggested a shattering of long-established 
concepts such as person or land, and the assumed boundaries which separated them. 
Instead he proposed an orientation which encompassed the mutually essential 
relationship of humans ‘in/as part o f  the world. This idea had three facets: first, a shift 
of attention from the idea of cultural variation to that of skills; secondly, that skills 
were not transmitted but instead “regrown in each (generation), and incorporated into 
the modus operandi of the developing human organism through training and 
experience in the performance of particular tasks”; and, thirdly, adopting a ‘dwelling 
perspective’ which situated the anthropologist “in the context of an active engagement 
with the constituents of his or her surroundings” (Ingold 2000:5). In sum, this 
approach hinged on the notion that people were connected to their surroundings 
through continuous engagement which developed skills necessary to livelihood at a 
particular time. If either surroundings or people’s engagement with it changed, then so 
would livelihoods.
This approach is valuable in order to appreciate the depth of the impact of 
development schemes on Chikafa and Kanyemba. Because of their subsistence 
livelihood, people in both settlements experienced the re-organisation of access to 
surroundings as a loss of skill and knowledge. In Kanyemba, the tembo mvura could 
not hunt without risking arrest, and everyone had to stop fishing with nets. Both 
activities entailed knowledge of the forest and rivers, and of specialist skills which 
were learned through example and practice. Similarly, in Chikafa, the drought of 
1991-92 highlighted the need for familiarity with bush foods as a survival mechanism.
220
If people’s time was taken up with cotton cultivation to the detriment o f food sources, 
then there would be greater risk of starvation in times of drought.
In echoing Escobar, I would submit that if  Zambesians followed the 
propositions of the two development schemes, they would lose their connection with 
the environment and, therefore, their local identity to become ‘peasants’, 
‘cash-croppers’, and ‘villagers’. There would be a loss of the specialist skills acquired 
through interactions between individuals, communities, and surroundings. Without 
their local identities, related to clan and residence, people would become as unskilled 
and interchangeable in the Zambesi as they had been during labour migration on the 
plateau. Without a sense of social and ecological fixity, Zambesians felt vulnerable to 
domination. This sense of exposure led to expression in witchcraft accusations, a case 
which I will illustrate in Chapter 9.
The impact of development in Chikafa and Kanyemba was very different due 
to contrasting social and political organisation. Chikafa settlement was characterised 
by a number dispersed clans of shallow genealogy and a power-sharing arrangement 
between long-standing Chikunda and Korekore clans. Kanyemba had been dominated 
by a Chikunda clan for over a century which controlled local economy and political 
process.
iv. CAMPFIRE: Design
CAMPFIRE was a resource management program applied in several areas of 
Zimbabwe. I observed this program in Kanyemba settlement in northern Dande. There 
a company held a lease to a hunting concession in Chewore National Park where the 
business operated between May and October. The concept behind this program was 
the conservation of wildlife through its market value: That if  people received monetary 
compensation for not killing wild animals which lived adjacent to settlements, they 
would participate in their conservation. The broad concept of the program was the 
following. In areas where there existed an abundance of wild animals who might 
compete with people for food and water, the adjacent forested area would be leased to 
a safari operator who paid a fee for animals hunted and killed. The lessee paid a
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percentage of takings to Rural District Council which then allocated this money three 
ways. A portion remained with the RDC as a council levy. Another portion would be 
allocated for wildlife management costs. A third part would be given to wildlife 
producer Wards who divided this income three further ways: 1) to cover Ward level 
management costs; 2) for Ward level projects; and, 3) as household dividends. In the 
CAMPFIRE scheme, “the revenue devolved to sub-district levels, mostly to wards, 
provides the financial incentive for individuals and households to participate in the 
common management of wildlife” (Bond 2001:229). In design, the objectives of 
CAMPFIRE seem advantageous because, in return for refraining from killing animals 
for food or profit, households were each to receive a dividend, and to benefit from 
infrastructure such as schools and clinics which the Ward would build from its own 
dividend. Furthermore, conservation of animals ensured that viable populations would 
exist for the benefit of future generations. In Kanyemba it was understood that the 
safari hunter would provide game meat to the community to be shared amongst 
inhabitants.
Community conservation, which was at the heart of CAMPFIRE, had four 
conceptual foundations. The first of these was economic instrumentalism in which 
wildlife was made into an economically competitive form of land use. Secondly, there 
was the idea of devolution where a cash-strapped central government allocated the 
responsibility for conservation to local areas. Third, the notion of collective 
proprietorship termed a “communal property regime” in which the conservation of the 
area was believed to be in everyone’s best interests. Fourth, the project was an 
experiment in policy termed ‘adaptive management’ in which implementation 
compromises were made over time (Jones and Murphree 2001:44-45). CAMPFIRE 
fell under the rubric of “sustainable development”.
While this brief outline of CAMPFIRE is a simplification of a complex 
program, it describes the broad framework in which localities ceded rights to wild 
animals in exchange for a household dividend and the promise of infrastructure in their 
communities. In theory it turned the bush into a source of cash, with the promise of 
more income with the further development of tourism, as was anticipated for
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Kanyemba area. A primary goal of this scheme was also to devolve political process to 
localities.
Kanyemba is located at the confluence of the Zambesi and Mwadzamutanda 
Rivers. To the west lies a mountain range which includes the Chewore National Park 
(837 700 acres), an area officially consigned to safari operators who hold leases under 
CAMPFIRE. To the east lies the Mozambican border. To the north is the Zambesi 
River and Zambia, and to the south, forest. Kanyemba is a long thin settlement with 
most households located on the eastern side of the Mwadzamutanda River, and a 
smaller amount on its western side. According to the Ward Councilor, there were 281 
households of various sizes, dispersed throughout the area. Small clusters of 
households built around the homesteads of senior males, usually a sabhuku (headman), 
were situated within walking distance from one another.
In the early 1990s the environment in Kanyemba provided a variety of food 
sources and people’s diets, for the most part, derived from a combination of wild and 
cultivated foods. The Chikunda tended to eat the greatest amount of cultivated food, 
but that was simply because they owned the most land. The predominant crop was 
maize, but sorghum, millet and groundnuts were also grown. In riverine gardens, 
people grew pumpkin and sweet potato of which they ate both the fruit and the leaves. 
They also grew rape, tomatoes, and onions which were fried and eaten as a 
complement to maize meal porridge. Other foods grown in gardens included two 
varieties of beans, and rabu tobacco for local consumption. Chief Chapoto possessed 
banana trees he brought from Malawi in the mid-40s which still yielded fruit. Some 
people grew sugar cane which was chewed to obtain the juice. Informants claimed that 
in the past they had eaten a variety of wild meat to which they no longer had access.
In the early 1990s meat was rarely eaten, but sources included chickens, field 
mice, tins of corned beef, and occasionally game meat obtained illegally in Zimbabwe 
or Mozambique. Both oral history and colonial record described widespread hunting 
in Kanyemba up until the 1970s. The Chikunda had held a monopoly of elephant and 
other big-game hunting because they possessed guns, and for reasons to do with 
entrenched trade practices and food prohibitions. Chikunda ate all large game with the
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exception of crocodile. Oral histories described the tembo mvura and Korekore as 
experts in hunting smaller game such as kudu, baboon, and a variety of buck with 
spears. The tembo mvura were also known for hunting with traps and the game meat 
was eaten immediately or dried and often traded to the Chikunda for maize or goods. 
The consumption of field mice was common during the 1990s, and according to 
Kingsley Garbett, was also practiced during the 1960s at the time of his major 
fieldwork in the Zambesi Valley 1. At the time of this study, hunting was illegal. A few 
men had been caught hunting and had been sent to Chinhoyi prison.
The Chikunda recounted that fish was one of their traditional dishes and that 
the way they cooked it set them apart from others. During fieldwork, Chikunda 
described two methods for fishing with nets. The first technique, called kokota, 
involved two men to position a net in a u-shape into a pool in a river. While one person 
stood on the river’s edge with one end of the net, the other swam in a u-shape until he 
returned to shore. The net was then pulled in with the catch. This method was 
practiced during chirimo, the part of the dry season between September and October. 
Another method of net-fishing was called kasasa and involved two ways of spreading 
a net in the current of a river. In the first way, the net was suspended between two poles 
stuck into the river bed. In the second case, two people paddled into the river in a 
mwadia (dugout canoe) and suspended a net between two floaters made of wood 
called chabobo which floats like cork. With the kasasa method the nets were kept in 
place for several days and checked twice daily. This method was practiced in the 
Zambesi at the end of the rainy season when the river flooded. During this study, most 
fish eaten locally had been caught with poles, in the afternoons when the temperature 
was hottest and the water still, or had been traded from Mozambique. Fishing with 
poles yielded less fish but could be done all year round and was legal.
It was not surprising that fish consumption had reduced significantly after nets 
were outlawed. A Chikunda informant related how his father and ten other men had 
been arrested for fishing with nets and made to spend several days in Chinhoyi prison. 
He said that the men were denounced by a neighbour. Another informant, a sabhuku
1 Personal communication, Adelaide, Australia, 2003.
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of a subordinate lineage whose family was known for expertise in fishing, complained 
about a fishing business operating in the area. He said that Zambians from across the 
Zambesi River provided Mozambicans with fishing nets yielding large catches of fish 
which were dried and traded to Zimbabweans for items unavailable in Zambia. 
Examples of this exchange included four fish for a loaf of bread, eight fish for one 
kilogram of sugar, and varying amounts of fish for yeast and soap. This informant 
found it unfair that Zimbabweans were prohibited from fishing with nets while 
Zambians and Mozambicans profited from doing so. His view was that his children, 
and not foreigners, should profit from local resources. Although this man was vocal, 
he was from a subordinate clan and I had witnessed the futility of his attempts to make 
claims during a session of the Chiefs Court.
Since Kanyemba is situated between Chewore National Park and a 
Mozambican game area, farming was made difficult by the proliferation of wild 
animals. Dining the growing season people slept on platforms in their fields where 
they pounded metal pots and gongs to frighten elephants away. Similarly, most 
households owned a variety of spears with which they killed baboons which entered 
into their fields. Although elephants and baboons were most threatening to crops, birds 
eating sorghum also taxed farmers. Also, animals traveled at night to drink from the 
Mwadzamutanda and Zambesi Rivers trampling fields and feeding on crops which lay 
in their path. The safari company holding the hunting lease in Kanyemba was 
responsible for ‘problem animal control’ but informants said that it had neither the 
time nor the resources to fulfill this obligation. Thus, locals were left to cope with 
problem animals without firearms or permission to kill them. One sad example of the 
dangers of wild animals, which occurred the year before my study, involved a leopard 
which entered the settlement and dragged away a baby who slept on a mat next to its 
mother. Locals complained that, without guns, they could not protect themselves in 
these cases. Also, because hunting was prohibited, it was a skill which the younger 
men would have no chance of practicing.
Because hunting and net-fishing were illegal and tsetse fly prevented the 
keeping of cattle and goats, the diet of all Kanyembans derived mostly from plant
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sources. Consumption of wild plants was widely practiced, but varied from group to 
group. The tembo mvura knew the most about wild plants as these comprised a great 
part of their diet. They ate a number of roots which were soaked, boiled, and pounded, 
as well as the boiled leaves and fruit o f wild okra. Everyone ate masao, a fruit 
resembling crab-apple, which was consumed fresh, dried, pounded into a paste 
(ichinkobo), or distilled into a potent spirit called kachasu.
Despite the general shortage of food, Chikunda mocked the fact that the tembo 
mvura had a wide knowledge of and consumed bush foods. The Chikunda opposed the 
forest to cultivated land which they saw as the difference between wildness and 
civilisation. The Chikunda believed that they had learnt their ‘civilised* ways, intrinsic 
to their identity, from the Portuguese. In accounts of the eating habits of ancestors who 
“walked with the Portuguese’*, Chikunda described European customs such as 
drinking tea and eating biscuits as their own. One Chikunda woman proclaimed 
knowledge of Portuguese eating habits, saying that they favoured soft cooked foods 
instead of stiff maize meal porridge2. Additionally, it was thought that the conqueror, 
Kanyemba, preferred European food served on porcelain crockery.
Significantly, in both Chikafa and Kanyemba the most desirable form of maize 
flour, chipere chakusvura, was highly processed. In Chikafa, of the nine women who 
produced this maize flour, seven were Chikunda. The remaining two experts were 
Korekore who had supposedly learnt the skill from Chikunda. Chipere chakusvura 
was thought to be a better accompaniment to fish than less refined maize meal. In short, 
the Chikunda associated themselves with cultivated, highly processed, and cooked 
foods as a marker of status and rejected wild foods which they deemed inferior. By 
equating highly processed/cultivated food with civilisation and bush foods with 
wildness, the Chikunda adopted European food classification. In practice, bush foods, 
particularly roots, had to be highly processed in order to be consumed. Thus, the 
Chikunda practice of ranking of food with degrees of civilisation was not a statement 
about skills, but rather about political hierarchy. In this way, the tembo mvura, who 
procured and processed wild foods, were marginalised. As part of their domination of
2 Whenever I felt ill, my assistant cooked dilute maize meal porridge because several older women had
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Kanyemba area, the conquering Chikunda controlled markers of status.
Oral histories as well as colonial record described greater availability of 
relishes in the past. A 1965 Rhodesian government report on the Chapoto chieftaincy 
stated that, “people are quite clearly happy in that they are reasonably well fed (maize, 
sweet potatoes, tomatoes, etc., two crops a year; bananas, pawpaw, sugar cane 
throughout the year)”, (BPK/JC; Sept. 1965). In the 1990s, locals recounted that the 
variety of food had decreased, even in years of adequate rainfall. People perceived that 
there was generally less water in the environment in the 1990s and that flooding levels 
of the Mwadzamutanda River had been low with less pools during the rainy season. 
Informants mentioned places where pre-existing pools had dried up. Also, they said 
that with lower flooding levels, the Mwadamutanda River provided less water for 
cultivation and for pole-fishing which is done in pools. Damming o f rivers on the 
plateau in order to irrigate commercial farmland resulted in decreased flow of water 
into the Zambesi Valley. One elderly informant stated that there was less water in the 
1990s than in the 1960s.
The prohibition placed on hunting and fishing with nets under the CAMPFIRE 
scheme effectively altered the local diet. It was difficult to maintain livestock as these 
were vulnerable to snakes, wild animals, and tsetse fly. For example, households 
possessed a variety of coops raised on platforms to keep chickens safe. Also, 
destruction of crops by wild animals from the protected areas went unchecked and 
affected available quantities of food.
In addition to cultivation, complementary sources of livelihood included trade, 
paid employment as in the case of teachers, nurse’s aides, and the few positions 
available at the safari camp. Labour migration became an option during British 
administration and remained so. Some individuals sold pots and handicrafts to safari 
camp clients. In truth there existed few alternatives to subsistence farming in 
Kanyemba.
There are a number of reasons why I describe livelihood practices in
told him that Europeans had weaker stomachs than Africans.
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Kanyemba in such detail. For one, it is important to understand the challenges and 
circumstances of food procurement in such an area. Secondly, it is also important to 
highlight the skills of agriculture, hunting, fishing and their associated local 
technologies which were needed in order to survive in such an area. Most importantly, 
examining livelihood practices lends insight into livelihood opportunities which 
CAMPFIRE had removed. As I will describe later in this study, livelihoods which are 
fragile in years of regular rainfall have less margin to cope with disasters such as 
drought which leave people exposed to hunger and distress.
v. Social Organisation and CAMPFIRE in Kanyemba:
Although the objectives of CAMPFIRE were to transform the bush into a 
source of cash as a form of conservation, and to transfer political process to localities, 
the consequences of the program in Kanyemba were wholly unintended. As I 
described earlier, under this scheme access to food sources decreased as a result of the 
prohibition on hunting and fishing with nets. Also, because the ‘problem animal 
control’ component of the agreement with the hunting company went unfulfilled, 
fields were trampled and crops damaged. In this section, I will demonstrate how 
CAMPFIRE consolidated Chikunda economic and political domination, at the same 
time as it yielded few benefits either to households or to the community as a whole.
CAMPFIRE was administered in Kanyemba by the Wildlife Committee 
composed of seven members, all Chikunda. Although most meetings of the Wildlife 
Committee were open to local residents, attendance was usually comprised of the 
Committee, the Ward Councillor who was a descendant of Kanyemba, any number of 
sabhuku, most of whom were also Chikunda, and Village Development Committee 
(VIDCO) chairmen. The Korekore were generally under-represented in relation to 
their numbers in the area. The tembo mvura were spoken for by their sabhuku. The 
result of the imbalances in representation was that discussions about the workings of 
CAMPFIRE were conducted entirely without consultation with the people it most 
affected, the subjugated clans.
Their under-representation in political structures had grave consequences for 
the tembo mvura as was well illustrated by a Wildlife Committee meeting in August
228
of 1993 which I reviewed earlier in Chapter 6. There, the topic of discussion was 
fencing a portion of land on the western side of the Mwadzamutanda River in order to 
build a campsite for future tourists. The purpose of the fence was to prevent wild 
animals from crossing into inhabited areas. The people most affected by this proposal 
were the tembo mvura clan who’s dispersed households on the western side of the 
settlement would have to be concentrated closer to the river. These people, already 
disadvantaged by the prohibition on hunting, ate a great deal of wild foods which 
required their proximity to the bush. If they were to be moved closer together in a 
defined area, their dependence on the Chikunda for food would increase as they also 
had little land to cultivate.
At the local level, the design of CAMPFIRE proposed a complementary 
relationship between communities and the safari operators who held leases to adjacent 
wildlife areas. These lessees had two responsibilities toward communities. First, the 
meat from animals killed by clients was to be distributed to locals. In Kanyemba there 
were a number of problems with the distribution of meat. Mostly animals were killed 
far from the settlement, and I was told that the safari operator did not have the 
resources to cut up the animals and transport these closer to Kanyemba. Also, there 
had been a number of problems with equitable distribution within the community. The 
second responsibility of the safari operator was to kill problem animals that threatened 
fields or people. I was also told that this part of the agreement had not been complied 
with. In both these instances there was no available mechanism to enforce these 
important understandings while fields continued to be trampled by elephant and 
hippopotamus at night.
For a number of structural reasons, there was very little resistance to 
CAMPFIRE in Kanyemba. The Chikunda controlled all representative structures, 
including the Wildlife Committee and they also controlled the economy as they were 
majority land-holders. The mpondoro represented Kanyemba, and so was of no use to 
members of subjugated clans. Although individuals who had incurred serious losses to 
livelihood complained in private, there was no vocal or active resistance to the 
program. The only complaint brought to light during my study regarded households
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missing out on dividends from the program. Otherwise, as the Ward Councillor said at 
a Ward Council meeting held in August of 1993, “the committees are working well for 
the people, so the wildlife committee should also work well”. That in all committees 
most places were held by Chikunda was a basic local understanding. CAMPFIRE 
benefited the Chikunda who ruled Kanyemba because it was group members who 
managed the program locally. But the greatest advantage accruing to the Chikunda 
was that the program helped to consolidate their power in the area.
Earlier in this chapter I introduced Escobar’s idea that it was people who had 
experience of the market and a degree of economic autonomy who fared better under 
development (Escobar 1995:219). I also said that the Chikunda had an advantage over 
neighbouring groups in that their identity was based on a historical experience of 
exchange with larger and more powerful groups, notably the Portuguese. In the early 
1990s the Chikunda had a ruling apparatus in place in Kanyemba which could 
encounter new influences and re-work these to their advantage. The most poignant 
example of this structure was the issue of the fencing off of areas inhabited by the 
tembo mvura. The Chikunda Ward councillor supported this plan at a meeting held 
with a Senior Ecologist of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife 
Management ini 993. That the tembo mvura would surely lose what little economic 
independence they enjoyed at the time was not considered. The Chikunda, however, 
would be able to maintain their hold on decision-making.
One of the aims of CAMPFIRE was decentralisation from the state to the 
community. However, the two main interest groups in CAMPFIRE areas to benefit 
from this orientation were the traditional authorities and arms of the state such as 
District Councils who received a percentage of the revenues (Duffy 2000:93).
An attempt by the Chikunda to consolidate their power in Kanyemba was 
nothing new given the group’s history of conquest and subjugation in the area. That 
one group should profit disproportionately from CAMPFIRE was, however, in 
contradiction to the objectives of that scheme. One important component of the 
program was the notion of ‘institutional development’ which meant the creation of 
new forms of communal conservation where there would be equitable benefit from
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wildlife. In the program, community conservation was “part of wider processes of 
social change and about attempts to redistribute social and political power” (Hulme 
and Murphree 2001:4-5). This objective sought to devolve power from central 
government to localities which would then have a stake in the management of wildlife. 
However, the forms that local power structures took, and the question of why wildlife 
management in of itself would prompt localities to adopt democratic models of 
government was not accounted for in project design. In effect, the decentralisation 
which took place benefited District Council rather than the communities which had 
sacrificed access to game meat. The simple reason for this situation was that District 
Council kept a portion of wildlife levies charged to safari companies. Thus, the 
supposed benefits of decentralisation, as outlined by CAMPFIRE did not trickle down 
to the communities who formed the backbone of the project.
The CAMPFIRE Association was established in the mid-1990s after the first 
financial success of the whole of the national CAMPFIRE program. Its aim was to 
promote the wildlife interests of the Rural District Councils. Jones and Murphree 
(2001) submitted that:
“The Association played an important role in making communal land 
wildlife producers an important constituency of the government, a 
dimension often neglected in community conservation programmes in 
other countries”.
(Jones and Murphree 2001:48)
I think these authors confused the ability to generate sizeable overall revenues 
from the program, a portion of which went to government, with equitable distribution. 
I found no evidence for fair distribution of revenues from CAMPFIRE. According to 
the Ward Councillor, in 1992 Chapoto Ward received Z$91 000 from District Council 
in CAMPFIRE dividends. Of this sum, each of 281 households received Z$192, which 
meant that there was a difference of Z$37 348 not accounted for. I was told that a 
portion of money was used for the school, Z$2400 to be precise, but could not trace the 
rest. It was difficult to understand how exactly local people were compensated for 
having relinquished their rights to natural resources.
CAMPFIRE did not assess the costs to people of conserving wildlife. In
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Kanyemba, these costs were couched in a decreasing diversity of livelihood practices. 
Diverse activities were what people professed to having done in the past and, in the 
early 1990s after a short experience of CAMPFIRE, were what they still believed to be 
in their best interest. They felt that engaging in a variety of economic practices such as 
agriculture, fishing, labouring, migrating, and trade ensured that there would always 
be access to food and necessities. Also, a combination of these activities would 
provide the cushions necessary to overcome times of shortage due to cyclical drought 
or war. In times of shortage of food, it was both social relations and the skill to engage 
in a variety of livelihood practices which ensured households’ ability to survive.
There was a presumption in the CAMPFIRE philosophy that 
institution-building in designated areas would take place based on the mechanism of 
community consensus. I believe this notion of community introduced into the Zambesi 
is a western construct, imported into the area by interests supporting CAMPFIRE. 
Consensus was not a part of political process in Kanyemba.
In sum, CAMPFIRE had a profound impact on Kanyemba area. In terms of 
diet, everyone experienced a reduction in the variety and quantity of foods they 
consumed. From a mixed diet of cultivated and bush foods, including ample sources 
of meat and fish, residents became dependent on cultivated crops such as maize and 
garden vegetables. The tembo mvura suffered particularly as they owned almost no 
land (half an acre per household) but were prohibited from hunting, their traditional 
source of food. While hunting and fishing with nets was prohibited under CAMPFIRE, 
agriculture also became more challenging as people were not allowed to shoot animals 
which trampled their fields or ate their crops at night. Several households owned 
spears with a barbed point which they surreptitiously used to kill baboons which 
chewed through maize crops. Distribution of game animals killed by safari camp 
clients, as promised under the scheme, did not take place regularly or equitably. For 
these sacrifices, residents of Kanyemba saw no improvement in their standard of 
living. Access to food became more limited, while in 1993, there were no visible 
improvements to infrastructure.
Whereas CAMPFIRE was associated with Chikunda domination of Kanyemba
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area and further oppression of long-standing subjugated clans, the MZP in Chikafa 
precipitated a further fragmentation of social organisation resulting in confusion, 
distress, and the emergence of new claims to resources from formerly disenfranchised 
groups.
vi. Mid Zambezi Valley Rural Development Project (MZP): Design
According to the “Appraisal Report: Mid Zambezi Valley Development 
Project Zimbabwe” (1986), the objectives of the project were the following:
“To develop the Mid-Zambezi Valley, a communal area, in accordance 
with Government policy contained in the Five- Year (1986-1990) National 
Development Plan; to settle 3000 families and to improve the living 
conditions of these plus the 4600 families already resident in the project 
area through the provision of agricultural services, and physical and social 
infrastructures; to increase crop production thus insuring self-sufficiency 
in food and cash incomes for the farming community and contributing to 
the earning of foreign exchange for the economy through exports; and to 
conserve and utilize the natural resources of the area”.
(African Development Fundi986:24)
The MZP was a resettlement program which aimed to move 4600 resident 
families into new areas as well as resettling 3000 new families within the mid-Zambesi 
area. Each household was to be given 12 acre plots to cultivate, and a .5 acre 
residential plot. The incoming 3000 families were to be settled in 130 villages of 
between 20-25 households (ADF 1986:36). The boundaries of the project area were 
from east to west, 10 km east of the Manyame River to 10 km east of the Musengezi 
River, the Mozambican border to the north and the escarpment to the south. This area 
fell within the districts of Guruve and Muzarabani in Mashonaland Central Province. 
Because the methods for assessing available land and numbers of people were flawed 
(the census was outdated and land was demarcated by using aerial photographs), by the 
start of the project, in addition to the 7600 households planned for, there existed 
another 2500 households (Derman 1993:8)
The MZP was administered through the Ministry of Local Government and 
Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD) and the Department of Rural
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Development Division (DERUDE). In the Zambesi, the MZP was managed by the 
Project Manager whose office was located in Mahuwe, a town at the foot of the 
escarpment. His job included overseeing Resettlement Officers and Agricultural 
Planners who demarcated land throughout the project area.
The origins of the MZP resided with an FAO proposal regarding land use in the 
Zambesi which was submitted to the African Development Bank and accepted. The 
objectives of the project coincided with the ideology of land for Africans which the 
ZANU party had fought for in the Independence War. The demarcated project area 
“was a strategic area during the war and important for the victory of the liberation 
forces. Both Zanu and Zapu were very active here” (Derman 1990:6). That the 
Zambesi was a hotbed of guerilla warfare is undisputed. I also gathered information 
about the role of Zambesians in the Independence War: the time in concentration 
camps; all-night political information pungwe; areas where different guerilla groups 
were active; and, numbers of children recruited. It is not surprising that the ZANU 
government considered the Zambesi to be a site deserving of betterment and perhaps 
even recompense for the war effort. However, it is hard to imagine how crowding the 
Zambesi Valley could possibly be considered a reward for supporting guerrillas.
Within the MZP design, new villages, clinics, and schools were to be 
constructed near boreholes. Each village was to have a communal grazing area, and 
numbers of animals were to be controlled through a permit system (ADF 1986:36).
In short, the MZP aimed to change the system of land ownership. Land 
allocation procedures changed in 1985 with the creation of the Provincial Councils 
and Administration Act. Before this legislation, land was distributed by headmen and 
land spirits speaking through their mediums. After 1985, these decisions were made by 
the Ward Councilor and Village Development Committee (VIDCO) chairperson. 
During the early 1990s in Chikafa, land assignment was carried out by both sabhuku 
Chikafa and the elected Village Chairman. They also consulted the local land spirit in 
this regard. Land tenure in the Zambesi Valley had been based not on individual or 
household property rights, but on usufruct right. The Natural Resources Act of 1942 
contained a Streambank Protection Regulation which stated that cultivation within
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100 feet of a stream bank or river was prohibited. The reason was to prevent soil 
erosion. The MZP reserved this land for grazing. Over the past few decades there had 
been a tension between government rulings and local ways of using land. The 
difference with the introduction of the MZP was that, instead of the population being 
submitted to general laws regarding land use, which were open to local interpretation, 
they were told precisely where and how they could farm.
The stated rationale of the MZP was to give people a better standard of living 
through the provision of infrastructure, nevertheless, a major objective was to 
encourage cash-cropping of cotton. In this way, Zambesians would become part of the 
national economy as producers rather than simply as labourers. While CAMPFIRE 
made wildlife profitable to government through the system of levies on money 
received from safari lessees, the MZP would have people engaged predominantly in 
cash-cropping cotton which would earn foreign exchange for the national economy.
As I outlined early in this study, Chikafa was one of six villages which 
belonged to Zvaitika VIDCO, one of four VTDCOs within Neshangwe Ward. At the 
time of this study, Zvaitika VIDCO was headed by a man who lived in Chikafa 
settlement and held an auxiliary position at Chikafa clinic. In an interview in July of 
1993, he told me that during the previous year the former Ward Councilor 
accompanied Ministry of Works employees to Chikafa so that pegging of new arable 
and residential plots could commence. Land designated for residents of Chikafa was 
an area about 5 kilometres west of the settlement called Karinyanga where 200 fields 
(278 in another account) of 12 acres each were marked. When I was in Chikafa this 
area was still forested as the residents had refused to move there complaining of poor 
soil and lack of water. In response, the MZP officer had given them the choice of four 
other areas, but these also did not meet with local approval.
At one point locals became tired of the constant anxiety of whether they would 
have to leave their fields and homes to move to a new area. They organised and rallied 
a number of politicians within the administrative hierarchy of the Zambesi to finally 
gain the support of the provincial governor, the M.P. and AGRITEX in their attempts 
to avoid resettlement to a new area. Sabhuku Chikafa told me that the locals would
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never move to Karinyanga because, “there is no sadza there”. By July of 1993, 4 
blocks of 90 fields each (12 acres/field) had been demarcated in a neighbouring area. 
A number of residents of Chikafa took up the fields and began to cultivate. This area 
was situated on the western side of the Manyame River and could only be reached by 
canoe when the river flooded during the rainy season. In 1993 the budget for the MZP 
had finished and with only a few families allocated usable land in Chikafa area. 
However, with a 3 year extension of its budget, 180 fields were ‘pegged’ in 
Karinyanga, the place where residents of Chikafa said farming was impossible.
Recipients of land in Chikafa area were of two groups. First, 10 fields which 
were demarcated in fertile soil close to Chikafa were set aside for influential residents. 
Of this group, 4 were Korekore, 4 Chikunda, 1 was Karanga but quite vocal, and the 
last field was reserved for the local shopkeeper who had emigrated from the plateau. 
These recipients were all involved in the political or economic infrastructure of 
Chikafa area and most were junior elders. The second group of settlers arrived in 1992 
from Mutoroshanga, an area on the plateau where a mine had recently closed. In the 
wake of the MZP and migrations taking place into the Zambesi Valley, they crossed 
the border into Mozambique and asked the Village Chairman for fields for 39 families. 
He complied and they started to farm as much as was possible during the drought. One 
reason for crossing the border was that only residents of Guruve or families that had 
been officially resettled were allowed access to MZP-designated land. But this story 
illustrates both how economic pressures on the plateau lead people to try their luck in 
the Zambesi Valley and how far word of land grants had traveled.
For the most part, the MZP was not welcome in Chikafa area. While 10 
influential individuals eventually accepted land after a number of years of refusal and 
anxiety, the established population did not benefit from any aspect of the project. 
Successive offers of poor lands by the MZP administration, and the ongoing battle to 
avoid resettlement took their toll in anxiety and distress. Locals could not understand 
why they should move away from rivers where they cultivated the gardens which 
sustained their families during the dry season, and had ensured their survival during 
the serious drought of 1991-92. The MZP also required that long-term residents within
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the project area move to new designated areas and change their farming methods and 
livelihood practices.
Below I will describe long-standing land-use and agricultural practices in 
Chikafa in order to illustrate the great demands for change made upon residents by the 
MZP.
vii. The MZP, Land Use, and Livelihood in Chikafa:
Chikafa village, situated along the Manyame River, falls within the MZP area. 
The MZP placed demands upon the people of Chikafa settlement in terms of a shift in 
livelihood practices and settlement patterns. In order to understand the magnitude of 
these demands it is important to understand longstanding economic practices of 
inhabitants prior to the MZP.
The primary economic activity of Chikafa village was diversified agriculture. 
At the time of my study cash-cropping of cotton was beginning to occupy more of 
local people’s time. There had been various incentives on the part of the Zimbabwean 
government to impel people to concentrate on the cultivation of cotton, mostly through 
AGRITEX and cash loans. Primarily, people saw growing cotton as a way to earn cash 
which could be used to purchase services such as schooling, health care, transportation, 
and items such as household wares, clothes, soap, sugar, and fuel. Not every household 
could cash-crop cotton effectively as this activity required investment capital which 
most families did not possess. Additionally, it was more labour-intensive than growing 
maize and for that reason required a greater amount of time and labourers than most 
households had at their disposal. Of the 93.5 acres of cotton under cultivation in 
Chikafa in 1993, 39.50 (42%) were owned by the Chikunda and 44.50 (48%) by the 
Korekore. Cotton farming was not considered a major source of income but it did 
require more time than maize cultivation. It was still at an experimental stage in the 
early 1990s because no household seemed to have made a profit from cotton 
cultivation (see Appendix II).
In the Zambesi the importance of maize cannot be overstated. During the rainy 
season, inhabitants of Chikafa cultivated maize both in dryland and riverine fields. For
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Zambesians, maize was synonymous with food. If there was relish but little maize, 
people would point to their granaries and state that there was no food. Two types of 
maize were grown in Chikafa, one variety growing faster than the other thus ensuring 
a longer period of availability. Maize was processed into flour which was cooked into 
ntsima, a stiff porridge eaten with a stew of vegetables occasionally including meat or 
fish. Maize was also brewed into beer which was drunk at various ritual occasions 
such as spirit possession ceremonies, menarche celebrations, funerals, and the opening 
of new homesteads. During the drought of 1991-92, all beer parties and possession 
ceremonies which were not strictly to do with rain-making were delayed until the onset 
of rains. There werel52.50 acres of maize cultivated in Chikafa in 1993. Of these 
83.50 acres were owned by the Chikunda (55%) and 57.50 (38%) by the Korekore see 
Appendix II).
Millet and sorghum were also grown and processed into porridge. Sorghum 
was preferred for beer as it was considered to be of greater ritual value. Often 
households grew half to one acre of these crops as an insurance against failure of their 
primary maize crop. In most cases farmers intercropped cucumber, pumpkin, beans, 
okra and watermelon with these cereals in their dryland fields. Both these crops 
attracted birds which made cultivation difficult so that they were grown on the same 
patch of land where they could be looked after at the same time.
Almost every household kept a riverine garden which provided households 
with vegetables year-round. People divided their gardens into three portions which 
were respectively burned, tilled, and left fallow. These portions were rotated annually 
with the result that particular vegetables were grown on different soil each year. 
Gardens produced a variety of vegetables including two kinds of cabbage and sweet 
potato, four types of tomato, three types of beans, onions, various types of leafy green 
vegetables, and chilies. Most vegetables were boiled or fried in commercial cooking 
oil because domestic production of peanut oil was no longer practiced. Also, both the 
leaves and the fruit of sweet potatoes and pumpkin were eaten. The cultivation of a 
garden, although labour-intensive because of the constant watering and weeding 
required, was a household’s insurance against hunger in years of bad rainfall (see
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Figure 5).
Although gardens were considered to be the preserve of females, I observed 
men, especially the aged, working in these either alone or alongside their wives. It is 
unclear to me whether this shift in the gender division of labour took place suddenly 
as a result of the increased importance of the garden during the drought. It is also 
possible that with changes in the weather and with decreased water supplies, the 
garden had slowly taken on more importance in the overall diet. It would be interesting 
to see whether this pattern will change with the increased demands of cotton 
cultivation. In 1993, locals were heard to complain that growing both sorghum and 
millet which attracts birds, and cotton which is labour-intensive was extremely 
difficult. It is possible that the cultivation of cotton will affect household production 
of food in ways similar to that of drought: maize crops will decrease and the 
importance of garden produce in the local diet increase. In the case of a drought, it is 
lack of rainfall which impeded the cultivation of maize. In the case of cotton 
cultivation, it is the lack of time and labour which may have the same effect (see 
Figure 6).
In addition to vegetables, many households in Chikafa also grew two types of 
tobacco (fodya) in their gardens. The first, rabu, was dried and shaped into cakes 
which were ground into snuff and sold to a merchant from Harare. A certain amount 
of this tobacco was kept for local consumption, particularly by the elderly and the 
spirit medium. The second type of tobacco grown was the commercial Virginia variety 
which was smoked locally.
Farm animals comprised another source of relish in Chikafa. Many households 
owned domestic animals. 51% of households owned chickens and 22% owned goats. 
Other domestic animals in Chikafa included ducks, and there were negligible (less 
than 1%) amounts of turkeys, pigs, and pigeons. A few households had cats or dogs 
(4% of domestic animals), which is probably not representative of pet-owning as many 
dogs had died during the drought (see Appendix II).
A few families owned goats for meat. Of a total of 24 goats in Chikafa, 11 were 
owned by Chikunda households and 11 by Korekore. In terms of goat ownership by
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clan, the marunga came up slightly ahead of the nzou samanyanga at 7 to 6 goats. One 
Chikunda household in Chikafa obtained milk from their goats which they mixed with 
both tea and porridge. Goats had become a source of problems in Chikafa in 1992 and 
1993 as they tended to wander about the settlement eating their way through crops. No 
goat-owning household kept their animals enclosed. Goat ownership was also 
associated with elevated social status and wealth. The goat-owning Chikunda 
headman said that he did not see these animals as a problem.
Although there was a CAMPFIRE program in place in Chikafa, there were not 
many wild animals, beside elephant, and so very little hunting. Elephant had become 
a problem which prompted farmers to sleep in their fields to protect crops. At a 
CAMPFIRE meeting held in July of 1993, locals complained that they had not gotten 
any money from the sale of wild animals. Obtaining meat was a problem in Chikafa. 
Hunting for game was prohibited under CAMPFIRE. At the same time keeping cattle 
was also prohibited as the village was situated too close to a game fence to be sure that 
there would be no contact with buffalo carrying tsetse fly. Also, farmers complained 
that without the draught power provided by cattle, they could not farm well under the 
MZP.
Although some wild food was eaten, it was not on the same scale as in 
Kanyemba. Field mice (mbewa) were a popular source of meat in Chikafa when I was 
there. Mice were usually procured by children who made a game of finding and 
trapping them. They were prepared by boiling whole in water for several hours, or else 
roasted on skewers. The only wild game eaten in Chikafa was obtained from 
Mozambique. According to locals, there was a hunting area at a certain location on the 
Mpanyame River somewhere between the Zimbabwean border and the confluence 
with the Zambesi River. Although hunting was illegal in Tete province, this business 
thrived because rifles were easily available in Mozambique and there was a ready 
market for dried game meat in Zimbabwe. Fishing was only permitted with poles (see 
Figure 7).
During the drought I asked women if  they had obtained wild plants from the 
bush. There were two types of answers. First, that they did not really know anything
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about the bush. Second, that the bush was also dry and so would yield no plants. 
Several months after the drought had ended, I was instructed about bush foods. These 
included several varieties of edible and medicinal plants, as well as various insects 
which were eaten roasted. I interpreted the initial withholding of information on the 
part of local women as their reticence to being associated with the bush and therefore 
considered unsophisticated. Chikafa was a place with good access to the plateau as it 
was on a bus route, and so local people were well aware of outsider’s stereotypes of 
them. Mostly older individuals knew about bush foods and their preparation. For this 
knowledge to be communicated to the young there needed to be access to the bush and 
use of hunting and trapping techniques which were forbidden under the CAMPFIRE 
scheme.
In Chikafa there was no great difference between the eating habits of different 
clans. Although the Chikunda did claim to be better at cooking fish and processing 
maize, there was nothing to indicate that they ate more of either of these foods. Rather, 
food preparation techniques and ownership of knowledge regarding certain types of 
food were used as ethnic markers. As in Kanyemba, Chikunda professed knowledge 
of European food as a sign of social status.
The MZP project design espoused a discourse of empowerment through the 
economic promise of cotton cultivation. Yet, at its very beginning this scheme created 
hardship for people who were resettled and great tension and uncertainty for those who 
managed to stall its implementation in their area. The occurrence of a serious drought 
in 1991-92 served to both exacerbate the weaknesses of the project and highlight the 
fragility of people’s relationship with the environment. In the Chikafa area the project 
ran out of time and money before the entirety of the design could be implemented. Yet 
the effects of the MZP were greatly felt because of new migrants, anxiety at fragile 
livelihood, and inter-generational conflict which resulted.
On one level, the MZP united residents of Chikafa against the project because 
of lack of consultation. Not only were Zambesians upset about the decision to move 
whole settlements to areas of poor soil and uncertain water supply, they were also 
angry that some new migrants had been allocated good land. For locals it was shocking
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that foreigners should be moved into the Valley without following the proper 
procedures of incorporation into localities. Many people protested that the Valley 
belonged to long-term residents. Thus, the first opposition created was that of 
long-term resident versus newcomers. These two labels did not refer to length of 
residence of individuals or even households, but of lineages. Most residents of Chikafa 
were long-term residents. A few newcomers had settled before the MZP by following 
the proper channels. In Chikafa newcomers could be identified by their lineage names.
A discrepancy which I noticed toward the end of my fieldwork was couched in 
gender terms. Widows were given 2 V2 acres of land irrespective of their ability to farm. 
Some widows were young and had the available labour in their own households to be 
able to farm more land. Also, the MZP assumed that households were headed by men, 
when some households were headed by women while their husbands worked 
elsewhere. Additionally, women complained about fields being located far from 
residential plots which would require a long walk each day. Women worked both 
fields and gardens each day and so needed these to be close to each other. Other 
problems regarded the location of sources of firewood and water.
Another issue which entered the arena of debate in Chikafa was that of 
inter-generational tension. Historically this tension had been resolved by the 
emigration of young people, sometimes married couples, who returned only to help 
with harvesting and to retire. The stated reason for these migrations was to gain 
enough capital and goods to be able to live and farm successfully. This meant paying 
off brideprice. But in effect the migration of younger people allowed for the social 
hierarchy, based on lineage and seniority, to remain largely undisputed.
With the MZP the differences in outlook between the young and the old 
became pronounced. Because the project did not consider age of recipients and the 
investments they had made in the areas where they lived, land was allocated on equal 
terms to male heads of households. The result was that many of the young were quite 
happy because they were given land outside of the usual channels of paying a high 
brideprice and brideservice. One aged informant told me that girls had become like 
prostitutes because any man could arrive with money and take his daughter. In other
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words, he could no longer enforce the types of marriage obligations that he had had to 
comply with. Also, the MZP gave young people the notion that land could be obtained 
without the authorisation and blessing of the gerontocracy of headmen and land spirits.
While the MZP caused great distress within Chikafa, especially as its 
implementation in neighbouring areas coincided with a serious drought, the greatest 
effect that the project had on the area was socio-political. Not only were 
inter-generational conflicts exacerbated, but the ruling triumvirate of headman, 
Village Chairman, and land spirit was challenged. The most obvious way in which this 
occurred was by the fact that the MZP tried to implement its re-location scheme 
without consulting these authorities. The MZP used a state apparatus which bypassed 
headmen, chiefs, and spirits. In doing so it not only overlooked individuals who had 
become used to power, but more importantly it also ignored a whole system of social 
relations which was well entrenched. Although internally contested, the collaboration 
of chiefs and land spirits constituted a system of social and moral order.
As far as they were concerned, the project breached many norms of appropriate 
conduct, but the pegging of sacred sites especially angered the spirits. The mpondoro 
Negomo was particularly incensed by this act and stated at a ceremony in 1992 that the 
MZP had, “pegged the gravesites and these were cleared and people work them, it is 
a curse on the people”. If one followed the logic of the system of land spirits, 
desecration of sacred places meant conquest. Therefore, the installation of new human 
‘chiefs’ would eventually translate into new spirits in the Zambesian pantheon. 
Negomo protested this challenge.
The mpondoro protested at threats to their authority through the mechanism of 
the pangolin. As discussed in Chapter 5, the pangolin was considered to be a sacred 
animal, to be eaten solely by chiefs and mediums, and which symbolised the kinship 
binding constituents of a particular mpondoro. In the rain-making ceremony of 1992, 
Negomo lamented that food was no longer brought to the ceremonies and that the 
pangolin was no longer brought as relish. Instead he said, “pangolin are being taken 
from the forest and are being eaten by the government”. Another mpondoro present 
added, “if they do this on their own, why must they consult us about the rain?”. The
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statement regarding the absence of the pangolin related to discord among locals as the 
animal was a symbol of unity. The notion of the government taking the pangolin was 
an admission by the mpondoro o f a challenge to their authority. A refusal to make rain 
meant unwillingness to cooperate with new authorities as was shown by the mpondoro 
Karembera’s contention that, “if the government brings back the pangolin and removes 
the pegs then we can work together”.
In sum, the MZP was a villagisation program which aimed to settle people 
according to its own logic based in western notions of economic empowerment. 
Before the project, settlements in the Zambesi were all o f diverse form, depending on 
the number of kin settled around the homestead of senior men, and essentially 
followed the contours of the river valley. Rivers were desirable settings for the 
building of homesteads as they provided fish, transportation, and fertile soil for 
gardens. The MZP stipulated that arable plots should all be of the same size, and that 
fields were to be situated away from rivers. Another feature of the MZP was that the 
names of settlements, which often reflected the ruling families, were changed and 
replaced with descriptive terms or letters. People felt that this was a way for the 
government to take away their local identities and confuse long-term with new 
residents.
As I described above, agricultural practices in Chikafa were quite diversified 
which maximised the ability of households to weather difficulties such as drought. The 
MZP proposed to change all this by encouraging the cash-cropping of cotton and the 
abandonment of riverine gardens. After a number of years of political activism and 
anxiety, only a small number of households were allocated land by the MZP. However, 
one of the effects of the project was the arrival of new migrants to the Chikafa area 
who competed for resources which were already stretched such as the school, clinic, 
boreholes, the bus service, shop, sources of firewood, resources from the bush, and the 
Manyame River. Political organisation also underwent a transformation, as younger 
members of established lineages and influential newcomers such as the local 
shopkeeper began to have greater voice within existing structures. For example, a 
great deal of opposition to the various unsuitable areas demarcated for residents of
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Chikafa was articulated by younger members of old lineages. However, the arrival of 
outsiders also meant that political and economic power was further eroded from these 
old lineages. In social terms, new forms of land allocation meant that affinal 
obligations were cut short by the demise of brideservice and shorter period of 
brideprice payments.
viii. Development in the Zambesi Valley: Resistance and Acquiescence
In the Zambesi Valley, development schemes hoped to capture people’s 
imagination and to alter their livelihood practices by changing both their 
circumstances and their symbolic relationship with each other and with their 
surroundings. Impeding access to long-used resources and attempts to change how 
people made a living were one side of the coin of change. The differential impact of 
programs within areas, and the debates which this elicited, were the other side of the 
same coin. Ingold’s (2000) ideas of skills, livelihood and dwelling was a useful way to 
approach the relationship between humans and environment, to consider the 
re-organisation which development brought to the Zambesi, and whether projects 
could provide the sustainable development they promised.
Because both the MZP and CAMPFIRE were based in western development 
dogmas, they included ideas such as consensus within political process, the individual 
and the household as economic unit, the environment as conceptually separate from 
humans, and assumptions about the form that settlements should take. In doing so they 
obscured the established symbolic constructions that locals had with surroundings and 
the practices which made sense to them. By promoting their development views 
wholesale to the Zambesi Valley as if it were some sort of terra nulis, these schemes 
created hardship for the already structurally weak, and, in some cases, strengthened the 
powerful. Thus the ‘empowerment’ aspect of development did not come to pass.
Each project provided different attempts of state government policy of 
decentralisation (Derman 1993:16). CAMPFIRE aimed to devolve authority to 
localities, whereas MZP bypassed local power structures while fragmenting 
communities. In effect, in Kanyemba, CAMPFIRE strengthened entrenched authority
245
and made wildlife a taxable commodity, while in the Chikafa area the MZP attempted 
to standardise fanning practices and encourage cotton growing. In both cases, 
decentralisation meant making communities participants in the national economy by 
the levies on income from wildlife, and the foreign currency potentially earned by 
marketing cotton.
Both projects implied a standardisation of the concept of the person. For one, 
neither scheme accounted for age, gender, and skill-based differences of their clients. 
The MZP gave the same size arable plot to household regardless of compositions. In 
neither case was the infrastructure of schools, clinics, nor boreholes built as promised 
by each project. Thus the lot of women and children was not improved. Neither project 
accounted for the different needs and abilities of local inhabitants.
Both schemes demonstrated a disregard for local histories. The MZP did so 
blatantly, while CAMPFIRE professed to be community-based but was so 
encumbered by various levels of bureaucracy and its own discourse of equitableness, 
that it failed to address the fact that local communities were stratified.
Specifically, in Kanyemba, through its control of political process and 
ownership of land, the ruling marunga rosario andrade clan managed to appropriate 
control of CAMPFIRE so that the project contributed to consolidation of its power. 
While everyone suffered in Kanyemba due to the limited diet imposed by the scheme, 
the tembo mvura clan lost a great deal of their livelihood as this had been based on 
access to the forest.
In Chikafa, the MZP project had profound impact as the debate around its 
implementation in the area and the arrival of migrants precipitated changes in social 
organisation, economic practices, and political process. Most notable of these changes 
was the idea that land need not be obtained from elders, a fact which broke a cycle of 
long-term affinal relations as well as the power of lineage elders. Previously 
disenfranchised groups such as single women and widows realised that they could 
obtain land on par with senior males under the MZP scheme. Cotton cultivation slowly
3 Polygynous households were given an extra 21/2 acres of land under the MZP.
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encroached on the time people spent on food crops, which contributed to problems 
with food security during drought. Also, active participation by young men in 
negotiations regarding implementation of the MZP led to their greater political 
involvement in day-to-day decisions regarding administration of the settlement.
Loss of skills associated with the forest was noticeable in both settlements. In 
Kanyemba area, the prohibition of hunting and fishing with nets meant that these skills 
were not practiced and not taught to young men. Suspicion of people who ventured 
into the bush meant that technologies associated with the processing of wild foods 
were suppressed and hidden for fear of accusations of poaching. In Chikafa area, the 
time taken up with cultivation, particularly of new cotton crops meant that people had 
less time to dedicate to products from the bush. I found only one young adult who had 
extensive knowledge of bush plants and animals. Ignorance of this alternate resource 
meant greater vulnerability in times of drought.
Mostly, development in the Zambesi Valley during the 1990s was about 
domination. The state attempted to dominate the Zambesi through its confusing 
policies of decentralisation coupled with the authoritarian way in which development 
was implemented. People could not understand whether the state was acting as 
autochthon, in which case it should be benevolent, or as conqueror where it would do 
as it pleased. In Kanyemba, the imposition of CAMPFIRE was managed by invoking 
long-standing processes of internal domination of historically subordinate clans. In 
Chikafa, the ruling alliance between Chikunda and Korekore elders was eroded by the 
inclusion of foreigners and junior elders in political and economic power.
In the following chapter I will extend discussion of processes of domination 
and exclusion by focussing on the serious drought of 1991-92 and its social impact on 
the Dande area.
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Chapter 8: The Impact of the Serious Drought of 1991-92 in the Zambesi
Valley
“A person’s a person, no matter how small”.
Dr. Seuss, from Horton Hears a Who!
i. The Serious Drought of 1991-92: An Introduction:
In discussing drought it is tempting to describe crop failure, dry riverbeds and 
other physical aspects of the phenomenon. However, the fact is that drought, although 
an environmental occurrence and ostensibly an act of God, is also a social experience 
with ramifications for individuals, communities, and polities. The serious drought of 
1991-92 in the Zambesi Valley had a profound impact on social organisation, political 
systems, exchange and livelihood, and individuals in the forms of hunger, anxiety, 
illness, and death.
While two settlements were researched for this study, this chapter focuses on 
Chikafa area because it was most profoundly affected by the serious drought of 
1991-92. Drought also affected Kanyemba area but, because the settlement was 
situated at the confluence of two rivers and heavily forested, it was generally wetter 
and so crops grew. Also, this area was excluded from the MZP design which meant 
that longstanding mechanisms to deal with shortage of rainfall were not disrupted. The 
great difference between these two settlements, however, was their political and social 
organisation. Kanyemba was governed by a centralised Chikunda chieftaincy which 
presided over a longstanding rigid social hierarchy, while Chikafa was characterised 
by a power-sharing arrangement between Chikunda and Korekore which ruled over a 
socially fragmented area. In Chikafa, changes to political hierarchy after Independence, 
social influence from the plateau, increasing emphasis on cotton cultivation, and the 
implementation of the MZP contributed to a fragile environment as well as to tenuous 
social organisation. Because of its weak internal structure, Chikafa was prone to 
domination from without. Drought provided an opportunity to test new forms of social 
and political organisation in Chikafa.
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During the early 1990s, the combination of development, structural adjustment, 
and drought resulted in increased difficulty with making a living in the Zambesi Valley. 
In Chikafa, an area which had supported the guerrilla movement during the 
Independence War, residents began to construe the state as no longer their benefactor, 
but rather as conqueror. Certainly, the mpondoro of the area blamed the serious 
drought on the MZP suggesting that it had precipitated disruption in the community 
which caused the absence of rain. Mpondoro blamed the actions of humans with 
regard to land for the lack of rain and resulting infertility of cultivated and bush plants. 
In their view, Mugabe was to blame for ‘pegging* sacred areas in the Zambesi, and its 
residents were responsible for attempting to cultivate these demarcated areas. 
Consequently, in Zambesian cosmology, drought was associated with the politics of 
humans. In this way, mpondoro were in line with de Waal’s (1997) belief that famines 
were the result of a lack of ‘political contract’ between states and localities. While this 
author construed ‘political contract’ in terms of democratic government, the 
mpondoro of Chikafa area believed that the arrangement Zambesians had made with 
Mugabe at Independence was one of autochthonous chieftaincy in which rule had been 
legitimately acquired through the support of the population. The scale of the drought 
was believed to be an indication that the interests of Zambesians were not promoted by 
the state which, instead, acted in its own interest very much in the way of conquerors.
In this chapter, I will argue that the serious drought of 1991-92 associated with 
acute hunger, anxiety, illness and death was viewed by Zambesians as an indication 
that the state had breached a contract of partnership which many believed had been 
struck at Independence. To pursue this issue I will examine the scale of the drought 
and the nature of the disruption of social life it entailed in Chikafa area. Drought is a 
fact of life in the Zambesi, but the factors involved in this serious drought were such 
that a number of coping strategies were required to deal with everyday practicalities of 
survival. Next, I will consider the impact of the drought on body, mind, and 
community through a discussion of suffering and anxiety experienced by individuals 
in Chikafa. Such a huge socio-environmental disruption precipitated renewal of 
interest in the cult of mpondoro as a means of explanation. To this end, I will describe 
an important rain-making ceremony, in November of 1992, which articulated local
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understandings of the drought. Finally, the actions of the Zimbabwean state before and 
during this drought will be reviewed in order to shed light on the opinion of many 
Zambesians that it had behaved as a conqueror.
In the Zambesi Valley there are two types of drought. The first is typical 
drought which occurs in cycles of five to fifteen years causing crop failure and hunger 
(IllifTe: 1990). The second type is severe drought which affects the whole environment 
including low water levels in rivers, total dryland crop failure and a shortage of 
available bush foods. Oral history accounts describe three severe droughts in the 20th 
century, the 1991-92 episode being the severest in living memory. A typical drought 
occurs when there has been little or no rain for one calendar year, and entails dryland 
crop failure. In normal years, the landscape of the Zambesi Valley varies greatly 
between the wet and dry seasons. During the wet season, the bush is green, the 
seasonal rivers rise up so that dugout canoes (mwadia) are necessary for navigation, 
dryland fields are cultivated with maize, sorghum, and millet, and intercropped with 
pumpkin, cucumber, and watermelon. In these years, riverine gardens produce a 
variety of vegetables as well as tobacco for sale. Chickens and goats thrive, the grass 
grows tall and the trees leafy and shady. There is fruit on the masao trees (a fruit 
similar to crabapple) and the bush is abundant with a number of shrubs, fruits, insects, 
and leaves which supplement cultivated foods and supply medicines.
During a usual dry season, the bush turns yellow and brown, and the dryland 
fields are left fallow. Riverine gardens, which retain moisture from the swollen rivers 
of the wet season, continue to produce a variety of relishes. If the rainy season has been 
good, granaries in homesteads will be full of dry maize cobs, and women will have 
stores of maize meal flour. Adequately fed chickens will produce eggs regularly. 
During this season there may be migration to the plateau for wage-labour, with 
individuals returning for planting and harvesting. Livelihoods are also supplemented 
with trade and bush foods such as field mice, insects, fruits, shrubs, and roots. In years 
of mild drought, Zambesians shift the procurement of livelihood toward 
non-agricultural options such as employment on the plateau, and an increase in 
consumption of wild foods, fish, and trade.
In the instance of an exceptional drought, such as that of 1991-92, there will
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have been no rainfall at all during the rainy season with the result of total crop failure. 
Toward the end of the drought, in July and August of 1992, people in Chikafa pointed 
to their empty granaries when asked if  they had food. During the drought, gardens 
became a crucial source of food which meant a meager diet of green leaves, tomatoes, 
and sweet potatoes. Toward the time of the rain-making ceremony described below, 
land was desiccated, stream- and riverbeds dry, the level of boreholes low, trees 
leafless, and the air hot and dusty. A survey of Chikafa in June and July of 1992 
counted sixty households, while a similar survey conducted after a successful rainy 
season in 1993 counted seventy-six households. The difference was accounted for by 
migration to commercial farms, urban areas, and the homes of relatives who lived 
elsewhere. Remaining households were often headed by women, and contained a large 
number of children and elderly. At this time people survived through the consumption 
of garden vegetables, a limited amount of trade, pole-fishing, and drought relief. In 
truth, vegetables from riverine gardens kept Chikafa from famine, as other forms of 
livelihood did not prove reliable.
Serious drought appeared to be the result of environmental catastrophe, and 
there was no doubt that in the minds of Zambesians that severe drought was the 
opposite of life. However, the impact of drought on people is very much mediated by 
their actions. There is no direct correlation between lack of rainfall and famine. Instead, 
the actions of states, local leaders, families, and individuals play an important part in 
the crucial difference between hunger and famine.
In a book on famine in Zimbabwe, Iliffe examined droughts which occurred 
between 1890 and 1960. His main point was that famine occurred mostly as a result of 
human activity and not because of natural disaster. He described three phases of 
famine in Zimbabwe. The first phase, between 1896 and 1922, was mostly due to 
violence in the form of resistance to the northern advance of the British South Africa 
Company. The second phase, which took place after 1922 and lasted well into the 
1940s, “was a result of the triumph of European settlement” and “appeared first and 
most severely in the area most disrupted by European scarcity” although there was 
endemic malnutrition (1990:10-11). The third phase happened after 1960 because, he 
argued, the settler economy could not absorb the extra labour available in time of
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drought and so was unprepared (1990:11). At this time relief became a necessity. 
Throughout his book, Iliffe reiterated the point that in all times of drought, with the 
exception of the pre-colonial period, famine occurred for structural reasons separate 
from the fact of crop failure. For example, he suggested that during the drought of 
1933, there was hunger due to the gradual decline of African grain production 
resulting from the White Agricultural Policy. In his words:
“Instead of acute famine concentrated in the most remote areas, South 
Rhodesia experienced a widespread and lingering scarcity which was 
serious both in isolated regions like the Sabi Valley and in areas of intense 
European pressure like Matabeleland”.
(Iliffe 1990:90)
Similarly, the serious drought of 1947, which Zambesians call Mwantoto, 
resulted in hunger and endemic malnutrition because of overpopulation and excessive 
cattle in the Reserves. In addition to hunger, there were also outbreaks of measles and 
smallpox (Iliffe 1990:101-102). Another example of structural problems causing 
famine was demonstrated during the drought of 1960 when, Iliffe argued, the hunger 
that ensued from crop failure was a result of increasing alienation of land from 
Africans and the expansion of the capitalist economy (1990:108). This drought 
coincided with the displacement and forced resettlement of the Tonga people away 
from the Zambesi River. In the absence of produce from riverine gardens to substitute 
for failed maize crops, hunger ensued (1990:105).
In a book on the Malawi famine of 1949-50, Megan Vaughan arrived at a 
similar conclusion that there was no simple correlation between drought and famine. 
She reviewed several theories of ‘food crises’ to arrive at the conclusion that hunger 
and famine are associated with drought when there are intervening structural reasons. 
For example, if  there had been a decline in food production due to cash-cropping, the 
creation of labour reserves to service European commercial endeavours, the formation 
of class divisions, or commercialisation in which Africans became dependent on 
market exchange rather than primary food production, then there would be hunger 
(Vaughan 1987:9).
The serious drought of 1991-92 displayed many of the characteristics which 
Iliffe elicited in his analysis of colonial era famines in Zimbabwe. For instance,
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increasing time and labour spent on cotton cultivation since the late 1980s meant that 
food crops, including those grown in riverine gardens had been somewhat neglected. 
In the same vein, the lack of access to markets had also discouraged the production of 
maize for sale to the plateau. The MZP also affected access of households to diverse 
sources of food. Families which had accepted arable plots away from rivers, found 
themselves in a situation of crop failure compounded by the lack of a garden to provide 
vegetables. Scarcity of food in the Zambesi prompted a number of families in Chikafa 
to disperse and search for food elsewhere, particularly in towns and commercial farms 
on the plateau. Many residents of Chikafa returned from these migrations with no 
money, having been offered subsistence wages or having found no work whatsoever. 
Difficulty in finding employment, as I reviewed in Chapter 6, was associated with 
structural adjustment which required a reduction of jobs in both private and public 
sectors of the Zimbabwean economy. Also, Iliffe*s observation that illness follows 
famine was certainly bome out in Chikafa when a cholera epidemic occurred several 
months after the first harvest of 1993. Although no government official had an 
explanation for the appearance of this illness in Chikafa, low levels of water in the 
Manyame River meant that the population obtained its water from a small number of 
boreholes that occasionally ran dry during the drought.
The serious drought of 1991-92 certainly shared characteristics with previous 
droughts in Zimbabwe. However, it also took place at a particular time in Zambesian 
history when there had been rapid change. The conjunction of ESAP which affected 
labour migration patterns, and land resettlement which affected livelihoods, provided 
an unprecedented set of conditions with which residents of Chikafa faced a serious 
drought. For this reason it is useful to examine issues such as differential impact of 
drought within Chikafa, the nature of coping strategies, approaches to suffering, 
interpretations of the drought of 1991-92, and particular actions of the state. In doing 
so, it becomes possible to view the experience of residents of Chikafa during that 
difficult time on its own terms.
Both Iliffe and Vaughan elicited structural reasons for the occurrence of 
famine in drought-stricken areas, however the central argument of Vaughan’s book is 
that, within a given population, drought affects particular groups more severely than
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others. In an analysis of the Malawi famine of 1949, this author argued that women and 
children suffered most. Crop failure in local areas meant that people relied on trade 
and wild foods. However, men were far more mobile than women with children, and 
the resulting separations meant that existing marriages broke down, fewer marriages 
were contracted, and there were fewer births (Vaughan 1987:33-36). In short, 
Vaughan argued that the differential impact of the 1949 drought was particularly 
manifested along gender line.
Similarly, in Chikafa, consequences of drought were varied amongst groups as 
people suffered in different ways. For instance, women’s work increased as the 
importance of the garden rose. The pressures of rationing food also took their toll in 
stress and hunger, as women were often the last to eat. Pregnancy became difficult to 
bear with the constant hunger. Children suffered socially as households were shattered 
and dispersed, while hunger kept many out of school. Old people remained behind as 
their children left to find work elsewhere, sometimes struggling to look after 
themselves. Men traveled to the plateau in search of work or to Mozambique in search 
of food. These were the immediate consequences of drought. However, long-term 
effects on social organisation, political process, livelihood, and health also became 
manifested in the months following the first harvest in March of 1993.
ii. Local Response to the Drought: Practical Strategies
Local response to drought in Chikafa was manifested in two ways. First, 
people were concerned to survive through the increasing hunger they experienced 
throughout 1992. Secondly, they were anxious about maintaining the integrity of their 
families, livelihoods, social position, and fields. In short, people in Chikafa devised 
coping strategies during the drought which they hoped would ensure their return to 
familiar circumstances once the hardship had passed. In 1992 informants could not say 
what they thought of the drought and had difficulty articulating the ways in which they 
dealt with it. During interviews for Survey I in June, July, and August of 1992,1 visited 
all 60 households in Chikafa to find that most people could not speak about the impact 
of drought, seemed shocked by its extent, and asked me to come back later when they
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would have thought of a name for it. My impressions of this time unfolded from clues 
gathered during the first survey, observations, and conversations with local 
representatives and educated young adults. In this way, I was able to envisage the 
short-term impact of the 1991-92 drought in Chikafa as a scramble for survival, and 
the long-term impact as a political struggle between the established order and 
newcomers.
In his book, Famine that Kills, de Waal argued that famines should be 
interpreted on their own terms if anything is to be learned from each individual case. 
To this end, he described a lexicon for famine devised in Darfur, Sudan comprising 
three categories: a shortage of grain implying hunger; a reference to wild foods 
implying a short-term change in status (bush foods being the province of the poorest); 
and, mass destitution relating to a temporary suspension of normal social life 
(1989:73-74). Appended to these three designations was the conceptual dichotomy of 
‘famine that kills’ and that which did not. Death was measured not in terms of quantity, 
but against usual levels of mortality for particular age groups. This rationale shifted the 
focus from a simple correlation between perceived severity of the conditions of famine 
and outcomes in terms of aggregate deaths, to a localised view of a moral community. 
For example, there was an acceptance that small children had, at all times, a likelihood 
of dying, so that their deaths were not construed as famine-related, but instead 
expected (1989:75). In Darfur, locals conceived of drought in three phases: hunger, 
destitution, and death (1989:77). These were moral delineations which referred to 
people’s capacity to plan for the time after drought. In this way, death ensued after 
attempts at reconstitution of social life through various strategies had been exhausted, 
usually after a number of years of drought.
Similarly, drought in Chikafa had many more meanings than the simple 
absence of rainfall and a harvest. Strategies employed to cope with hunger depended 
very much on perceived social position and economic factors. Also, because of the 
pattern of cyclical drought in the Zambesi Valley hunger was not unprecedented and 
there were methods of dealing with it. The striking feature of the 1991-92 drought was 
that its scale threatened to disorganise local society entailing change in unpredictable 
ways.
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One of the most immediate coping strategies deployed included dispersal of 
family members during the hungriest months. In these cases, children were sent to live 
with relatives who had more resources, men and older sons migrated to the plateau in 
search of work, women might travel with the men or else stay behind to look after the 
garden, and old people always stayed. Families who engaged in this practice were 
successful farmers who owned enough land to feed members and produce surplus 
maize, were of established lineages, and held a relatively high social position.
The case of a Chikunda household of eleven members presents a good example 
of this coping strategy. This particular family was relatively successful at farming in 
normal years, cultivating a mixture of maize, sorghum, millet, garden produce, 
tobacco, and cotton. They were also major goat-owners and kept chickens. They were 
Catholic and also supported the mpondoro, features which denoted both long-term 
residence and interest in maintaining the Korekore/Chikunda alliance in the area. The 
sons were well-educated by local standards having completed secondary school on the 
plateau and also being knowledgeable with regard to local customs such as 
iron-working, fishing, and the social meanings of flora and fauna. One son of this 
family compiled a plant catalogue for me with translations of each entry into three 
languages. During 1992, the men of the family traveled to the plateau to look for work 
while a young sister was sent to live with relatives elsewhere. The mother stayed 
behind to look after the gardens and animals. Individual members had returned by late 
1992 in order to prepare fields for planting. By adopting a strategy of dispersal this 
family managed to maintain the integrity of the household, and their position as 
long-term residents and successful farmers while withstanding months of hunger.
Rationing was another common way in with which people coped with drought. 
Women decreased the numbers of meals and sizes of portions in order to stretch maize 
supplies. Drought relief, which I will discuss below, was disorganised and inadequate 
and, for the most part, people scrambled to devise their own resources. The little aid 
maize which arrived in Chikafa, between 5kg and lOkg/adult/month had to extend to 
also feed children. Women cooked aid maize, which was yellow, into thick porridge 
(ntsima) which they served with garden vegetables or on its own. Young children were 
often fed a thinner form of this dish. By November of 1992, some impoverished people
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in Chikafa were dipping their porridge into salt or sugar water in lieu of relish. I 
learned of this practice through my assistant at the time. People did not eat this way out 
in the open as it would denote loss of status. One polygynous family headed by a 
builder, provided a sad example of rationing during 1992. During work for Survey I, 
my assistant noticed that there was quite a discrepancy between the household of one 
wife who seemed to be better supported than that of her co-wife who lived next door. 
The second wife was visibly thinner and her homestead appeared to be depleted of 
resources. There were no animals, the absence of a granary and a dearth of household 
items. Her one mat, which she offered to me, was old and tom. She said that her garden 
had not produced enough vegetables as she had had problems with insects. Instead she 
and her five children survived on food aid which she rationed.
The issue of bush foods was contentious as certain types of these foods were 
associated with low status. For the Chikunda, even in Chikafa, bush foods were 
thought to be the preserve of subordinate tembo mvura people whom they associated 
with ‘uncivilised’ hunting (with spears) and gathering practices. In contrast, the 
Chikunda liked to emphasise their association with highly processed maize and 
sorghum, and their cooking techniques with fish. During 1992 hardly anyone would 
tell me about bush foods, and it was only after the first harvest in 1993 that stories of 
these foods were disclosed.
There were two types of uncultivated foods in Chikafa. First, there was high 
status food associated with high levels of skill for procurement and preparation such 
as fish and game. Also in this category was food such as field mice which denoted a 
connection to soil and fertility, and masao fruit which could also be processed into a 
number of finished products. In the second category there were plants and insects 
related to low status groups who owned less land and had a weaker claim on 
cultivation. These foods included grass seeds, insects, roots, shrubs, and certain fruits.
During 1992 a number of households ate low status bush foods such as 
porridge made with grass seeds and baobab leaves. Various grubs and insects were 
also procured and cooked over fires. I never observed these practices but was 
subsequently informed in 1993 by many informants. At least two types of insects were 
eaten during 1992, including nkuruzi (big white ants) and nyenze (similar to a cicada),
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both roasted and eaten as a relish. The leaves of shrubs such as runi, chamburuzi, 
ntsapani, and nduwe were eaten mostly boiled as an accompaniment to porridge. Two 
forms of wild okra, tobve and terere yanyenje were also eaten, as well as punde, a leaf 
found near swamps very similar to the greens of sweet potatoes. Although a variety of 
bush foods were eaten during the drought, quantities were low as informants 
emphasized that the bush had also been very dry at that time. A case in point was that 
of fish. The low level of the Manyame River, with its shortage of pools, meant that 
most fish eaten in Chikafa in 1992 had been traded from Mozambique.
In short, it was impossible to gauge how much bush food was eaten in Chikafa 
during the drought. High status families would not discuss this issue because they were 
reticent to lose prestige, and poorer households seemed to not know about the bush. It 
is also possible that there had been a loss of knowledge about the bush. I met very few 
younger people who were able to discuss resources from the forest. Many young adults 
had been to school on the plateau, were bom during cycles of labour migration, or 
simply did not want to be associated with ‘traditional’ ways instead focusing on cotton 
cultivation and entrepreneurial activities.
While bush foods supplemented meager diets, riverine gardens kept Chikafa 
from famine throughout 1992 and until the harvest in March of 1993. In 1992, most 
households, except for the very poor, kept a garden of about half an acre. A variety of 
vegetables were grown which included greens, tomatoes, sweet potato, pumpkins, 
cabbage, onion, okra, beans, and a few maize plants. Tending of gardens was usually 
the preserve of women and girls, but during drought men also participated. As with 
cultivation of fields in years of rain, the success of gardens depended on the quality 
and quantity of inputs such as seed and fertilizer, size of plots and their position, the 
skill of the cultivator, and number of workers. Families which pooled labour had better 
yields. Successful gardeners during the drought included the household of a senior 
Chikunda man whose garden was tended by his wife and two adult daughters who 
lived in adjacent huts.
In 1992 I observed households in which members ate vegetable relish in the 
place of porridge. Often vegetables were simply boiled or dry-fried as most people had 
no money for cooking oil. Occasionally children were given a boiled or roasted maize
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cob to nibble on. But the truth is that while gardens kept people from starvation, they 
did not supply adequate calories and protein and so individuals grew thin and children 
listless. In Chitete settlement across the border in Mozambique, I saw children with 
distended bellies and light hair characteristic of malnutrition. It is important to 
emphasise that there simply was no surplus from gardens. During 1992 I had almost 
no luck buying vegetables for my own consumption.
One of the factors which kept starvation at bay in Chikafa was food aid, 
although this was disorganised, did not arrive with regularity, and was prone to theft 
and corruption at the local level. For these reasons, people could not plan their food 
consumption around drought relief food. In theory there were a number of food aid 
programs in Chikafa. There was maize distribution from early 1992 to July of 1993 
with amounts offered varying between 5 and lOkg/adult /month. A ‘Food for Work 
Program’ was also installed with the double objective of building community facilities 
such as Blair (long-drop) toilets and providing maize to workers. However, amounts 
of compensation changed over time so that it was hard to gauge the work-to-maize 
equation. Similarly, since a number of arable plots had been designated by the MZP in 
1992, there had been contention as to which drought relief list these new landowners 
belonged to. There had been incidences where families received aid twice, but the 
issue was difficult to resolve as boundaries of jurisdictions were in flux. Toward the 
end of 1992, quantities of government relief maize dropped off by half because the 
Grain Marketing Board depot at Mahuwe had become depleted. Locals took this as a 
sign that the government, in the person of the President, did not look after them as a 
proper chief would do.
Special needs groups designated by government and donor organisations were 
also the recipients of food aid. Schoolchildren were given a nourishing drink called 
Nutresco which the local Member of Parliament delivered at a ceremony on 21st 
September, 1992. In his speech he promised a phone for Chikafa village, entreated 
people to be fair with regard to relief food, and stated that the government was trying 
hard to ensure that no one died of hunger as a result of drought. On 5th November, the 
headmaster of Chikafa School said that his pupils were to have 200ml of Nutresco 
drink/day until supplies ran out. He said that any aid that had come to the school from
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Lower Guruve Development Association and a Christian charity had been one-off acts. 
He said that a number of children had remained at school as a result of extra feeding. 
However, other informants told me that children were simply underfed to the point that 
many were too tired to go to school.
Pregnant women were also provided with extra food, as were the elderly. But, 
once again, these programs were applied erratically so that it was difficult to gauge 
whether they actually had any impact. I know from both my surveys, conducted in mid 
1992 and mid 1993, that drought relief did not play a large part in their food 
consumption unless the household was very close to destitution. An instance in which 
aid was redirected in Chikafa area was indicative of problems with equitable 
distribution where local authorities exploited their position. In one episode which took 
place in 1992, the VIDCO Chairman at the time and an accomplice stole 4 of 106 50kg 
bags of beans donated by a Christian aid organisation. He then gave these beans to his 
wife to sell in a neighbouring settlement in Mozambique. 8 local young men decided 
this theft was intolerable and so made a complaint to the police station at Mushumbi 
Pools. The police asked for proof of the crime which the young men produced by 
sending one of their number to Mozambique to purchase beans. With evidence in hand, 
the police arrested the VTDCO Chairman and he was sent to Chinhoyi prison for 5 
months to serve out a sentence for theft.
This story of corruption is interesting in that it provides a good example of 
inter-generational conflict elicited by circumstances surrounding drought. On the one 
hand, the VIDCO Chairman in 1992 and his accomplice were both older and of the 
established Korekore group and active supporters of ZANU. They represented the 
melding of established gerontocratic political power with new government structures 
introduced during the 1980s. The VIDCO Chairman was said to be particularly corrupt 
as he had also been involved in the theft of school funds and in unfair adjudication of 
a boundary dispute related to the MZP. On the other hand, the 8 young men who 
denounced the theft were also of established lineages, but were imbued with notions 
of fairness and proper political process. One among their number became VIDCO 
Chairman in 1993, and by all appearances acted equitably on behalf of his constituents 
in difficult circumstances of cholera and the MZP.
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Alex de Waal (1989) argued that the actions people take during drought are 
related to their attempts to maintain the social world with which they are familiar. In 
this way, they may undergo periods of destitution in order to keep resources to regain 
their previous social status. Also, he contended that the only way to understand the 
impact of droughts on societies was to look at the particular conjunction of 
circumstances relevant to each occurrence.
During the 1991-92 serious drought, the population of Chikafa area engaged 
five strategies to manage crop failure and depletion of their natural environment. 
These included the strategic dispersal of family members, so that some left in search 
of work and food, and others stayed to maintain the integrity of the household and its 
fields and garden. In this way, there was a temporary attenuation of the household’s 
prominence in the settlement, but not long-term loss of social position. Secondly, most 
households rationed food which accentuated hunger, but ensured a continued, if 
survivalist, food supply and the ability to preserve a homestead in Chikafa throughout 
the drought. Thirdly, a number of households ate bush foods, but because of the stigma 
attached to doing so, particularly amongst the established Korekore and Chikunda, it 
was hard to gauge the actual extent of this practice. In the fourth place, and most 
importantly, the cultivation of riverine gardens ensured a supply of vegetables which 
supplemented meager quantities of maize meal. The importance of these gardens 
broke down usual gender division of labour as all family members participated in 
cultivation. Lastly, aid food from the Zimbabwean government and donor 
organisations contributed to keeping famine at bay. However, irregular delivery and 
fluctuations in quantities meant that it was difficult for households to engage in 
rationing strategies to stretch maize to the next delivery. The way food aid was 
managed locally provided opportunities to articulate an increasing disparity between 
governing styles of old and young.
Perhaps most tellingly, the coping strategies which residents of Chikafa 
employed to survive the drought were differentiated according to high and low status. 
High status households of established Korekore and Chikunda lineages adopted plans 
which would ensure their continued presence within Chikafa settlement. This 
orientation was especially important in light of the fact that the MZP continued to
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allocate land during the drought, and under pre-MZP practices, control over land 
depended on usufruct right. Thus, if a homestead and fields were abandoned for a time, 
the family could lose claims to future designated land. In the end, this did not matter 
as the project ran out of money in 1993 and was abandoned. However, the ways in 
which families coped with drought demonstrated the relative importance of belonging 
to a locality.
iii. The Impact of the Drought on Body, Mind, and Community:
The practical strategies which residents of Chikafa adopted during drought 
functioned as more than a mechanism to ensure physical survival, they constituted 
ways in which households ensured continuity in a climate of great social upheaval. 
Established Korekore and Chikunda lineages strove to maintain their social position 
which they knew hinged on ownership of land. That the drought coincided with 
implementation of the MZP only exacerbated their anxieties. Members of newer 
lineages with shallow genealogies who did not own much land left Chikafa during the 
drought and abandoned homesteads. Upon their return in 1993, after the drought had 
ended, they managed to acquire land through local authorities, and hoped that the MZP 
would eventually designate an arable plot for them.
The experience of famine in Darfur documented by Alex de Waal (1989) held 
a number of parallels with that of residents of Chikafa. Particularly, his contention that 
foremost in the minds of his informants was the shape of the ‘moral geography’ of 
their community. It was this feature which informed how they classified famines and 
devised coping strategies. For instance, in Darfur agriculturalists and pastoralists held 
different notions about social organisation. For the former “the creep of the desert is a 
symbol of the awful power of the encroachment of all that is wild and hostile to life, 
the desert, into all that is homely and supportive of life, the sower” (de Waal 1989:89). 
For the latter, their concept of spatial social organisation resembled a chessboard with 
places for farmers and for themselves, including the notion that environmental change 
entailed movement (1989:89-90). Thus for farmers, with drought and “ecological 
change has come an insecurity of community identity and relations” (1989:89).
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In the same way, with the drought in Chikafa, members of established lineages 
felt great anxiety at losing their foothold in social hierarchy, while newer groups 
envisaged opportunity in the midst of disruption. During normal years Chikafa is an 
area of tenuous leadership and fragmented social organisation. However, during 
1991-92 the combination of drought, the MZP, and structural adjustment brought the 
community new challenges. As I described in Chapter 7, implementation of the MZP 
was fraught because land was designated three separate times, and in the third instance 
the scheme was only partially accepted by residents. At the same time, structural 
adjustment encouraged the very difficult task of cotton cultivation while reducing jobs 
on the plateau and disrupting labour migration patterns. These changes brought much 
anxiety to residents of Chikafa. Established families saw their power slipping away, 
and poorer families suffered destitution during the drought. All were victims of forces 
beyond their control and all experienced degrees of suffering.
In this section I will discuss the impact of routine suffering and social suffering 
on the bodies and minds of residents of Chikafa by examining hunger, anxiety, and 
illness associated with the drought of 1991-92. Both types of suffering are connected 
with state policies, the difference being that routine suffering results from lack of 
intervention while social suffering is the outcome of explicit actions by the powerful. 
The purpose of examining suffering is twofold. First, it is important to acknowledge 
the physical conditions in which people live and their effects on the body and mind. 
Secondly, suffering is one outcome of authoritarian government policy, and often it is 
through the body that individuals express their experience of it.
Life is hard in the Zambesi Valley and there is much routine suffering in the 
mundane experience of its inhabitants. The promised infrastructure, which locals 
expected to arrive after Independence, failed to materialise in this marginal comer of 
Zimbabwe. In the 1990s there was a great short of health care so that many ailments 
such as infections, animal bites, cuts, toothache, eye problems, appendicitis, 
complications with childbirth and a number of treatable complaints had to be endured 
for lack of clinics and medicines. Malaria was endemic in the area, yet Chikafa clinic 
was often out of anti-malarial drugs. Accident victims were treated by nurse’s aides 
despite having no pain relief stronger than paracetamol, and a shortage of sutures and
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dressings. In a place where snakebite was common, there was no anti-venom medicine 
and no transport to hospitals on the plateau. In 1992, a young woman died after being 
bitten by a snake while working in her garden. Another aspect of routine suffering was 
the seasonal hunger experienced at the end of each agricultural year when grain 
supplies were diminished. Routine suffering which could be assuaged through proper 
infrastructure, including health care and the stockpiling of maize by the state, was left 
unchecked during the 1990s.
Social suffering was also connected to actions by the state, however, unlike 
routine suffering which ensued from the absence of care, it was the direct result of 
policies. Earlier I reviewed the work of Illiffe (1990), Vaughan (1987), and de Waal 
(1989) who argued that it was through the actions of the powerful that drought 
transformed into famine. I will add to this idea by arguing that the conjunction of 
drought, development, and structural adjustment in Chikafa precipitated social 
disruption in which ruling clans felt threatened and the powerless saw opportunity 
within new power structures crystallising within that society. As I proposed in Chapter 
1, because Chikafa was an acephalous society, it was easier to disrupt which then made 
it prone to domination from the exterior.
The concept of social suffering is pertinent to the context of Chikafa because it 
suggests a way to understand power and domination in that area. ‘Social suffering’ is 
a term coined by Kleinman, Das, and Lock (1997) to elucidate processes of control at 
work in disrupted societies. It is associated with cultural representations, social 
experiences, and political and professional processes. For instance, these authors 
argued that the media appropriates images of suffering so that these become 
commodified to fit the objectives of particular institutions or interest groups 
(1997:xi-xii). The repetition of images of distress, packaged for public consumption, 
over time come to pass as unmediated representations of actual social experience 
(1997:xi-xii). These abstractions then obscure experiences such as the pressure placed 
on livelihoods by development and structural adjustment which I encountered in the 
Zambesi. Kleinman et al. argued that “social suffering results from what political, 
economic, and institutional power does to people, and reciprocally, from how these 
forms of power themselves influence responses to social problems” (1997:i).
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Social suffering is the result of the forces of domination which the powerful 
impose upon the powerless, and of the representations and interpretations that are 
applied to these circumstances. The poor are thus doubly disempowered by their lack 
of voice. Kleinman et al. suggested that “as we ‘master’ nature...the form that suffering 
takes, the construction of needs and deficiencies, is actually created by the very 
technology designed to alleviate suffering” (1997:xix). The development schemes in 
the Zambesi conformed to this description in that they proposed an improvement in 
living conditions, which was delivered in a climate of authoritarianism, and local 
expression was constrained by parameters of compliance. These parameters included 
a mastery of technocratic language linked to development which proved difficult for 
non-English speakers, and the fact of living in a one-party state which permitted very 
little expression of opinion.
The serious drought of 1991-92 transformed routine suffering in Chikafa into 
social suffering because of the way in which it was managed by the state. Although it 
is almost inevitable that total crop failure would produce hardship, it was the limitation 
of coping mechanisms which precipitated hunger. Equally, the cholera outbreak which 
took place in June of 1993 was not a usual feature of drought in the Zambesi, and 
occurred for the first time in combination with the MZP. Earlier I reviewed the 
limitations placed on time-tested coping methods usually deployed during cyclical 
droughts common to the Zambesi. For instance, migration to the plateau for work was 
not very successful in 1992 due to reduction of jobs linked to ESAP. Also, Zambesians 
had come to expect relief maize in times of drought because the Rhodesian regime had 
also provided relief, and because they believed that President Mugabe would enact his 
proper role of Chief and provide help. As it turned out, delivery of relief maize was 
inadequate because ESAP required a reduction of national grain stores and the state 
had made no contingent plans. Thus, it can be argued that a shortage of maize during 
the drought was not simply the result of crop failure at the local level, but also a 
consequence of the political choice of structural adjustment and support for 
development at the national level. Hunger in Chikafa was compounded by a language 
of empowerment and local responsibility, adopted at meetings, which suggested that 
individuals and families were to blame for their own misfortunes. People knew that
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this discourse meant to mystify processes of control from outside the community and 
obscure the lack of responsibility displayed by the state. Many individuals displayed 
their dissatisfaction by renewing support for the territorial mpondoro.
An outbreak of cholera in June of 1993 was one sign that social and physical 
circumstances had changed in Chikafa during the previous year. The nature of the 
incidence of this illness, and local and state response to it demonstrated the dire impact 
of environmental and structural changes within the settlement. At the same time, the 
divergent way in which it was understood by locals and state officials was 
symptomatic of the level of disruption in Chikafa.
On 5th June 1993 a local representative told me that 32 people had died of 
cholera in the Chikafa area. I observed this outbreak of cholera at close proximity 
because my hut was situated a few meters from the clinic which treated patients, and 
the borehole used by their relatives. In this position I was able to follow the rhythm of 
illness and death by observing the activities of relatives, hearing their news, and 
listening to the sounds of their mourning. Each day, as the sun rose I would help 
women to pump water from the borehole nearby. The well was low from overuse, so 
that it would often require two people to pump a bucket of water. Cholera victims 
required a large amount of water because their bodies dehydrated quickly and diarrhea 
meant frequent washing. It was distressing to observe how the hopefulness of relatives 
displayed in the mornings sometimes gave way to wails of sadness during the night. In
tha journal entry for 7 June, 1993 I wrote:
“The cholera problem looks like it is getting worse. There are a lot more 
patients outside the clinic today. A man just passed by the house wheeling 
a woman sitting in a wheelbarrow. The borehole has run dry. Jimu (the 
clinic general hand) said he was trying to pump water and nothing came 
out. People have been getting water for sick relatives all yesterday and this 
morning”.
Strikingly, at the time of its occurrence, I encountered few explanations for the 
cholera outbreak from any source in the Zambesi. The nurses at Chikafa clinic and the 
Environmental Health Technician sent by the state believed it was caused by low water 
levels in the river and spread through beer parties. The doctor who worked at 
Chitsungo Mission was at a loss saying that June and July were the wrong months of
266
the year for the illness. Similarly, neither mpondoro nor local healers immediately 
came forward with explanations for its causality, although they did offer an opinion at 
a ritual to resolve a witchcraft accusation to be discussed in Chapter 9. It seems likely 
that limited water sources used by many people, few pools in the Manyame River and 
a shortage of boreholes used by many, provided a facilitating milieu for cholera. A 
resurgence of ritual beer parties after the first harvest and the sharing of drinking 
vessels may also have produced circumstances conducive to transmission of this 
illness. Characteristics of the occurrence of cholera in 1993 pointed to its being a new 
phenomenon to Chikafa, associated with drought and concentration of limited water 
sources. According to the Merck Manual o f Diagnosis and Therapy (1992): “In 
endemic areas, cases usually occur during warm months and the incidence is highest in 
children; in newly infected areas, epidemics may occur during any season and all ages 
are equally susceptible” (1992:110). This outbreak of cholera occurred during the dry 
season and its victims were adults, including a number of the elderly. From direct 
observation, I would suggest that cholera was unprecedented in Chikafa and occurred 
as a result o f new social and environmental conditions in the area.
The government’s response to the cholera outbreak in June 1993 was to treat it 
as a technical problem. To this end it provided additional nurse’s aides to Chikafa, an 
Environmental Health Technician (EHT) who advised on measures to prevent 
transmission of the disease, medicine, and tents to shelter the patients. A ‘cholera 
prevention meeting’ was held on 8th June, 1993 which was attended by locals from 
Chikafa, including the sabhuku, Village Chairman, VIDCO Chairman, and clinic 
nurses. At this meeting the issue of brewing beer merited the most discussion. The 
elderly, including sabhuku Chikafa, were concerned that beer rituals for the midzimu 
(ancestral spirits) should be held as there had been a harvest. The younger generation, 
represented by the EHT, VIDCO Chairman, and nurses argued that cholera had been 
transmitted by lack of sanitation, the sharing of food and cups, and contaminated water 
from the rivers. Their concern was with the construction of Blair toilets, boiling of 
water, and location of tents for patients. While the sabhuku and his elderly supporters 
argued for the importance of beer rituals which would articulate a sense of social 
continuity in community, younger adults discounted these views and instead suggested
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that cholera was a matter of individual responsibility.
The debate during this meeting illustrated the divergent worldviews of the 
older and younger generations. The preoccupation of the elderly with the proper beer 
rituals alluded to a belief system where drought and illness resulted from breaches in 
the moral relationship between ancestors, humans and their surroundings. In other 
words, the ancestors needed to be addressed for the world to become right again. 
During June and July of 1993, many beer parties, which had been put off during the 
drought, were held in Chikafa. During that time several interviews with older 
individuals were canceled because of beer parties. The elderly considered beer rituals 
to be of such great importance that they overlooked the risk of contracting cholera 
from sharing drinking vessels. They believed that cholera could be dealt with by 
propitiating the ancestors through the use of a ritual fire called moto akusika. In this 
ritual, a medium’s assistant makes fire by rubbing together two pieces of wood from 
the msika tree. The resulting fire is then used to light fires in households which want to 
prevent members from contracting cholera. In contrast, their children, ambitious 
farmers in their twenties and thirties, professed to not liking beer parties. For the 
younger set, cholera also had a moral dimension, couched in the language of science, 
in which non-compliance with the scientific worldview constituted the breach.
Local reactions to the conjunction of events which precipitated acute hunger 
and cholera in the Zambesi were not uniform. Although it is true that mpondoro 
provided a voice of common rejection of these schemes which reinforced a sense of 
regional Zambesian identity, responses also crystallised according to clan, lineage, 
gender, and age groups. Kleinman et al. proposed that “the normal, instated through 
bureaucratized norms and institutional practices of regulating bodies and behavior, 
advances the bureaucratic state’s quest for order, control, and efficiency” 
(1997:xix-xx). In other words, development shifted the notions of how to live and 
what was desirable by packaging these as normative, and defining differences of 
opinion as non-compliance.
While routine suffering is a feature of life in the marginal Zambesi Valley, the 
1991-92 drought was characterised by the advent of social suffering. In this section I 
have discussed the processes of domination which mediated state actions during that
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drought and led to new forms of suffering. Shortage of relief maize as a result of 
diminution of national grain stores contributed to acute hunger which, coupled with 
anxiety related to loss of social position, took their toll on the health of individuals. 
State support for development which led to the use of boreholes as a primary source of 
water also seems likely to have been conducive to a cholera outbreak resulting in at 
least 32 deaths. Understandings of this illness led to inter-generational disparities in 
which the old believed that beer rituals signifying the integrity of the community 
needed to be performed, while the young thought that cholera was a matter of 
individual responsibility. Thus, the device of social suffering is helpful because it 
suggests that domination by the state promoted further disruption of Chikafa, a place 
where social organisation had already been rendered fragile by drought.
iv. A Rain-Making Ceremony in Chikafa: A Case Study of Spirit Possession
Rituals of ancestor worship were performed in Chikafa throughout the year for 
a number of reasons. The most important beer party of the year was held at the end of 
the dry season, in November, for the purposes of rain-making. Additionally, ancestors 
were invoked at funerary rites, the opening of new homesteads, and to resolve matters 
of social disruption such as witchcraft accusations. The rain-making ceremony I will 
describe in this section was held in November of 1992, after a year of absence of rain 
and total crop failure. At a glance, the performance of this ceremony appeared simply 
to be a matter of carrying out social prescription. However, the conjunction of drought, 
development, and structural adjustment precipitated a crisis of interpretation between 
older and younger generations. Inter-related experiences of foreign domination which 
deepened social disruption in the settlement, and hunger and anxiety resulted in a 
polarisation of interpretations of drought. The older generation, particularly senior 
members of established Chikunda and Korekore lineages, perceived drought as a 
symptom of the slippage of the power of chiefs in which they were invested. For this 
reason, they and their followers turned to mpondoro as interpreters of local identity. In 
contrast, younger members of these established lineages as well as newcomers seemed 
to see the drought as a natural phenomenon of which effects were exacerbated by 
mismanagement on the part of the state and individuals. While they respected the
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opinions of their elders, and co-operated with these in matters of local administration, 
young people did not believe that the drought was invested with a moral dimension. 
The crucial difference between the generations was that the old viewed social change 
as a matter of upheaval, whereas the young thought it presented a wealth of 
opportunity. It is perhaps important to emphasise that the ceremony described below 
took place several months before the cholera outbreak which exacerbated local sense 
of disruption.
The following ceremony took place at the homestead of the mpondoro 
Nyamanindi, the territorial spirit of Chikafa area. The land spirit’s medium was new 
and had recently moved to the area. Since this shrine had been recently reconstituted, 
Nyamanindi was supported by the senior land spirits, Negomo, a territorial neighbour, 
and Karembera. Attendance at this ritual was high because it included members of six 
settlements in the area. There was a mixture of young and old. While there can be 
various interpretations of this ceremony, the primary concern of the land spirits was to 
articulate a principle of local identity coupled with an affirmation of the value of 
chieftaincy.
The horizon turns brilliant orange and pink as the light from the setting sun 
filters through dispersed clouds o f dust. This evening spectacle is characteristic the 
end o f  the dry season. The skies are particularly spectacular in November o f 1992 as 
there has been no rain fo r  one fu ll year and the bush has become very dry. A number 
o f inhabitants from six villages in the Chikafa area are gathering at the homestead o f 
the medium o f the mpondoro Negomo. The imbayesvikiro (hut where the mediums 
become possessed) and the dendemaro (hut where possessed mediums hold audiences) 
have been prepared by the mutapi (medium's assistant). As the light fades specialists 
set up ceremonial drums and start a fire in order to light bundles o f grass with which 
the skins o f the drums will be heated and tightened throughout the night-long 
ceremony. In another spot close by a large pot o f  maize-meal beer is being stirred and 
cups readied. All around the homestead people are laying down mats and taking the 
opportunity to rest before the ceremony begins. Because o f the drought, there will be 
three mpondoro present at this ceremony. Their mediums enter the imbayesvikiro 
where they will become possessed. Boys who have been practicing on the ceremonial 
drums during preparations now make way fo r  the senior men who are specialists. As 
the rhythm picks up, women start to dance in prescribed patterns and singsongs which 
call out to the mpondoro. As the evening progresses, the drumming, dancing and 
singing produce a constant rhythm. At this point the ceremony takes on a sensual 
character with the women's swaying torsos, the stamping o f their feet producing small 
clouds o f red dust, the scent o f  the sweet mopane firewood, their hot bodily smells, and
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the high pitched supplications to the mpondoro to appear. As the performance 
achieves a smooth level o f coordination, the possessed medium o f Negomo leaps out 
o f the imbayesvikiro and into the crowd o f women. He is shortly followed by the 
possessed mediums o f  Karembera, and Nyamanindi. Negomo is the senior land spirit 
and so leads the dancing and singing with the women. The men stand by drinking beer 
and talking. Negomo leaps in amongst the circles o f  moving women and coaxes little 
girls to follow him. The dancing mpondoro threaten reluctant dancers with a thin 
branch. Occasionally the revolving circle o f women breaks into three or four groups 
whilst the land spirits run amongst them carrying ceremonial spears, axes, and 
walking sticks. They wear skirts o f cobalt blue and black striped cotton symbolising 
their rain-making abilities, and on their upper bodies strings o f black and white beads 
which reference the spirit realm. Karembera wears a feather headdress, Negomo 
wears an elephant hair hat as he is a senior spirit, and Nyamanindi is bare-headed. 
The dancing and singing carry on throughout the night until dawn approaches.
With first light, the mpondoro adjourn to the dendemaro where they lie on reed mats 
facing forward onto fla t baskets. Nyamanindi and Negomo share a mat while 
Karembera lies apart. All mpondoro are covered with blue and black cloth. They 
occasionally smear their faces with snuff which is provided in small calabashes. At 
this time participants in the ceremony gather around the dendemaro while the 
medium's wives sit inside. The men sit facing the spirits on the left, and the women on 
the right. As the spirits prepare to speak, the men clap their hands in greeting and the 
women ululate.
Negomo starts the audience by calling out the names o f  the sabhuku in the area. He 
looks at me and says that he is glad that I  clapped hands as other visitors before had 
not done so. He sings a song which states that people not present should be beaten or 
cast out o f the area. A mutapi asks why there were so many people present when they 
did not usually participate in such large numbers. Negomo then lists the wars that had 
affected the area, including those involving Kanyemba, the Ndebele, and Makokowa, 
the latter a reference to the coming o f the British. He asks why people from the 
Chikafa area and neighbouring Mozambique do no t  come to his ceremonies and 
wonders i f  they have taken another spirit. He asks i f  a VIDCO chairman is telling 
people to stay away. Negomo wants to know why people have cleared sacred areas, 
including a number o f  graves o f  a local family. He asks why people cultivate in the 
sacred areas pegged by the Mid-Zambesi Valley Rural Development Project and 
proclaims that it is a curse on the people. He continues by lamenting that sacred trees 
are cut as these provide bees fo r  honey, shade, and commemorate dead people. In his 
opinion, cutting these trees shows a lack o f respect.
Negomo then complains that people no longer bring the pangolin to ceremonies, and 
that they (the mpondoro) used to have this animal for relish. He says ”i f  you see a 
pangolin, take it to the chief or medium because it is royal, they can eat it. Pangolin 
are being taken from the forest and are being eaten by the government” At this point 
Karembera adds that i f  they can do this on their own than why must they consult the 
mpondoro regarding rain. He describes the expanse o f his territory and reminds 
everyone that he is powerful. He then turns to me and says that I  am better than the 
people in Chikafa because I  understand that I  must see the spirit. He adds that there is
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no time at present to answer my questions but that I  could visit him anytime during the 
following week. He grumbles about the recent lack o f  attendance at ceremonies. 
Karembera then bemoans a request by the state to the mpondoro o f the Zambesi Valley 
to perform rain-making ceremonies. In his words, “Mugabe said that the spirits must 
do as he says ”. The three mpondoro all say that they refused this request because no 
money was provided fo r  the transportation o f the mediums and mutapi, and “the 
government does a lot o f  things by itselfwithout consulting the spirits, so it can resolve 
the rains by itse lf’. The reasons given fo r  the refusal to comply with this request were 
that in the past, when animals were killed, the Rhodesians would take the skins but 
leave the meat and that now “i f  people are seen with meat from game, they are 
arrested i f  they don’t report the meat”. They also objected to the government 
forbidding people to fish in rivers with nets, as well as the pegging o f  land. Karembera 
says, “I  will do nothing to pray fo r  rains as the government asks because now 
everybody is fo r  Mugabe without the mediums being consulted”. He says that i f  the 
government brings back the pangolin and removes the pegs, then they can work 
together and adds that “when the government took the pangolin, this made the spirits 
angry”.
Since the aim o f  the ceremony was to pray fo r  rains, there was some discussion as to 
whether these local spirits should join in a larger effort as requested by the 
government. Participants agreed that the request had not been made through the 
appropriate channels, i.e. through a senior Zambesi Valley land spirit who then 
contacted his juniors, and so the local mpondoro thought they should stay at home. At 
this point Negomo states that “i f  people are not properly settled after the war there 
will be more wandering spirits, once there is a black government” and the colonisers 
are gone. He says that wandering spirits belong to people who died during the war. 
He then asks the women to speak. He returns to discussion o f the government’s request 
to make rain and states that “Mugabe does things on his own without consulting us. 
Why does he consult us fo r  rain? ”. He adds that “ifpeople listened to the land spirits 
like they had during the war there would be no problem with rain ”. He complains that 
because his medium's area was pegged he now must also move away from a particular 
sacred tree.
Negomo then tells a man who had cut down a sacred tree that he has to pay a fine, 
which is reduced because he belongs to the spirit's line. My assistant whispered that i f  
the man had been a migrant he would have had to pay a heavier fine such as a goat. 
The mpondoro then proclaims that he does not want witchcraft and incest in his area. 
He says that i f  anyone practices witchcraft they willed be killed. Nyamanindi agrees. 
He also says that he does not want anyone to have to leave the area because o f incest.
At this point it is mid morning and there is grumbling in the crowd that people are 
hungry and want to go home. Negomo says that the beer must be shared amongst the 
inhabitants o f  various villages and names these. They are told to drink beer until the 
drums stop.
The mediums retire and the ceremony is finished.
My assistant and I  start the walk back to Chikafa. I  am very thirsty so we stop at 
someone’s homestead and I  am given a drink o f  water. As we continue on our way, a 
light rain starts to fall. Men and women appear in fields with hoes and scrape at the
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earth.
This ceremony articulated a number of issues which all proceeded from the 
primary preoccupation of mpondoro with the tension between centralisation and 
decentralisation. In this ceremony, a centralised polity in Chikafa area would be 
represented by a principle of chieftaincy put into practice by an alliance of 
representatives of established lineages and land spirits. In this system, mpondoro 
would control sacred knowledge so that adjudication of local matters would reside 
within their shrines. Because of the fragmented nature of social organisation in 
Chikafa in which residents belonged to a variety of new and older lineages, the device 
of the pangolin would be used to integrate the community by a principle of inclusion 
through common clan affiliation. If rule were to be concentrated amongst the 
established authorities, then the community would be in order and rain would fall.
On the other hand, mpondoro depicted apprehension with changes to land use 
practices, perceived threats to their power by other local authorities such as the 
VIDCO, and by the state in the form of pegging or designation of land, symbolic 
removal of pangolin, and requests for rain conducted through improper channels. 
These actions would remove power from mpondoro and result in drought. In effect, 
the ceremony depicted above expressed a great deal of misgiving with regard to new 
forms of authority, not least because these were unfamiliar and seemed incompatible 
with the established system.
Rain-making ceremonies in the Zambesi Valley were performances of perfect 
knowledge which stood at the summit of a hierarchy of knowledge in the Zambesi 
Valley. It was believed that perfect knowledge could only be achieved after death. 
Lineage ancestors possessed important knowledge, but mpondoro were considered to 
possess ultimate knowledge which existed for the benefit of all. For example, 
mpondoro were consulted to identify affliction, or “when a person reaches the limits 
of her or his knowledge, or when the limits of the knowledge they feel it legitimate to 
admit to” have been exhausted (Lan 1985:54). Rain-making was the prime example of 
equilibrium in social relations between the living and the dead in the Zambesi Valley. 
“Rain will only be withheld if the mhondoro’s laws are disobeyed. If incest, murder or 
witchcraft take place drought follows and the crops will fail. But if the descendants of
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the mhondoro obey his laws and perform his ceremonies in due time, they will live in 
peace and plenty” (Lan 1985:32).
Fertility is one important function of land spirits which is highly imbued with 
notions of territorial integrity. Fertility occurs through incorporation of outsiders in the 
form of exogamy, or in times of threat to the community through a principle of incest 
to preserve the integrity of the community. In his analysis of three myths describing 
rain-making in Dande, Lan arrived at the conclusion that the role of mpondoro as 
provider of rain “is a gift made by father’s-in-law to their conquering sons-in-law of 
natural fertility or rain” (1985:87). At the same time, the fertility that rain-making 
represents can also emanate from a female principle embedded in the cult of the 
mpondoro through the notion of a primordial incest. In one myth of the Korekore 
conquest of Dande, Nebedza has intercourse with his sister Nehanda. By doing so he 
ensures that his own “lineage can supply itself with fertility, biological and natural” 
(1985:88). In this way, Korekore as conquerors have no need of autochthons to supply 
them with fertility and thus remove themselves from the position of son-in-law. As 
Lan concluded “wives come and go but mother is always there” (1985:91). Thus, rain 
refers to fertility and to the social continuity of communities which results from 
adherence to the cult of the land spirits. The story of incest refers to the possibility of 
community self-sufficiency in matters of its own reproduction. Incest is a referent for 
endogamy, and thus a contingency plan for times of outside threat to the community. 
Mpondoro are primarily interested in the continuity of life in their areas over time, and 
the opposition between incest and exogamy is another way to express the ongoing 
tension between centralisation and fragmentation.
Mpondoro also represent regional and local identities. During the ceremony, 
mpondoro alluded to the following identities. First, all land spirits are genealogically 
linked and each claim a geographical territory within which reside their constituents. 
This pan-Zambesian web of mpondoro created a sense of regional identity. Second, 
local neighbourhood and community identity was delineated by the territories of each 
land spirit. After the Independence War these notions of kinship were extended to the 
Zimbabwean state as mpondoro and the populations in their territories had provided 
support for guerrillas.
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Although attendance at ceremonies has waxed and waned over the years, 
perhaps the reason why the mpondoro obtained support in the Zambesi was that, in the 
face of a succession of colonising powers, the system maintained a meaningful moral 
and political contract with people. Each new and powerful entity to the Zambesi had in 
the past promised a better life through trade, new technologies, political change, new 
infrastructure and a better life. Over the years, the benefits promised by larger powers 
and central states never arrived and so it is not surprising that Zambesians continued in 
their allegiance to chieftaincy as represented by mpondoro.
In the rain-making ceremony described above mpondoro re-affirmed regional 
identity by their vehement opposition to the MZP and CAMPFIRE, both programs 
which had been applied in various places in the Zambesi Valley. Specifically, they 
denounced ‘pegging* (demarcating) land for resettlement and prosecution of people 
for possessing game meat. This is not surprising as agriculture, fishing, and hunting 
have been dominant modes of livelihood for centuries, and the opportunities for trade 
and pan-Zambesian movement which these presented have underpinned the idea of a 
regional identity.
Issues of moral order, common history and regional identity were all important 
to the continuity of land spirit shrines, however, I think that the foremost 
preoccupation of mpondoro resided with political control of the Chikafa area. 
Specifically, the rain-making ceremony of 1992 expressed local anxiety with regard to 
the historical oscillation between principles of autochthony and conquest. At 
Independence, the system of mpondoro represented local belief that a contract of 
benevolence had been struck with the new government in which Chikafa would be 
integrated into a national polity built on notions of kinship and mutual obligation. This 
arrangement would mirror the organisation of Zambesian mpondoro in which all 
territorial spirits belonged to the same hierarchy. In a circumstance of high political 
integration, mpondoro would produce rain with regularity.
In contrast, during the 1992 rain-making ceremony, mpondoro expressed the 
opinion that the political contract struck with ZANU at Independence had been
275
breached. Negomo and Karembera both denounced state interference in matters of 
land allocation and access to bush resources stating that these destroyed sacred areas. 
In other words, disruption of powers of land allocation invested in headmen and 
lineage elders coupled with the obliteration of commemoration for the dead both 
indicated an attempt on the part of the state to usurp local political control of Chikafa 
as well as a sense of common history and mutual obligation.
The most poignant statement of anxiety regarding social disruption was the 
concern that the government had taken the pangolin, a great symbol of local kin 
relatedness. In the cult of land spirits, absence of pangolin denoted social 
fragmentation, disorder, and ultimately drought. In the rain-making ceremony, 
mpondoro articulated the apprehension of some residents of Chikafa that drought was 
a symptom of a disintegration of a relationship of inclusion within the state they 
believed had been struck at Independence. The notion that the state had relinquished 
its ties of autochthony to the Zambesi, and instead adopted the demeanor of conqueror 
was a great preoccupation of older people. The actions of the state during the drought 
and in its aftermath added to this opinion.
v. The Role of the State During Drought:
Earlier in this chapter I reviewed the work of Illiffe (1990), Vaughan (1987), 
and de Waal (1989) who argued that there is no direct correlation between lack of 
rainfall and the occurrence of famine. Instead, they believed that the relationship 
between drought and famine was mediated by the actions of states. The case of the 
1991-92 drought in the Zambesi Valley was no different because a number of 
structural features exacerbated a condition of absence of rain so that acute hunger 
ensued.
Although Zambesians were well accustomed to droughts and counted on a 
number of coping strategies which they invoked at such times, in 1992 these proved 
inadequate as a result of new state policies. As I reviewed above, the implementation 
of ESAP disrupted labour migration and caused the government to wind down its 
maize stores. At the same time, the MZP and CAMPFIRE both changed land use 
patterns and access to the environment. The combination of structural adjustment and
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development schemes obstructed the functioning of available coping structures which 
would aid in avoiding acute hunger. Instead, the combination of absence of rain, crop 
failure, and state policy contributed to acute hunger and illness suffered by residents 
of Chikafa area.
In response to the serious drought, the Zimbabwean government installed a 
number of food aid programs from the beginning of 1992 to mid 1993. These included 
the delivery of donor maize and beans, a ‘Food for Work’ program, child feeding 
program implemented at Chikafa School, and relief food targeted at pregnant women 
and the elderly. While on paper these initiatives appeared to be generous, the fact 
remained that the infrequency of their delivery and fluctuations in quantities resulted 
in recipients’ inability to plan their diet so as to avoid acute hunger. In this way, routine 
suffering which was an unfortunate feature of the harsh environment and political 
marginality of the Zambesi Valley, gave way to ‘social suffering’ (Kleinman, Das, and 
Lock: 1997) perpetrated by state policy and neglect.
To be sure, the Zimbabwean state participated in measures to manage drought. 
For example, there was membership in the SADC Regional Early Warning System. In 
an article on the 1991-92 drought written by John M. Rook of the FAO and the SADC 
REWS in Harare, he concluded that “various studies and workshops...all acknowledge 
that responsible government and sophisticated logistics enabled food imports to be 
ordered and delivered in record time and without significant congestion. These factors 
ensured a relatively rapid response to the crisis” (1997:1). In the same paper, he added 
however, that:
“responses to initial warnings concerning the depletion of grain stocks 
over the 12-month period leading up to the drought were generally slow 
and late. It was not until such stocks had dropped to critical levels that 
reactions were initiated, by which time it was already too late to avoid 
maize shortages which hit countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe during the 
early part of 1992”
(1997:2).
The apparent contradiction in these statements is reconciled by adopting the author’s 
standpoint that although maize shortages occurred in the SADC countries, the REWS 
worked as intended. This article is a good example of what Alex de Waal (1989) 
termed the ‘technical fix’ approach common in international humanitarianism:
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problems are reduced to a set of technical concepts, and aid is applied by organisations 
which set their own goals and terms of success irrespective of the problem they purport 
to address. While the state participated in the SADC REWS, this system had no impact 
whatsoever on the situation of drought in the Zambesi Valley.
In contrast, de Waal (1997) argued that in order to best deal with famine it was 
necessaiy for countries to have a strong ‘political contract’ in which governments 
would be accountable to the population. In his opinion, the greatest impediment to 
successful famine management was the combination of corrupt and unaccountable 
government, often authoritarian and ‘minimalist’ in their policies, and external 
pressures wrought by the application of neo-liberal economic policies (1997:3). He 
added that international humanitarianism served to confound the political context of 
famine through a discourse of moral imperative. In his words: “the struggle against 
famine cannot be the moral property of humanitarian institutions. An important step in 
that struggle is for those directly affected by the famine to reclaim this moral 
ownership” (1997:5). In de Waal’s view, charitable organisations should be relegated 
to an ancillary position rather than “as subcontractors in the large-scale delivery of 
basic services such as health, agricultural extension and food rations” (1997:53).
The near disappearance of state benevolence from the lives of residents of 
Chikafa during the 1991-92 drought and the cholera outbreak of 1993 prompted local 
re-evaluation of the nature of the ‘political contract’ (de Waal 1997) struck with 
government at Independence. Residents of Chikafa wondered at the nature of new 
forms of rule in their settlement and felt anxiety with regard to their consequences. The 
old felt comfortable with chieftaincy, particularly the oscillation between autochthony 
and conquest characteristic of this system. While they believed that President Mugabe 
had undertaken an association of mutual obligation couched in terms of kinship, the 
sabwira relationship, with the Zambesi Valley, they could also imagine government 
through conquest. After all, Chief Chapoto in Kanyemba had no illusions that the 
ZANU government was anything other than a conqueror. The difficulty for the aged, 
particularly members of established Chikunda and Korekore lineages, was the state of 
social disruption in which Chikafa settlement found itself from 1991 to 1993, which 
was during the serious drought and its aftermath.
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In contrast, young people easily dispensed with chieftaincy to adopt the new 
language of development which preached self-help and individual empowerment 
through education and acquisition of technical skills. While many of the young 
attended mpondoro ceremonies, they found their true forum at local committee 
meetings. They rejected the beer rituals of ancestor worship to, instead, participate in 
organisations which promoted individual or group interests. In this way, they 
welcomed release from long-established relations of obligation formed through the 
marriage process.
Young people also had a different memory of war as they had been children 
when the local communities rallied to the cause of guerrillas. They did not interpret 
development as a breach of a political contract with government, but instead as an 
opportunity. The young also tended to join new churches in which positions of 
authority formerly held by elders, were assigned to the young. For example, pastor’s 
wives acted as nchembere, a role formerly held by aged women who initiated girls at 
menarche. Pastors also tended to be young men, some of whom had attended religious 
lessons in Harare.
In mid 1993, social life in Chikafa was polarized between the elderly who 
believed in a system of chieftaincy in which they controlled land and marriage 
relations, and the young who wanted to break free of gerontocracy. The newly 
re-constituted shrine of Nyamamnindi, the territorial spirit, was one locus of power of 
lineage elders. It was through this shrine that opposition to innovations associated with 
social disruption in Chikafa was articulated. At the same time, the young who saw new 
opportunity with the MZP and committee work discussed their views at meetings.
Problems inherent in social disruption such as unclear processes of land 
distribution with the demise of the MZP, the suffering perpetrated by the combination 
of drought and structural change, and new migrations of people competing for 
decreasing resources had begun to overwhelm local resources for dealing with change 
and conflict resolution. These tensions culminated in a witchcraft accusation in 
mid-1993 in Chikafa which involved members of old lineages and newcomers, 
mpondoro, the police, and youth. This issue will be addressed in the next and final 
chapter.
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Chapter 9: “They Fix Each Other with Crocodiles”: Resurgence of Witchcraft in 
Chikafa in 1993
i. Introduction: A Crisis of Social Reproduction in Chikafa
In July of 1993, a young man from Chikafa happened to mention that people in 
Mushumbi Pools, a town southward on the road to the escarpment, were engaged in 
many disputes. When I asked him how they resolved these issues he replied: “They fix 
each other with crocodiles”. After further enquiry I was told there had been a spate of 
minor witchcraft accusations in the area probably due to increasing population and 
competition for resources. As it turned out witchcraft had also experienced resurgence 
in Chikafa settlement with an accusation aimed at a local shopkeeper and his wife who 
was a businesswoman. In this instance, a schoolteacher fell ill and became unable to 
walk. A spirit possession ceremony was organised at the homestead of a local man at 
which three territorial mpondoro, Nyamanindi, Mutandabuti, and Chidziyo were 
present. Chidziyo is a land spirit from Mozambican territory, and Mutandabuti is a 
senior spirit from within Zimbabwe. During this possession ceremony Mutandabuti 
made an accusation of witchcraft against the local shopkeeper’s wife. The following 
week there was another possession ceremony. This time the three mpondoro were 
joined by Nyamaqwete, a land spirit specialising in witchcraft, who was called to 
determine the cause of the schoolteacher’s affliction. The police were also asked to 
attend the ritual. During this ceremony, Nyamaqwete found the source of the 
witchcraft to emanate from neighbouring Mozambique.
While this accusation of witchcraft involved most residents of Chikafa 
settlement as well neighbouring Chitete in Mozambican territory and addressed issues 
of integrity of the community, it also contained a personal dimension. In the first place, 
the man who hosted the first ceremony and the shopkeeper were in dispute regarding 
a marriage arrangement in which a young daughter of the former was to marry the 
latter. The girl had refused to marry the shopkeeper protesting that he was too old, but 
her father had accepted a payment of brideprice which he would not refund. Secondly, 
the afflicted schoolteacher and the shopkeeper’s wife had had a quarrel over 
non-payment of a grocery bill which had ended in blows. The striking feature about
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these disagreements was that the shopkeeper and his wife were newcomers to Chikafa, 
and had been prosperous throughout the drought and in the period afterward. In light 
of the fact that most people in Chikafa area had suffered during that same period, it 
was not surprising that these businesspeople would come to symbolise contradictions 
and ambiguities of recent impoverishment and wealth with which locals had been 
faced.
In a recent article set in the Taita Hills of Kenya, Smith discussed the case of
a community which hired a well-known ‘witchdoctor* to:
“Ameliorate a perceived crisis in local social reproduction-such as 
declining fertility, increased mortality, and falling economic 
productivity-typically said to be brought about by moral failures in the 
form of malicious actions by kin and neighbours”
(2005;142)
The case of Chikafa was very similar. As I have reviewed in the previous chapters, the 
area was the site of several important influences which had changed livelihood 
practices, family relations, and political process. Locals also experienced these 
changes as a double pressure. On the one hand, loss of jobs with ESAP and the labour 
demands of cotton cultivation at home meant that labour migration as a means of 
release from the constraints of life in Chikafa became less of an option. On the other 
hand, development had changed access to land and many people said that farming had 
become increasingly difficult at home. Thus, for residents of Chikafa, the relationship 
between the two worlds of plateau and Dande which had defined cycles of agriculture 
and labour migration and contributed to the rhythms of marriage and settlement, were 
radically disturbed. The connection between plateau and Dande started with the first 
labour migrations in the early part of the 20th century and had been in existence for 
three generations at the time of this study. It became apparent that sudden rupture was 
shocking to Zambesians as it seemed to disassemble established possibilities for social 
reproduction.
It is because of the crisis of social reproduction which precipitated the 
witchcraft accusation in Chikafa in mid 1993 that the relationship between the plateau 
and Dande merits elaboration. Also, the issue of the relationship between the Zambesi 
and the state, which had been redefined as autochthonous in character at Independence, 
seemed to locals to have changed abruptly into one of domination.
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Residents of Chikafa told many stories of labour migration, but the common 
theme in all depictions was that the plateau served as a safety valve and an escape from 
the constraints of life in Dande. One informant referred to his time in Harare as a young 
man as “eating pleasure” before his return home to marry and farm. Labour migration 
was remembered fondly if individuals found jobs as house servants or tractor drivers 
where they had enjoyed higher status and a less taxing workload. Mostly, work on 
‘maprazi’ (large commercial farms) was remembered as a necessary time of hardship 
to earn money to invest in future houses and agriculture in Chikafa. However, the 
crucial feature of migration was that it addressed the important issue of 
inter-generational difference by offering an alternative to potential conflict. From the 
inception of British rule until the Independence War, access to land, marriage and 
political process was directed by lineage elders through practices of brideprice and 
brideservice, and through their control of land and the local judiciary. With the advent 
of ESAP and the reduction of job opportunities on the plateau, migration there became 
less of an option.
At the same time, circumstances in Chikafa also changed dramatically on a 
variety of fronts. During the 1980s, the introduction of committees had fostered an 
alliance between lineage elders and junior members through a new division of labour 
whereby the former ruled and the latter administered. With the advent of the MZP, the 
importance of the administrative work of committees increased and the power of the 
elderly eroded further in favour of the skills of the young. For one, proficiency with the 
English language was essential in order to grapple with new technical terms associated 
with mechanisms of land resettlement. Also, skill related to quantification became 
necessary as fields were measured and ‘pegged’, food relief was also measured, and 
agricultural chemicals were applied in exact doses. Organisational work also required 
a high degree of mobility within the Zambesi and to Guruve District offices on the 
plateau which the young found easier. Importantly, elderly leaders such as the sabhuhx 
and the Village Chairman experienced a greater loss of influence with the MZP which 
removed control of land allocation out of their hands.
A shift in political process from the domain of lineage elders to that of lineage 
juniors was one crucial aspect of social change in Chikafa. Another equally important
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feature was the change in livelihood options. There was general agreement that 
farming had become more difficult as the abolition of marketing boards had rendered 
returns from cotton cultivation and surplus maize unpredictable. The tension between 
cash-cropping cotton and food production also became pronounced in 1993 as the 
work required to do both increased. Specifically, food cultivation had become more 
difficult with the drought, in terms of the project design of the MZP, and with the local 
CAMPFIRE program which hobbled locals’ ability to control problem elephant 
destructive to fields. As the pressures on farming increased, markedly successful 
economic activity could be seen amongst newer polygynous families which 
commanded a good supply of labour, and shopkeepers whose business flourished in 
1993. The shopkeepers in Chikafa were particularly disliked as they became perceived 
as a necessary evil within the community. There were two reasons for this attitude. 
First, the male shopkeeper’s behaviour during the drought was considered particularly 
abhorrent as he had re-sold, at inflated prices, maize bought previously, and had 
accepted in his household a number of impoverished servant girls with whom he slept. 
Locals called him “stupid” for taking advantage of the girls. Secondly, in the emerging 
economy based on cash-cropping cotton, the male shopkeeper and his wife played a 
role akin to mediators between the need and desire of locals for consumer goods and 
food, and the increasing difficulties in their ability to repay debt by farming. The shop 
provided credit on grocery purchases which was often difficult to repay, and they 
offered Z$10 worth of goods in exchange for a 20 litre bucket of unground maize 
which was then re-sold when household supplies ran low. This practice was a cause of 
disputes with locals and contributed to the perception that foreigners had grown rich at 
the expense of established families who were finding life increasingly difficult in 
Chikafa.
Other modifications in Chikafa society which were cause for comment 
included an increase in violence and illness, new forms of inequality, and extension of 
state presence. Local residents seemed to have the resilience necessary to deal with any 
of these occurrences if they happened one at a time, however, it was the combination 
of notable changes which caused distress and disorientation. For instance, people in 
Chikafa had memories of violence from their experiences during the Independence
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War and they also were also accustomed to the occasional drunken brawl. However, 
the presence one morning of a young man who had been hit over the head with a brick 
during a dispute was new. People attributed this escalation of violence to the 
proliferation of bottled beer. More seriously, a dispute over land allocation under the 
auspices of the MZP in another area in Dande had resulted in a murder, an occurrence 
not seen since the War.
People also noticed that there was an increase in deaths during 1993 mostly 
associated with the cholera outbreak, but others due to unspecified illnesses. In 
probability, deaths resulting from mysterious illnesses indicated the first signs of AIDS 
in Chikafa. Shortly before I left the Zambesi in late September 1993,1 was told that the 
afflicted school teacher at the centre of the witchcraft accusation had been found HIV 
positive at a hospital on the plateau. The cholera deaths were also shocking, not just 
because of their numbers, but because the illness did not follow any recognisable 
patterns for locals. In the Zambesi, it was expected that young children would be 
vulnerable to diarrheal illnesses and I had noticed toddlers who wore strings of beads 
and threads to ward off sickness. Also, it was considered normal that old people should 
fall ill with both respiratory problems (which was the case with Chief Chapoto) and 
lingering infections. However, cholera as well as mystery illnesses struck adults of 
productive age and seemed to kill these quickly.
Although new ZANU party structures had been welcomed into the Zambesi 
and inserted into local political process during the 1980s, in 1993 people began to 
comment on the increased presence of the state as well as on notions that it was no 
longer a benevolent force in Dande. Youth referred to ZANU party members as 
“thugs” and associated corrupt residents with the party. However, it was not the actions 
of a few ZANU members which changed people’s opinion about the state, but instead 
the wholesale re-structuring of the land tenure system and the new migrants brought by 
the MZP. The refusal by MZP administrators to engage in local consultation, and the 
apparent support of the project by the state, led to the idea that President Mugabe had 
ceased to act as a benevolent chief and had, instead, begun to behave as a conqueror.
By mid 1993, residents of Chikafa were confronting changes to governance, 
livelihood, kin relations, illness and death, inequality, and new migrations. The power
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of elders seemed to be eroding with each passing week, yet the new technocratic 
language of administration adopted by their sons, proved to be mysterious. A number 
of people, both old and young, began to wonder who was in charge and where did 
guidance come from. In other words, there occurred a crisis of social reproduction as 
a result of increasingly ambiguous social organisation. Foremost in people’s minds 
was the question of with whom knowledge resided. Lineage elders and their followers 
believed that mpondoro were the keepers of ultimate knowledge about the social and 
natural worlds. In this light, the witchcraft accusation and its resolution through the 
auspices of land spirits could be construed as an opportunity for this system to appear 
relevant with regard to rapid change. At the same time, the preponderance of 
committee meetings and the rejection by many youth of the beer parties intrinsic to 
ancestor worship, along with their increasing support for new churches, meant that the 
cult of mpondoro was faced with unprecedented threat to its existence.
It was apparent that there was a clash of worldviews between the older and 
younger generations, however, considering recent upheaval in Chikafa, they each 
sought answers to similar preoccupations: the nature of exchange and property; land 
use; adjudication; and the social symptoms of disorder in the world. If the idea that 
drought as a symptom of disorder was accepted, then technocratic language that 
framed it as a feature of weather patterns would be rejected and with it much of the new 
ideas which had so affected the area.
In this chapter I argue that development, structural adjustment, and drought 
during the early 1990s altered fields of exchange precipitating witchcraft accusations 
which re-organised established social spaces or “chains of societies” (Amselle 1985). 
In a study on domination, it is important to examine whether witchcraft is an 
instrument of control or a means to diagnose and repair ‘disarticulations’ within 
communities. To this end, I will review the relationship between witchcraft and the 
state, the meanings of witchcraft in Kanyemba and Chikafa, and provide analysis of 
the witchcraft accusation and its resolution.
Witchcraft (or sorcery) is a term which, popularly, implies malevolence and 
jealousy. Yet in Africa, this concept is part and parcel of social life because of its 
function in explaining modem forms of wealth accumulation and power. While
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witchcraft can be disruptive, it can also be constructive in its guise as a form of 
protection and a reinforcement of authority (see Geschiere 1997).
While witchcraft in the Zambesi has its own particular structure and style, it 
holds similarities to the use of the supernatural in other places. In this study, witchcraft 
is taken:
“To cover those practices, often described as magical, that are 
concerned to harness and manipulate those energies and forces which 
are centred in human beings and which extend from them to 
intervene-heal, harm, or protect-in the action and circumstance of other 
human beings”.
(Kapferer 1997:8)
In the Zambesi witchcraft is both part of a belief system in which a breach of social or 
natural order precipitated problems, as it is “a matter of social diagnostics” (Moore 
and Sanders 2001: 4). The latter point refers to the contextual manifestation of the 
occult in which it becomes an instrument to understand and manage stressful social 
circumstances.
The concept of witchcraft or sorcery commonly used in the Zambesi, ufiti, is 
of Nyanja origin and is employed by all groups including the Chikunda people. In this 
same language a witch is called mfiti. According to informants, increased witchcraft 
took place in Chikafa area in 1993 in the wake of social disruption. At that time, it 
became apparent that the young and the old had different outlooks with relation to 
social change. The elderly believed that ancestors, particularly mpondoro, could 
explain change and upheaval. To this end they spent a great deal of time attending beer 
parties which had been suspended in 1992 during the drought. Housewarmings, as the 
homesteads of returned migrants were built, were one type of popular party. Beer was 
the conduit to communicating with ancestors, and as one informant pointed out, when 
old people got drunk, they sang like the mpondoro. In June and July of 1993 many 
interviews with the elderly had to be cancelled because, as informants sometimes 
shouted at me, they were drunk. For the elderly, mpondoro and their perfect 
knowledge stood in opposition to witchcraft and its intimations of rupture, but both 
forces could be explained within the same system. In contrast, young adults rejected 
mpondoro as a primary explanatory model of how the world functioned. Instead they
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looked to new administrative practices and committee work and the new churches for 
guidance.
ii. Witchcraft and the State in Africa and Zimbabwe:
In a study about domination, it is important to review the relationship between 
witchcraft and the state. While attitudes to ancestor worship were a point of difference 
between the younger and older generations in Chikafa, the fact remained that 
adherence to a belief system in which witchcraft exemplified both disorder and its 
resolution was a way to form a local locus of power. In this order of reasoning rejection 
of ancestors was also a way to remove a source of contestation of new forms of social 
organisation. In this section I will review the relationship between witchcraft and the 
state by examining a number of writings regarding witchcraft as a way of 
apprehending social and economic change.
The supernatural and the state have had a long association in Zimbabwe. 
During the colonial period there was anti-witchcraft legislation, so healers and 
mediums were restricted so that and opposition to ‘indirect rule* could only be 
expressed through trade unions. In the 1980s, spirit mediums and mpondoro 
constituted an important feature of decolonisation (Lan: 1985; Alexander et.al.:2000). 
Similarly, during the 1990s, with the perception that the state was behaving a 
conqueror, the population returned to their ancestors for explanations.
Peter Geschiere has written extensively on witchcraft and the post-colonial 
state. His work was based in Cameroon where the occult had a greater national public 
presence than in 1990s Zimbabwe where it was localised. However, his argument that 
the increase in witchcraft in post-colonial Africa is linked to new forms of wealth and 
impoverishment holds true for 1990s Zambesi Valley. Particularly, this author does 
not view witchcraft as specifically a form of opposition to inequality, but as a way to 
participate in an overwhelmingly capitalist world order. In collaboration with Cyprian 
Fisiy, he wrote: “there seems to be a surprising convergence between discourses on the 
occult-with their emphasis on individual accumulation and debt-and a capitalist 
worldview” (1996; 194). For these authors, post-colonial witchcraft had a variety of 
functions. For instance, while there was a levelling aspect in which visibly increasing
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individual wealth is dealt with, it can also be used to aid and protect this accumulation 
(1996:195). Elsewhere, Geschiere stressed the idea of “representations of witchcraft as 
a precarious balance between ‘levelling’ and ‘accumulative’ tendencies” (1997:16). 
But in the same work, he also emphasised that witchcraft discourse “relates the 
familiar context of home and family to the modem changes that have so deeply 
affected domestic relations” (1997:24). In effect, witchcraft had become a 
culturally-contextual way to deal with ambiguities related to new forms of enrichment 
and dependency. Since witchcraft is a moral discourse which uses the notion of 
desirable and undesirable kinship relations as a metaphor for appropriate social 
relations, it also expresses, in localised terms, acceptable and unacceptable forms of 
change. In Chikafa, widespread impoverishment associated with drought and ESAP 
stood in stark contrast to the prosperity of the shopkeepers and larger families of new 
migrants.
As well as playing an important role in dealing with capitalism, post-colonial
witchcraft also addressed longstanding tensions between kinship, communitarian
control, and individual autonomy. Fisiy and Geschiere argued that new forms of
exchange, related to the opportunities provided by capital, exacerbated these anxieties
which might then translate into violence. They submitted that:
“Local discourses on witchcraft and sorcery have always centred on 
power and inequality, on the tension between individual ambition and 
communitarian control, and on the spectre of the ‘sovereign subject’ who 
tries to emancipate him/herself from this control in a way which may be 
secret, but certainly not reprehensible”.
(1996:194)
The witchcraft accusation at the centre of this chapter elicits the tension between 
individual ambition and control by the community. In the recent past, lineage elders 
controlled young men through land allocation practices and marriage payments. 
Difficulties with this system were resolved through temporary migration of young 
adults. The erosion of the power of elders and a new economy based on cotton 
cultivation opened up opportunities for individual action divorced from older forms of 
social constraint. Not least to seize the moment were divorced women and widows 
who accepted parcels of land through the MZP and embarked on or expanded business
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ventures such as the sale of beer, vegetables, or the highly potent kachasu spirit. While 
some men said these independent women were mahure (whores), they were allowed to 
continue their businesses unimpeded. Younger women also benefited from the 
shrinking importance of marriage payments which meant less control by elders who 
might choose older men, willing to make greater payments, as their husbands.
The witchcraft accusation in Chikafa certainly addressed a number of tensions
and ambiguities characteristic of the post-colonial situation in the form of: increased
state control coupled with decreased state responsibility; obscuring local voice
through new and confounding structures of governance; and, the interference of
market-mediation in affairs of family and lineage. With this approach in mind, the
expression of witchcraft through mpondoro ceremonies was in line with the view that:
“ritual, as an experimental technology intended to affect the flow of power 
in the universe, is an especially likely response to contradictions created 
(and literally) engendered by processes of social, material, and cultural 
transformation, processes represented, rationalized, and authorized in the 
name of modernity and its various alibis (‘civilization’, ‘social progress’, 
‘economic development’, ‘conversion’ and the like)”.
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1993: xxx).
Over the years British, Rhodesian, and post-colonial governments tried to 
eradicate, or at least control, witchcraft because the practice was deemed to be a 
potential site for power and, thus, dangerous to the state. One way to contain the power 
of expression of witchcraft was to adopt the attitude that the state regulated from 
without whereas witchcraft regulated from within. This was certainly the attitude of 
Zambesians. It was also an orientation which worked well with the system of ‘indirect 
rule’ where local matters, even if  these encompassed responses to influences from 
outside communities, were placed under the control of chiefs and headmen. Chief 
Chapoto dealt with witchcraft in his area as a matter for his Court which was 
dominated by marunga clan elders.
Similarly, ZINATHA, the Zimbabwe National Association of Traditional 
Healers, prohibited witchcraft accusations. Formed in 1980, this organisation aimed to 
promote and regulate the work of n ’anga (traditional; healers). Its stated exclusion 
from issues of witchcraft was a public statement that it would not work in opposition
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to the national government. N ’anga formed their first professional association in 1957 
which split, reformed and finally became ZINATHA. In this organisation applicants 
were approved by a council which was also empowered to strike off individuals 
(Gelfand et.al. 1985:6). If mpondoro in the Zambesi had conformed strictly to the rules 
of this association they would not have participated in the witchcraft accusation 
described below and would have withdrawn from the political arena at a time when 
various interest groups jostled for position in the emerging order. Clearly, in the 1990s, 
there was a difference between the state’s attempts to regulate ritual life, and local 
response to re-organisation of social life.
The view that witchcraft posed a danger to colonial power was one reason for
its suppression, however, the late 19th century was also a time of renewed interest in
the scientific paradigm. Shortly after British conquest of Southern Rhodesia, the state
implemented The Witchcraft Suppression Act (1899) which punished both people
who made accusations of witchcraft and those who were said to practise it. In a review
of British colonial records for Lomagundi District, which encompassed Kanyemba
and Chikafa areas, I found no cases of witchcraft having been brought to the attention
of the authorities. Cases brought before the Assistant Native Commissioner at Sipolilo
(now Guruve) during the 1920s included arson, possession of firearms, illegal entry
into the district, murder, and even sodomy, but not witchcraft. Similarly, records for
Feira (now Zumbo in Zambia) show no cases of witchcraft. Incomplete records may
be one explanation, but it is also possible that witchcraft was dealt with away from the
authorities. Another reason for the absence of witchcraft from colonial relates to a
conjunction of features of early British colonisation 1. Kapferer argued that:
“Anthropological interest in sorcery and magic took root at a time of 
Western expansion and colonial domination. It arose in a scientific climate 
alive with the spirit o f Darwinism and concerned with the application of 
evolutionist thought to cultural, social, and political matters. The 
investigation of sorcery and magic...was part of a philosophical and 
growing anthropological enterprise with huge political undertones. Their 
study was integral to the more general engagement of knowledge in the 
legitimation of the imperial domination of the West (the site of reason) 
over the subordinated rest (the site of unreason)”.
(1997:9)
1 Case 19/21 K9/21; Case 121 S625; L.J. Tweedy 1921.
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As this author suggested, the issue of witchcraft deviated from the Crown’s objective 
of a tidy system of governance based on Enlightenment ideals. That this conceptual 
dichotomy also enabled re-arrangement of local economies to satisfy market ideology 
proved fortuitous. In this way, events of the 1990s in the Zambesi Valley were very 
similar because a language of science and quantification, seemingly devoid of moral 
content, was expressed as an alternative representation of local economy and social 
life.
Perceptions of witches have changed over time in Zimbabwe. During the 
Independence War witches were equated with sell-outs because both were considered 
to work against the greater good. However, these were often individuals caught in 
political crossfire and misunderstanding. In Matabeleland executions of witches “are 
remembered as deeply traumatic, and certainly had a lasting impact on intra-familial 
and intra-community tensions” (Alexander et. al. 2000:173). From Lan’s (1985) 
account, it seems that during the 1980s witches emanated from within the family, and 
were preoccupied with lineage and interpersonal matters. In ways similar to 
Matabeleland, during the war witches in the Zambesi constituted the conceptual 
opposite of mediums in that they were thought to work against community values. 
However, while interpretations of community will during the 1970s are usually 
focussed on collective support of the Independence War, during the 1990s 
communities such as Chikafa were fragmented, a situation which allowed for 
individual action.
The relationship between the state and witchcraft was mediated by the system 
of mpondoro in Chikafa in 1993. Land spirits did not attempt to contain witchcraft but 
rather harnessed social disorder and fragmentation to highlight their importance in the 
emerging political order of the area. Foreign policies, supported by the Zimbabwean 
state in the 1990s, had changed local economy which resulted in new forms of 
inequality. ESAP and development had also contributed to disassembling of familiar 
institutions, such as the rule of elders, and concomitant rise of individual action which 
resulted in greater political fragmentation. The resulting disorder provided spaces of 
ambiguity as well as opportunities for increased state control over the area. Witchcraft
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was the local response to perceived chaos and distress. Just as it had provided a focal 
point for local identities during the First and Second Chimurenga, the system of land 
spirits once again mobilised to address social change and threatened fragmentation of 
communities. The acephalous character of Chikafa, in comparison to the centralisation 
of Kanyemba, made it a vulnerable place for the advent of development.
iii. The Meanings of Witchcraft in Dande: Kanyemba and Chikafa Compared
What is most striking about witchcraft in the Zambesi of the 1990s is the 
difference in meanings it held for old and young. For the older generation, witchcraft 
was part of a larger moral universe in which spirits and humans co-existed in a mutual 
relationship of cause and effect. For the younger set, witchcraft was viewed as 
somewhat separate from the world of ancestors, and more to do with the new forms of 
wealth and disparity resulting from recent political and economic changes. Many 
young people rejected ancestor worship as the province of the old and as symbolic of 
the power of lineage elders who controlled land and marriage. In a comparison of 
witchcraft in Chikafa and Kanyemba, the notable difference is that it was accepted as 
a form of expression of local concerns in the former, and as dissent to be quashed in 
the latter. These divergent approaches can be attributed to the contrast in political 
organisation and economy between these areas. While Kanyemba was a highly 
centralised polity where potential inter-generational conflict was diffused through 
power-sharing between old and young members of the dominant marunga clan, 
Chikafa was an acephalous society of fragmented political process and rapidly 
changing economy over which no one exercised control. In this section, I will review 
the different meanings of witchcraft in these two settlements in order to provide a 
context for the witchcraft accusation in Chikafa to be discussed later in this chapter.
The history of Chikafa and Kanyemba is characterised by conquest and 
migration, and for that reason there has been a longstanding preoccupation with 
appropriations of wealth and power. However, the notion of conquest permeated most 
stories about Kanyemba area. The legend of the Chikunda warlord Kanyemba 
described him as taking muti (medicines) in order to acquire dominion over conquered 
areas. In Chief Chapoto’s account, “Kanyemba was interested in mankwara (magic)”
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and would persuade n 'anga to disclose their knowledge of herbs with which to kill 
enemies. Once the information was proffered, Kanyemba would ask one of his 
lieutenants to kill the healer. Another way in which Kanyemba is said to have acquired 
power was by castrating men in conquered areas. In the words of another elderly 
informant, “Kanyemba won wars, castrated men, (and) didn’t want men to look at 
women”. The acquisition of power through occult means, and the suppression of 
fertility of conquered men are two pervasive themes in stories about the person of 
Kanyemba. Chief Chapoto described Kanyemba as a figure representing absolute 
power and compared this historical figure to President Mugabe in terms of the 
untouchability of his position. The story of Kanyemba and the supernatural is 
interesting in that it illustrates very much the appropriation of control over the 
conquered population and the principle of centralised power.
In contrast, concepts of witchcraft in Chikafa carried an implication of 
potential disorder, disruption, and danger. Old people would barely discuss the issue 
of ufiti, and recoiled at any suggestion that it might occur in the area. In Chikafa, the 
social world was divided into the parallel realms of humans and spirits. Each realm 
was further divided into hostile and friendly, inside and outside beings (Lan 
1985:35-39). Witchcraft was perpetrated by the actions of hostile beings, both living 
and dead. In the realm of spirits, midzimu were the friendly ancestors who remained so 
as long as their descendants remembered them. They represented order and continuity. 
Hostile spirits took two forms. The ngozi were spirits of people who were unhappy in 
life and wandered through the village, angry and malicious, spreading harm. “A ngozi 
is unmarried or childless, unburied or done to death. For such a person death is not an 
enhancement but a degradation” (Lan 1985:35). Owing to their unsatisfactory lives, 
ngozi could not take their place amongst ancestors. They were forever reminders of 
unhappiness, inequity, and lack of fulfilment in life.
Muroyi (witches), on the other hand, were humans who either became 
possessed by a shave, the animal spirit of the hyena who hunted by night and ate dead 
creatures, or made a free choice to apprentice in witchcraft (Lan 1985:36). Similarly, 
Bourdillon distinguished between two types of witches: ancestral witches who were 
thought to enjoy evil and did not seek to be cured; and, sorcerers who harnessed evil,
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often through the use of medicines, for a specific purpose (1987:178-179). This author 
assumed a difference between witchcraft and sorcery amongst Shona in that the former 
referred to an ongoing condition of inherent evil, whereas the latter suggested a 
goal-oriented and finite villainous act (1987:179). While this distinction is noteworthy, 
I did not encounter it during my fieldwork as the term uflti was used to denote all 
actions perpetrated by mfiti (witches). During the 1980s, Lan noted that “witchcraft 
will strike from within, that evil lies, sharp-toothed, poised to pounce, just where you 
most expect and need affection, ease, support, and care” (1985:37). In his work, he 
described witches as emanating from within the lineage or from amongst one’s affines, 
whose archetypal work was eating dead people as the result of envy of riches or 
fertility (Lan 1985:35-37). Ordinarily ancestors offered protection against witches, but 
only if the proper beer rituals were performed by their descendants.
During 1993 there was an unusually high amount of beer parties in Chikafa. 
Part of the reason for this occurrence was the return of new migrants and the opening 
of reconstructed homesteads. The number of funerals of cholera victims was another 
reason. For much of June and July of that year it was difficult to find elderly persons 
who were sober enough to give a coherent interview. So important were beer rituals 
for the aged that they ignored warnings of cholera transmission to the point where a 
ritual to combat cholera was organised in an attempt to arrive at a compromise with the 
viewpoint of the old.
The tenacity of the old for ancestor worship spoke to an adherence to the belief 
that the world of spirits must be appeased if  normal life was to continue. The fact of 
drought along with political and economic changes in Chikafa coupled with new 
migrants, all contributed to a sense of disorientation for the old.
In his study, The Shona Peoples (1976/1987), Michael Bourdillon described 
the resemblance between witches and healers in that both were possessed by powerful 
mashave (animal spirits). He argued, as I encountered in Chikafa, that healers were 
often reluctant to discuss witchcraft for fear of being thought witches. In his estimation 
there was a fine line between healing and witchcraft because of similarities in both the 
ability to host a spirit and use medicines (Bourdillon 1987:177). In the case of a 
serious illness in a community, often a witch would be sought because, “a witch or
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sorcerer is believed to know the antidotes to his or her poisons” (Bourdillon 1987:187). 
In other words, the circumstances which caused illness also contained means to a 
resolution. Healers, mediums, and non-specialists possessed by spirits were all in a 
tenuous position with regard to others in their community. If the activity of their 
possessing spirit was not properly harnessed for the collective good, they risked being 
labelled as witches, or in some cases, as frauds.
In order for the dead to protect the living there had to be a cycle of proper beer 
rituals which expressed allegiance to lineage ancestors and local mpondoro. Lack of 
ritual provided an opportunity for ngozi to rise up and was one indication of social 
rupture. During the possession ceremony discussed in Chapter 8, the mpondoro 
Negomo complained that the Zambesi was frill of “wandering spirits” of people who 
had not been properly settled after the Independence War. There were a number of 
ways in which this statement could be analysed, but one interpretation was that 
descendants of had not honoured the dead. In other words, the sacrifices of members 
of individual lineages had not been remembered at the same time as the collective 
effort to change governments in Harare had been forgotten. Top-down implementation 
of policy and the observable growth of wealth in some quarters, as well as rapid 
impoverishment in others were reasons often cited for the assumed preponderance of 
ngozi. Weak support for the mpondoro and the system of sabhuku. and chiefs, as well 
as increased interest in committee work and cash-cropping among the young was 
another factor contributing to the belief in disquiet amongst ancestors. The witchcraft 
accusation to be discussed below took place after a period of repeated misfortune and 
suffering, in the form of famine and cholera, so that an episode of serious individual 
illness took on wider meaning for the locality.
While in 1993 the disorganised nature of social life in Chikafa and the number 
of contingencies led to a serious case of witchcraft, in Kanyemba, a smaller case of 
witchcraft was easily dispatched in a session of Chief Chapoto’s court in August of 
that year. At the time two cases were heard by Chief Chapoto, relating to witchcraft 
and to domestic violence. Other issues that the Chief dealt with at Court included theft, 
incest, and boundary disputes. The Court session took place as follows:
Chief Chapoto and his retinue o f four elderly male Chikunda councillors, a
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male Chikunda clerk, two ‘policemen ’ who are respectively Chikunda and tembo 
mvura, and one o f  the Chief’s sons arrive at the old District Commissioner's house 
which is now used as a Courthouse. Two cases are to be heard today, starting with 
that o f a witchcraft accusation. The accused, A, four plaintiffs by the names o f Maria, 
Antonia, Wilson and Innocent are present. One witness, John, is also there. My 
assistant and I  are the only observers.
A begins arguing his case. He says that he was paid a large sum o f money by 
two white men to find  people who could perform mapipi (a miracle or astonishing 
performance). He added that the clients were also interested in taking pictures o f 
hyenas, crocodiles, and tortoises. Now, he said, people were accusing him o f being 
hired to point out witches. Antonia, in particular, had cried at a beer party that he had 
pointed her out as a witch and that now the gossip at these occasions was that he 
pointed out witches. He finished by saying that the two white men had told him that 
they had gone to an area on the plateau looking fo r  people who performed mapipi and 
had been supplied the names with no trouble.
Maria speaks next. She says that A told her that two white men were looking 
fo r  witches to photograph and that he had suggested she should have her picture taken. 
In her words, “A is my sabwira so I  thought he was joking, but then I  saw he was 
serious ” She reports that A went on to tell her that i f  she sees a hyena or a crocodile 
she should ask fo r  her picture to be taken so that she can earn money.
Antonia then accuses A o f having called her a witch and says that she 
confronted him at a beer party where she asked him i f  he had given her name to the 
white people. He refused to answer her. Then Wilson adds that he had seen Maria and 
Antonia at a beer party and found out that he was also included in the pointing out o f 
witches by A. Innocent then says, “I  was told that A had pointed me out as a witch ”. 
He explains that he had reported this accusation to Chief Chapoto previously who had 
told him to go away, cool down and wait fo r  the Court session to find  the truth. A then 
interjects “X  can witness that the two white men asked me to point out people with 
crocodiles. They wanted to take pictures ”. Councillor no. 1, an elderly Chikunda, then 
stirs in his seat and announces to A, “mapipi means witchcraft so you were pointing 
out witches, you should pay fo r  pointing out witches ” A insists that he needs to know 
who started the witchcraft rumours. Councillor no. 1 then asks where other witnesses 
fo r the plaintiffs are.
Chief Chapoto speaks next. He says that many people have come to him with 
the same problem and that his advice to them has been to go away and cool down. He 
says that i f  he had had the opportunity to ask the white men i f  they had been taking 
pictures o f  people who perform mapipi, or carry dipa (spear), or ukano (axe), they 
would deny it. His son then suggests that the case be postponed as two witnesses are 
missing. The Chief ponders out loud what to do. A says that he needs one more witness. 
But Councillor no. 1 interjects that A brought rumours o f  witchcraft by soliciting 
business from the two white men in question. The witness, John, then relates how he 
told Maria that white men were looking fo r  n ’anga who could do mapipi fo r  healing, 
and that they were taking pictures o f witches. Councillor no. 1 then states that A has 
spread rumours o f  witchcraft to white people. A retorts that i f  the Court finds the case 
too difficult to solve, it should be taken to the police. Councillor no. 1 asks Maria for  
her opinion to which she answers that he should judge the case as she does not know
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what to do and has no personal quarrel with A. The Chief reminds everyone that he 
wants to judge the case fairly but is also prepared to hand it to the police. The Chief’s 
son then proclaims, “A, you bring rumours o f  witchcraft so you are guilty ”. He adds 
that it is not the business o f  A to deal with the white people, but it is instead the job o f  
the Ward Councillor who deals with outsiders to the area. 
Finally, Councillor no. 1 announces that A and John are both guilty o f  witchcraft. He 
says that these two men pointed out Maria as a witch before Nyamaqwete (the 
specialist witch-finding land spirit) could do so. In addition to which he thinks they 
should apologise to Maria. He adds that it is the Ward Councillor’s job to deal with 
outsiders, not A. Maria interjects that she has no quarrel with A. Councillor no. 1 says 
that A “is a respected person, a sabhuku, so he should not spread rumours ”. Innocent 
then asserts “A, you are younger than me so you should not play with me. You should 
pay a fine ”. Councillor no. 1 then tells Innocent that i f  he wants compensation from  
the accused, they should discuss this matter at his house. He declares the Court 
session closed.
This session of Chief Chapoto’s Court reflected the ruling marunga clan’s 
approach to witchcraft: that an accusation was best settled early and the matter 
subdued before it became a matter of public debate. The Court meeting was held in 
relative privacy with only villagers directly involved in the case present. There were a 
number of reasons why this witchcraft incident was held in private and resolved with 
very little debate.
First, in Kanyemba witchcraft was a feature of social control. A’s role in the 
witchcraft accusation discussed above was a good illustration of this feature of 
marunga. centralised control. As discussed previously in this study, the ruling 
hierarchy established at the time of conquest remained until the 1990s. The lineages of 
two of the three conquering brothers, Chihumbe and Kanyemba, had alternated 
possession of the Chiefship throughout the 20th century. Also, the succession dispute 
to do with Chief Chapoto’s imminent demise was contested between the descendants 
of Chihumbe and Kanyemba. The descendants of the third conquering brother, 
Nyanderu, had not presented any candidates. Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter 6, 
control over new positions and new committees organised under the auspices of 
development schemes and central government were in the hands of younger Chikunda 
from the ruling lineages. When I arrived in Kanyemba area the Ward Councillor came 
to see me to object to my presence, but was appeased by the knowledge that I had 
interviewed an elderly descendant of Kanyemba whom he called “father”. The reason
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for briefly recapitulating the social structure of Kanyemba area is to provide 
background for discussing A’s role in the witchcraft accusation tried by Chapoto’s 
Court.
A was a sabhuku whose lineage could be traced to the time of the original 
conquest of Kanyemba. His clan was crocodile and he identified himself as Korekore. 
He claimed descent from Msumpa, Chihumbe’s powerful wife whose father was from 
Gokwe but settled in Kanyemba area at the time of conquest. His paternal 
grandmother’s brother, a marunga. from Mozambique, was taken to Lisbon for chibaro, 
and given a nickname to do with this experience which both A’s father and A also used. 
The name in question was derived from Portuguese and would lead an observer to 
believe that A was actually of the marunga clan, however, his ancestors included 
conquered Korekore who intermarried with Chikunda of the marunga clan, as well as 
the influential Shona branch of which Msumpa was a member. Needless to say, A’s 
family could be considered as a long-term residents of Kanyemba by virtue of their 
long, if  subordinate, association with the ruling lineages.
As an individual, A was quite entrepreneurial and politically vocal. He was an 
expert fisherman who possessed a vast knowledge of the craft. He farmed four acres 
of dryland crops which included cereals and groundnuts, and had a garden which grew 
fruit and vegetables. He occasionally earned extra money by catching crocodiles and 
fishing with nets for foreign film-makers who came to the Zambesi. He was also quite 
active in a fishing co-operative starting up at the time and was a critic of the 
CAMPFIRE program because he said that Zambians and Mozambicans were coming 
to the south side of the Zambesi River to fish with nets while he was not allowed to do 
so. He lamented that his children went hungry while outsiders profited from 
Zimbabwean resources.
As discussed earlier in this study, Chief Chapoto descended from Chihumbe. 
Councillor no.l descended from Kanyemba and was a possible candidate for the 
Chieftaincy. Although it might seem paradoxical that he would be a close advisor to 
the Chief in matters of customary law, history shows that power had been shared 
between the descendants of Chihumbe and those of Kanyemba. While there was a 
dispute between these two lines regarding inheritance of the Chieftaincy, they closed
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ranks when classificatory outsiders attempted to social mobility, as A had repeatedly 
attempted through his economic ventures. In effect, the witchcraft accusation levelled 
against A by none other than his sabwira, was an exercise to remind him of the 
consequences of ambition. Although the implication during the Court session was that 
A had called the women crocodiles, and therefore witches, no official gave indication 
that he took the accusation seriously. Also, the accuser let the matter drop easily once 
it had been heard by the Court, and there was no imposed fine. A’s threat that the 
matter be placed before the police, in effect taken out of the power structure of the 
locality, was not carried out.
Although in Kanyemba area, people subscribed to the same cosmology as in 
Chikafa, witchcraft accusations carried much less weight and were not thrust into the 
public forum of the mpondoro ceremony. One reason might be that social hierarchy in 
Kanyemba was so well-entrenched that patterns of accumulation o f wealth and 
poverty were not subject to significant change. For example, while the Chief told me 
that he was happy the tembo mvura people earned money from selling pots to safari 
camp clients, he never condemned their exploitation by senior land-owning Chikunda, 
a fact which ensured that these subjugated people remained in their position of 
inferiority. At the same time, any new opportunities for greater wealth and influence, 
such as committee work and development schemes were quickly appropriated by 
junior members of the two ruling lineages. In his survey of Kanyemba, Cutshall noted 
“that if there is a core of ‘intelligentsia’ within the community, it is most likely to be 
composed of ‘younger’ adult males of Chikunda extraction” (1990:8). Besides 
migration, the disenfranchised of Kanyemba had very little opportunity to change their 
social or economic position. In this area, members of subordinate lineages, even if they 
were sabhuhx such as A, had no means of representation. Their involvement in 
political process was limited to support of the two dominant lineages of the marunga 
who acted in their own clan and lineage interests to the detriment of outsiders.
In light of this circumstance, the variant of witchcraft observed in Kanyemba in 
the 1990s seemed to be hardly post-colonial as it served to reinforce a social hierarchy 
established at the time of conquest. While there was plenty of room for individual 
accumulation of wealth for members of the Kanyemba or Chihumbe lineages, other
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persons were kept in their structurally determined positions. This particular instance 
of witchcraft was resolved by retaining the equilibrium of the status quo, and therefore 
of the clan which ruled Kanyemba area.
In comparison, the term ufiti prompted strong reaction from older individuals 
in Chikafa where the great amount of social disruption was perceived as a threat to 
social reproduction. For these people, witchcraft indicated the possibility of restless 
ngozi who required appeasement as they represented discontinuity. In order to 
apprehend perceived disorder symbolised by the illness of a male schoolteacher, the 
shrine of the territorial spirit, Nyamanindi, was mobilised to represent local concerns 
and arrive at a reconciliation of possible breaches of moral order. In this way, elder 
residents of Chikafa re-affirmed their belief that mpondoro were the repositories of 
perfect or ultimate knowledge.
iv. A Witchcraft Accusation in Chikafa Area:
Although Chikafa was conquered by the Chikunda shortly after Kanyemba 
area and a series of lieutenants to the conquering brothers were installed as headmen, 
the structure of power and wealth there had been vigorously contested over time. Not 
only was the area under the governance of the Korekore Chief Chitsungo in the 1990s, 
various committee positions, the Village Chairmanship, and the VIDCO chairmanship 
were held by Korekore. Genealogies were shallow and rules of inheritance not 
enforced. For example, sabhuku Chikafa acquired his public position from his 
mother’s line. There had also been significant immigration in the wake of the MZP. 
Cotton cultivation and the effects of ESAP on labour migration had changed local 
economy from subsistence to cash-cropping. Inter-generational conflict had become 
pronounced as young people found they could not migrate for work easily, while they 
were also more proficient at interpreting the new language of development. In short, 
during the 1990s, social life in Chikafa was defined by disruption and contingency.
As I mentioned earlier, in mid 1993 a possession ceremony was organised in 
Chikafa so that land spirits could hear cases of individual affliction. The mpondoro 
Nyamanindi, Mutandabuti and Chidziyo were invoked to attend. As discussed earlier 
in this study, Nyamanindi was the spiritual owner of Chikafa area. Mutandabuti’s
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territory was in Chitete, an area adjacent to Chikafa which was in Mozambique. 
Chidziyo’s territory was on the Mozambican side of the Musengezi area, far to the east 
of Chikafa. Amongst the illnesses discussed with the land spirits, there was the case of 
a young schoolteacher in Chikafa who was struck with a debilitating illness and 
became unable to walk. This circumstance resulted in a witchcraft accusation aimed at 
a shopkeeper in his early 50s and his wife which required a second possession 
ceremony at which Nyamaqwete, a mpondoro specialising in witchcraft was present. 
In the Zambesi, for witchcraft accusations to have community-wide implications they 
must be made, or confirmed, by mpondoro. Otherwise, identifying individuals as 
witches remained a matter of a particular lineage, and so had no relevance for others.
Through their highly visible business activities, the shopkeeper and his wife 
had become associated with undesirable aspects of new forms of wealth and 
accumulation which emerged in Chikafa during 1993. Because of their apparent 
prosperity it was not surprising that the shopkeepers should become the target of a 
witchcraft accusation. Their practice of buying maize stocks which they then resold in 
difficult times for a profit was considered abhorrent, as was the male shopkeepers’ 
requests of sexual favours from hungry girls. In addition, their foreignness, and the 
fact that they had not created any kinship links locally resulted in suspicion. In Chikafa, 
tensions between old and new forms of economy, the slippage of political control and 
influence over family matters experienced by the elderly, and the increasing power of 
the young became pronounced with this witchcraft accusation.
The witchcraft accusation addressed two levels of social life. First, tensions 
between individuals and interest groups which had occurred in the aftermath of great 
change were played out. Secondly, locals expressed their frustration at the 
inaccessibility of the state. In short, internal and external tensions were performed 
publicly in these two ceremonies.
The first ceremony is held in early June 1993 at the homestead o f  Mr. X. A 
makeshift dendemaro (hut fo r  audiences with mpondoro) was built, drums set up, and 
a large fire fo r  drying drum skins throughout the night is made. Junior players start to 
play shortly after sunset, while men and women drink maize-meal beer. Mediums and 
their assistants sit on reed mats. All three mpondoro are Korekore and the dress o f  
their mediums refers to African chiefs o f the past. They wear skirts o f  blue and black 
cloth which signify their rain-making role, and strings o f  beads which indicate
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possession by spirits. Mutandabuti and Chidziyo also possess sable horns which are 
blown to announce their presence. All recline on black cloth. Women and young girls 
dance and sing. Occasionally a mpondoro chases girls in circles. As the three 
mediums become possessed, the crowd o f dancers and drinkers sit on the ground to 
listen to their wisdom. At this point Nyamanindi's assistant asks people who have used 
strong soap to stand back as the mpondoro do not like perfume.
Mutandabuti first offers thanks to M r.X who is hosting the ceremony. He then 
affirms that he has come to accompany people at this time, but not fo r  any specific task 
such as pointing out a witch. He states that i f  someone is a witch, then he or she should 
leave their witchcraft behind. He then describes his territory by saying that, when he 
was a live chief, he had a boundary with Kanyemba. When I  asked him about his life, 
he replied that his father was killed by Kanyemba and so they do not speak. He also 
says that he used to see white people at Zumbo and is therefore not surprised to see 
me. When questioned about the Chikunda he replies that they used to be his slaves 
through conquest. He added that he never had good relations with Kanyemba, and so 
they made a treaty to not invade each other.
After my brief audience with Mutandabuti both men and women drank beer 
while people had private audiences with the mpondoro regarding a number o f 
illnesses. A local school teacher who had been ill fo r  months and had lost the ability 
to walk was brought to the mpondoro in a wheelbarrow. The proceedings were kept 
hushed.
The second possession ceremony is held seven days later. It is morning. The 
three mpondoro from the first ceremony are present as well as Nyamaqwete, a land 
spirit specialising in solving witchcraft accusations (see figure 10). The ceremony 
starts at the home o f  Nyamanindi’s medium where all the mediums become possessed, 
and then proceeds to the site o f the first ceremony. The procession is headed by the 
possessed medium o f Nyamaqwete, who is followed by the possessed mediums o f  
Nyamanindi, Mutandabuti, and Chidziyo. Behind walk locals amongst whom a 
Mozambican mutapi blows a sable horn to announce the presence o f  the mpondoro. 
Bringing in the rear, are the local shopkeeper and policemen from a town nearby. At 
their destination Nyamaqwete instructs Mr. X, who is an expert drummer, to begin 
playing. Mutandabuti and Nyamaqwete begin to dance amid much singing and 
ululation. Several elderly people are drunk. One woman dances with Nyamaqwete. 
Nyamanindi’s assistant provides water fo r  the dancing mpondoro. Nyamaqwete 
demands that the drums be beaten faster. He calls fo r  Mr. X., and then rolls on the 
ground, past mats laid out fo r  the ceremony and then rolls back to the crowd. He then 
picks up his walking stick and runs into long grass. The crowd follows singing. Mr. X  
is asked fo r  a hoe. Nyamaqwete, followed by the crowd, arrives at the road that leads 
from Chikafa into Chitete in Mozambique. Nyamaqwete instructs a man to dig a hole 
in the road. He does so and strikes a bunch o f  roots as well as a bundle tied with string 
to which is attached a British coin.
The mpondoro and the crowd repair to Mr. X's homestead. Mr. X  asks the 
policemen i f  they have seen the bundle, to which they reply in the affirmative. 
Nyamaqwete then declares that he has completed his task and that the matter is in 
Nyamanindi’s hands. The latter proclaims that “these herbs are from Chitete He
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adds that Nyamaqwete is his muzukuru2. Nyamaqwete then asks the crowd i f  he found 
the herbs in a house to which the crowd reply in the negative. The shopkeeper then 
asks Nyamaqwete to point out the witch. He adds that i f  no witch can be found’ then 
the herbs should be burned at the police station.
The crowd disperses, leaving behind a few  drinkers. The ceremony is over.
This witchcraft accusation placed into the public forum two great themes of 
social life in Chikafa in 1993: internal tensions wrought or exacerbated by new 
avenues to wealth and impoverishment; and, external tensions created by top-down 
government policy which was perceived to bring both economic hardship and new 
migrants who competed for resources into the area. Internal tensions comprised the 
issues of the position of ancestor worship and healers in the new social order, a dispute 
between the afflicted schoolteacher and the accused shopkeeper’s wife, and a problem 
where Mr.X had promised his daughter in marriage to both the shopkeeper and another 
man and had accepted bride-price payments. Anxiety brought by external forces 
included interrogations as to whether people such as the shopkeeper had used 
supernatural forces to grow wealthy during recent times of hardship. At the same time 
there was the perception that foreigners were becoming wealthy, while long-term 
residents became poorer. To compound these perceptions, long-standing 
inter-generational conflict seemed to widen with modified fields of exchange.
One aspect of internal tension in Chikafa was the increasing ambiguity of the 
role of the cult of mpondoro and by association, the role of headmen. The most 
observable threat to the cult of land spirits had come from external forces in the form
2
Muzukuru is a kinship term which refers to ego’s sister’s son. But it is also a term 
which can be used to refer to anyone descended from any woman of one’s own lineage. 
In short, muzukuru denotes a person who is outside of one’s patriline, but is a relative. 
A muzukuru is someone with whom there is ease and joking as they cannot be 
embroiled in patrilineal issues, but are still close enough to be counted on.
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of land resettlement which ignored sacred areas, and new structures of governance 
which by-passed authority based on ancestral links between spirits and chiefs. Also, I 
was told that support for Nyamanindi, as well as for neighbouring mpondoro, had 
decreased in Chikafa for some years as young individuals became involved in 
committee work and in the MZP’s promise of equitable allocation of land regardless 
of age, gender, lineage, length of residence or previous farming ability.
In light of increasing ambivalence toward mpondoro in Chikafa, the witchcraft 
accusation provided an opportunity for the shrines of the four mpondoro involved to 
demonstrate their relevance within the emerging order. Some people in Chikafa 
believed that the seriousness with which mpondoro had taken the witchcraft 
accusation betrayed a financial ulterior motive on the part of their shrines. A number 
of individuals observed that mediums and their assistants had been seen drinking 
together for days before the first ceremony at which the accusation was made. Also, 
Nyamaqwete’s specialty in witchcraft was said to allow his medium to earn large sums 
of money resolving accusations for commercial farmers . Some informants believed 
that Mutandabuti had created the current accusation by interpreting the schoolteacher’s 
affliction as witchcraft. This circumstance then led to the need for Nyamaqwete who 
had the appropriate skills to resolve the matter. Rumours circulated that the 
shopkeeper and his wife, who had been accused of witchcraft, paid Nyamaqwete and 
Nyamanindi to find her innocent. A boy had told a number of people that he had seen 
a bundle of money in the shop while the mediums were at the shopkeepers” house 
which was adjacent. He said he did not believe the shopkeeper’s wife when she said 
the money was hers, and thought that she had prepared it for the mediums.
Regardless of the motivation for the involvement of mpondoro, one outcome 
of these ceremonies was that the relevance of land spirits as respected elders and 
keepers of sacred knowledge was reconfirmed and their place in Chikafa society 
prolonged. Much of the political and economic change in early 1990s Chikafa 
bypassed mpondoro, and so it was unsurprising that shrines attempted to create a 
relevant space within the emerging social order of the area. Nyamanindi’s shrine was
3 Nyamaqwete’s medium was said to have earned Z$500 for his work in Chikafa.
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well supported by two medium’s assistants (mutapi/kambande), one hereditary the 
other appointed, who were popular and respected. After the drought, the hereditary 
assistant, who was also a builder, constructed two homesteads adjacent to each other 
for himself and Nyamanindi’s medium. The latter was young and personable and 
seemed to be well liked in Chikafa area. His personal and professional behaviour was 
impeccable. As a medium he adhered closely to protocol, dressing the part, avoiding 
English because it was not an African language, and placing himself under the 
guidance of the assistance. Personally, he was polite and deferential, which was the 
appropriate behaviour for newcomers, and not known to drink. In short, he ran little 
risk of causing offence. His demeanour could be interpreted as that of someone in a 
tenuous circumstance who was attempting to find a place in local society.
Nyamaqwete’s medium stood in counterpoint. While the mpondoro was 
respected because of both his place in the Zambesian pantheon and specialist skills, 
the medium was thought a fool. Locals said that he was greedy, and that his wife had 
left him because, in the words of one informant, “she didn’t want to be married to 
someone who wears skirts”. Besides personal attributes, the striking difference 
between these mediums was that Nyamaqwete had become established before the 
changes of the early 1990s while Nyamanindi had done so during that difficult time. 
With hindsight it is clear that Nyamanindi’s medium tried to bridge the increasing gap 
between young and old. On the one hand, he embodied the mpondoro and thus 
represented the order of chiefs and ancestors. On the other hand, he was young, had 
recently started farming, was not seen to drink which was in line with most ambitious 
young men, and left all political issues to his kambande who was old enough to be his 
father. In these ways, he could find a foothold within both age groups and demonstrate 
the relevance of Nyamanindi’s shrine to changing circumstances within Chikafa.
While one outcome of the witchcraft accusation was that the shrines of land 
spirits became newly relevant, another was the performance of the ambivalence which 
residents of Chikafa felt toward newcomers who appeared to become wealthy at the 
expense of established households. Nowhere was this situation better demonstrated 
than in opinions concerning the shopkeepers. On the one hand, people felt grateful to 
the shopkeeper because he had exchanged food for various goods and services during
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the drought. On the other hand, he had accepted the services of young women in return 
for food, when his wife had been away on buying trips, and was disrespected and 
thought stupid as a result. But more importantly, locals were very suspicious of the 
shopkeepers because they had prospered during the drought when almost everyone 
else had suffered. Attitudes toward these businesspeople, who provided desirable 
consumer goods and credit, mirrored the general unease toward the social changes 
which took place in Chikafa in the early 1990s, in particular those brought by 
foreigners. In essence, the prosperous shop constituted another nucleus of power and 
influence in Chikafa because it provided goods which were both desired and suspected, 
and was a source of credit which, although useful as a last resort during the drought, 
indicated that local economy was not prosperous.
The shopkeeper’s wife had also been the target of mixed emotions as she was 
a strong and large woman and a symbol of personal prosperity at a time of strife. It was 
no surprise that Mutandabuti’s accusation of witchcraft was aimed specifically at her. 
But it was also known that she and the afflicted schoolteacher had come to blows over 
his refusal to pay for groceries obtained on credit. According to this story, during the 
fight his hat had fallen off and she had kept it. Later, she was thought to have hired a 
n 'anga to tie herbs to the hat which was said to have caused the man’s illness. After the 
first mpondoro ceremony described above, the woman sent word to the police of the 
accusation against her and hired two land spirits to resolve the issue. In effect, she had 
used both local and state authority to protect herself from any further threat, thus 
reflecting the ambiguity in loci of power and authority.
The third sphere of internal tension represented in this accusation regarded Mr. 
X’s involvement. At first glance, it seemed peculiar that Mr. X should provide his 
homestead as venue for the possession ceremonies. But I later discovered that he had 
promised a daughter to both the shopkeeper and another man and had accepted 
preliminary bride-price from both. The girl had refused to contemplate marriage to the 
shopkeeper who was much older and had threatened to run away. Since the 
shopkeeper’s payment had been in groceries, Mr. X could not return these, and so 
found himself in debt to him. Mr. X was a long-term resident and well-established. It 
gave the shopkeeper an air of credibility to have the case against his wife heard at Mr.
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X’s house. Mr. X’s situation with the two men also illustrated the problems associated 
with a system of marriage payment based entirely on the exchange of money and goods 
for women. With a shortened cycle of obligation between wife-givers and wife-takers, 
it was possible to avoid forming relationships between families. One elderly Chikunda 
man lamented in interview that bride-price without bride-service had made prostitutes 
of girls. He said that with current practice any man could go to his house and pay for 
his daughter which he found to be immoral. In effect, payment of bride-price meant 
avoidance of uxorilocality and, thus, of control by the bride’s family.
At the same time as the witchcraft accusation brought to the fore a number of 
tensions which had been seething in Chikafa, it also provided a platform for anxieties 
concerning foreign influences. The most important of these apprehensions regarded 
the perceived accumulation of wealth by recent arrivals in the area. With regard to the 
local shopkeepers, people wondered if they had not used the supernatural to become 
rich, an opinion reflected in the witchcraft accusation. Also, in areas surrounding 
Chikafa, locals had observed that newly settled people from outside the Zambesi 
seemed to be farming successfully4. At the same time they had been subject to a spate 
of outsiders such as project planners, health workers, and government officials who 
had spoken to them about development projects and then helped to implement and 
enforce them. That some younger Chikafians had embraced these ideas was 
considered a way of appropriating what was local, and perhaps a version of the idea 
that witchcraft strikes from within.
Since attempts to resist land resettlement and resource management instigated 
by foreigners had not been very successful locally, inhabitants of Chikafa turned their 
anxieties into anger aimed at Mozambicans, their closest neighbours. A great source 
of worry was the fact that a number of miners from Mutoroshanga had moved to 
Mozambique to start farming. At one level, a number of people held the view that 
Mozambican territory really belonged to Zimbabwe. One explanation was that, at the
4
This is particularly true of newer churches which encouraged polygamy, a fact which 
allowed for pooling of resources and the provision of more labour required to 
cash-crop cotton.
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time of Chikunda conquest of Dande, the area along the Mpanyame River from the 
confluence of the Zambesi to Chikafa was ruled by headmen who had been loyal to 
Kanyemba. Oral histories also suggest that the Chikunda were quite influential until 
the Independence War when internment in camps and the re-organisation of the 
jurisdiction of chiefs weakened their power. It is possible that some people tried to 
revive old boundary claims in the early 1990s as a reaction to hardship.
Another interpretation of ire toward Mozambicans was that, despite the 
existence of many family ties across the border, people in Chikafa had wearied of 
sharing their resources. Mozambicans used the clinic, boreholes, attended the school, 
made purchases in the shop, and used the buses whose last stop was Chikafa. Locals 
complained that Mozambicans used their facilities without contribution, and caused 
the roadblocks faced by bus travellers on their way to the plateau as police looked for 
people without documentation. Also, locals in Chikafa feared that Mozambicans 
would get land through the resettlement project. Importantly, they also said that 
Mozambican girls were cheaper to marry as their parents required a small brideprice 
when they married Zimbabweans. In effect, the chance to live in Zimbabwe had been 
factored into the marriage payment.
The fact that Nyamaqwete found the bundle of herbs said to have caused the 
teacher’s illness on the road to Mozambique, reflected local opinion that many 
nefarious influences emanated from across the border. They blamed Mozambicans for 
prostitution, increased drunkenness caused by kachasu, cholera, and bandits which 
caused bus roadblocks. Nyamaqwete’s ‘discovery’ was, in effect, a signal that new 
boundaries were being demarcated in the area. Once he had identified the source of the 
witchcraft, Nyamaqwete turned the ceremony over to Nyamanindi in 
acknowledgement of the latter’s sovereignty over Chikafa area. With that gesture he 
indicated that not only was Chikafa separate from all the new and undesirable social 
changes represented by Mozambican opportunists, but that it was still meaningfully 
mled by a mpondoro.
v. Summary: Social Disruption and Justice
The early 1990s was a time of significant change in the Zambesi Valley.
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Longstanding practices related to livelihood, political process, and kin relations were 
disrupted through the introduction of a structural adjustment policy nationally in 
Zimbabwe and development schemes in Dande. ESAP disrupted established patterns 
of labour migration which had provided a safety valve from the pressures of 
inter-generational conflict at home. At the same time, development schemes centred 
on cotton cultivation and curtailment of access to the natural environment modified 
considerably the ability of residents of Chikafa to make a living. The absence of jobs 
on the plateau kept the young in Dande, while the MZP allocated land equally 
regardless of age, gender, farming experience or length of residence in the area. This 
project bypassed the power of elders to influence marriage practices and land use 
thereby disrupting relationships with affines made through marriage alliances, and 
with patrilineal kin made through a system of primary obligations. Ironically, as the 
MZP disrupted kin obligations, it also encouraged cotton cultivation which was labour 
intensive and expensive and could only be achieved successfully through the pooling 
of resources.
Coupled with pressures on family relations and livelihoods, residents of 
Chikafa also wondered at the nature of their relationship with the state. They believed 
that, through their participation and sacrifices during the Independence War, they had 
achieved a relationship of mutual benefit with the state. Because of support from 
Zambesian mpondoro, people believed that the state had been imbued with 
autochthonous power which meant that it would act benevolently toward Chikafa. The 
authoritarian way in which the MZP and CAMPFIRE were introduced to the area, and 
the consequences that these projects had for social life led to the belief that the state 
had turned into a conqueror. The inadequacy of drought relief and the perception of 
greater state control along with less political representation compounded the sense that 
the state would not be munificent.
The occurrence of the worst drought in living memory and its aftermath of 
illness and death were interpreted by the aged as a sign that the cycle of life, in other 
words, social reproduction, was in crisis. The combination of ruptured kin relations, 
particularly affinal ties, coupled with stifled local voice when the area had contributed 
so significantly to the creation of the state, precipitated local questions regarding how
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their community was constituted.
It was unsurprising that a witchcraft accusation occurred at this time, as locals 
searched for a meaningful way to apprehend the scale of change which had affected 
their lives so dramatically. To this end they recruited their territorial spirit along with 
more senior and specialised mpondoro who would provide the required knowledge to 
understand impoverishment, new wealth, illness, death, and foreign influence. The 
conclusion that all terrible powers emanated from Mozambique confirmed the 
integrity of Chikafa as a community by creating an opposition with the traditional 
neighbours. The definition of Mozambique as foreign was perhaps the greatest 
influence that the Zimbabwean state had on Chikafa in 1993 because it helped to 
create a symbolic boundary through established economic and kin relationships.
Throughout the political, economic, and social changes which contributed to 
the hardship and upheaval experienced by many residents of Chikafa, many of their 
social actions could be interpreted as a quest for social justice. It was on this one 
crucial point that the old and young generations agreed. The old attempted to 
apprehend disruption through ancestor worship in beer rituals and through renewed 
support of the local mpondoro, Nyamanindi. In Chapter 8 I described how a group of 
young men had brought theft of aid food to the attention of the police out of outrage for 
the callousness of the crime at a time of dire local need. In this sense, both generations 
sought to participate in a coherent social milieu where rules of morality applied.
The description of a witchcraft accusation in Kanyemba was provided as an 
example of the depth of domination in that area. The way that a local sabhuku was 
accused of witchcraft and the nature of adjudication by a Court controlled by the 
conquering marunga clan, depicted a society in which a rigid hierarchy precluded 
significant social disruption. Chikafa, on the other hand, had a fragile social 
organisation which proved vulnerable to change. The scale of the witchcraft 
accusation there, which involved most residents of Chikafa settlement as participants 
and spectators revealed the depths of disruption and change there.
In his article on the Taita Hills of Kenya, James Smith, whom I cited earlier, 
asserted that disarticulations prompted a return to “collective historical experiences” 
(2005; 56). Similarly, the reassertion of mpondoro as keepers of ultimate knowledge in
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Chikafa could be interpreted as a renewal of the relevance of a local institution with 
enabled residents to confront important questions of social relationships and 
continuity. Despite the new language of personal empowerment and individual 
achievement which arrived with development, people in Chikafa remained true to the 
worldview of the mpondoro.
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Conclusion:
It was fortuitous that I was able to conduct research for this study in two very 
different settlements in the Zambesi Valley. Although Chikafa and Kanyemba are both 
within the Dande area and shared kinship relations, a similar economy based on 
subsistence agriculture, and a common past of Chikunda conquest, they had contrasting 
forms of social organisation and very different responses to changes and innovations 
which arrived with the postcolonial era. This difference was accounted for by the nature 
of the Chikunda chieftaincy of Kanyemba which was highly centralised and controlled a 
rigid social, political, and economic hierarchy thereby ensuring the continued 
dominance of the marunga rosario andrade clan. Chikafa, in comparison, was loosely 
governed by an agreement between longstanding Chikunda and Korekore allies which 
represented the melding of ‘traditional’ and postcolonial authority structures.
This study addressed three important issues in the Zambesi Valley of the 1990s, 
domination, development, and drought, by examining the Zambesian concept of 
chieftaincy as an oscillation between autochthonous rule and conquest. Autochthonous 
rulers were considered to be legitimate because they had the support of the people, and 
benevolent because they acted in the interest of communities. For these reasons they 
were believed to have rain-making abilities. In contrast, conquerors were thought to 
have achieved their rule by force through usurping the power of pre-existing authorities. 
Conquerors were not expected to act for the population they governed but, instead, in 
their own interests. These leaders held no ritual power whatsoever, confiding their 
activities to administrative issues outside of the realm of morality.
The advent of development highlighted the very different forms of mle in each 
settlement. In Kanyemba, the ruling clan, as represented by its titular head, Chief 
Chapoto, controlled the implementation of a resource management scheme and worked 
it to their advantage so that it actually reinforced their power. In contrast, because of the 
fragmented nature of its social organisation, including its political structure, a land 
resettlement program applied to the Chikafa area caused further splintering of its 
population.
312
Similarly, the serious drought of 1991-92 had a profound effect on Chikafa 
society in that it precipitated a great deal of disruption. Notably, interpretations of the 
drought, coping strategies, and attitudes toward the cholera outbreak that followed a few 
months later were split between older and younger generations.
This study is composed of nine chapters which represent the breadth of 
experience, both historical and contemporary, with which residents of each settlement 
confronted their everyday lives. For instance, longstanding Chikunda familiarity with 
colonial governments facilitated their dealings with Zimbabwean government policies of 
the 1980s in the form of new government structures which they controlled, and the 
development initiatives of the 1990s which they also turned to their advantage. Similarly, 
experience in the ‘keeps’ at Mushumbi Pools during the guerrilla war, enabled residents 
of Chikafa to interact with members of different clans and lineages. This study begins 
with a discussion of the nature of 1990s Zambesian society as exemplified by the case of 
Chikafa and Kanyemba settlements, and concludes with a local response to 
overwhelming social disruption. Throughout I have depicted the response of 
Zambesians to the important events of development and drought through the ‘cultural 
logic’ (Garbett 1992) of the oscillation between autochthonous and conquering 
chieftaincy.
Chapter 1 began with a discussion of the differences between centralised and 
acephalous societies, represented by Kanyemba and Chikafa settlements respectively. 
The oscillation between centralised and acephalous polities is a pervasive theme in 
African studies. A number of scholars (Kopytoff 1989; Amselle 1985; Feierman 1990; 
Lancaster 1974) suggested that political life in African society depended on where each 
polity was situated on this spectrum. In a general sense, centralised societies were 
characterised by a strong chief, a unified history, and rain-making power whereas 
acephalous societies were governed by headmen, had shallow and dispersed genealogies, 
many histories, and fragmented allegiances. Since the oscillation between state and 
segmentary society (centralised and acephalous) was nothing more than an expression of 
opposite poles of the same political continuum, African societies fundamentally shared 
the same characteristics and could change over time. Thus a chieftaincy could lose its
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grip on power and become fragmented into a series of dispersed lineages without a 
common sense of the past while a strong ruler could unify an area of disparate lineage- 
based allegiances into a centralised polity.
In a circumstance of potential fluidity, the issue of domination addressed the 
question of how societies developed social hierarchies which controlled political and 
economic processes. Kanyemba provided a good example of how a dominant Chikunda 
chief rallied a number of features in support of his clan’s near absolute rule of that area. 
Chieftaincy does not happen by chance and the mitigating circumstances are always 
based in the here-and-now. By the 1990s, Chief Chapoto had had 50 year tenure of 
Kanyemba which he governed through principles of a dominant historical account of 
marunga clan conquest of the area, a strong clan ideology which negated any other 
histories, and a rigid social hierarchy based on clan and lineage interests, and firm 
control of the economy and political process.
In comparison, Chikafa did not exemplify any of the characteristics of strong 
leadership. Its residents displayed shallow and dispersed lineages, the settlement was 
ruled by a tenuous power-sharing arrangement between Korekore and Chikunda 
longterm residents, and there was a great deal of movement of the population. The area 
was owned by a rain-making mpondoro who provided a unifying principle through the 
concept of the pangolin clan (the clan to which all humans belong). However, his shrine 
had only recently been reconstituted after a period of little local support.
In light of its fragmentation, Chikafa settlement became vulnerable to disruption 
when the MZP and CAMPFIRE were installed. In the first place, lack of political 
organisation meant that the area was not initially in a position to voice opposition to 
land resettlement, although residents did ultimately refuse to move to designated arable 
plots. Secondly, fault lines existing within families between the control of elders and the 
aspirations of the young were exacerbated by the MZP which promised equitable land 
distribution based on an identification card rather than on gifts from headmen or 
brideservice. Thus, the old in Chikafa viewed development as disruption and the young 
thought it provided opportunities to break from gerontocracy.
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In Kanyemba, the CAMPFIRE program did not cause interference with 
established marunga clan power but instead contributed to its further consolidation 
during the 1990s. Appropriation of the project was achieved through the ruling clan’s 
control of all forms of governance in the area, both older structures and post-colonial 
committee work. In this way, Chikunda controlled the implementation of the project and 
its relative effects on members of the population. There was no question of inter- 
generational conflict as marunga clan supremacy of the area was achieved by an 
alliance between senior males who controlled the chieftaincy and the Chiefs Court, and 
junior members who sat on all post-colonial representative structures.
The contrast in social, political, and economic organisation between Kanyemba 
and Chikafa settlements provided clues as to why historians and anthropologists held 
opposing views of the nature of Chikunda identity. Historians such as Allen Isaacman 
(and also Capela and Rosenthal) had long argued for the existence of a strong and 
discemable Chikunda ethnic identity. At the same time, notably the anthropologist Chet 
Lancaster who has done extensive research in the Zambesi expressed a strong opinion 
that the Chikunda were not an ethnic group but rather an occupational term based on 
particular types of economic association with the Portuguese.
Isaacman gleaned his knowledge of the Chikunda from Portuguese colonial 
archives and a number of interviews with Chikunda senior males in Mozambique. He 
has argued that the Chikunda identity was consolidated through a common historical 
experience of warrior-slavery within the colonial Portuguese land-tenure (prazo) system. 
Also, he believed that this group solidified its sense of identity in the mid to late 19th 
century when the decline of the prazos caused stratified bands of Chikunda warriors to 
strike out on their own under the wing of strong leaders who later became warlords. 
During this time, Chikunda developed the specialties of hunting, ivory trade, and 
freelance work for the Portuguese as intermediaries which provided the basis of their 
power in the Zambesi Valley.
These features of early Chikunda history were echoed in the solid clan structure I 
encountered during the 1990s in Kanyemba settlement. For that reason, I believe that the 
reason Isaacman found an ethnic group while Lancaster did not was because they each
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encountered people who called themselves ‘Chikunda’ under different circumstances. 
Isaacman had a firm notion of the group from his historical work and interviews with 
elders, while Lancaster researched during the 1960s and 1970s when the Zambesi 
Valley was disrupted by building of the Kariba and Cabora Bassa dams and guerrilla 
warfare. In fact, what each scholar found were two poles of the same political system 
viewed in different social, political, and economic contexts.
It was precisely because fieldwork for this study encompassed two disparate 
locations that I believed that Chapter 2 should be devoted to methodology. There is no 
doubt that it would have been easier to work in only one fieldsite, especially as the 
period of introduction to a new area can be the most stressful time of research. However, 
had I done so there would not have been the opportunity for the comparisons which this 
study depicts. Had I stayed in Chikafa, there would not have been the chance to observe 
Chief Chapoto’s rule and record oral histories of dominant and subordinate lineages. If 
Kanyemba has been my only fieldsite, I would not have known the experience of great 
disruption and hardship which drought and development wrought on the people of 
Chikafa. In short, the study of two sites enabled a better understanding of the breadth of 
social organisation within the Zambesi Valley during the 1990s.
Chapter 3 was concerned with the beginnings of Chikunda domination and the 
historical circumstances which led to the installation of the Chapoto Chieftaincy I 
encountered during the 1990s. In this piece, my intention was to depict continuity 
between common experience within the prazo system, where corporate identity of 
warrior-slaves was created, and the strong centralised polity of the Chapoto Chieftaincy. 
To do so, this chapter provided a review of Chikunda migration to Dande and the 
Chiefs version of his clan’s conquest of the area during the late 19th century. In this 
story, the basis for the legitimacy of marunga rosario andrade clan rule was depicted as 
a ‘civilising’ mission in which they brought cloth, beads, and hoes to established 
populations who had been living in the wild. These three material innovations also 
constituted metaphors for the extension of Chikunda influence and the perceived 
superiority of their social, political, and economic structure. Cloth represented the 
expansion of trade networks to the area as this was the primary trade item provided in
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thexchange for elephant tusks during the ivory trade of the late 19 century. Beads were 
an allusion to changed marriage patterns in the context of conquest. In this case, brides 
could be taken exchange for a bead as Chikunda did not pay brideprice or engage in 
brideservice. The imagery of hoes was particularly powerful in Chapoto’s depiction as it 
provided him with the opportunity to reiterate the idea that only the Chikunda are 
worthy of access to land. The meaning of the imagery of hoes as an instrument of 
conquest related to appropriation of land and subjugation of resident populations in 
Kanyemba area.
Of course, members of subordinate lineages, particularly the tembo mvura, had 
contrasting accounts of the legitimacy of Chikunda rule. While there existed few ways 
for subjugated people to express dissent, some individuals were happy to contradict 
Chapoto. One common form of opposition included the contention that Chapoto’ 
ancestor, Chihumbe, had acquired the chieftaincy through trickery, and that, therefore 
the Chief did not legitimately occupy his office.
Through the description of the prazo system and oral histories of marunga rule 
in Kanyemba area, I hoped to demonstrate how the social organisation encountered 
during the 1990s came about. The hierarchy which formed the backbone of Kanyemba 
society was distinct: the top strata consisted of members of the three lineages which 
made up the marunga rosario andrade clan; and the bottom strata were made up of 
members of subordinate lineages. The dominant marunga clan contained three lineages 
made up of descendants of three brothers who conquered the area. These three brothers 
were Chihumbe, who was Chapoto’s ancestor, Kanyemba, whose descendants claimed 
the chieftaincy, and Nyanderu who had little representation locally. Subordinate lineages 
consisted of the descendants of groups of followers who arrived with the Chikunda or 
who were subjugated at the time of conquest. All political process was contained within 
the confines of the marunga clan which banded together when faced with threats from 
without, and split into lineage interest in the case of internal disputes such as access to 
the Chieftaincy.
Chapter 4 brought the issue of the oscillation between centralised and 
decentralised societies into the 1990s with descriptions of the populations of both
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fieldsites. Furthermore, the question of why the Zambesi Valley had become a subject of 
national interest during the 1990s was addressed. For a long time the area had been left 
outside of the sphere of state action and interest, a fact which suited many of the older 
generation who saw the valley as a home area which provided respite from the pressures 
of labour migration.
In contrast to Kanyemba, the population of Chikafa was characterised as 
disparate, emanating from a number of lineages which described shallow genealogies 
and mythical origins. Most informants there portrayed their origins in terms of a place 
rather than a pivotal ancestor. For example, some individuals said that they were from 
Nyungwe, the mythologised seat of Chikunda identity. Others simply stated that their 
relatives came from Malawi or “over there” as they pointed to Mozambique. There were 
no strong political allegiances in Chikafa, a fact reflected in its weak form of 
governance through an alliance between the elderly sabhuku and Village Chairman. In 
Kopytoff s terms, this settlement would be an area of open networks. In this way, it was 
very different to the rigid social structure which characterised Kanyemba.
While, an opposition between centralised and acephalous social forms was clear 
from comparisons of Kanyemba and Chikafa, the role of the system of land spirits in 
each locality did not follow this dichotomy. According to Feierman (1990) a centralised 
polity would have a rain-making land spirit as a reflection of integration within the 
society, whereas a fragmented polity would have disparate healers who dealt with 
domestic affairs. The reverse was, in fact, true in my observation of Zambesian society 
which I discuss in Chapter 5.
In Zambesian cosmology, land spirits or mpondoro are expressions of ideal 
chieftaincy. They are legitimate and benevolent because they have the support of the 
population, and can make rain. Their power encompasses rights over the natural and 
social worlds among which they strive to maintain equilibrium. The pantheon of land 
spirits in the Zambesi Valley encompassed rain-makers who represented principles of 
autochthony, Korekore conquerors, and latecomers such as the Chikunda spirits. In ideal 
terms, Zambesian cosmology was in accordance with Feierman*s arguments that 
centralisation leads to rain-making.
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However, in my research I found that in Kanyemba, where Chapoto ruled a 
centralised polity, the local mpondoro, called Kanyemba, represented solely the interests 
of his lineage and was predominantly preoccupied with bureaucratic affairs to do with 
the succession dispute. Other mpondoro who had territories in that place also dealt with 
lineage affairs. The spirits of Chihumbe and Nyanderu, the other two marunga 
conquering brothers, were not represented by mediums in 1993. The predominant 
characteristic of Chikunda mpondoro was their proximity to the world of the living as 
typified by oral histories depicting events in their lives, and genealogies placing them in 
the near past.
The territorial spirit of Chikafa area, Nyamanindi, and his neighbour, Negomo, 
each represented Korekore chiefs from the mythological past. While I have no doubt 
that this area was characteristic of an acephalous society, its land spirits were powerful 
and could make rain. One interpretation of this seemingly incongruent feature was that 
people supported their shrines precisely because they represented the only principle of 
ideal chieftaincy available to the local population. This proposal appears likely in that 
the importance of mpondoro increased with the implementation of the MZP and the 
occurrence of serious drought which precipitated further fragmentation.
Chieftaincy is discussed in three chapters of this study, the formation of a 
Chikunda chieftaincy, principles of governance among populations in Chikafa and 
Kanyemba, and the role of mpondoro, in order to illustrate the lens through which 
Zambesians viewed political process until Independence. Before the 1980s, populations 
in the Zambesi Valley had been governed by variants of chieftaincy, either through 
headmen or chiefs whose power had been consolidated through British colonial policy 
of ‘indirect rule’. However, during the 1980s the ZANU government installed new 
structures throughout Zimbabwe which paralleled those of chieftaincy. Chapter 6 
discusses the role of the post-colonial state in Dande. Its principle concern is with the 
notion that, while at Independence the Zimbabwean state was believed to be the 
culmination of the power of autochthons (as depicted by David Lan), during the 1990s 
its actions were that of a conqueror. In 1992 and 1993 this notion was articulated by 
mpondoro at possession ceremonies in Chikafa who lamented that “Mugabe” had taken
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the pangolin (a symbol of the clan which encompasses all humans), and ‘pegged’ sacred 
areas. In other words, through mpondoro, people expressed their sense of betrayal by the 
state in view of its policies, such as the MZP project which had caused anxiety and 
increased difficulties with livelihood.
There were a number of reasons why people in the Zambesi believed that state 
became a conqueror during the 1990s. One reason was that the conflicting messages of 
centralisation and decentralisation were confusing for locals. On the one hand, state 
agencies such as AGRITEX taught people to be self-sufficient in farming and various 
committee meetings discussed concepts of self-empowerment. On the other hand, the 
MZP was implemented in an authoritarian way which resembled the practice of 
centralised chieftaincy. In other words, the perception of the intensification of state 
control coupled with the withdrawal of state services such as schools, clinics, and roads, 
and the absence of representation resulted in the opinion that the state had turned into 
conquering chieftaincy.
During the 1980s there was not much disruption to local life. The new system of 
Village, Ward, and District Councils installed then had been incorporated into Chikafa 
society with little friction. The position of Village Chairman was filled by Korekore who 
ruled in alliance with established Chikunda headmen in the area. Other council and 
committee work was taken up by junior elders of established lineages who administered 
while their seniors ruled. This arrangement between the generations seemed to work 
well until a conjunction of events in the early 1990s exacerbated longstanding inter- 
generational conflict.
Foremost amongst these measures was the adoption by the Zimbabwean 
government of a policy of structural adjustment. While Dande is a marginal and isolated 
area of Zimbabwe, this policy had important effects on local livelihoods and perceptions 
of the role of the state. The two main effects of ESAP were the disruption of 
longstanding labour migration practices and the removal of marketing boards. Labour 
migration had typically been a safety valve for conflict between elders who controlled 
access to land and to marriage, and young men who wanted a period away from the 
control of relatives. Also, labour migration was an important source of cash and an
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alternative form of livelihood in years when cyclical droughts struck. ESAP prescribed a 
reduction in state jobs and precipitated restructuring within the commercial farming 
sector, both sources of the menial and unskilled jobs which many Zambesians filled. 
Without the option of work on the plateau, young men engaged with increased interest 
in local administrative affairs, sometimes clashing with the interests of their elders.
In short, the state lost ground in the esteem of Zambesians through its apparent 
withdrawal of services and representation, and increase in control. The demise of the 
Grain Marketing Board and the dissipation of grain stores were also perceived as 
abandonment by the state because of the idea that benevolent chiefs always kept a 
granary for difficult times. But the greatest blow to people’s trust in the state was the 
implementation of the MZP during the late 1980s.
Chapter 7 deals with the introduction of two development schemes to Dande, the 
MZP and CAMPFIRE. The MZP was a land resettlement program which proposed a 
wholesale re-organisation of local communities through the allocation of arable plots 
and residential plots equally regardless of age, gender, and farming experience. This 
scheme was an initiative of the African Development Bank of which underlying premise 
was the gift of land to Zimbabweans. The idea of land distribution was palatable to the 
ZANU government which had achieved power on that political platform. At the local 
level, the MZP was experienced as great disruption, not least because the project had 
demarcated land for Chikafa settlement three times, each attempt meeting with refusal to 
move on the part of the population. This ambivalence caused great distress among 
people whose primary source of livelihood was subsistence farming.
The problems caused by the MZP related to social, economic, and political 
changes. With equitable distribution of land, lineage elders lost their base of power 
which had resided with allocation of land and control over marriage. If access to land 
was no longer an issue, then brideprice payments could be shortened and brideservice 
would become obsolete. This feature intensified inter-generational conflict as elders 
construed the MZP as disruption, while their children saw it as a fountain of opportunity. 
The complexities of negotiating the complicated implementation of the project in 
Chikafa also increased the importance of the administrative work which the young
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performed through committees. Also, the project’s encouragement of cotton cultivation 
precipitated competition with food crops, required cash for agricultural inputs such as 
seed, fertilisers, and pesticides, and increased the demand for labour to plant and weed. 
It soon became apparent in 1993 that only families who could pool their resources 
would be able to farm cotton for profit. These successful farmers were sometimes 
newcomers to the area, particularly members of new churches which organised rental of 
tractors and pooling of labour. Unfortunately, these changes took place toward the end 
of my time in Chikafa and I did not have the opportunity to conduct interviews with 
regard to new farming practices.
The implementation of the CAMPFIRE project in Kanyemba had the opposite 
effect of the MZP in Chikafa. Rather than disrupt social organisation, CAMPFIRE 
consolidated Chikunda rule. This scheme proposed to transform wild animals living in 
areas adjacent to human settlements into marketable commodities which would bring 
cash income into communities. To this end, forested areas were leased out to safari 
hunting companies which provided hunting holidays to clients who paid a daily rate in 
addition to which they also paid a trophy fee for each wild animal they killed. A 
percentage of these monies were then paid to District Council which then compensated 
local communities according to a pre-arranged formula. Communities which 
participated in this scheme forfeited their right to hunt wild animals and to fish with nets.
It is important to note that the project actually impoverished all residents of 
Kanyemba at the same time as it increased Chikunda control over the economy. 
Quantities and variety of food were reduced due to decreased access to animals, and the 
inability of locals to shoot animals which trampled fields and ruined crops. Also, skills 
of net fishing linked to Chikunda identity were in danger of being lost as the knowledge 
was not passed on to young men. But to understand the full impact of the CAMPFIRE 
scheme on Kanyemba area it is necessary to examine the depth of the loss suffered by 
the subordinate tembo mvura lineage. These people were hunter-gatherers who had been 
slowly and forcibly settled beginning at the time of the guerrilla war. They lived in the 
most marginal area of the settlement and owned nearly no land. Their diet consisted 
mostly of bush plants and small animals. The separation from the bush entailed by the
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implementation of the scheme caused their sources of livelihood to further decrease with 
the result that they become more dependent on the Chikunda, who owned most land, for 
casual work (often paid in maize kernels). The tembo mvura had no voice with regard to 
CAMPFIRE as their only representative, a sabhuku, had no influence in political life.
Because of its rigid social hierarchy, the Chapoto Chieftaincy succeeded in 
working CAMPFIRE to its advantage. Local implementation of the project was 
supervised by junior elders of the marunga clan who controlled administrative 
committees. Further marginalisation of the tembo mvura allowed for increased 
Chikunda economic control.
The results of development in the Zambesi were an attempt at devolution which 
backfired. For instance, instead of enriching local communities which sacrificed access 
to the bush for cash, CAMPFIRE benefited District Council which received payments 
from hunting companies. Also, the MZP which was supposed to exemplify equitable 
distribution of land actually came to symbolise loss of political representation for 
residents of Chikafa
Chapter 8 is about drought. The occurrence of serious drought in 1991-92, one of 
three such events which took place during the 20th century, was experienced as extreme 
hardship in Chikafa area. Kanyemba was not greatly affected by drought as it was 
heavily forested and situated close to two rivers which provided enough water for 
agriculture. The serious drought of 1991-92 caused total crop failure in Chikafa. 
Residents responded by splitting up families and dispersing to other areas in search of 
food or work, eating bush foods, tending their gardens, and waiting for relief food. But 
these strategies, adopted during years of mild drought, failed to work in the face of 
environmental degradation due to increased population and the MZP. Besides suffering 
hunger, locals also experienced a high degree of anxiety due to fear of resettlement 
when they felt at their most vulnerable.
The occurrence of an outbreak of cholera in June and July of 1993, during the 
dry season and after a harvest, caused further disruption to Chikafa society. 
Interpretations of drought and its after effects in the form of illness where split between 
the older and younger generations. The elderly believed that the drought was a symptom
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of social disorder, and insisted that beer rituals associated with ancestor worship needed 
to be performed. In this view, drought was the result of improper human behaviour such 
as the MZP, and illness was the work of ngozi (the spirits of the unhappy dead) who 
needed to be appeased. In contrast, young adults saw the drought as an environmental 
issue which needed to be effectively managed through equitable distribution of relief 
food and future planning. Cholera was similarly a technical problem to do with hygiene 
and overuse of water sources.
Inter-generational conflict was one dimension of the serious drought which 
caused disruption in Chikafa society. Changes to social relations, economy, and political 
process brought by the MZP also added stressors to local life. The slippage of power 
from within the hands of elders caused distress as their control over family life was also 
their insurance to be looked after when they could no longer farm. The competition 
between cotton cultivation and food crops and the increased time spent in fields in 1993 
was another source of strife. The arrival of newcomers into the area who had not been 
incorporated through the longstanding mechanism of the sabwira relation (a form of 
fictive kinship) also caused worry. These people were perceived as competitors for 
resources such as water sources, firewood, the school, the clinic, and land.
Chapter 9 focuses on resurgence of witchcraft in the Chikafa area in mid 1993 in 
the wake of perceived betrayal by the state, land resettlement, drought, and cholera. 
While witchcraft accusations also occur in Kanyemba area, and I provide an example in 
this chapter, these are about social control and are dealt with quietly through Chapoto’s 
Court. In Chikafa, witchcraft articulated issues related to social and moral order. In mid 
1993 a prosperous female shopkeeper was accused of causing a debilitating illness in a 
schoolteacher with which she had had a disagreement over a grocery debt. This 
accusation was made by a mpondoro at a possession ritual which meant that it had social 
and cosmological implications. Resolution was obtained through a further ritual in 
which another mpondoro specialised in resolving witchcraft was involved. In his 
statement this land spirit described witchcraft as emanating from Mozambique along 
with cholera. This opinion echoed the opinions of local residents who were becoming 
weary of sharing dwindling resources with their neighbours.
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Perhaps the point of this accusation was that it articulated a perceived crisis of 
social reproduction on the part of the elderly. The cumulation of loss of control over 
social and political life in Chikafa, coupled with the seriousness of the drought, had 
caused the aged to worry over continuity of life. The resurgence of support for 
mpondoro which occurred concurrently with the witchcraft accusation was one way for 
this age group to reclaim a version of chieftaincy which they understood. In contrast, the 
younger generation, similarly concerned with continuity, believed the answer to 
inequality lay with exposing corrupt individuals and endeavouring to behave equitably 
and fairly in committee work.
While each age group in Chikafa adhered to different ways to redress perceived 
breaches of a moral universe, their endeavours had a common purpose: the search for 
social justice in the midst of disruption. In this area, domination, development and 
drought exposed a fault line between old and young generations within an already 
fragmented society. However, in dealing with external pressures these two new interest 
groups found common purpose in the conviction of their members that they wanted to 
pursue fairness in their everyday lives. It was in their methods that they differed.
Domination was the key issue in the study of Kanyemba settlement. The 
Chikunda clan which conquered the area during the late 19th century provided an 
important case study of the resilience of centralised chieftaincy. Further work would be 
needed to better understand the nature of the continuation of the rigid social hierarchy 
with which that area is governed. An in-depth discussion of the rich Portuguese colonial 
record for that area fell outside the scope of this study but merits attention. Similarly, the 
case of the tembo mvura lineage, particularly of reasons why they have remained in a
thsubjugated position since the late 19 century also merits study.
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Appendix 1:
Questionnaire for Survey I:
1. Name of household head.
2. Name of wife (maiden).
3. Ethnic group of each spouse.
4. Number of houses at residence.
5. Number of children living in the household.
6. Number of wives at present time.
7. Numbers of others living in the household.
8. Mutupu/chidau of each spouse.
9. Religion(s) practised in the household.
10. Economic activities of members of the household.
11. Comments.
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Survey I: 1992
Chikafa: Household heads by Ethnicity
Chikunda 28
Korekore 20
Tande 1
Chewa 3
Shona 1
Manyika 1
no answer 6
Total 60
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Survey I: 1992
Chikafa: Mutupu of Chikunda & Korekore Household Heads
Chikunda: marunga 16
shumba 1
nzou 3
phiri 2
no answer 6
Sub-total 28
Korekore: nzou 7
tembo 2
tsoko 6
shava 2
no answer 3
Sub-total 2U
Survey I: 1992
Chikafa: Inter-ethnic marriage
1. Chikunda with: Chikunda 17
Korekore 3
Chewa 1
Ntsenga 1
Zezuru 1
Widowed 3
Don’t know 2
Sub-total 28
2. Korekore with: Korekore 5
Chikunda 11
Chewa 1
Rozvi 1
Ntsenga 1
Don’t know 1
Sub-total 20
3. Tande with Chikunda 1
4. Chewa with Chikunda 3
5. Shona with Chikunda 1
6. No ethnic group name supplied 7
Total 60
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Survey I: 1992
Chikafa: Livelihood Practice
Vegetable garden 35
Remittances 11
Sale of masao (wild crabapple) 2
Barter 1
Drought relief 17
Back payments from CMB 7
Selling of tobacco 3
Selling of labour 3
Selling of clothes t
Selling of cotton j
L... ■—  . . . .  -  .. - -------------------------------------------■ £
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Survey I: 1992
Chikafa: Religion by Household
mpondoro 27
Roman Catholic 6
Jehovah’s Witness 3
Evangelical 3
humbekumbe 1
mpondoro/Roman Catholic 3
mpondoro/Johan Marange 2
mpondoro/Faith Apostolic Mission 1
Roman Catholic/Zion 1
no answer 13
Total 60
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Appendix 2:
II. Questionnaire for Survey II:
1. Name of household head.
2. Name of spouse of household head.
3. Name of ethnic group.
4. Mutupu/chidau of each spouse.
5. Number of houses within the residence.
6. Number of children living in the household.
7. Churches in which members of the household participate.
8. Sources of livelihood: a. sources of money
b. sources of food, clothing and other necessities.
9. Has the household had enough food lately?
10. What crops does the household grow during the rainy season?
11. What crops does the household grow during the dry season?
12. Does the household have a garden? What is grown in the garden? Do they have 
animals?
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Ethnicities of Household heads
Tande (1.32%)~i 
Sena (1.32%)-i 
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Phiri sem atope (5.26%)
Phiri nguruve (1.32%)
Nzou samanyanga (22.37%)
3-D pie chart showing the totemic group of the household hea
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Nguruve (1.32%) 
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Crop acreage by ethnicity
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Maize crop by ethnicity
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Cotton by Ethnicity
(2.67%)
Chikunda
Karanga
Sena (1.07%) 
Ndau (2.67%) 
Manyika
(42.25%)
Korekore (47.59%)
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3-D pie chart showing the ethnic group of the household heads growing maize
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Percentage of animals by Household
L — chickens (50.47%)
goats (22.43%)
turkeys (0.93%) 
pigs (0.93%) 
pigeons (0.93%) 
none (15.89%)
ducks (4.67%) 
domestic pets (3.74%)
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Ethnicity of Goat Owners
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Korekore (45.83%)
3-D chart of ethnic group of the head of the households that own goats
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